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Abstract 
This thesis examines the accounting choices related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies in the first three years of the 
implementation of FRS 3 Business Combinations (i.e. 2006/7 to 2008/9). Three 
aspects of these accounting choices are examined, i.e. disclosure, 
measurement, and recognition of goodwill impairment.  
This thesis makes four main contributions. Firstly, it shows how the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective, previously developed and tested by prior 
studies using data from listed companies in developed economies (reported to 
have dispersed ownership), helps explain managerial decisions on the 
measurement of goodwill impairment in the developing economy of Malaysia 
(documented to have concentrated ownership). Managerial opportunism is 
normally discussed in prior studies in the context of agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders in companies with disperse ownership. Because of 
the high outside ownership concentration found in the Malaysian listed 
companies, the empirical result of this thesis suggests that most probably the 
opportunistic behaviour occurs due to an agency conflict between the 
controlling shareholders (shareholders outside of the companies) and the 
minority shareholders. Within this conflict, managers would possibly act on 
behalf of the controlling shareholders at the expense of the minority 
shareholders. 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to research design by developing a disclosure 
framework. Future researchers could make use of the disclosure framework to 
identify accounting choices related to goodwill impairment, or to interpret their 
statistical findings, which this thesis has attempted to do.  
Thirdly, this thesis presents new results from the empirical evidence related to 
factors influencing managerial decisions on the measurement of goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies. These factors are: managerial 
ownership, and two different measures of pre-write-off earnings. These results 
highlight the need for future studies to incorporate these variables, in order to 
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provide a more comprehensive model of accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment.  
Finally, this thesis constructs a research setting which aims to capture evidence 
of a recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment exercised 
by Malaysian listed companies. Testing this setting allows the recognition study 
to make a contribution, by identifying the motives of companies for recognising 
zero goodwill impairment, which has received limited attention in prior studies. 
Information concerning these motives is useful to the relevant regulatory bodies 
overseeing financial reporting standards on goodwill. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of the thesis is to analyse accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment exercised by listed companies in Malaysia in the first three years of 
the implementation of Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 3 Business 
Combinations (i.e. 2006/7 to 2008/9). In this thesis, accounting choices are 
identified by the implementation decisions made by managers, in particular, 
through judgements and estimates employed in performing an impairment test 
of goodwill (see Section 2.2.1 for a detailed definition of accounting choice 
applied in this thesis). Three aspects of implementation decisions related to 
goodwill impairment are analysed, namely, disclosure, measurement, and 
recognition of goodwill impairment. 
Three theoretical papers which are pertinent to the definition of accounting 
choice adopted in this thesis are Fields et al. (2001), Francis (2001), and Nobes 
(2006) (see Section 2.2.1). Fields et al. (2001), in their review of accounting 
choice studies published in the 1990s, defined accounting choice as: 
‗any decision whose primary purpose is to influence (either in form or 
substance) the output of the accounting system in a particular way, 
including not only financial statements published in accordance with 
GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles], but also tax returns 
and regulatory filings.‘ 
Fields et al. (2001: 256) 
This definition, according to Francis (2001: 311), broadens the scope of 
accounting choice to include, among others, judgements and estimates required 
to implement GAAP. In a similar vein, Nobes (2006: 240), in his discussion of the 
international differences in IFRSs, relating particularly to International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 36 Impairment of Assets, considers the judgements 
and estimates employed by managers when undertaking an impairment test of 
assets (including goodwill), to be ‗covert options‘. 
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The consideration of implementation decisions as key elements of accounting 
choice, discussed by Fields et al. (2001) and Francis (2001: 312), is timely, as 
the aim of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is ‗not to permit 
choices in the accounting treatment‘ (IASB, 2006a: Preface to International 
Financial Reporting Standards, paragraph 13). The IASB‘s elimination of 
alternative accounting treatments for a number of the revised financial 
reporting standards has at least two implications which have a bearing on the 
accounting choice studies. Firstly, academic researchers should focus less on 
accounting method choice (Francis, 2001: 313). This is because many of the 
revised financial reporting standards, which are either issued by the IASB or the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), no longer have an alternative 
accounting treatment.  
Secondly, more research is needed in examining individual accounting items 
which are known ‗to require substantial managerial judgement and to have a 
significant impact on reported profitability‘ (Francis, 2001: 314). This is because 
managers could, when exercising judgement be conveying credible private 
information about companies to investors (Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 366; Fields 
et al., 2001: 257). Alternatively, they could be opportunistically be making use 
of discretion, either for their own self-interest (Fields et al., 2001: 312) or for 
the interest of the existing shareholders, and possibly at the expense of other 
contracting parties (Francis, 2001: 312).  
1.2 Motivation of the study 
Motivated by Francis‘s call (2001: 314) for further research looking into the 
implementation decisions of individual accounting items, this thesis seeks to 
analyse accounting choices related to goodwill impairment exercised by 
Malaysian listed companies.  
Goodwill impairment represents an interesting area of research because in 
implementing FRS 3 Business Combinations and FRS 136 Impairment of Assets 
(similar to IAS 36), managers are required to apply judgements and estimates, 
especially when performing an impairment test of goodwill (see Section 4.4 for 
detail). The judgements applied would determine whether an impairment loss 
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needed to be recognised (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BCZ24) (see 
Section 4.3). At the same time, two IASB Board members argued that the 
impairment test itself has not yet met the requirement of a ‗rigorous and 
operational impairment test‘ (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, 
Dissenting opinions, DO3; IFRS 3, Basis for Conclusions, DO14 - see Section 4.5). 
Given that an impairment loss of goodwill directly affects a company‘s net 
income, the reliance on the impairment-only approach as a way of ensuring that 
the carrying amount of goodwill reported on the balance sheet does not exceed 
its recoverable amount, without the existence of a strong control mechanism for 
the impairment test, imposed within the standard, may create an avenue for 
managers to manipulate the impairment loss if they have explicit incentives (via 
contractual agreements) or implicit incentives to do so. 
Malaysia provides a unique setting for testing the theories of accounting choice 
related to goodwill impairment for two main reasons. Firstly, listed companies 
in Malaysia are documented to have concentrated ownership (see Section 3.4). 
The concentrated ownership is also found in other East Asian countries such as 
Thailand and Indonesia (Leuz et al., 2003: 516). On the other hand, listed 
companies in developed economies, in particular, the United States (US) and the 
United Kingdom (UK), are said to have dispersed ownership (Leuz et al., 2003: 
507). For example, Leuz et al. (2003: 516-517) reported that during their period 
of study (i.e. from 1990 to 1999), the median shareholding of the largest three 
shareholders of listed companies in Malaysia was 52% while for the UK and the 
US it was 15% and 12% respectively (see Section 3.4).  
With different features of ownership structure observed among Malaysian listed 
companies compared to those in developed economies, such as the US and UK, 
the nature of agency problem which exists in these Malaysian companies might 
also differ (see Section 2.3.3). Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 754) reason that 
compared to companies with disperse ownership, companies with concentrated 
ownership might face fewer agency problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and management. Fan and Wong (2002: 405), however, argue that 
when shareholders obtain a substantial portion of company shares, to the point 
at which they acquire an effective control of the company, the nature of agency 
problem shifts. Instead of a conflict of interest between managers and 
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shareholders, the conflict is between controlling owners and minority 
shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002: 405). Thus, the potentially different nature 
of the agency problem in companies with concentrated ownership may affect 
the applicability of the contracting perspective and the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective, which rely on the agency theory model as developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). 
Thus far, the contracting perspective and the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective have been tested by prior studies examining goodwill impairment by 
listed companies located in developed economies which have dispersed 
ownership, such as the US (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 2007; Zang, 
2008), Canada (i.e. Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008), and the UK (i.e. 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) (see Section 2.2.2). To the researcher‘s knowledge, 
there exists no comprehensive study of goodwill impairment testing the two 
perspectives of accounting choice in listed companies located in developing 
economies1. By focusing on listed companies in Malaysia, as an example of listed 
companies in a developing economy, this thesis provides an opportunity to test 
the contracting perspective and the opportunistic behaviour perspective in a 
new institutional setting hitherto unexplored by prior studies analysing goodwill 
impairment. 
The second motivation for studying Malaysian listed companies is because of the 
country‘s specific history of accounting for goodwill (see Section 3.2.4). Since 
the 1970s, the Malaysian standard setter has struggled to come up with an 
accounting standard on goodwill (Susela, 1999: 359). Large corporations 
objected to the publication of an accounting standard on goodwill (Susela, 1999: 
370), basing these objections on, for example, the socio-economic 
consequences of the standard. In addition, there was a lack of acceptance of 
the standard by the business community (Susela, 1999: 375 and 379). Their 
objections reached the point of them lobbying the Ministry of Finance to defer 
the standard (Susela, 1996: 338). Only when FRS 3 was implemented in 2006 did 
listed companies in Malaysia have a specific accounting standard on goodwill. 
Malaysia‘s history of resisting an accounting standard on goodwill based on its 
                                         
1 There is one conference paper, i.e. Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011) which has tested the 
applicability of the two perspectives in explaining the recognition of goodwill impairment by 
Malaysian listed companies (see Section 2.2.2 for detail). 
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suitability raises the question of whether companies are following the standard 
in good faith or whether they are taking advantage of the covert options 
available to managers during an impairment test of goodwill in order to get the 
desired result.   
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
As noted in Section 1.1, the overall aim of the thesis is to analyse accounting 
choices related to goodwill impairment exercised by listed companies in 
Malaysia in the first three years of the implementation of FRS 3 Business 
Combinations (i.e. 2006/7 to 2008/9). In line with the motivation of the study - 
which is to test both the contracting perspective and the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective in a new institutional setting (see Section 1.2), the 
following theoretical and specific research objectives have been formulated. 
Table 1.1: Summary of research objectives 
 
Theoretical research objective 
 
1. 
 
To assess the applicability of theories of accounting choice in explaining the 
implementation decisions related to goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies. 
 
Specific research objectives 
 
               Empirical  
               chapters 
 
2. 
 
To explore, via the annual reports of companies, types of 
accounting choice related to goodwill impairment exercised 
by Malaysian listed companies after the implementation of 
FRS 3. 
 
 
Disclosure 
study – 
Chapter 7 
3. To analyse factors influencing managers‘ decisions when 
determining the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses 
divided by prior year total assets (including goodwill), and 
zero otherwise reported on the income statement. 
 
Measurement 
study - 
Chapter 8 
4. To analyse factors influencing the recognition choice 
related to reporting zero goodwill impairment exercised by 
Malaysian listed companies in a situation where companies‘ 
market values are lower than the book values of their net 
assets for three consecutive years. 
 
Recognition 
study - 
Chapter 9 
Table 1.2 maps the research questions with the relevant research objectives and 
empirical chapters. The next section discusses the summary of research design 
for each of the empirical chapters. 
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Table 1.2: Research questions and their link to research objectives as well as empirical chapters 
 
Research questions 
Link to 
objectives 
Empirical chapters 
 
Theoretical research question 
  
 
Research 
Question 1:  
 
How can an investigation of FRS 3, focusing on goodwill impairment by 
Malaysian listed companies, contribute to the theories of accounting choice? 
 
Objective 1 
8 - Measurement 
study  
and 
 9 - Recognition study 
 
Specific research questions 
Research 
Question 2: 
To what extent is the market capitalisation indication (i.e. companies‘ market 
values lower than the book values of their net assets at the balance sheet date) 
an appropriate proxy for an indication that goodwill may be impaired? 
 
 
Objective 2 
 
7 - Disclosure study 
Research 
Question 3: 
What are the types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies which can be identified through 
detailed analysis of annual reports? 
 
Research 
Question 4: 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in measuring 
goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect the underlying economic values 
of cash-generating-units containing goodwill? 
 
 
 
 
Objective 3 
 
 
 
8 - Measurement 
study 
Research 
Question 5: 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in measuring 
goodwill impairment support the contracting perspective? 
 
Research 
Question 6: 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in measuring 
goodwill impairment support the opportunistic behaviour perspective? 
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Table 1.2 (continue): Research questions and their link to research objectives as well as empirical chapters 
 
Specific research questions  Link to 
objectives 
 
Empirical chapters 
Research 
Question 7: 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in measuring 
goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect companies‘ ownership 
structures? 
 
 
 
Objective 3 
 
 
8 - Measurement 
study Research 
Question 8: 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in measuring 
goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect the discretion available in FRS 
136 Impairment of Assets? 
 
Research 
Question 9: 
To what extent does the recognition choice1 related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies reflect the underlying 
economic values of cash-generating-units containing goodwill? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 - Recognition 
study 
 
 
 
Research 
Question 10: 
To what extent does the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies support the contracting 
perspective? 
 
Research 
Question 11: 
To what extent does the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies support the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective? 
 
Research 
Question 12: 
To what extent does the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies indicate that they reflect 
companies‘ ownership structures? 
 
1 The recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment focuses on companies which their market values lower than the book values of the net   
  assets for three consecutive years and which reported zero goodwill impairment. 
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1.4 Summary of research design 
Research approach adopted in this thesis is primarily quantitative, in that, it 
emphasises the quantification in the collection and analysis of data. Because the 
implementation decisions made by managers in relation to goodwill impairment 
are not visible or, as Nobes (2006: 239-240) calls them, ‗covert options‘,  the 
disclosure study acts as an initial exploration of accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment (see Section 1.4.1). The research then continues with the 
measurement study (see Section 1.4.2), and ends with the recognition study 
(see Section 1.4.3). 
 
1.4.1 Disclosure study of goodwill impairment 
The aim of the disclosure study is to explore, via the annual reports of 
companies, types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment exercised 
by Malaysian listed companies after the implementation of FRS 3 (see Section 
1.3). To achieve this aim, the disclosure study is carried out in two parts.  
The first part of the disclosure study aims to examine the appropriateness of the 
market capitalisation indication as an indication that goodwill may be impaired 
(see Section 6.5.1). This is undertaken by comparing two types of information, 
which represent the observed practice vs. the stated explanation. The data 
compared are: (i) the market capitalisation indication of companies (i.e. where 
market values are lower than the book values of net assets at the balance sheet 
date), and (ii) reasons for companies reporting goodwill impairment (both zero, 
and goodwill impairment losses) disclosed in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement (see Section 7.2). This comparison has been carried out in two ways. 
Firstly, it is performed across companies implementing FRS 3 within one year. 
This covers 294 companies for the financial year ended December 2006 and a 
further 235 companies for the financial years ended between January and 
November 2007. Secondly, the comparison has been conducted on the same 
companies over a period of two years. This includes 258 companies with data 
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available for financial years ended December 2006 and December 2007 (see 
Section 6.5.1.1). 
The second part of the disclosure study aims to identify types of accounting 
choice related to goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies 
after the implementation of FRS 3 (see Section 6.5.2). This is conducted using a 
self-constructed disclosure framework (see Section 6.5.2.2). The disclosure 
framework takes into account six key items of data: (i) goodwill data, (ii) 
segment result, (iii) financial performance, (iv) the market capitalisation 
indication, (v) reasons for reporting goodwill impairment loss disclosed in the 
Notes to the Financial Statement, and (vi) audit report concerning goodwill (see 
Figure 6.2 in Section 6.5.2.2). Using the disclosure framework, 20 companies 
which reported goodwill impairment losses and are categorised into Group 2 
(see Section 6.5.1.2) from the result of part one of the disclosure study, will be 
examined in greater depth (in Sections 7.3 to 7.3.3). The analysis is carried out 
over several years (depending on the traceability of goodwill impairment losses 
backward from the write-off year to the acquisition year) (see Section 6.5.2.2).  
1.4.2 Measurement study of goodwill impairment 
The measurement study examines factors influencing managers‘ decisions when 
determining the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses divided by prior year 
total assets (including goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on the income 
statement (see Section 1.3). Studies of the measurement of goodwill 
impairment have until now been conducted using data from countries in 
developed economies, such as the US (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 
2007; Zang, 2008), Canada (i.e. Lapointe-Antunes et al, 2008), and the UK (i.e. 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) (see Section 2.2.2). As noted in Section 1.2, these 
countries are reported to have dispersed ownership. The measurement study of 
this thesis, therefore, extends these studies to the developing economy of 
Malaysia, which has concentrated ownership.  
Investigating the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies, as an example of listed companies in a developing economy, 
provides an opportunity to test the contracting perspective and the 
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opportunistic behaviour perspective in a new institutional setting, previously 
unexplored in prior studies analysing the measurement of goodwill impairment 
(see Section 1.2). Hence, the result of the measurement study is expected to 
contribute to the theories of accounting choice by providing support for the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective and the contracting perspective in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies which have concentrated ownership. 
The measurement study is carried out on the total population of Malaysian listed 
companies which implemented FRS 3 in the first three years of the standard 
taking effect. This includes 1498 firm-years with 369 firm-years reporting 
goodwill impairment losses and 1129 firm-years reporting zero goodwill 
impairment from 2006/7 to 2008/9 (see Table 8.1 in Section 8.2.1.1). The 
dependent variable for the measurement study is the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses divided by prior year total assets (including goodwill), and 
zero otherwise reported on the income statement (see Table 5.1 in Section 5.2). 
This dependent variable has four characteristics: (i) a lower limit, which is zero 
value, (ii) a substantial number of observations which take on the limiting value, 
(iii) the remaining observations take on a wide range of values above the limit, 
and (iv) repeated observations. These characteristics lead to the application of 
random-effects tobit regression model (see Section 6.7.1).  
1.4.3 Recognition study of goodwill impairment 
The recognition study of goodwill impairment is conducted in an attempt to fill 
the gap identified by Alciatore et al., (1998: 33), i.e. a need for studies ‗to 
identify and examine firms that have impaired assets but have not written them 
down, or did not write them down in a timely manner‘ (see Section 2.2.2). In 
the context of goodwill impairment, the gap identified by Alciatore et al. (1998) 
is timely as one of the concerns raised by the IASB board members via the 
dissenting opinion of IAS 36 Impairment of Assets is the lack of a rigorous 
impairment test of goodwill because of the focus of the IASB on preventing 
excessive goodwill write-offs (see Section 4.5). By undertaking the recognition 
study, this thesis will be able to identify companies‘ motives in recognising zero 
goodwill impairment. 
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To test the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment, all 
of those companies which have market values below the book values of their net 
assets for three consecutive years, and which recognise zero goodwill 
impairment throughout the three years, are selected as a test group (see 
Section 9.2.1). This group is tested against a control group of companies which 
experience a similar condition (i.e. market values below the book values of net 
assets for three consecutive years); but which reported goodwill impairment 
losses at the end of the third year. To perform the analysis, the test group is 
coded as one and the control group is coded as zero. The recognition study is 
carried out on 132 companies (before missing values) of which 96 companies are 
regarded as the test group and 36 companies are considered as the control 
group (see Figure 9.3 in Section 9.2.1). Because of the binary nature of the 
dependent variable, a binary logistic regression is applied in the recognition 
study (see Section 6.8). 
1.5 Research contributions 
This thesis meets the four research objectives in the following four main ways.  
Firstly, in meeting Research Objective 1, this thesis contributes to the theories 
of accounting choice. It shows how the opportunistic behaviour perspective, 
previously developed and tested by prior studies using data from listed 
companies in developed economies (reported to have dispersed ownership), 
helps explain managerial decisions on the measurement of goodwill impairment 
in the developing economy of Malaysia (documented to have concentrated 
ownership) (see Section 10.4.1.2 for detail). Managerial opportunism is normally 
discussed in prior studies in the context of agency conflict between managers 
and shareholders in companies with disperse ownership (see Sections 2.3.2 and 
2.3.3). Because of the high outside ownership concentration found in the 
Malaysian listed companies, the empirical result of this thesis suggests that most 
probably the opportunistic behaviour occurs due to an agency conflict between 
the controlling shareholders (shareholders outside of the companies) and the 
minority shareholders (see Section 10.4.1.2). Within this conflict, managers 
would possibly act on behalf of the controlling shareholders at the expense of 
the minority shareholders. 
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Secondly in meeting Research Objective 2, the disclosure study contributes to 
the research design by developing a disclosure framework (see Figure 6.2 in 
Section 6.5.2.2), which aims to explore, via annual reports of companies, types 
of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian 
listed companies. Future researchers could make use of the disclosure 
framework to identify accounting choices related to goodwill impairment, or to 
interpret their statistical findings, which this thesis has attempted to do (see for 
e.g. Table 7.3 in Section 7.3.1 and Section 8.12.2 for the application of the 
disclosure framework).  
Thirdly, in meeting Research Objective 3, the measurement study contributes to 
literature of accounting choices related to goodwill impairment by presenting 
new results from the empirical evidence related to factors influencing 
managers‘ decisions when determining the magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses divided by prior year total assets (including goodwill), and zero otherwise 
reported on the income statement by Malaysian listed companies. These factors 
are: managerial ownership (see Section 10.4.2.1 for detail), and two different 
measures of pre-write-off earnings (see Section 10.4.2.2 for detail). These 
results highlight the need for future studies to incorporate these variables, in 
order to provide a more comprehensive model of accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment.  
Finally, in meeting Research Objective 4, the recognition study contributes to 
the research design by constructing a research setting which aims to capture 
evidence of a recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
Testing this setting allows the recognition study to makes a contribution, by 
identifying the motives of companies for recognising zero goodwill impairment, 
which has received limited attention in prior studies (see Section 10.4.3.2 for 
detail). Information concerning these motives is useful to the relevant 
regulatory bodies overseeing financial reporting standards on goodwill in 
Malaysia, such as Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB), Malaysian 
Securities Commission, and auditors.  
The research contributions of this thesis are discussed in detail in Sections 10.4 
to 10.4.4. 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
A conceptual map of this thesis is displayed in Figure 1.1. This thesis is 
structured as follows: 
 Chapter 1 (Introduction): The introduction sets out the motivation, research 
objectives and questions, research design, contributions of the study, and 
structure of the thesis. 
 Chapter 2 (Literature review): The literature review discusses the definitions 
of accounting choice, the gaps in the literature of prior studies in analysing 
asset write-offs and goodwill impairment, and companies‘ motivations for 
accounting choice. It also discusses the theoretical framework, and the two 
perspectives of accounting choices to be applied in this thesis. 
 Chapters 3-4 (Context of the study): Chapter 3 reviews the history of the 
development of an accounting standard on goodwill in Malaysia, the 
regulatory bodies overseeing the compliance with accounting standards, and 
the ownership structure of Malaysian listed companies. Chapter 4 reviews 
the requirements of IFRS 3, focusing on indications that an asset (goodwill) 
may be impaired, judgements and estimates involved in an impairment test 
of goodwill, and issues surrounding the impairment test of goodwill. 
 Chapter 5 (Hypotheses development): This chapter develops hypotheses to 
test both the measurement and the recognition studies related to goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
 Chapter 6 (Research design and methods): The chapter describes the total 
population of Malaysian listed companies which implemented FRS 32 from 
2006/7 to 2008/9, discusses the process of validating the Datastream source 
data, and specifies the final number of Malaysian listed companies which are 
available for the analysis. It also describes the research designs and 
statistical tests for the three empirical chapters – disclosure, measurement, 
and recognition study. 
                                         
2 FRS 3 Business Combinations refers to Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business 
Combinations while IFRS 3 refers to the International Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business 
Combinations, issued by the IASB. When a discussion revolves around the exact requirement of 
the standard, especially when the issues are stated in the Basis for Conclusion (not available in 
FRS 3), IFRS 3 is applied; when a discussion involves Malaysian environment, FRS 3 is applied. 
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 Chapters 7-9 (Empirical chapters of the thesis): These three chapters present 
the empirical findings for the disclosure, measurement, and recognition 
studies respectively. 
 Chapter 10 (Discussion and conclusion): This chapter reviews briefly the 
achievement of the four research objectives, formulated at the outset of this 
thesis. It discusses the contributions of the study, explains its limitations, 
and offers suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature and Theoretical 
Framework of Accounting Choices 
2.1 Introduction   
This chapter has two main purposes. Firstly, it reviews the literature on 
accounting choices. The review covers three key issues; the various 
definitions of accounting choice, the gaps in the literature of prior studies in 
analysing asset write-offs and goodwill impairment, and companies‘ 
motivations for accounting choice as classified by Fields et al. (2001). 
Secondly, it discusses the theoretical framework of accounting choices which 
is applied in this thesis, that is, the agency theory model of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). It then continues with the two perspectives of accounting 
choice which emerge from the agency theory, i.e. the contracting 
perspective, and the opportunistic behaviour perspective. 
This chapter is expected to contribute to the wider thesis in the following five 
ways. Firstly, the review of definitions of accounting choice (in Section 2.2.1) 
helps set a boundary on the issue of accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment examined in this thesis. Thus, the review contributes to the 
formulation of the research objectives in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.3). 
Secondly, the review of prior studies analysing asset write-offs and goodwill 
impairment (in Section 2.2.2) highlights gaps in the literature, which this 
thesis attempts to bridge. Thirdly, the review of companies‘ motivations for 
accounting choice as classified by Fields et al. (2001) (in Section 2.2.3) helps 
in identifying the appropriate theoretical framework of accounting choice to 
be applied in this thesis. Fourthly, the review of the contracting perspective 
(in Section 2.3.1) and the opportunistic behaviour perspective (in Section 
2.3.2) set expectations for the development of hypotheses in Chapter 5. 
Finally, the review of agency theory (in Section 2.3) and its evaluation in the 
context of listed companies in the developing economy of Malaysia (in Section 
2.3.3) highlight the nature of agency problem that may exist in companies 
with concentrated ownership, which may have an influenced on the 
applicability of the contracting perspective and the opportunistic behaviour 
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perspective. The review also generates ideas concerning the ownership 
structures of companies, which will be further explored in Chapter 5, upon 
development of the hypotheses.  
This chapter is structured into four main sections, including the introduction. 
Section 2.2 reviews the literature on accounting choices. Section 2.3 
continues with a review and discussion of the theoretical framework of 
accounting choice applied in this thesis. Section 2.4 summarises and 
concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Review of literature on accounting choices 
The review of literature on accounting choices helps to define the scope of 
the study (see Section 2.2.1), identifies gaps in the literature (see Section 
2.2.2), and presents an overall picture of the motivations of companies in 
exercising accounting choice (see Section 2.2.3). Thereafter (in Section 2.3) 
the relevant perspectives of accounting choice to be applied in this thesis are 
specified. 
2.2.1  Definitions of accounting choice 
Three definitions of accounting choice offered in the literature are: 
‗[Accounting] policy choices in financial reporting — situations in which 
one reporting method enables the user to convert easily to the 
alternative method‘ 
(Carter, 1981: 109-110) 
‗Accounting choice includes the firm manager's choice of one 
accounting method over another. An example is the manager's choice 
of straight-line depreciation rather than accelerated depreciation. 
Accounting choice also includes the FASB's choice of accounting 
standards.‘ 
(Watts, 1992: 235) 
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‗An accounting choice is any decision whose primary purpose is to 
influence (either in form or substance) the output of the accounting 
system in a particular way, including not only financial statements 
published in accordance with GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles], but also tax returns and regulatory filings.‘ 
(Fields et al. 2001: 256) 
Other academics (e.g. Warfields et al., 1995: 63; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994: 149), although not providing an explicit definition, have described the 
accounting choice in terms of the discretionary portion of total accruals 
applied by managers. For example, Warfield et al. (1995) explained:  
‗We concentrate on accounting accruals, or more specifically the 
discretionary portion of total accruals, as reflective of managers‘ 
accounting choices.‘ 
(Warfields et al., 1995: 63) 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) exemplified:  
‗Estimates of bad debt expense, estimates of inventory obsolescence, 
and timing of sales are examples of management choices reflected in 
accruals.‘ 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994: 149) 
All of these definitions share a common feature, that is, they emphasise the 
discretion exercised by the managers. The discretion could be directly 
observed such as choosing between the accounting methods available to their 
companies. Alternatively, it could be indirectly identified through the 
accounting estimates made by the managers in applying a particular 
accounting procedure. As expressed by McNichols and Wilson (1988): 
‗[M]anagement can exercise discretion through accounting method 
choice, through operating, investing, and financing policies, and 
through choice of estimates for a given accounting method.‘ 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988: 2) 
Compared to other definitions, the definition offered by Fields et al. (2001) is 
comprehensive. In reviewing their work, Francis (2001) considers the 
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definition to be wide-ranging, in the sense that it includes a number of 
choices examined by prior studies. She elaborates that:  
‗The definition includes: choices among equally acceptable rules (what 
I term ‗‗hard‘‘ accounting choices, such as selecting LIFO versus FIFO 
for inventory valuation or choosing ......); judgments and estimates 
required to implement generally accepted accounting rules (for 
example, the estimated service life of long-lived assets or …….); 
disclosure decisions (such as the amount of detail provided in the 
description of accounting policies); timing decisions (such as …….); 
lobbying activities (such as ……); choices about display (e.g., 
………………); aggregation decisions (such as the extent to which 
components of income are displayed as separate line items); 
classification decisions (e.g., ……………….); decisions to structure 
transactions in certain ways to achieve a desired accounting outcome 
(for example, ……….); and real production and investment decisions 
(such as ……………).‘ 
(Francis, 2001: 310-311) 
Of the many types of accounting choice outlined by Francis (2001), two are 
analysed in this thesis. These are: judgements and estimates employed by 
managers in performing an impairment test of goodwill, and detailed 
information on goodwill impairment disclosed in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement. These two types of accounting choice lead to three aspects of 
goodwill impairment to be examined in this thesis. These are disclosure (see 
Chapter 7), measurement (see Chapter 8), and recognition (see Chapter 9) of 
goodwill impairment. 
According to Francis (2001: 309 and 313), in providing the definition of 
accounting choice, Fields et al. (2001) consider ‗implementation decisions‘ to 
be part of an accounting choice. Francis (2001: 312-313) views such a 
definition as consistent with the focus of the regulators in the US.  
Accordingly, she (p. 312) sees the effort as creating more opportunities for 
future research in the field of accounting choice. It is also the researcher‘s 
view that these opportunities could be extended to other researchers who are 
interested in investigating companies located outside the US which implement 
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IFRSs. This is because the aim of the IASB is ‗not to permit choices in the 
accounting treatment‘ (IASB 2006a: Preface to International Financial 
Reporting Standards, paragraph 13). Should this aim be achieved, the 
implication is that there would be no accounting method choice. Therefore, 
by considering the implementation decisions as part of accounting choice, 
Fields et al. (2001) paved the way for researchers interested in analysing 
companies which implemented IFRSs. 
The definition of accounting choice that this thesis builds upon is that of 
Fields et al. (2001: 256). As noted earlier in Section 2.2.1, Fields et al. (2001: 
256) define accounting choice as: 
‗An accounting choice is any decision whose primary purpose is to 
influence (either in form or substance) the output of the accounting 
system in a particular way, including not only financial statements 
published in accordance with GAAP, but also tax returns and regulatory 
filings.‘ 
(Fields et al. 2001: 256) 
Because the definition of accounting choice offered by Fields et al. (2001) is 
too broad for a single research project, four terms offered by Fields et al. 
(2001) in their definition (as underlined by the researcher above) require 
further explanation and contextualisation. The contextualisation is essential 
as it confines the scope of the issue of goodwill impairment examined in this 
thesis.   
Firstly, the term any decision, in this research should be interpreted as 
referring to decisions made by managers of Malaysian listed companies in 
implementing FRS 3, focusing specifically on goodwill impairment. As noted 
earlier in this section, three aspects of implementation decisions are 
examined, namely, disclosure, measurement, and recognition of goodwill 
impairment. These implementation decisions cannot be observed directly, in 
the sense that companies do not have a choice, for example, to measure or 
not to measure goodwill impairment losses. Rather, the implementation 
decisions represent indirect options, or as Nobes (2006: 240) refers to them 
‗covert options‘, which are available to managers via judgements and 
estimates employed while performing an impairment test of goodwill. These 
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‗covert options‘ allow the managers to make decisions when reporting 
goodwill impairment losses (see Sections 4.4.2). As an example, in performing 
an impairment test of goodwill, managers can be selective in the discount 
rates employed in estimating the recoverable amount of cash-generating-units 
containing goodwill so that they will be able to report goodwill impairment 
losses (see Section 5.8.2.1). Alternatively, the managers could decide to 
allocate goodwill to high growth cash-generating-units and thus report zero 
goodwill impairment (see Section 5.8.1). 
Secondly, the term primary purpose refers to companies‘ motives in reporting 
goodwill impairment losses, or in reporting zero goodwill impairment. Because 
the motives cannot be observed directly, they will be hypothesised based on 
the contracting perspective (see Section 2.3.1) and the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective (see Section 2.3.2). Among the potential motives for 
reporting goodwill impairment losses, hypothesised in this thesis, are Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) (both existing and incoming) attempting to provide 
a signal that past problems have been addressed (see Section 5.6.3), to 
smooth earnings (see Section 5.6.4), and new CEOs attempting to reduce the 
benchmark against which their future performance will be judged (see Section 
5.6.1). Potential motives for reporting zero goodwill impairment are the 
concerns of CEOs for their reputation (see Section 5.6.2), and managers 
attempting to avoid debt covenant violations (see Section 5.5). 
Thirdly, because reporting goodwill impairment losses has an impact on 
companies‘ earnings, the term to influence (either in form or substance) the 
output of the accounting system refers mainly to managers‘ attempts to 
influence company earnings reported in the income statement.  
Fourthly, the investigation of implementation decisions is confined to 
financial statements published in accordance with GAAP. It does not take into 
accounts tax returns and regulatory filings.  
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2.2.2 Gaps in the literature of prior studies in analysing 
asset write-offs and goodwill impairment  
The literature of asset write-offs emerged in the 1980s and focused on US 
listed companies (e.g. Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliot and Shaw, 1988; Zucca 
and Campbell, 1992; Francis et al., 1996). In the 1980s and 1990s, prior 
studies of asset write-offs hypothesise the motives of companies for taking 
asset write-offs (e.g. Strong and Meyer, 1987; Zucca and Campbell, 1992; 
Francis et al., 1996), or for taking large write-offs (e.g. Elliot and Shaw, 
1988). In their review of prior studies analysing asset write-offs of US and 
Australian listed companies between 1987 and 1998, Alciatore et al. (1998) 
explained there was a need for research in this area during this period as 
companies tended to take a large magnitude of asset write-offs (i.e. mean 
amount of write-offs ranged from 4% to 19.4% of the total assets) (Alciatore et 
al., 1998: 1). This is because before 1995, there was no specific requirement 
for US listed companies to write-down the value of those assets that had 
become impaired (Alciatore et al., 1998: 4). As a result, the US GAAP allowed 
a great deal of flexibility in accounting for the write-offs (Alciatore et al., 
1998: 1).  
To test motives of companies for reporting asset write-offs, prior studies (e.g. 
Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliot and Shaw, 1988; Zucca and Campbell, 1992; 
Francis et al., 1996) employed variables which captured these motivations, 
such as change in CEO, big bath variable, and earnings smoothing variable. 
They then tested the companies‘ decisions in taking asset write-offs against a 
control group of companies which did not. By selecting variables which tested 
the motives for taking asset write-offs, it seems that these studies say very 
little about the motivation of companies for reporting zero asset write-offs 
(i.e. not reporting the write-offs).  They also assumed a zero reported figure 
to be a faithful indication that no impairment has occurred. 
Alciatore et al. (1998: 33) considered these prior studies to be a ‗subtle 
problem‘, due to their emphasis on examining companies‘ motives for taking 
asset write-offs. They recommended that future studies identify and examine 
companies that ‗have impaired assets but have not written them down‘ 
(Alciatore et al., 1998: 33). They stated: 
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‗A more subtle problem is that researchers have generally only examined 
firms that have taken asset write-downs. An interesting avenue for future 
research would be to identify and examine firms that have impaired assets 
but have not written them down, or did not write them down in a timely 
manner.‘ 
(Alciatore et al., 1998: 33) 
 
The literature of goodwill impairment was initially part of the literature of 
asset write-offs. For example, Francis et al. (1996: 118), in examining asset 
write-offs categorised goodwill impairment as discretionary asset write-offs. 
In 2001, as a result of a joint effort between US FASB and IASB in accounting 
for business combinations, that required an impairment-only approach to 
accounting for goodwill, academic researchers started to focus exclusively on 
goodwill impairment. This research was initiated by Beatty and Weber (2006), 
and examined US listed companies implementing SFAS 1423 in 2001. The study 
carried out by Beatty and Weber (2006) was later adapted by others focusing 
on US listed companies but with an increased sample size (i.e. Zang, 2008), 
including subsequent years of investigation (e.g. Guler, 2007; Ramanna and 
Watts, 2012), and in different environments [i.e. Lapointe-Antunes et al.‘s 
(2008) analysis of goodwill impairment by Canadian4 listed companies]. Two 
prior studies closely related to this thesis are the studies of the 
implementation of IFRS 3 Business Combinations focusing on goodwill 
impairment by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), which examined UK listed 
companies, and Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011) which analysed Malaysian listed 
companies. 
Prior studies which focused on goodwill impairment appear to be divided into 
three groups. The first group examined a specific accounting choice related to 
goodwill impairment available to US listed companies (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 
                                         
3 SFAS 142 refers to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards on Goodwill and Other 
Intangible Assets and was implemented in 2001. 
4 Canadian listed companies implement Section 3062 of the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants‘ Handbook which is similar to SFAS 142, in that, it offers a transitional period to 
Canadian listed companies in reporting goodwill impairment in 2002. However, it differs from 
SFAS 142 with regard to its treatment of the transitional goodwill impairment loss as a 
retroactive method of a change in accounting principle instead of cumulative effect of a 
change in accounting principle, as required by SFAS 142. 
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2006; Zang, 2008) and Canadian listed companies (e.g. Lapointe-Antunes et 
al., 2008) during the transitional period of implementing an accounting 
standard on goodwill5. This transitional choice is not available for companies 
which implement IFRS 3 including Malaysian and UK listed companies. 
Therefore, this thesis will not discuss the hypotheses formulated by these 
studies, which aimed to capture companies‘ motives in selecting and 
reporting the transitional choice6.  
The second group of studies related to goodwill impairment extended the 
prior studies of asset write-offs by focusing on companies‘ motives for 
reporting goodwill impairment losses. For example, Godfrey and Koh (2009: 
129) selected only those US listed companies which reported goodwill 
impairment losses from 2002 to 2004. This thesis will discuss the hypotheses 
formulated by this group (see Chapter 5, e.g. Section 5.6.3). 
The third group of studies related to goodwill impairment examined 
companies likely to require write-offs (e.g. Guler, 2007; Ramanna and Watts, 
2012). According to Guler (2007: 18), companies which have the ‗probability 
of having to take a goodwill impairment charge‘ are companies that have 
their market values lower than the book values of their net assets and the 
difference does not exceed the amount of goodwill balance reported. 
Ramanna and Watts (2012: 750) regard the ‗market indications of goodwill 
impairment‘ to be when companies experienced a book-to-market ratio 
greater than one for two consecutive years after previously reporting higher 
                                         
5 At the times of these studies, the accounting standard on goodwill for US listed companies is 
SFAS 142 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards on Goodwill and Other Intangible 
Assets while for Canadian listed companies, it is Section 3062 of the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants‘ Handbook. 
6 For US listed companies, the transitional choice refers to a trade-off faced by managers in 
either reporting goodwill impairment losses as the cumulative effect of a change in 
accounting principle during the transitional year (known as below-the-line of an income from 
continuing operation), or in delay reporting the impairment losses in that year by reporting 
the impairment losses in the subsequent year as an operating charge (known as above-the-
line of an income from continuing operation) (Beatty and Weber, 2006: 257 and 262). For 
Canadian listed companies, the transitional choice refers to a decision made by managers in 
reporting the transitional goodwill impairment losses as a retroactive method of a change in 
accounting principle (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008: 38). The cumulative effect method under 
SFAS 142 requires the transitional goodwill impairment loss to be charged to income 
statement while the retroactive method under Section 3062 requires transitional goodwill 
impairment to be charged to the opening retained earnings (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008: 
38).  
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market values than the book values of their net assets. Guler (2007) 
investigated factors influencing managers‘ choice in recognising goodwill 
impairment losses.  Ramanna and Watts (2012: 750), on the other hand, 
adopted a more direct approach by investigating factors influencing ‗goodwill 
non-impairment‘. This thesis will also discuss the hypotheses formulated by 
this group (see Chapter 5, e.g. Section 5.6.2). 
The two studies which analysed companies implementing IFRS3, namely, 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) and Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011), appear to have 
analysed both goodwill impairment losses and zero goodwill impairment. In 
the case of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), their analysis of goodwill impairment 
(a measurement study) includes the top 500 UK listed companies which 
reported zero goodwill impairment and goodwill impairment losses. Omar and 
Mohd-Saleh (2011: 400 and 402) focused on the recognition of goodwill 
impairment by the total population of Malaysian listed companies during the 
initial year of implementing FRS 3 (i.e. either in 2006, 2007 or 2008). 
The review of literature discussed in this section highlights two important 
gaps in the studies of asset write-offs and goodwill impairment. Firstly, the 
majority of these studies focused on listed companies in developed 
economies, mainly in the US (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 2007; Zang, 
2008; Ramanna and Watts, 2012) but also in Canada (i.e. Lapointe-Antunes et 
al., 2008) and the UK (i.e. AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). Omar and Mohd-Saleh 
(2011) represent an early attempt in analysing goodwill impairment among 
listed companies in the developing economy of Malaysia. However, they 
investigate (p. 402) companies which implemented FRS 3 in the first year 
(either in 2006, 2007, or 2008), and the study focuses on the recognition of 
goodwill impairment7. Thus, there is a need for a more comprehensive study 
focusing on goodwill impairment by listed companies in a developing 
economy, a gap which this thesis attempts to address by conducting a 
measurement study8 of goodwill impairment (see Chapter 8). 
                                         
7Their dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, equal to one when a company reported 
goodwill impairment loss, and zero otherwise. 
8In the measurement study, the dependent variable is the magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses divided by prior year total assets (including goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on 
the income statement. 
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The second gap identified in the literature of asset write-offs and goodwill 
impairment concerns their emphasis on examining only those companies 
taking asset write-offs and their motives. As highlighted by Alciatore et al. 
(1998: 33), future studies need to identify and examine ‗firms that have 
impaired assets but have not written them down, or did not write them down 
in a timely manner‘. Similar in concept to the study undertaken by Ramanna 
and Watts (2012) as discussed in this section, this thesis aims to analyse 
companies‘ motives for recognising zero goodwill impairment in a specific 
setting in which impairment might reasonably be expected. The setting 
chosen in this thesis is one where the market values of companies are lower 
than the book values of their net assets for three consecutive years (see 
Chapter 9). 
Having discussed two gaps in the literature of asset write-offs and goodwill 
impairment, Section 2.2.3 now briefly describes the taxonomy of accounting 
choice literature offered by Fields et al. (2001).  
2.2.3 Companies’ motivations for accounting choice as 
classified by Fields et al. (2001) 
This section serves two purposes. Firstly, it presents an overall picture of 
companies‘ motivations with regard to accounting choice. Secondly, it 
identifies the relevant perspectives of accounting choice to be applied in this 
thesis.  
In presenting an overall picture of companies‘ motivations for accounting 
choice, this thesis applies the taxonomy of accounting choice literature 
offered by Fields et al. (2001). In their review of accounting choice studies 
published in the 1990s, Fields et al. (2001) endeavoured to classify the various 
perspectives of accounting choice into three categories based on three 
different types of market imperfection, i.e. agency costs, externalities 
affecting non-contracting parties, and information asymmetries (Fields et al. 
(2001). Figure 2.1 depicts companies‘ motivations for accounting choice as 
per the taxonomy provided by Fields et al. (2001). 
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Figure 2.1: Companies’ motivations for accounting choice classified by Fields et al. (2001) into three 
different types of market imperfection 
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Turning to Figure 2.1, the first motivation for accounting choice outlined by 
Fields et al. (2001: 257) is the contractual motive, which arises as a result of 
the existence of agency costs. In this category, managers exercise an 
accounting choice in order to influence contractual arrangements with the 
primary purpose of alleviating agency costs (Fields et al., 2001: 261-262). This 
view of accounting choice is referred to as an efficient contracting 
perspective (Fields et al., 2001: 261). For example, management 
compensation contracts tied to the accounting numbers are established in 
order to better align the incentives of the managers with the shareholders 
(Fields et al., 2001: 262). On the other hand, ex post accounting choice could 
be exercised in order to increase the level of management compensation or to 
avoid debt covenant violations (Fields et al., 2001: 262). Fields et al. (2001: 
267) describe this view of accounting choice as managerial opportunism 
[alternatively referred to by Holthausen (1990: 207) as an opportunistic 
behaviour perspective]. Companies‘ contractual motivations will be explored 
in this thesis (see Section 2.3.1).  
As outlined by Fields et al. (2001), externalities affecting non-contracting 
parties are the second motivation for an accounting choice. Fields et al. 
(2001) segregated this motivation into two - taxes and regulation (see Figure 
2.1). Following on from this, political cost hypotheses have been developed 
and tested (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990: 134; Fields et al., 2001). Studies on 
the link between taxes and accounting choice normally analyse whether 
managers make use of accounting choice to minimise the present value of 
taxes (Dhaliwal and Wang, 1992), or to reduce the tax burden (Kang, 1993). 
The issue of taxes will not be explored in this thesis because under the 
Malaysian tax system, goodwill impairment losses are non-tax deductible 
(Azmi, 2006). Similarly, in the case of regulation, prior studies normally 
examine the impact of accounting choice on industry-specific regulation (e.g. 
Jones, 1991). However, in Malaysia, the number of companies which are 
classified under industry specific regulation is small9. 
                                         
9 For example, Malaysian steel industry is price regulated by the government (JUBM, 2008). In 
this industry, only 28 firm-years (from 2006 to 2008) implemented FRS 3 related to goodwill 
impairment. 
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The third motivation for an accounting choice outlined by Fields et al. (2001) 
comprises asset pricing. This arises because of the existence of asymmetrical 
information between a company and the market (Fields et al., 2001). This 
motivation is segregated into three areas – earnings management, companies‘ 
disclosure policies, and market efficiency (see Figure 2.1). Asset pricing 
motivation will not be explored in this thesis because the issue is too far 
reaching for inclusion and this thesis is already committed to an analysis of 
three aspects of the implementation decisions, i.e. disclosure (see Chapter 7), 
measurement (see Chapter 8), and recognition (see Chapter 9) of goodwill 
impairment. However, because the asset pricing motivation examines the 
consequence of the accounting choice exercised, it is seen as the next step in 
the study of accounting choice and will be considered for future research. 
One challenge faced by the researcher in following exactly the three 
classifications of companies‘ motivations for accounting choice as offered by 
Fields et al. (2001) (see Figure 2.1) is that these classifications do not 
emphasise the theoretical frameworks of accounting choice. Rather, Fields et 
al. (2001) focus on three types of market imperfection. Because of this, an 
opportunistic behaviour perspective, which is a common perspective of an 
accounting choice applied by prior studies of asset write-offs and goodwill 
impairment, is discussed by Fields et al. (2001) interchangeably both in the 
contractual motivations and asset pricing motivations. To overcome this issue, 
Section 2.3.2 discusses an opportunistic behaviour perspective both within 
contracts and without an explicit link with companies‘ contractual 
arrangements. 
2.3 Agency theory 
This section first reviews the agency theory model as developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Following this review, the section is expanded into three 
areas. Section 2.3.1 discusses the contracting perspective, Section 2.3.2 
discusses the opportunistic behaviour perspective, and Section 2.3.3 evaluates 
the idea of the agency theory to listed companies in the developing economy 
of Malaysia, which are found to have concentrated ownership. 
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Agency theory as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) models the 
relationship between a principal (who delegates work) and an agent (who 
performs the work) (Eisenhardt, 1988: 490). In the model, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976: 308) consider contracts between owners and managers of a 
company, where in the contract, the owner is the principal and the manager 
is the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  They describe these contracts as an 
agency relationship (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986: 181), and define the 
agency relationship as: 
‗A contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent.‘ 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 308) 
In describing the agency relationship, agency theory assumes that both the 
principal (owner) and the agent (manager) are utility maximisers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 308). Based on this assumption, the theory predicts that the 
agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal (ibid., p. 308). 
This may lead to agency conflict between the two parties (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 308; Eisenhardt, 1989). In this context, conflict refers to a 
situation when the actions which maximise the agent‘s expected utilities do 
not necessarily lead to the maximisation of the principal‘s expected utilities 
(Watts, 1977: 55). 
The divergence of interests (and therefore the potential conflict between the 
principal and the agent) generates agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
These costs consist of three components: monitoring costs, bonding costs, and 
residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 308). Monitoring costs are costs 
borne by the principal in his efforts to ensure that the agent is acting in the 
principal‘s best interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 308). Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986: 181) explained that these costs are incurred by the 
principal to guarantee that the agent limits his activities, consistent with the 
contracts. Bonding costs are costs borne by the agent in order to provide some 
assurance to the principal that he will not take an action which will harm the 
principal‘s best interest, or if he does, that compensation will be provided 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 308). These costs are incurred by the agent to 
guarantee that he will limit his activities in line with the contract (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986: 181). Residual loss is a reduction in welfare faced by the 
principal, given optimal bonding and monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 
308).  
2.3.1 Contracting perspective 
In developing the contracting perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 201) 
emphasised the role of accounting numbers employed in the contracts. They 
argue that accounting numbers are used in designing the terms of the contract 
and in monitoring of the contracts (ibid., p.196). For example, a bonus plan 
contract which is formulated to align the interests of the manager (agent) 
with those of the shareholder (principal) utilises accounting earnings (Watts, 
1992). Thus, accounting numbers are seen as monitoring and bonding devices 
between the manager (agent) and the shareholder (principal) (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).  
The argument about the role of accounting numbers in contracts goes further 
by suggesting that if the accounting numbers become an integral part of the 
contracting process, and the numbers used in the contracts reduce 
companies‘ agency costs, then the accounting procedure used to calculate the 
number is more efficient than an alternative accounting procedure (ibid., p. 
196). Employing the alternative procedure increases the agency costs and thus 
reduces the company‘s value or the manager‘s wealth (ibid., p. 196). Thus, 
the contracting role of accounting allows accounting procedures to have an 
impact on companies‘ values and their cash flows (ibid., p. 199). It also 
provides an explanation for managers‘ choice of one accounting method over 
another (ibid., p. 196).  
Following this line of argument, the contracting hypothesis is developed 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). The hypothesis states that: 
‗Accounting methods are primarily determined by the use of accounting 
numbers in contracts between parties to the firm.‘ 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990: 132)  
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Watts and Zimmerman (1990: 135) further elaborate the contracting 
hypothesis by stating that the managers‘ choice of one accounting method 
compared to another could be because the accounting choice exercised 
increases the wealth of all the contracting parties (i.e. efficiency reasons) or 
because it maximises the managers‘ wealth to the detriment of other 
contracting parties (i.e. managers acted opportunistically). Holthausen (1990: 
207 and 208) referred to these explanations, i.e. efficiency reasons, and 
managers behaving opportunistically, as ‗efficient contracting perspective‘ 
and ‗opportunistic behaviour perspective‘ respectively.  
Similar to Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Holthausen (1990) explained that 
under the efficient contracting perspective, accounting choice is exercised in 
order to reduce agency costs. He states: 
‗The efficient contracting perspective with respect to accounting 
choice implies that accounting methods, like the form of organization 
chosen or the form of contracts written, will be selected to minimize 
agency costs amongst the various parties to the firm.‘ 
 (Holthausen, 1990: 207) 
For the opportunistic behaviour perspective, Holthausen (1990) explained that 
managers take the existing contracts as given and choose an accounting 
method to make themselves better off at the expense of other contracting 
parties. He states: 
‗the accounting method a manager would choose is driven by how the 
choice affects the existing contracts without considering how future 
contracts might be written. From this perspective and some additional 
assumptions come hypotheses such as: managers will tend to choose 
more income-increasing techniques the greater the company‘s leverage 
in an effort to reduce the extent to which accounting-based debt 
covenants are binding, or managers choose income-increasing 
techniques to increase their bonuses if their compensation is directly 
tied to accounting earnings. These hypotheses arise not from 
maximization of firm value but from a transfer of wealth between 
bondholders, shareholders, and management which increases 
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management‘s utility because of their holdings of stock and stock 
options and because of their bonus compensation plans.‘ 
(Holthausen, 1990: 208) 
Briefly, the contracting perspective suggests that the manager of a company 
will exercise an accounting choice because of the accounting numbers used in 
the contracts (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990: 132). From the contracting 
perspective, two further perspectives emerge, namely, an efficient 
contracting perspective, and an opportunistic behaviour perspective (Watts 
and Zimmernman, 1990: 135-136; Holthausen, 1990: 207).  
The efficient contracting perspective suggests that the choice of one 
accounting method over another is ‗to minimize agency costs amongst the 
various parties to the firm‘, which lead to the maximisation of a company‘s 
value (Holthausen, 1990: 207 and 208). In contrast, taking the existing 
contracts as given, the opportunistic behaviour perspective sees that the 
accounting choice exercised by managers is designed to make them better off 
at the expense of other contracting parties (Holthausen, 1990: 208; Christie 
and Zimmerman, 1994: 539). In this thesis, it is not feasible to design a test to 
distinguish between the efficient contracting perspective and the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective (see Section 2.3.1.3). Thus, the position 
taken in this thesis is to interpret the finding of the debt hypothesis (which 
will be discussed in Sections 2.3.1.2 and 5.5) from the contracting perspective 
without specifying whether the result could be interpreted from the efficient 
contracting or opportunistic behaviour perspective. Detailed discussion of the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective is presented in Section 2.3.2. 
In applying the contracting perspective of accounting choice, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986: 198) explained that prior studies focused on two types of 
contract - the management compensation agreements and the debt 
agreements. Sections 2.3.1.1 to 2.3.1.2 discuss these two types of contract 
and Section 2.3.1.3 ends the section by discussing the limitation of prior 
studies testing the contracting perspective. 
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2.3.1.1 Management compensation plan: Internal 
agency conflicts 
A management compensation plan is a contract between companies and their 
managers. This contract is set up in order to reduce any internal agency 
conflicts between the two parties. One of the management compensation 
contracts which has been thoroughly examined is the bonus plan (Fields et al., 
2001: 266). The bonus plan is designed so that the bonus awarded is based on 
a certain percentage of the accounting numbers, and which reflects a 
company‘s performance (e.g. reported income, sales, or assets) (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2006).  
Generally prior studies investigating the bonus plans found that managers 
exercised an accounting choice to boost their compensation (Fields et al., 
2001: 267). For example, in the case of goodwill impairment, Beatty and 
Weber (2006), found that managers of companies with earnings-based bonus 
contracts that are written on net income and which include special items (i.e. 
goodwill impairment losses), are less likely to take goodwill impairment losses 
than those with earnings-based bonuses that exclude special items. For 
Malaysian listed companies, data on management compensation is not publicly 
available. For this reason, this thesis will not explore the issue of the 
management compensation plans.  
2.3.1.2 Debt covenants: External agency conflicts 
A debt covenant is a contract between companies and their debt-holders, 
established to reduce the agency conflicts between the two parties (Fields et 
al., 2001: 265). The contract often includes covenants related to the 
accounting numbers published in financial statements. These are designed to 
limit the actions of managers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) in redistributing 
the companies‘ values to the shareholders (Lys, 1984) at the expense of the 
debt-holders (Duke and Hunt, 1990). Any breach of the covenant is regarded 
as a default, which allows lenders to then take legal action (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986: 210). 
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Assuming that defaulting on the debt contracts is costly to companies, prior 
studies predict that managers of companies which are close to violating the 
debt covenants are likely to exercise an accounting choice to reduce the 
likelihood of breaching the accounting-based debt contracts (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Duke and Hunt, 1990). By exercising an accounting choice, 
these companies are attempting to relax the accounting-based restrictions 
stipulated in the debt covenants (Smith, 1993), hence avoiding violating the 
terms of these covenants (Dichev and Skinner, 2002). Thus, in general, the 
debt hypothesis suggests that companies which are close to violating their 
debt covenants are more likely to exercise an accounting choice by adopting 
income increasing accounting methods than those companies which are not 
(Whittred, 1987: 269; Fields et al., 2001: 273) (see Section 5.5 for detailed 
discussion of the debt hypothesis in relation to goodwill impairment). 
To test the debt hypothesis, many of the prior studies (e.g. Press and 
Weintrop, 1990; Hall, 1993; Guler, 2007; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Hamberg 
et al., 2010) employed leverage as a surrogate for companies‘ closeness to 
debt covenant violations (Duke and Hunt, 1990; Fields et al., 2001: 272). 
However, one continuing issue in applying leverage is that it does not fully 
capture the default risk of debt (Lys, 1984; Fields et al., 2001; Dichev and 
Skinner, 2002). For example, Dichev and Skinner (2002) examined the 
association between companies‘ actual covenant slacks and leverage for 
114,330 loans (or 2,810 US borrowing companies) between 1989 and 1999. 
Their argument, not stated, is that for leverage to be a good proxy for the 
closeness to the debt covenant violation, it should be highly associated 
negatively with the actual debt covenant slacks, in that, highly levered 
companies will have fewer slacks. They found that, although the actual 
covenant slacks and leverage are significantly associated (in a negative 
direction), the correlation of the two variables is not ‗large economically‘ (p. 
1105). To them, the results of the correlation between the two variables, 
which is less than 0.5, suggest that for the companies they analysed, leverage 
is ‗a noisy proxy for actual closeness to covenants‘ (p. 1105). 
To overcome the limitation of using leverage, some researchers began to 
inspect the actual debt covenants of companies (e.g. Dichev and Skinner, 
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2002). In this thesis, because data on these debt covenants is not publicly 
available, leverage is employed as a proxy for closeness to debt covenant 
violations. The application of leverage represents a limitation to the study, in 
the sense that the variable is an indirect test of the debt hypothesis (see 
Section 5.5). 
2.3.1.3 Limitation of research works testing the 
contracting perspective 
One of the limitations of prior studies of accounting choice analysing 
companies‘ contractual arrangements is that generally they would interpret 
the findings as evidence of managerial opportunism (Fields et al., 2001: 267 
and 271). These studies view managers as taking advantage of the discretion 
available in contracts to increase their compensation (Fields et al., 2001: 
267). However, it is possible that in some cases, the behaviour of managers 
could be interpreted as value maximising (Fields et al., 2001: 271). The 
inclination to interpret the result from the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective instead of the efficient contracting perspective is because of the 
difficulties academic researchers face in constructing variables to test the 
efficient contracting perspective (Holthausen, 1990). Moreover, it is almost 
impossible to measure either the efficiency in contracting or the value 
maximisation of the companies (Fields et al., 2001: 274).  
As noted in Section 2.3.1.2, the contracting perspective will be tested in this 
thesis by employing leverage (debt ratio). Realising that it is not yet feasible 
to design a test to distinguish between an efficient contracting, and an 
opportunistic behaviour perspective as discussed above, the position taken in 
this thesis is to interpret the finding of the debt hypothesis from the 
contracting perspective (using leverage as a proxy for company‘s closeness to 
debt covenant violation), without specifying whether the result could be 
interpreted from the efficient contracting, or the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective.  
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2.3.2 Opportunistic behaviour perspective  
In this section, two aspects of the opportunistic behaviour perspective are 
discussed, namely, managerial opportunism within contracts, and managerial 
opportunism without an explicit link with the contractual arrangements. 
Incentives for the opportunistic behaviour by managers include: to influence 
their own compensations, based on reported earnings (Christie and 
Zimmerman, 1994: 542; Francis et al., 1996: 123; Riedl, 2004: 828 and 833), 
to reduce the likelihood of being removed as a result of their companies‘ poor 
performance (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994: 542; Healy, 1996: 108), and to 
transfer wealth to shareholders from other stakeholders (Healy, 1996: 108).  
As noted in Section 2.3.1, managerial opportunism within contracts emerges 
from the contracting perspective. Taking the existing contracts as given, the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective posits that managers choose an 
accounting method to make themselves better off at the expense of other 
contracting parties (Holthausen, 1990: 208; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994: 
539).  
Prior studies generally employed proxies to capture managers‘ incentives in 
influencing companies‘ contractual arrangements, and they interpreted the 
result as providing evidence of managerial opportunism, driving the 
accounting choice (Skinner, 1993: 408). For example, in the case of a 
management compensation plan, Beatty and Weber (2006: 270) captured the 
effects of bonus compensation on the decisions to report goodwill impairment 
losses via a dichotomous variable, equal to one if a company has an earnings-
based bonus plan. They (p. 273) then regress the dependent variable (i.e. 
measures of accounting choice) on the dichotomous variable for a bonus plan. 
A negative relation between the two variables is interpreted by Beatty and 
Weber (2006: 259) as evidence of managers exercising an accounting choice to 
influence their compensation. In this instance, managerial opportunism 
includes transferring wealth from companies to the managers under 
managerial compensation contracts (Skinner, 1993: 416). In the case of debt 
covenant, managerial opportunism involved transferring wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders by the managers (Skinner, 1993: 416). 
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Apart from interpreting evidence of managerial opportunism within the 
contractual arrangements of companies, prior studies have also interpreted 
evidence of managerial opportunism without an explicit link with companies‘ 
contracts. In the context of asset write-offs and goodwill impairment, prior 
studies applied the opportunistic behaviour perspective by suggesting that 
managers take advantage of the discretion afforded by the standard (Francis 
et al., 1996: 118; Riedl, 2004: 849; Hilton and O‘ Brien, 2009: 181 and 201). 
Reasons for such managerial opportunism are explained in terms of the 
behaviour of incoming CEOs in reporting goodwill impairment losses soon after 
appointment (see Section 5.6.1), the behaviour of continuing CEOs in being 
less likely to report goodwill impairment losses (see Section 5.6.2), big bath 
reporting behaviour (see Section 5.6.3), and earnings smoothing activities (see 
Section 5.6.4). For all these reasons, the prior studies (e.g. Elliott and Shaw, 
1988; Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004) did not discuss the link between the 
behaviour of the CEOs and the contracts which may exist between the top 
managers and the company. Detailed discussion of the reasons for managerial 
opportunism is carried out in Section 5.6.  
2.3.3 Evaluation of agency theory  
La Porta et al. (1998: 471) and Claessens et al. (2000: 82) believed that the 
theoretical study of Jensen and Meckling (1976) was developed around the 
image of companies with disperse ownership. The idea of disperse ownership 
might be challenging to listed companies in Malaysia because these companies 
possess at least two characteristics distinct from listed companies in the 
developed economies, such as the US and UK. Firstly, listed companies in 
Malaysia are reported by prior studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998: 1147; Leuz 
et al., 2003: 516; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006: 1035) to have concentrated 
ownership (see Section 3.4). Secondly,  managers of Malaysian listed 
companies were observed to own a large portion of their companies‘ shares 
(Claessens et al., 2000: 103; Mohd Ghazali, 2004:192) (see Section 3.4).  
With concentrated ownership, the nature of the agency problem which exists 
in Malaysian listed companies might differ from those in developed 
economies, such as the US and UK. Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 754) argue that 
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compared to companies with disperse ownership, companies with 
concentrated ownership might face fewer agency problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and management. Niehaus (1989: 271-272) explains 
that when shareholders have a small stake in the companies in which they 
have invested, they have less incentive for monitoring the actions of 
managers, as the monitoring costs outweigh the benefits. However, as 
shareholders ownership claims increase, the benefits of monitoring managers 
tends to outweigh the costs (Niehaus, 1989: 271-272). 
On the other hand, Fan and Wong (2002: 405) argue that in companies with 
concentrated ownership, the nature of the agency problem might have shifted 
to a conflict between controlling owners (who are also the managers) and 
minority shareholders. This could occur when shareholders obtain a 
substantial portion of a company‘s shares, to the point where they acquire an 
effective control of the company (Fan and Wong, 2005: 405). Once the 
effective control is acquired, the conflict of interest shifted (Fan and Wong, 
2005: 405). Instead of a conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders, the conflict is between controlling and the minority 
shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002: 405).  
The potentially different nature of the agency problem faced by companies 
with concentrated ownership, compared to companies with dispersed 
ownership (discussed above), might affect the applicability of the contracting 
perspective and the opportunistic behaviour perspective. The applicability of 
these two perspectives will be examined in the measurement study (see 
Chapter 8) and the recognition study (see Chapter 9) of this thesis. 
With regard to managerial ownership, agency theory suggests that as an 
owner-manager‘s fraction of the equity falls, his claim on the outcome 
declines (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 313; Warfield et al., 1995: 62). This in 
turn creates incentives for him to pursue non-value maximising behaviour such 
as ‗shirking and perquisite taking‘ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 313; Warfield 
et al., 1995: 62). To restrict the manager‘s value-reducing behaviour when 
there is a separation of ownership and control, contracts which normally 
contain accounting-based constraints are established (Warfield et al., 1995: 
62).  
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Given that there is latitude in GAAP, managers tend to exercise an accounting 
choice to either alleviate the accounting-based constraints, or to benefit from 
the incentives available in the contracts (Warfield et al., 1995: 62 and 63). 
Therefore, lower managerial ownership is associated with an increase in 
companies‘ contractual constraints, which is often based on accounting 
numbers (Warfield et al., 1995: 65). Accordingly, this may lead to greater 
accounting choice being exercised by managers in order to relax the 
constraints or to capitalise on the incentives (Warfield et al., 1995: 65). Thus, 
it is possible that when managerial ownership is high, there may be less 
emphasis on the incentives contracts, leading to the contracting perspective 
being less applicable in explaining the accounting choices exercised by 
managers of Malaysian listed companies. 
The argument discussed above suggests that the ownership structures of 
companies, specifically, outside ownership concentration and managerial 
ownership, may well influence the accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies. By incorporating the 
ownership structures variables, it is hoped that a more complete model of 
accounting choices related to goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies is developed. 
2.4 Summary and conclusions  
This chapter has reviewed the literature on accounting choices by discussing 
the various definitions of accounting choice (in Section 2.2.1) and the gaps in 
the literature of prior studies in analysing asset write-offs and goodwill 
impairment (in Section 2.2.2). It has also reviewed two perspectives of 
accounting choice – the contracting perspective and the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective (in Sections 2.3.1, and 2.3.2), and discussed the 
applicability of the agency theory model to listed companies in the developing 
economy of Malaysia (in Section 2.3.3). The main conclusions of the chapter 
are as follows: 
Firstly, the review of the various definitions of accounting choice (in Section 
2.2.1) highlights that the definitions of accounting choice share a common 
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feature, in that, they emphasise the discretion exercised by managers. This 
helps the researcher to confine the scope of this thesis by focusing on the 
decisions made by managers of Malaysian listed companies in implementing 
FRS 3, focusing specifically on the disclosure, measurement, and recognition 
of goodwill impairment.  
Secondly, the review of prior studies analysing asset write-offs and goodwill 
impairment (in Section 2.2.2), demonstrates that there remains at least two 
gaps in the study of goodwill impairment. The first gap is that all of the 
published studies to date have focused on companies in developed economies, 
in particular US listed companies. Given that the contracting perspective and 
the opportunistic behaviour perspective were formulated by prior studies 
using data from developed economies, the lack of studies on accounting 
choices related to goodwill impairment in a developing economy highlights 
the need to investigate such an issue. 
The second gap in the literature is the lack of focus regarding companies‘ 
motives for reporting zero goodwill impairment. This leads this thesis to 
analyse both aspects of goodwill impairment, i.e. (i) motives for reporting 
goodwill impairment losses (in the measurement study – see Chapter 8); and 
(ii) motives for reporting zero goodwill impairment (in the recognition study – 
see Chapter 9). 
Thirdly, the review of companies‘ motivations for accounting choice as 
outlined by Fields et al. (2001) (in Section 2.2.3) helps in identifying the 
appropriate theoretical framework of accounting choice to be applied in this 
thesis. 
Fourthly, the review of the contracting perspective (in Section 2.3.1) and the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective (in Section 2.3.2) forms a basis for the 
development of the hypotheses in Chapter 5. Testing the hypotheses in 
Chapters 8 and 9 will provide empirical evidence for whether the contracting 
perspective and the opportunistic behaviour perspective are applicable in 
explaining the measurement and recognition of goodwill impairment by listed 
companies in a developing economy, in particular Malaysian listed companies.  
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Finally, the evaluation of agency theory (in Section 2.3.3) highlights that prior 
studies (i.e. La Porta et al., 1998: 471; Claessens et al., 2000: 82) took the 
view that the theoretical study of Jensen and Meckling (1976) had been 
developed around the image of companies with disperse ownership. 
Accordingly, this may affect the applicability of the contracting perspective 
and the opportunistic behaviour perspective among listed companies in 
Malaysia (in Chapters 8 and 9). The evaluation of the agency theory model 
also suggests that the ownership structures of companies may well influence 
the accounting choices exercised by Malaysian listed companies. The 
ownership structures of Malaysian listed companies will be discussed in 
Chapter 3, and the formulation of additional hypotheses related to the 
ownership variables in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3: Accounting for Goodwill in Malaysia 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 has provided a review of literature on accounting choices and the 
two perspectives of accounting choices, i.e. the contracting perspective, and 
the opportunistic behaviour perspective, to be applied in this thesis. As noted 
in that chapter, most of the prior studies analysing asset write-offs and 
goodwill impairment have focused on listed companies in developed 
economies, namely, the US, Canada, and UK. As this thesis is concerned with 
accounting choices related to goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian 
listed companies, the present chapter serves as an introduction to the 
financial reporting environment in Malaysia, both before and after the 
implementation of the FRS 3 Business Combinations.  
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it reviews the history of the 
development of an accounting standard on goodwill in Malaysia, prior to the 
implementation of FRS 3 Business Combinations. The review provides an 
insight into the issue of accounting for goodwill surrounding the Malaysian 
standard setters since the 1970s, and assists the researcher in forming an 
expectation regarding the possibility of accounting choices exercised by listed 
companies in Malaysia.  
Secondly, it discusses the regulatory bodies overseeing Malaysian listed 
companies‘ compliance with accounting standards. This review helps in the 
formulation of the hypotheses in Chapter 5 and the interpretation of the 
findings in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Thirdly, it discusses the ownership structures of Malaysian listed companies. 
This discussion provides insight into the applicability of the contracting 
perspective and the opportunistic behaviour perspective (reviewed in Chapter 
2) in explaining the accounting choices related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies. It also leads to the formulation of 
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additional hypotheses related to the ownership structures variables in Chapter 
5. 
This chapter is structured into five main sections including the introduction. 
Section 3.2 presents the history of the development of an accounting standard 
on goodwill in Malaysia, prior to the implementation of FRS 3. Section 3.3 
highlights the regulatory bodies overseeing companies‘ compliance with 
financial reporting standards, especially during the implementation of FRS 3. 
Section 3.4 discusses the distinctive ownership structures of Malaysian listed 
companies. Section 3.5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
3.2 History of the development of an accounting 
standard on goodwill in Malaysia  
This section aims to review the history of the development of an accounting 
standard on goodwill in Malaysia. It begins with the efforts of the standard-
setters in developing an accounting standard on goodwill (see Section 3.2.1), 
before continuing with objections to Malaysian Accounting Standard (MAS) 6 
Accounting for Goodwill (see Section 3.2.2), and ending with the setting up of 
the Financial Reporting Act 1997 (see Section 3.2.3). Understanding the 
history, assists the researcher in forming an expectation concerning the 
possibility for accounting choices related to goodwill impairment being 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies. 
3.2.1 Efforts of the standard setters in developing an 
accounting standard on goodwill 
In Malaysia, the development and issuance of financial reporting standards is 
the responsibility of an independent body known as the Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board (MASB), which was established in 1997 by the enactment of 
the Financial Reporting Act 1997 (MASB, Undated10). Prior to 1997, the 
issuance of accounting standards was the responsibility of a professional 
accounting body, the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants 
(MACPA) (Susela, 1999). Specifically, during the period 1958-1967, there was 
                                         
10 MASB (Undated). MASB profile. Retrieved on April 15, 2011 from 
http://www.masb.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=7  
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no legislation to regulate the accountancy profession (Ibid, p. 361). Only in 
1967, the Accountancy Act 1967 came into force, and the Malaysian Institute 
of Accountants (MIA) was established as a statutory body for the regulation of 
the accountancy profession (Ibid, p. 362).   
The discussion of accounting for goodwill in Malaysia emerged as early as 
1971, when the Central Bank of Malaysia requested that MACPA should look 
into companies‘ practices of accounting for goodwill (Susela, 1996). As noted 
in a letter dated September 10, 1971 sent by the Governor of the Central 
Bank to the President of MACPA: 
‗Generally, our Committee tends to view ―goodwill‖ with scepticism 
and I would like to have the assurance that the auditing profession 
would not support the valuation placed on goodwill without full 
confidence that it is fairly stated.‘ 
          (Susela, 1996: 332) 
From 1971 onwards, a number of initiatives were put in place to probe the 
issue of accounting for goodwill. Figure 3.1 shows the chronology of these 
initiatives. In 1971, a Technical Committee was set up by MACPA to address 
the various issues raised by the Central Bank, among which was the question 
of accounting for goodwill (Susela, 1996: 332). However, the issue related to 
goodwill was not addressed explicitly until 1987, when the two accounting 
professions - MACPA and MIA, initiated a joint effort on the subject (Ibid, p. 
335) (see Figure 3.1). The joint effort resulted in a discussion paper on 
accounting for goodwill, which was circulated to members of these two 
professional bodies (Ibid, p. 335). However, the feedback received from their 
members was so diverse that they decided to defer issuing an accounting 
standard on goodwill (Ibid, p. 335). 
In 1991, in the absence of an accounting standard on goodwill, the Capital 
Issue Committee (part of the Ministry of Finance11), decided to tackle the 
                                         
11 Capital Issue Committee is a regulatory body under the Ministry of Finance, which oversee 
the capital market in Malaysia prior to the establishment of the Securities Commission 
(Securities Commission, Undated). Frequently-Asked Questions. General information on the 
SC. Retrieved on April 9, 2011 from 
http://www.sc.com.my/eng/html/resources/faq/faqgeneral.html 
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issue of accounting for goodwill on its own initiatives by issuing guidelines on 
accounting for goodwill for Malaysian listed companies (Susela, 1996: 335). 
This action, plus the significant increase in the numbers of business 
acquisitions, pressured the two accounting bodies to reconsider the issue of 
an accounting standard on goodwill (Ibid, p. 335).  
Figure 3.1: Chronology of initiatives carried out by the Malaysian standard 
setter in issuing an accounting standard on goodwill 
Year Agenda 
 
1971 Technical Committee of MACPA 
- Goodwill standard was on the agenda of the committee. 
 
1987 Discussion paper on accounting for goodwill 
- A joint effort initiated by MACPA and MIA. 
 
1991 Capital Issue Committee (part of the Ministry of Finance) 
- Issued guidelines on accounting for goodwill. 
 
1992 Exposure draft - Malaysian Accounting Standard 6 (MAS 6) Accounting 
for Goodwill 
 
1993 Issued MAS 6 Accounting for Goodwill as a result of a joint effort of 
MIA and MACPA 
- The effective date of MAS 6 is for periods commencing on or after 
January 1, 1995. 
 
1994 MIA defers the implementation of MAS 6 to January 1, 1997 
 
1997 The enactment of the Financial Reporting Act (1997) and the 
establishment of the MASB 
 
1998 MAS 6 was not adopted by MASB as an approved accounting standards 
 
2000 MASB Exposure Draft 28 (MASB ED 28) issued for comments by 
February 2001 
 
2006 FRS 3 Business Combinations 
    
       Sources: Susela (1996); Tan (2000); MASB (2000, 2001, 2005, 2006a) 
Accordingly, the two accounting bodies assigned an academic (i.e. Tan, 1990) 
to study the accounting treatment of goodwill practised by companies listed 
on the main board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange for the reporting year 
ended 1990 (Susela, 1999: 336). Using annual reports published in 1990 and 
focusing on companies listed on the main board, the study, by Tan (1990), 
revealed that of the 276 companies examined, 155 had a goodwill accounting 
policy with three distinct accounting treatments (Susela, 1999: 365). 35% of 
the companies capitalised and amortised the goodwill, 34% treated it as a 
permanent item, and 27% used immediate write-off to reserves, with the 
remaining 4% employing other methods (Susela, 1999: 365). 
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In 1992, MIA and MACPA jointly published an exposure draft of accounting for 
goodwill - Malaysian Accounting Standard 6 (MAS 6) (Susela, 1996: 338). In 
April 1993, MAS 6 Accounting for Goodwill was issued as an accounting 
standard for goodwill with an effective date for periods commencing on or 
after January 1, 1995 (Ibid, p. 338). Among the key requirements of MAS 6 
were that purchased goodwill should be recognised as a fixed asset, and the 
amount should be amortised systematically through the Profit and Loss 
account (Susela, 1999: 359; Tan, 2000: 293). Further, the standard stipulated 
the amortisation period not to exceed 25 years, and that amortisation charges 
were to be treated as a normal expense (above the line of the operating 
income) (Tan, 2000: 293).  
3.2.2 Objections to Malaysian Accounting Standard 
(MAS) 6 Accounting for Goodwill  
Prior to its effective date, MAS 6 encountered objections from large Malaysian 
corporations and big-6 audit firms (Susela, 1999: 366 and 383). The main 
objections centred on the concerns for the socio-economic consequences of 
the accounting standard on Malaysian listed companies, consideration for the 
specific nature of the economy in Malaysia, and acceptance of the standard 
by the business community (Susela, 1999). Figure 3.2 depicts the detailed 
objections to MAS 6 documented by Susela (1999).  
Figure 3.2: Detailed objections to MAS 6 Accounting for Goodwill 
1. Socio-economic consequences of the standard 
 i. ‗we [Malaysian companies] are in the stage of experiencing growth 
and therefore, it might be too early to adopt the goodwill standard 
[MAS 6] as it might have a severe impact upon the profit of listed 
companies‘ cited in Susela (1999: 375). 
 
 ii. ‗goodwill amortisation would, in the absence of associated tax 
relief, hamper development of capital markets through its impact 
on reported earnings‘ cited in Susela (1999: 375). 
 
 iii. ‗Malaysian companies would be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage by the standard [MAS 6]‘ cited in Susela (1999: 375). 
 
2. Specific nature of the Malaysian economy 
 i. ‗it was the peculiar12 regulated environment in Malaysia that 
created huge goodwill accounting numbers, some portion of which 
                                         
12
 The peculiar regulated environment in Malaysia argued by the opponents of MAS 6 referred 
to licences such as stock-broking and broadcasting which were controlled and regulated by 
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might be represented by identifiable intangibles. MAS 6‘s 
amortisation requirements were problematic because they did not 
acknowledge that Malaysia was different‘ cited in Susela (1999: 
375-376). 
 
3. Acceptance by the business community 
 i. ‗Accounting standards should not be adopted that are not accepted 
by commerce and industry‘ cited in Susela (1999: 379). 
        
        Source: Based on Susela (1999) 
The objections raised by the large corporations induced MACPA to defer the 
approval of MAS 6. MIA, on the other hand, stood by its decision and 
implemented the standard in 1993 (Susela, 1996: 338; Susela, 1999: 359). 
Failing to persuade MIA to defer MAS 6, the large corporations pursued the 
issue with the Federation of Public Listed Companies (FPLC13), who then 
appealed the matter to the Ministry of Finance (Susela, 1996: 338). Susela 
(1996) noted that on page eight of the FPLC memorandum sent to MIA, the 
FPLC argues that: 
‗[T]he approach taken ignores business and economic realities - the 
amortised goodwill reduces the post-acquisition earnings, and is a 
disincentive to businessmen and entrepreneurs who assume significant 
risks in their investments, and discourages the growth of companies 
through mergers and acquisitions.‘  
(Susela, 1996: 349) 
At the end of 1994, increased pressure from the state compelled MIA to defer 
the implementation of MAS 6, initially until January 1, 1997 (Susela, 1996: 
338; Susela, 1999: 366), and then indefinitely (Tan, 2000: 307). To Susela 
(1996), the obstacles faced by the standard setter in issuing an accounting 
standard on goodwill showed that: 
                                                                                                                       
the Malaysian government (Susela, 1995: 352). Because in certain areas, no more licences 
would be granted by the government, these licences became very valuable, which lead to a 
high value of goodwill where companies had acquired the licences. Thus, the opponents 
argued that the standard setter should consider the accounting standard on intangibles before 
implementing an accounting standard for goodwill (Susela, 1996: 352). 
13 The Federation of Public Listed Companies (FPLC) is a non-profit organisation, whose 
members comprise companies listed on the Stock Exchange, as defined under the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 (FPLC, Undated). Retrieved on April 9, 2011 from 
http://www.fplc.com.my/FPLCv02/index.html 
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‗The case of the Goodwill Standard illustrates the attempts by the 
internal forces, the major corporations, to resist the urge to follow 
International Accounting Standards (which hitherto had been a major 
influence on the standard setting process) and instead defer the 
standard in consideration of the environmental issues raised.‘ 
Susela (1996: 148)  
3.2.3 Establishment of the Financial Reporting Act 1997 
In 1997, the Financial Reporting Act 1997 was established together with the 
setting up of the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) (MASB, 
Undated14). As a result, the Companies Act 1965 was amended to require 
compliance with the MASB-approved accounting standards (Susela, 1999: 366). 
In issuing the accounting standards, MASB has a convergence policy towards 
the International Accounting Standards (IASs) issued by the IASB (MASB, 2004). 
This means that the MASB approved accounting standards are based on those 
set by the IASB (formerly the International Accounting Standards Committee - 
IASC) with the wording in the IASB standards strictly maintained (MASB, 2004). 
Alterations to the IASB standards would only be made if there existed specific 
local issues which were not covered by the IASB, when there was a need to 
ensure compliance with Malaysian laws and regulations, or as an illustration to 
better understand the standards (MASB, 2004). In 1998, MASB adopted 24 
accounting standards issued by the former standard setters (i.e. MACPA and 
MIA) (Tan, 2000: 13). MAS 6 was not adopted (Tan, 2000: 13).  
A study undertaken by Abdullah et al. (2004), which investigated the 
accounting treatment of goodwill by Malaysian listed companies between 1996 
and 2000, documented that the three diverse accounting treatments for 
goodwill, as reported by Tan (1990) and discussed earlier in this section had 
reduced. Between 1996 and 2000, the majority of listed companies now 
capitalised and amortised goodwill. For example, in 1996, 64.8% of the 
companies (or 93 companies) amortised the goodwill. In 2000, the percentage 
                                         
14 MASB (Undated). MASB profile. Retrieved on April 15, 2011 from 
http://www.masb.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=7 
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of companies that capitalised and amortised goodwill increased to 68.8% (or 
106 companies). The remaining companies either capitalised and carried out 
an impairment review of the goodwill, or treated goodwill as a permanent 
item.  
In December 2000, MASB adopted IAS 22 Business Combinations and renamed 
it as MASB 21 Business Combinations (MASB, 2006: MASB 21). In paragraph six 
of MASB 21, it was stated that the standard on business combinations does not 
deal with accounting for goodwill or negative goodwill (MASB, 2006: MASB 21). 
The paragraph stipulated that the treatment for goodwill would be dealt with 
in a separate standard (MASB, 2006: MASB 21). The board explicitly stated in 
Appendix 1 of MASB 21 that compliance with the standard ensured conformity, 
in all material respects, with IAS 22 (revised) except for goodwill, reverse 
acquisition, and measurement of minority interest (MASB, 2006b: MASB 21).  
In 2001, MASB issued MASB ED 28 (MASB, 2001). This MASB exposure draft on 
goodwill was issued for comment by February 2001 (MASB, 2000). Among the 
key requirements of the Exposure Draft were: the treatment of purchased 
goodwill as an asset (paragraph 9); the treatment of goodwill subsequent to 
the initial recognition (paragraphs 32-47); and the disclosure requirements 
related to goodwill (paragraphs 55-58) (MASB 2001: MASB ED 28). In the case 
of the treatment of goodwill subsequent to initial recognition, the Exposure 
Draft proposed that goodwill should be carried at cost, less any accumulated 
amortisation and any accumulated impairment losses (paragraph 32) (MASB 
2001: MASB ED 28). As for the amortisation of goodwill, the Exposure Draft 
proposed goodwill to be amortised using a straight-line method with a 
rebuttable presumption that the useful life shall not exceed 20 years from the 
initial recognition (paragraph 33) (MASB 2001: MASB ED 28).  If the estimated 
useful life of goodwill exceeds 20 years from its initial recognition, the 
Exposure Draft proposed an annual impairment test of the goodwill (paragraph 
47) (MASB 2001: MASB ED 28). Both the amortisation and impairment loss of 
goodwill would be recognised as expenses (paragraph 35) (MASB 2001: MASB 
ED 28).  
According to the then Chairman of MASB, the Exposure Draft aimed to solve 
the ‗contentious issue of accounting for goodwill‘ (MASB, 2000). The Exposure 
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Draft was released to professional accountancy bodies, regulators, users, 
preparers, and other interested users and organisations for comment by 
February 20, 2001 (MASB 2001: MASB ED 28). However, the comment letters 
submitted to MASB cannot be analysed by the researcher. This is because, 
according to the Technical Director of MASB, the comment letters were not 
made publicly available due to the respondents‘ requests for confidentiality. 
MASB ED 28, which was intended to be issued on 1 July 2001, was withdrawn 
by the MASB (Abdullah et al., 2004). The standard setter reasoned that the 
Board wanted to adopt an approach which was similar to that of the IASB, 
that is, to combine goodwill into the Business Combinations standard.  
In January 2006, MASB approved 21 financial reporting standards issued by the 
IASB (MASB, 2005). Of these, 1815 were finalised and became effective for 
listed companies with annual period beginning on or after January 1, 2006 
(MASB, 2005). IFRS 3 Business Combinations which specifies the accounting 
treatment for goodwill was one of the 18 financial reporting standards 
adopted by MASB (MASB, 2005). IFRS 3 is a result of a joint effort between the 
IASB and the US FASB (see Section 4.2 for detail). In Malaysia, it was renamed 
as FRS 3, and, together with its two consequential standards (i.e. FRS 136 
Impairment of Assets and FRS 138 Intangible Assets), was made effective for 
business combinations on or after January 1, 2006 (MASB, 2005). The 
implementation of FRS 3 in 2006 provided listed companies in Malaysia with a 
specific accounting standard on goodwill, previously unavailable prior to 2006 
(Pillai, 2006). 
3.2.4 Implication of reviewing the history of the 
development of an accounting standard on 
goodwill in Malaysia  
The review of the history of the development of an accounting standard on 
goodwill in Malaysia (discussed in Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3 above) has two 
implications for this thesis.  
                                         
15 The three financial reporting standards which were deferred included FRS 117 Leases, FRS 
124 Related Party Disclosures, and FRS 139 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement (MASB, 2005). 
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Firstly, the review demonstrates that in Malaysia, accounting for goodwill has 
been an issue since the 1970s (see Section 3.2.1). The issue arose as large 
corporations objected to the publication of an accounting standard on 
goodwill and their objections reached the point of them lobbying the Ministry 
of Finance to defer the standard (see Section 3.2.2). As pointed out by Susela 
(1999: 379), the objections raised by these large corporations indicate that 
the acceptance of an accounting standard by the corporations was based on 
the suitability of the accounting method to the environment in which the 
organisations operated.  
Secondly, the review highlights that although there were numerous efforts put 
in place by standard setters in order to resolve the issue of accounting for 
goodwill, none has succeeded (see Section 3.2.1). The implementation of FRS 
3 in 2006 appears to have silenced the debate as companies are now required 
to comply with the FRSs (see Section 3.2.3). Nonetheless, given the history of 
companies resisting an accounting standard based on its suitability, it raises 
the question of whether companies are following the standard in good faith or 
whether they are taking advantage of the covert options available to 
managers during an impairment test of goodwill in order to get the desired 
result (see detailed discussion in Sections 4.4 and 4.4.2).  
A point of note is that although a review of the history is important for 
background information for this thesis, the findings, in particular the works of 
Susela (1999) and Abdullah et al. (2004) could not provide information 
concerning the reactions of the Malaysian listed companies toward the 
implementation of FRS 3 and FRS 136. Moreover, since the comment letters on 
MASB ED 28 (an exposure draft on accounting for goodwill) are not available 
for public viewing, there remains a gap in knowing the degree of acceptance 
of the Malaysian listed companies toward the implementation of FRS 3 and 
FRS 136. To address this gap, semi-structured interviews were carried out 
between June and July 2009, and these are discussed in the next section.  
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3.2.5 Background information obtained from semi-
structured Interviews  
The semi-structured interviews were designed to obtain the respondents‘ 
perspectives on the implementation of FRS 3 and FRS 136, focusing on an 
impairment test of goodwill. Four groups of respondents were targeted: 
finance managers, auditors, analysts, and standard setters. A list of open 
ended interview questions was designed and ethical approval to conduct the 
interviews was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the Accounting and 
Finance Department, University of Glasgow on March 17, 2009. Following this 
approval, 30 potential interviewees were contacted through formal 
gatekeepers and personal acquaintances. These potential interviewees were 
selected based on the existence of goodwill in the company and their 
expertise in the area. Of the 30 potential interviewees contacted, seven 
initially agreed to participate. However, one day prior to the interviews, 
three personnel cancelled their appointments. Thus, only four semi-structured 
interviews were carried out independently. These were interviews with a 
finance manager, a senior auditor, an analyst, and a former standard setter 
from the MASB. The interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed, and 
analysed. 
Due to the very low number of respondents, it was impossible to gain broad 
understanding of the implementation of accounting standards on goodwill (i.e. 
FRS 3 and FRS 136) via the findings generated from the semi-structured 
interviews. Consequently, the findings of the semi-structured interviews serve 
as background information, rather than forming the key results for this thesis. 
The findings have assisted the researcher in the following two ways. 
Firstly, the information gathered from the senior manager of a big-4 audit 
firm, the financial analyst, and the finance manager of Malaysian listed 
companies, suggests that when companies‘ market values are lower than the 
book values of their net assets within a year (i.e. there is a market 
capitalisation indication), that  situation requires careful consideration. This 
is because companies might consider the market capitalisation indication 
which occurs within a single year as a temporary phenomenon. This 
information has led the researcher to design a research setting which aims to 
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provide a much stronger market capitalisation indication that goodwill may be 
impaired. This is accomplished by selecting companies which have their 
market values lower than the book values of their net assets for three 
consecutive years instead of within a year (see Section 9.2.1). This research 
setting will be explored in the recognition study (see Chapter 9). 
Secondly, the semi-structured interviews provided insight into how a company 
identifies its cash-generating-units (CGUs) and the rationale for such 
identification. This information helped the researcher to better understand 
companies‘ disclosure of CGUs, i.e., in terms of identifying the number of 
CGUs disclosed by companies in their annual reports. Hence, the information 
assisted the researchers in the collection of data, in order to test the 
hypotheses related to the CGUs (see Section 5.8.1).  
3.3 Regulatory bodies overseeing the compliance with 
accounting standards of companies in Malaysia 
This section reviews the financial reporting environment surrounding 
Malaysian listed companies in order to assist in the interpretation of findings 
for the empirical chapters of this thesis (see Chapters 8 and 9). Ball et al. 
(2003: 236) argue that political forces such as the extent of involvement of 
regulatory bodies in enforcing accounting standards may affect the incentives 
of managers when producing companies‘ financial reports.   
In Malaysia, the regulatory bodies responsible for enforcing compliance with 
the approved accounting standards include the Registrar of Companies (under 
the Companies Act 1965), the Central Bank (under the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act 1989), and the Securities Commission (under the Securities 
Commission Act 1993) (MASB, Undated16). In the 1990s, Malaysia experienced 
a significant transformation in its financial reporting framework, with the 
government announcing its plan to establish a new financial accounting and 
reporting regime (Tan, 2000: 2-3). Consequently, on March 6, 1997, the 
Financial Reporting Act 1997 was passed together with the setting up of the 
                                         
16 MASB (Undated). Foreword to Financial Reporting Standards. Retrieved on April 17, 2011 
from 
http://www.masb.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=146%3Aforeword-
full-pg2&catid=9%3Aforeword&Itemid=23 
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Financial Reporting Foundation17 and MASB (MASB, Undated18; Tan, 2000).  
Thus, from 1997 onwards, the accounting standards issued by MASB became 
legal requirements (Susela, 1999: 366; Tan, 2000: 4). The enactment of the 
Financial Reporting Act 1997 also made it a statutory duty of companies‘ 
directors and managers to ensure that their financial statements complied 
with the MASB approved accounting standards (Tan, 2000: 4).  
With regards to companies listed on the Malaysian stock exchange (i.e. Bursa 
Malaysia), which is the focus of this thesis, the Securities Commission and the 
Bursa Malaysia each play a role in monitoring, and supervising companies‘ 
compliance with MASB approved accounting standards (Tan, 2000: 7 and 9). 
The Securities Commission, demonstrating its commitment to enforcement, 
revealed on its website, a list of court cases in which it had prosecuted 
directors of listed companies for the criminal offences related to furnishing 
misleading statements to the Securities Commission and to the Bursa Malaysia 
(Securities Commission, Undated19).  
Unlike the Securities Commission, which has the legal power to enforce 
compliance with MASB approved accounting standards, Bursa Malaysia is a 
private sector body incorporated to regulate companies listed on its exchange 
(Tan, 2000: 9). It has no legal authority to enforce compliance (Tan, 2000: 9). 
Nonetheless, the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements and Bursa Malaysia 
Rules empower the stock exchange to take enforcement actions for breaches 
of the requirements (Bursa Malaysia, Undated20). One of the Listing 
Requirements of the Bursa Malaysia is for companies to submit annual audited 
                                         
17 Among the primary roles of the Financial Reporting Foundation are to oversee the 
performance, financials and funding arrangements for the MASB (MASB, Undated). Retrieved 
on May 6, 2011 from 
http://www.masb.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=5 
18 MASB (Undated). Foreword to Financial Reporting Standards. Retrieved on April 17, 2011 
from 
http://www.masb.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=146%3Aforeword-
full-pg2&catid=9%3Aforeword&Itemid=23 
19 Securities Commission (Undated). Enforcement actions. Criminal prosecution initiated. 
Retrieved on April 5, 2011 from 
http://www.sc.com.my/main.asp?pageid=729&menuid=394&newsid=&linkid=2496&type= 
20 Bursa Malaysia (Undated). Enforcement overview. Retrieved on April 17, 2011 from 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/regulation/enforcement/overview.html 
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accounts, prepared in accordance with the MASB approved accounting 
standards (Tan, 2000: 9). 
The various regulatory bodies which exist in Malaysia, plus active monitoring 
by the Securities Commission and the Bursa Malaysia, suggest that strong 
regulatory enforcement is in place in Malaysia. In the context of companies 
implementing FRS 3, and focusing on goodwill impairment, such strong 
regulatory enforcement implies that listed companies in Malaysia have no 
choice but to comply with FRS 3.  
3.4 Ownership structures of listed companies in 
Malaysia 
Section 2.3.3 discusses briefly the applicability of the agency theory model of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) to Malaysian listed companies. This section 
continues the discussion by identifying two features of the ownership 
structure of Malaysian listed companies which distinguish the Malaysian 
context. 
Firstly, Malaysian listed companies are documented by prior studies (e.g. La 
Porta et al., 1998: 1147; Leuz et al., 2003: 516; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006: 
1035) to have concentrated ownership. For example, Leuz et al. (2003: 516) 
reported that during their period of study (1990 to 1999), the median 
shareholding of the largest three shareholders of listed companies in Malaysia 
was 52% while for the UK and US it was 15% and 12% respectively. Likewise, 
Mohd Ghazali‘s (2004) analysis of 87 Malaysian listed companies in 2001 
reported the median shareholding of the top 10 largest shareholders to be 
67.2%.  
Secondly, Malaysian listed companies are reported by prior studies (Claessens 
et al., 2000: 103; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006: 231) to be managed by 
their owners. As an illustration, Claessens et al. (2000: 103) observed that at 
the 20% cut-off levels, 67.2% of listed companies in Malaysia were in family 
hands, and 85% had the owner as the manager. 
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The two features of the ownership structure discussed above suggest that the 
ownership structures of Malaysian listed companies are not widely dispersed. 
Given the different features of the ownership structures which exists in the 
Malaysian listed companies compared to listed companies in developed 
countries, such as the US and UK, ownership structures will be examined in 
this thesis. Ownership concentration and managerial ownership will be further 
explored in developing the hypotheses (see Sections 5.7 to 5.7.2).  
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the history of the development of an accounting 
standard on goodwill in Malaysia, prior to the implementation of FRS 3 (in 
Section 3.2), and highlighted the regulatory bodies overseeing Malaysian listed 
companies‘ compliance with accounting standards (in Section 3.3). It has also 
discussed how the ownership structures of listed companies in Malaysia differ 
from listed companies in developed economies, such as the US and UK (in 
Section 3.4). The main conclusions of the chapter are as follows: 
Firstly, reviewing the history of the development of an accounting standard on 
goodwill in Malaysia (in Section 3.2) demonstrated that Malaysia has a specific 
history of accounting for goodwill. The specific history, that is, the objections 
to an accounting standard on goodwill prior to the implementation of FRS 3 
raised by large corporations, which lead to deferment of the standard 
indefinitely, indicates that the acceptance of an accounting standard by these 
large corporations was based on questions about the suitability of the 
accounting method to the environment in which the organisations operated.  
The review of the history (in Section 3.2.1) has also shown that prior to FRS 3, 
though numerous efforts were put in place by standard setters to resolve the 
issue of accounting for goodwill, none succeeded. The implementation of FRS 
3 in 2006 appears to have dismissed the issue as companies are now required 
to comply with the financial reporting standard. Nonetheless, given the 
history of companies resisting an accounting standard based on its suitability, 
it raises the question of whether companies are following the standard in good 
faith or whether they are taking advantage of the covert options available to 
 58 
managers during an impairment test of goodwill for their reporting incentives. 
This question leads to a discussion of the covert options available to managers 
in the next chapter (see Section 4.4.2). 
Secondly, the review of the regulatory bodies overseeing compliance with 
accounting standards in Malaysia (in Section 3.3) suggests that strong 
regulatory enforcement is in place in Malaysia. This implies that compliance 
with FRS 3 is not a choice. This information facilitates the formulation of 
hypotheses in Chapter 5 and the interpretation of the findings in Chapters 8 
and 9. 
Finally, the different ownership structures which exists between Malaysian 
listed companies and those listed companies in developed economies, such as 
the US or UK suggests a potentially different form of agency conflict might 
have occurred (in Section 3.4). By incorporating ownership structure 
variables, it is hoped that a more complete model of accounting choices 
related to goodwill impairment will be developed. This is particularly crucial 
when prior studies (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Claessens et al., 2000) argue 
that the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is based on the assumptions of 
companies with disperse ownership. Listed companies in Malaysia are found to 
have concentrated ownership. Thus, the investigation of Malaysian listed 
companies is expected to provide insight into the applicability of the agency 
theory, the contracting perspective, and the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective in explaining the accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment in a country with concentrated ownership. 
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Chapter 4: Discretion Available in IFRS 3 while 
Performing an Impairment Test of Goodwill 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 has reviewed the financial reporting environment in Malaysia both 
before and after the implementation of FRS 3 Business Combinations. The 
present chapter continues by reviewing the requirements of IFRS 321, focusing 
on an impairment test of goodwill. The purposes of the present chapter are 
twofold. Firstly, it describes the development of the IFRS 3 and FRS 3 in order 
to specify the phase of the FRS 3 which will be examined in this thesis. 
Secondly, it discusses three issues - the indications that an asset (goodwill) 
may be impaired, the judgements and estimates applied by managers in 
performing an impairment test of goodwill, and the weakness of the 
impairment test raised by few of the IASB board members, in order to 
describe the accounting choices related to goodwill impairment, which will be 
examined in this thesis. 
The chapter is structured into seven sections including the introduction. 
Section 4.2 describes the development phases of the IFRS 3 and FRS 3. Section 
4.3 proceeds with indications that an asset (goodwill) may be impaired. 
Section 4.4 discusses the judgements and estimates involve in measuring the 
recoverable amount of the cash-generating-units (CGUs) containing goodwill. 
Section 4.5 continues with a discussion of the critiques of the impairment test 
of goodwill highlighted by few of the board members of the IASB through their 
dissenting opinions. Section 4.6 discusses the accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment which will be examined in this thesis. Section 4.7 ends 
the chapter with a summary and conclusions. 
                                         
21 FRS 3 Business Combinations refers to Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business 
Combinations while IFRS 3 refers to the International Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business 
Combinations, issued by the IASB (see Figure 4.1). When a discussion revolves around the 
exact requirement of the standard, especially when the issues are stated in the Basis for 
Conclusion (not available in FRS 3), IFRS 3 is applied; when a discussion involves Malaysian 
environment, FRS 3 is applied. 
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4.2 Phases of the development of IFRS 3 and FRS 3 
Business Combinations 
The purpose of this section is to review the phases of the development of FRS 
3 in order to specify the phase of the FRS 3 and FRS 136 Impairment of Assets, 
examined in this thesis. 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations is the result of a joint effort between the IASB 
and the US FASB to improve financial reporting and promote an international 
convergence of accounting standards (IASB, 2010a: IFRS 3, IN1, A97). The joint 
effort was conducted in two phases, the first phase of the project resulted in 
the issuance of IFRS 3 by the IASB with an effective date of April 1, 2004; the 
second phase of the project led to a revised version of IFRS 3 by the IASB with 
an effective date of July 1, 2009 (IASB, 2010a: IFRS3, IN1, A97; IASB, 
Undated22). The issuance of IFRS 3 also led to a revision of its consequential 
standard, IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (IASB 2010b: IAS 36, IN2, A758). Figure 
4.1 shows the phases of the development, and revision of the IFRS 3 (FRS 3 in 
Malaysia) and the IAS 36 (FRS 136 in Malaysia) and their effective dates for 
both the IASB and the MASB. As of July 1, 2010, IFRS 3 has been revised twice 
and IAS 36 has been revised three times by the IASB (IASB, Undated).  
Although MASB has a convergence policy23 towards the IASs, the 
implementation dates of the MASB approved accounting standards differ from 
those of the IASB. As shown in Figure 4.1, in Malaysia, the effective dates for 
FRS 3 and FRS 136 were January 1, 2006 (MASB, Undated24). The first revision 
of FRS 3 (phase II) and the second revision of FRS 136 (phase II) became 
effective on July 1, 2010 (MASB, Undated). For this reason, the investigation 
of accounting choices related to goodwill impairment which will be examined 
                                         
22 IASB (Undated). Summaries of International Financial Reporting Standards. Retrieved on 
April 18, 2011 from http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs03.htm  
23 Convergence policy with IFRS means full compliance with IFRS as a basis for the financial 
reporting system in Malaysia. However, the term convergence is applied instead of adopt as 
the MASB follows a Malaysian due process and need to comply with the local legislation on 
financial reporting (MASB, Undated). Retrieved on August 16, 2012 from 
http://www.masb.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1685&Itemid=57 
24 MASB (Undated). Financial reporting Standards. Retrieved on April 19, 2011 from 
http://www.masb.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1476 
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in this thesis focuses on Malaysian listed companies implementing FRS 3 and 
FRS 136, from January 1, 2006 (i.e. phase I of the development as shown in 
Figure 4.1). The period of investigation is in the first three years of the 
implementation of FRS 3 (i.e. from 2006/7 to 2008/8 - see Figure 6.1 for 
detail). 
Figure 4.1: Phases of the IFRS 3 (FRS 3 in Malaysia) Business Combinations 
and IAS 36 (FRS 136 in Malaysia) Impairment of Assets 
 
 IASB MASB 
 
Business Combinations IFRS 3 FRS 3 
Phase I: 
 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations and related 
amended versions of IAS 36 and IAS 38 - IFRS 
3 supersedes IAS 22 
 
 
 
31 March 2004 
 
Effective date of IFRS 3  1 April 2004 1 January 2006 
 
Phase II: 
 
Exposure Draft of Proposed Amendments to 
IFRS 3 
- Addressed the guideline for applying the 
acquisition method. 
 
 
25 June 2005 
 
Revised IFRS 3 (2008) issued  
 
10 January 2008  
Effective date of IFRS 3 (2008) (Revised 1) 1 July 2009 1 July 2010 
 
Annual improvements:  
 
IFRS 3 amended for Annual Improvements to 
IFRSs 2010 
- Focus on the measurement of non-
controlling interests 
 
 
6 May 2010 
 
Effective date of May 2010 to IFRS 3 
(Revised 2) 
 
1 July 2010 1 July 2010 
   
Impairment of Assets 
 
IAS 36 FRS 136 
Exposure Draft E55 Impairment of Assets 
 
May 1997  
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 
 
June 1998  
Effective date of IAS 36 (1998) 
 
1 July 1999 
 
 
 
Phase I: 
 
IAS 36 Revised 
 
 
31 March 2004 
 
Effective date of March 2004 revisions to IAS 
36 (Revised 1) 
1 April 2004 
 
1 January 2006 
 
Phase II: 
IAS 36 amended for Annual Improvements to 
IFRSs 2007 about disclosure of estimates 
used to determine a recoverable amount, 
which is based on fair values less costs to 
sell 
 
22 May 2008  
Effective date of the May 2008 revisions to 1 January 2009 1 January 2010 
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IAS 36 (Revised 2) 
 
 
Annual improvements: 
 
IAS 36 amended for Annual Improvements to 
IFRSs 2009 about units of accounting for 
goodwill impairment testing using segments 
under IFRS 8 before aggregation 
 
 
16 April 2009 
 
Effective date of the April 2009 revisions to 
IAS 36 (Revised 3) 
 
1 January 2010 Has not been 
implemented at the date 
of writing (August 16, 
2012) 
 
4.3 Indications that an asset (goodwill) may be 
impaired 
This section aims to review indications that an asset25 (goodwill) may be 
impaired. The indications are outlined in IAS 36 Impairment of Assets in its 
paragraph 12. The review assists in identifying appropriate indicators of 
goodwill impairment to be examined in this thesis. 
IFRS 3 prohibits an amortisation of goodwill, and it requires companies to 
perform an impairment review annually, or more frequently if events or 
changes in circumstances indicate that the goodwill might be impaired, in 
accordance with IAS 36 (IASB, 2006c: IFRS 3, paragraph 55)26. The purpose of 
an impairment test of assets (inclusive of goodwill) is to ensure that the 
carrying amount of the assets reported on the balance sheet do not exceed 
                                         
25 According to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, the term asset applies equally to an individual 
asset or a cash-generating unit containing goodwill (IASB 2006: IAS 36, paragraph 7). In 
addition, in IFRS 3, when the standard discusses the issue of whether or not to permit choice 
in the accounting treatment for goodwill, the term asset is replaced with goodwill as follow 
‗entities should not be allowed a choice between approaches (a) [straight-line amortisation 
but with an impairment test whenever there is an indication that the goodwill might be 
impaired – in BC137] and (b) [non-amortisation but with an impairment test annually or more 
frequently – in BC137]. Permitting such choices impairs the usefulness of the information 
provided to users of financial statements because both comparability and reliability are 
diminished‘ (IASB, 2006c: IFRS 3, Basis for Conclusions, BC138). Therefore, in this thesis, 
when the discussion involves the requirement of the standard, similar to IAS 36 (paragraph 7), 
the following wording is applied - indications that an asset (goodwill) may be impaired. When 
the discussion deals specifically with research questions formulated in this thesis and the 
findings, the following wording is applied - indications that goodwill may be impaired.  
26 FRS 136 (paragraph 11) (similar to IAS 36, paragraph 11) prohibits an impairment loss 
recognised for goodwill in a previous period to be reversed [MASB, 2006(c)]. This means that 
goodwill once impaired cannot be reinstated. 
Source: IASB (Undated) and MASB (Undated) 
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their recoverable amount27 (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, paragraph 1; Ernst and 
Young, 2008: 1034). The IASC (the predecessor of the IASB) in its Basis for 
Conclusions acknowledges that a company ‗would use judgement in 
determining whether an impairment loss needed to be recognised‘ (IASB, 
2006c: IFRS 3, BCZ24). To limit the risk of an over-optimistic or over-
pessimistic estimation of the recoverable amount, IAS 36 provides safeguards 
in the form of a list of indicators that an asset (goodwill) may be impaired 
(IASB, 2006c: IFRS 3, BCZ24), though the standard emphasises that the list is 
not exhaustive (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, paragraph 13). 
The list of indicators, stated in paragraph 12 of the IAS 36 (equivalent to FRS 
136), are grouped into external and internal sources of information (see 
Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.2: Indications that an asset (goodwill) may be impaired as outlined 
in FRS 136 (2006: paragraph 12) 
 
 
External sources of information 
1. Market value of the asset declined significantly  
 
 - ‗During the period, an asset‘s market value has declined significantly more 
than would be expected as a result of the passage of time or normal use.‘ 
(MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12a) 
 
2. Significant changes with an adverse effect on the entity [Economic 
condition indication] 
 
- ‗Significant changes with an adverse effect on the entity have taken place 
during the period, or will take place in the near future, in the technological, 
market, economic or legal environment in which the entity operates or in the 
market to which an asset is dedicated.‘ 
(MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12b)  
 
3. Increased in the market interest rates  
 
- ‗Market interest rates or other market rates of return on investments have 
increased during the period, and those increases are likely to affect the 
discount rate used in calculating an asset‘s value in use and decrease the 
asset‘s recoverable amount materially.‘ 
 (MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12c) 
  
4. The market capitalisation indication 
‗The carrying amount of the net assets of the entity is more than its market 
capitalisation.‘ 
 (MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12d) 
 
Internal sources of information 
                                         
27
 The recoverable amount refers to the amount of cash flow which would be derived from 
the asset either from selling it at the present moment or from continuing using it in the 
future (Ernst and Young, 2008: 1034). 
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5. ‗Evidence is available of obsolescence or physical damage of an asset.‘ 
(MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12e)  
 
6. Significant changes with an adverse effect on the entity which affect 
the asset 
 
- ‗Significant changes with an adverse effect on the entity have taken place 
during the period, or are expected to take place in the near future, in the 
extent to which, or manner in which, an asset is used or is expected to be 
used. These changes include the asset becoming idle, plans to discontinue or 
restructure the operation to which an asset belongs, plans to dispose of an 
asset before the previously expected date, and reassessing the useful life of 
an asset as finite rather than indefinite‘. 
 (MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12f) 
 
7. ‗Evidence is available from internal reporting that indicates that the 
economic performance of an asset is, or will be, worse than expected.‘ 
 (MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12g) 
 
8. Dividend for an investment in a subsidiary, jointly controlled entity or 
associate    
 
- ‗Dividend from a subsidiary, jointly controlled entity or associate - for an 
investment in a subsidiary, jointly controlled entity or associate, the investor 
recognises a dividend from the investment and evidence is available that: (i) 
the carrying amount of the investment in the separate financial statements 
exceeds the carrying amounts in the consolidated financial statements of the 
investee's net assets, including associated goodwill; or (ii) the dividend 
exceeds the total comprehensive income of the subsidiary, jointly controlled 
entity or associate in the period the dividend is declared.‘ 
(MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12h) 
 
 
   Source: MASB (2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12) 
Turning to Figure 4.2, the researcher‘s views that of the eight indications 
provided by FRS 136, six indications (i.e. indications number 1, 3, 5-8) relate 
specifically to the assets. Information concerning these indications can only 
be accessed internally by the management. The remaining two indications 
relate to the economic environment in which the asset (goodwill) operates. 
These two indications are: the economic condition indication (i.e. number 2), 
and the market capitalisation indication (i.e. number 4). The market 
capitalisation indication will be further discussed in this chapter in identifying 
the recognition choice related to reporting goodwill impairment (see Section 
4.6.3.2) and will be explored in the recognition study (see Chapter 9). The 
researcher has attempted to explore the influence of the economic condition 
indication (indication number 2), i.e. the financial crisis which experienced by 
Malaysian listed companies in 2008. The result shows that the financial crisis 
has no influence on the decisions to report goodwill impairment. Due to words 
constraint, the result for the economic condition is not reported in this thesis. 
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With regards to the market capitalisation indication, according to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009: 1), if a company‘s market value is lower than 
the book value of the net assets (i.e. an existence of the market capitalisation 
indication) is not due to short term volatility in the market, the indicator 
represents one of the factors that can ‗potentially increase the risk for 
impairment‘. Ernst and Young (2011: 1083) added that the market 
capitalisation could possibly be a powerful indicator of impairment of assets 
(inclusive of goodwill). The audit firm notes that: 
‗Market capitalisation is, potentially a powerful indicator as, if it shows 
a lower figure than the book value of equity, it suggests the market 
considers that the business is overvalued.‘ 
 (Ernst and Young, 2011: 1083) 
Nonetheless, Ernst and Young (2011: 1083) noted that some CGUs may not be 
sensitive to the market capitalisation as an indicator. Thus, if the recoverable 
amount of the CGUs exceeds the market capitalisation, the audit firm 
suggested companies should disclose sufficient information to indicate the 
reasons for such a condition, as well as describing factors which may lead to 
impairment losses in the next year (Ernst and Young, 2011: 1083).  
To assess whether the market capitalisation indication is an appropriate proxy 
for an indication that goodwill may be impaired, information regarding 
companies‘ reasons for reporting goodwill impairment will be analysed by 
looking at companies‘ annual reports. Detail information of the investigation 
will be carried out in the disclosure study (see Section 7.2).  
4.4 Judgements and estimates involved in performing 
an impairment test of goodwill  
The purpose of this section is to discuss the judgements and estimates 
involved in performing an impairment test of goodwill. The discussion aims to 
shed light on specific areas where managers may exercise their judgements 
and estimates. The areas of discretion identified will be used to form relevant 
variables in developing the hypotheses in Chapter 5 (see Sections 5.8 to 
5.8.2.3).  
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Healy and Wahlen (1999: 366) argue that if financial reports are meant to 
convey information provided by managers about a company‘s performance, 
then accounting standards must allow managers to exercise judgement in 
producing such reports. This is because if managers are considered to be 
experts in the field (i.e. with regard to their company‘s performance), then, 
the judgements they exercise will enable them to produce financial reports 
which reflect the underlying economic values of their company (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999: 366). Nonetheless, because auditing is imperfect, the use of 
judgements also creates an avenue for managers to manipulate company‘s 
earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 366) if they have the motive to do so.  
In the case of goodwill impairment, if managers have an incentive to 
overstate or understate goodwill impairment losses, they can be selective in 
applying estimates and judgements while performing an impairment test of 
goodwill (Guler, 2007: 11; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 169 and 180). Ernst and 
Young (2007: 1) identify two areas in an impairment test of assets (inclusive 
of goodwill) under IAS 36 which require managers to apply judgements and 
estimates. These are: in identifying CGUs in order to allocate goodwill 
acquired in business combinations, and in determining the recoverable 
amount of assets (inclusive of goodwill) (Ernst and Young, 2007: 1). The next 
two sections discuss the identification of CGUs (in Section 4.4.1) and the 
judgements and estimates in determining the recoverable amount of CGUs (in 
Section 4.4.2) respectively. 
4.4.1 Identification of cash-generating-units
28
 (CGUs) 
for an allocation of goodwill 
IAS 36 acknowledges that the identification of CGUs requires judgements to 
be made (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, paragraph 68; Ernst and Young, 2010: 7). This is 
because the identification process is influenced by how the business operation 
is monitored by managers, for example, should CGUs be based on product 
lines, business, or regional areas (Ernst and Young, 2010: 7).  
                                         
28 A cash-generating-unit is the smallest identifiable group of assets that generates cash 
inflows that are largely independent of the cash inflows from other assets or groups of assets 
(IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, paragraph 6). 
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Thus far, no studies have explored the relationship between how companies 
identify CGUs and their decisions in reporting goodwill impairment. Rather, 
what has been analysed is the number of CGUs and the decisions to report 
goodwill impairment losses (i.e. AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 179) argue that companies with multiple CGUs have greater 
flexibility in allocating their goodwill. Managers of companies with multiple 
CGUs could exploit the number of CGUs by accelerating, avoiding or 
understating reporting goodwill impairment losses (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 
179-180). For examples, to accelerate goodwill impairment losses, managers 
could allocate a large portion of the purchased goodwill to those CGUs that 
are anticipated to decline in value; and to avoid or understate goodwill 
impairment losses, the managers could allocate the purchased goodwill to 
CGUs that are anticipated to rise in value (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 180). 
Similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), this thesis will analyse the number of 
CGUs and the decisions to report goodwill impairment losses (see Section 
5.8.1). 
4.4.2 Judgements and estimates involved in 
determining the recoverable amount of CGUs 
In determining the recoverable amount of assets (inclusive of goodwill), 
managers are required to use assumptions and estimations (Ernst and Young, 
2007: 1). Nobes (2006: 240) and Kvaal and Nobes (2010: 185) consider such 
assumptions and estimations to be ‗covert options‘. Kvaal and Nobes (2010: 
185) elaborate that the covert options include the managers‘ computation of 
cash flows in arriving at the recoverable amount of assets (inclusive of 
goodwill), and in applying appropriate discount rates to the cash flow 
computed.  
In the case of goodwill, when computing the recoverable amount of CGUs 
containing goodwill, a company has to choose the higher of fair value less 
costs to sell and value-in-use of the CGUs (MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 
74). In this thesis, managers‘ use of judgement in applying fair value less costs 
to sell will not be explored. This is because a study carried out by Carlin et al. 
(2009: 83 and 97), analysing the disclosure of goodwill impairment by 36 top 
Malaysian listed companies which implemented FRS 3 in 2006, revealed that 
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none of these companies disclosed that they had applied fair value less costs 
to sell exclusively as a basis of the recoverable amount. The managers‘ use of 
judgement in the value-in-use will be explored in this thesis.  The next 
paragraphs discuss the application of value-in use. 
In calculating the value-in-use of CGUs containing goodwill, managers are 
required to estimate expected cash flows from the continuing use of the 
assets, and to discount the cash flows to present value using the pre-tax 
discount rate (MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 31; Ernst and Young, 2007: 
7). Managers‘ expectations concerning possible variation in the value-in-use 
may be reflected, either through adjustment to the forecasted cash flow or 
the discount rate (FRS 136, paragraph 30-32). 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008: 8), both the expected cash flows 
and discount rate are important factors in determining whether there is any 
impairment loss. In forecasting the cash flows, managers have to make a 
number of assumptions and estimations, e.g. about forecast sales volume and 
profit margins (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008: 8). Likewise, the discount rate 
which is applied by managers in computing the value-in-use does not come 
from application of a simple formula (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008: 8). 
Rather, the estimation of the discount rate requires managers to exercise 
judgement based on the overall valuation exercise (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2008: 8). A change in the discount rate will have an impact on the recoverable 
amount (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008: 3). 
Ideally to identify whether companies have over-estimated or under-
estimated the calculation of the value-in-use, one would examine both the 
specific forecasted cash flows and the estimated discount rate employed. 
Nonetheless, the specific forecasted cash flows which are computed by 
companies in arriving at the value-in-use are not disclosed in annual reports. 
As a result, the analysis of the value-in-use is confined to the application of 
the discount rate. Thus, the discount rates will be employed as a test variable 
in formulating the hypotheses in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.8.2).  
Additionally, in an attempt to identify the possibility of estimating the cash 
flow from the segment data, this thesis will explore whether the segment 
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result could be employed as a proxy for an indication that goodwill may be 
impaired (see Sections 6.5.2.2 and 7.3.3). 
4.5 Dissenting opinions regarding an impairment test 
of goodwill 
This section discusses the dissenting opinions of a few of the IASB members 
concerning an impairment test of goodwill. The discussion seeks to highlight 
the weakness of the impairment test and hence points to the possibility of 
companies exercising accounting choices related to goodwill impairment. 
IFRS 3 was approved by 12 of the 14 board members; two board members 
dissented from the issuance of the standard (IASB, 2006c: IFRS 3, p. 309). 
Simultaneously, IAS 36 was approved by eleven members with three board 
members dissenting (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, p. 1496). The key point which 
materialises through the dissenting opinions, both in the IFRS 3 and IAS 36, is 
that with the abolition of the amortisation of goodwill, the impairment test of 
goodwill implemented in IAS 36 does not meet the requirement of a ‗rigorous 
and operational impairment test‘ (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, 
Dissenting opinions, DO3; IFRS 3, Basis for Conclusions, DO14).  
Specifically, two board members, namely, Messrs Cope and Leisenring were of  
the view that ‗a more rigorous effort must be made to determine the 
recoverable amount of goodwill‘ (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, 
Dissenting opinions, DO4). They agreed with the idea in the Exposure Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to IAS 36 which requires companies to carry out a two-
step approach in the impairment test of goodwill (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis 
for Conclusions, Dissenting opinions, DO4). This approach is based on the two-
step approach in SFAS 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, which is 
applied by US listed companies (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, 
BC167b). In step one of the approach, a company is required to compare the 
recoverable amount of the CGUs to which goodwill is allocated with its 
carrying amount (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36 BC, BC160). If the carrying amount 
exceeds the recoverable amount, a company is required to proceed to the 
second step. In step two, a company must determine the fair value of each 
identifiable asset, liability, and contingent liability within the CGUs (IASB, 
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2006b: IAS 36 BC, BC163). Nonetheless, because of the complexity and costs 
of applying the two-step approach which outweigh its benefits, the IASB 
decided to retain the one-step approach as applied in the previous version of 
IAS 36 (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC170). 
In addition to the two-step approach of an impairment test of goodwill 
discussed above, the IASB has also considered a subsequent cash flow test as a 
solution to improve the reliability of an impairment test of goodwill (IASB, 
2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC194). This subsequent cash flow test, 
applied in the UK under FRS 11 Impairment of Fixed Assets and Goodwill 
(IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC194) is meant to correct the 
cash flow estimate applied in the computation of the value-in-use (IASB, 
2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, Dissenting opinions, DO8). It helps in 
safeguarding ‗against over-optimism in the estimation of cash flows‘ (IASB, 
2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, Dissenting opinions, DO10).  
However, the test was not accepted by the board members for two reasons 
(IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC198). Firstly, the IASB explains 
that the focus of the impairment test should be on avoiding companies with 
excessive write-downs (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, Dissenting 
opinions, DO9). The IASB clarifies: 
‗[T]he greater risk to the quality of financial reporting might be from 
entities trying to write-off goodwill without adequate justification in an 
attempt to ‗manage‘ the balance sheet.‘  
(IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC197).  
Thus, the IASB claims that any subsequent cash flow test is misdirected (IASB, 
2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, DO9).  
The second reason for rejecting the subsequent cash flow test is because the 
IASB views that the test could become extremely burdensome, especially for 
companies with a large number of CGUs (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for 
Conclusions, BC197 (c)). If the test was required, these companies would have 
to re-perform the cash flow test every year within a five year period (IASB, 
2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC197 (c)). 
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In the end, the IASB decided to ‗explore improving the reliability of 
impairment test of goodwill through disclosure requirements‘ (IASB, 2006b: 
IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC198). This was done by requiring companies to 
disclose enough information to allow users to evaluate the reliability of the 
impairment test and at the same time maintaining an appropriate balance in 
the magnitude of the disclosures (IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, 
BC208). 
The dissenting opinions discussed above have two implications for this thesis. 
Firstly, the comments raised by the board members of the IASB regarding the 
lack of rigour in the impairment test of goodwill suggest that there is a lack of 
a strong control mechanism, such as the two-step approach and the 
subsequent cash flow test put in place by the IASB under its IAS 36 
Impairment of Assets. Relying on an impairment-only approach as a way of 
ensuring that the carrying amount of goodwill reported on the balance sheet 
does not exceed its recoverable amount, and at the same time allowing 
managers to exercise judgements and estimates (see Section 4.4) without a 
strong control mechanism in place, may possibly create an avenue whereby 
managers can exercise accounting choices related to goodwill impairment, 
especially if they have the motive to do so. 
The second implication of the review is that, in issuing IFRS 3 and revising IAS 
36, IASB relies on companies‘ disclosure to police the measurement rules 
related to goodwill impairment, rules which they do not impose (i.e. the two-
step approach of an impairment test or the subsequent cash flow test). This 
leads this thesis to examine (in Chapter 7)  whether disclosure would be able 
to provide enough information concerning a company‘s reasons for reporting 
goodwill impairment and thus provide empirical evidence on whether the 
actions of the IASB and thus the MASB in relying on companies‘ disclosure is 
successful or not (see Section 10.4.4).  
4.6 Accounting choices related to goodwill impairment 
after the implementation of FRS 3 
The purpose of this section is to specify accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment which will be examined in this thesis. This section covers 
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three areas. Section 4.6.1 discusses the notion of accounting choices which 
cannot be directly observed but exists in the form of the implementation 
decisions. Section 4.6.2 discusses the process of identifying the accounting 
choice. Section 4.6.3 discusses the accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment, which will be investigated in the measurement study (in Section 
4.6.3.1) and the recognition study (in Section 4.6.3.2).  
4.6.1 Implementation decisions as accounting choices 
related to goodwill impairment 
The implementation of IFRS 3 resulted in an impairment-only approach in 
accounting treatment for acquired goodwill (IASB, 2006c: IFRS 3, Dissenting 
opinions, DO10). One of the stated reasons for adopting the approach is 
because in formulating the IFRS 3, the IASB intends that a company should not 
be allowed the previous explicit choice between two accounting methods for 
the acquired goodwill. The IASB expresses the view that: 
‗[E]ntities should not be allowed a choice between approaches (a) 
[straight-line amortisation but with an impairment test whenever there 
is an indication that the goodwill might be impaired] and (b) [non-
amortisation but with an impairment test annually or more frequently]. 
Permitting such choices impairs the usefulness of the information 
provided to users of financial statements because both comparability 
and reliability are diminished.‘ 
 (IASB, 2006c: IFRS 3, Basis for Conclusions, BC138) 
This view regarding goodwill is consistent with the aim of the IASB in general, 
which is ‗not to permit choices in the accounting treatment‘ (IASB 2006a: 
Preface to International Financial Reporting Standards, paragraph 13). The 
impairment-only approach required by IFRS 3 implies that there is no longer a 
choice of accounting method related to ‗subsequent accounting for goodwill‘ 
exercised by companies.  
On the other hand, three issues discussed in this thesis suggest that it is 
possible for companies to exercise accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment. Firstly, the definition of accounting choice offered by Fields et 
al. (2001: 256) and the review of the various definitions of accounting choice 
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in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.1) suggest that accounting choice exists not only 
through the selection of accounting methods but also via implementation 
decisions. The implementation decisions, according to Francis (2001: 311) in 
her review of the definition provided by Fields et al. (2001), include estimates 
and judgements applied by managers in implementing GAAP. The view of 
Francis (2001: 311) concerning the estimates and judgements is in line with 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994: 149) who see the estimates and judgements 
exercised by managers as ‗management choices‘ (see Section 2.2.1).  
Secondly, the review of the requirements of IFRS 3, focusing on issues related 
to an impairment test of goodwill, shows that managers are given discretion 
to apply their assumptions and judgements, especially in determining the 
recoverable amount of assets (inclusive of goodwill) (see Section 4.4). 
Commenting on IAS 36, Nobes (2006: 240) and Kvaal and Nobes (2010: 185) 
indicate that IAS 36 is one of the IFRSs that include ‗covert options‘ (see 
Section 4.4.2). Kvaal and Nobes (2010) note: 
‗[T]here are several covert options and estimations in the issue of 
impairment, such as whether to recognise impairments, how to 
measure cash flows, and what discount rate to use.‘ 
(Kvaal and Nobes, 2010: 185) 
Thirdly, the review of the dissenting opinions regarding the impairment test 
of goodwill (in Section 4.5) points to the lack of a control mechanism, such as 
the two-step approach and the subsequent cash flow test put in place by the 
IASB in its IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, after the prohibition of an 
amortisation of goodwill. 
The above issues suggest that, although there is no longer an explicit choice 
of accounting method after the implementation of IFRS 3, there are covert 
options and estimations available to managers performing an impairment test 
of goodwill. Given the lack of strong control mechanism put in place in the 
impairment test of goodwill after the impairment-only approach as required 
under IFRS 3 (see Section 4.5), there could possibly be a scope for managers 
to exercise accounting choices in the form of the implementation decisions if 
they have the motive to do so. For example, to prevent debt covenant 
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violations (see Section 5.5), managers could allocate goodwill to a high growth 
CGUs (see Section 4.4.1) and thus report zero goodwill impairment.  
4.6.2 Process of identifying accounting choices related 
to goodwill impairment after the implementation 
of FRS 3 
Figure 4.3 presents a flowchart to enable a researcher to identify accounting 
choices related to goodwill impairment. The figure illustrates two phases that 
are involved in identifying the accounting choice. The first phase is when 
companies perform an impairment test of goodwill by comparing the 
recoverable amount of a CGU containing goodwill with the carrying amount of 
that unit. This gives the initial result of the impairment test. However, at this 
phase, the result is not disclosed in the annual report and hence not made 
publicly available.  
The second phase is when managers decide how they wish to report the result 
(obtained in the first phase) in the income statement. In this second phase, 
routes 1 and 2 portray situations in which there is no accounting choice 
exercised that conflicts with the expectations of the accounting standard. 
This is because the goodwill impairment reported immediately in the income 
statement (in Phase II) reflects the result of the initial impairment test (in 
Phase I). For example, in route 1, by reporting goodwill impairment losses 
immediately in the income statement when the result of the impairment test 
shows that the recoverable amount of the CGUs is lower than the carrying 
amount of the unit, the company is following the requirement of FRS 136. 
Similar reasoning applies to route 2 where the company reports zero 
impairment, consistent with FRS 136, as the recoverable amount is higher 
than the carrying amount. 
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Figure 4.3: An ideal flowchart to identify accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment 
 
 
 
 
GWIL(0) denotes Zero goodwill impairment reported on the income statement  
 
GWIL(IL) denotes Goodwill impairment losses reported on the income statement     
 
CGU denotes Cash-generating-unit 
Accounting choice, which is in the form of implementation decisions, comes 
into the picture when the managers decide to report zero goodwill 
impairment in the income statement (i.e. route 4 in Phase II) although the 
result that they obtain in Phase I indicates that they should report goodwill 
impairment losses. With this decision, the managers would then revisit the 
initial calculation obtained in Phase I in order to record an appearance of 
route 2 in Phase II. Similarly, accounting choice would occur when managers 
make a decision to report goodwill impairment losses in the income statement 
(i.e. route 3 in Phase II) even though the result that they obtain in Phase I 
indicate that they should report zero goodwill impairment. These choices are 
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not disclosed openly because the managers revisit the initial calculation to 
use different estimates. 
Figure 4.3 highlights two important points. Firstly, there are two types of 
accounting choice related to goodwill impairment which could be exercised by 
Malaysian listed companies which implemented FRS 3. These are: (i) 
accounting choice related to reporting a zero goodwill impairment in the 
income statement when there should be an impairment loss reported, and (ii) 
accounting choice related to reporting a goodwill impairment losses in the 
income statement when there should be a zero  impairment reported.  
Secondly, if a company discloses the recoverable amount and the carrying 
amount of the CGUs in the annual reports (i.e. the result of the impairment 
test in Phase I), identifying accounting choices related to goodwill impairment 
becomes a straightforward process. However, such disclosure is not the case. 
The Exposure Draft of the revised IAS 36 included a disclosure requirement 
whereby companies were required to disclose the ‗amount by which the unit‘s 
recoverable amount exceeds its carrying amount‘ [IASB, 2002: Exposure Draft 
of Revised IAS 36, C69(c), 151]. However, the proposal was not accepted, as 
the IASB was concerned about the comments made by the respondents to the 
Exposure Draft and the field visit participants that disclosing the values would 
cause significant commercial harm to companies [IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis 
for Conclusions, BC 207(b)]. For example, users of financial statements might 
use the quantitative disclosure as a basis for initiating litigation against 
companies in cases where the assumptions stated in the financial statement 
are inaccurate [IASB, 2006b: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC 207 (b)].  
Because the information concerning the amount by which the unit‘s 
recoverable amount exceeds its carrying amount (see Phase I of Figure 4.3) is 
not disclosed in the annual reports, identifying accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment is a challenging task. Sections 4.6.3 to 4.6.3.2 discuss 
accounting choices related to goodwill impairment, which will be investigated 
via both the measurement and the recognition studies. 
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4.6.3 Researching accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies after the implementation of FRS 3  
This section discusses the accounting choices related to goodwill impairment 
which will be researched in the measurement study (see Section 4.6.3.1) and 
the recognition study (see Section 4.6.3.2).  
4.6.3.1 Measurement study related to goodwill 
impairment  
IASB in its Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements defines measurement as ‗the process of determining the monetary 
amounts at which the elements of the financial statements are to be 
recognised and carried in the balance sheet and income statement‘ (IASB, 
2006d: Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements, paragraph 99). Based on this definition, the measurement study 
of this thesis focuses on the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses divided 
by prior year total assets (including goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on 
the income statement (see Section 1.3).  
Analysing the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses (discussed above) is an 
approach which has been employed by prior studies in analysing asset write-
offs in the 1980s to 1990s, when an accounting standard on long-lived assets 
in the US did not provide clear guidance on the timing and magnitude of 
assets write-off (Francis et al., 1996: 117) or when the standard (i.e. SFAS 
12129) requires ‗inherently subjective estimates and assumptions‘ (Riedl, 
2004: 824). Francis et al. (1996: 117), for example, argue that during the 
period of their study (i.e. 1989-1992), the absence of clear guidelines allowed 
managers of US listed companies substantial discretion in terms of the timing 
and magnitude of asset write-offs. Additionally, Riedl (2004: 850) opines that 
the ‗highly subjective estimates and assumptions‘ required by SFAS 121, could 
be one of the possible reasons for the asset write-offs of 1306 US listed 
                                         
29 SFAS 121: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 121: Accounting for the 
Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets, issued in 1995. 
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companies from 1995-1998 which he analysed (post-SFAS 121) as not 
reflecting the underlying economic values of the companies.  
In this thesis, the rationale for undertaking a measurement study of goodwill 
impairment may be explained as follows. After requiring companies to rely on 
an impairment-only approach as a way of safeguarding the goodwill balance 
(see Section 4.5), would the lack of a strong control mechanism in FRS 3 and 
FRS 136 on the impairment test of goodwill allow managers to be selective in 
their judgements and estimates in deciding the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses reported, should they have the motive to do so. Thus, the 
measurement study represents an indirect test of an accounting choice, in the 
sense that it neither identifies the accounting choices exercised nor tests the 
choice directly. Rather, the accounting choices exercised are inferred, based 
on companies‘ hypothesised motives in reporting goodwill impairment. For 
example, if a company‘s magnitude of goodwill impairment loss is influenced 
by earnings smoothing activity, in that, the larger the positive earnings 
surprise, the larger the magnitude of goodwill impairment loss reported, then 
in this case, there is a possibility for the company to exercise an accounting 
choice by reporting a  goodwill impairment loss (see Section 5.6.4).  
4.6.3.2 Recognition study related to goodwill 
impairment 
IASB, in its Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements, defines recognition as ‗the process of incorporating in the 
balance sheet or income statement an item that meets the definition of an 
element and satisfies the criteria for recognition set out in paragraph 83‘ 
(IASB, 2006d: Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements, paragraph 82). Based on this definition, the recognition study of 
this thesis focuses on decisions made by companies on whether to incorporate 
goodwill impairment losses or zero goodwill impairment in the income 
statement.  
Following on this definition, to identify the recognition choice related to 
reporting goodwill impairment, the researcher makes use of the market 
capitalisation indication as discussed in Section 4.3. This is accomplished by 
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replacing the information in Phase I of Figure 4.3 with the market 
capitalisation indication (i.e. a situation when a company‘s market value falls 
below the book value of the net assets at the balance sheet date). Figure 4.4 
illustrates the identification of this recognition choice. Thus, except for the 
market capitalisation indication, Figure 4.4 is similar to Figure 4.3 in its 
portrayal of two types of accounting choice – accounting choice related to 
reporting a zero goodwill impairment, and accounting choice related to 
reporting a goodwill impairment loss. The market capitalisation indication has 
been employed by prior studies (with slight modification) in analysing goodwill 
impairment of US listed companies (see Section 2.2.2), for example, Guler 
(2007) and Ramanna and Watts (2012). 
Figure 4.4: Identification of recognition choices related to reporting 
goodwill impairment using the market capitalisation indication 
 
 
GWIL(0) denotes Zero goodwill impairment reported on the income statement  
 
GWIL(IL) denotes Goodwill impairment losses reported on the income statement     
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Using the market capitalisation indication, the researcher argues that it is 
possible for companies to be regarded as exercising recognition choices when 
they are not following the market capitalisation indication. For the 
recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment, companies 
are considered to be exercising choice when their market capitalisation 
indications indicate that they should report goodwill impairment losses yet 
they report zero goodwill impairment (route 4). For the recognition choice 
related to reporting goodwill impairment loss, companies are considered to be 
exercising choice when they have no market capitalisation indication yet they 
report goodwill impairment losses in the income statement (route 3).  
As noted in Section 3.2.5, semi-structured interviews with a senior manager in 
a big-4 audit firm, a financial analyst, a former standard setter, and a finance 
manager of a Malaysian listed company were carried out by the researcher at 
the early stage of the PhD study. The information gathered from the 
interviews suggest that for Malaysian listed companies, when the market 
values of companies are lower than the book values of their net assets within 
a single year, the market capitalisation indication might be considered by 
companies to be a temporary phenomenon. Accordingly, companies may not 
refer to the market capitalisation indication in reporting goodwill impairment. 
To create a stronger market capitalisation indication that goodwill may be 
impaired, instead of applying market capitalisation indication which occur 
within a year, the researcher focuses on market capitalisation indication 
which occur for three consecutive years.  
Applying the market capitalisation indication for three consecutive years, a 
specific scenario which aims at testing the recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment is constructed. In this scenario, companies 
which have their market values lower than the book values of their net assets 
for three consecutive years are selected (i.e. the market capitalisation 
indication persists for three consecutive years). Within this group, companies 
which recognised zero goodwill impairment are considered to be exercising 
the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. They 
are tested against a control group of companies which faced similar conditions 
but reported goodwill impairment losses at the end of the third year. In this 
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scenario, there are 132 companies (before missing values) which have market 
values below the book values of their net assets for three consecutive years, 
with 96 companies recognising zero goodwill impairment for three consecutive 
years and 36 companies recognising goodwill impairment losses at the end of 
year 3. This scenario will be tested in the recognition study (see Section 9.2.1 
for detail). 
Ideally, the recognition choice related to reporting goodwill impairment losses 
should be tested as well by selecting companies which have their market 
values higher than the book values of their net assets for three consecutive 
years. However, the number of companies which recognised goodwill 
impairment losses in this scenario is too small (i.e. only two companies30) 
which renders this thesis unable to examine the recognition choice related to 
reporting goodwill impairment losses. 
Unlike the measurement study which represents an indirect test of accounting 
choices related to goodwill impairment, the recognition study attempts to 
test the accounting choice directly. This is done by analysing companies‘ 
decisions in going against the market capitalisation indication by recognising 
zero goodwill impairment. Thus, the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment is defined as follow: 
The decisions made by managers in term of their judgements and 
estimates employed during an impairment test of goodwill which lead 
them to recognise zero goodwill impairment when their market values 
are below the book values of their net assets for three consecutive 
years. 
 
4.7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the requirements of IFRS 3, focusing on the 
impairment test of goodwill. The main conclusions of the chapter are as 
follow. 
                                         
30 There are 17 companies which have market values below the book values of their net assets 
for two consecutive years and reported goodwill impairment losses.  
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Firstly, the review of the phases of the development of IFRS 3 (in Section 4.2) 
has specified the phase of FRS 3 Business Combinations (and FRS 136 
Impairment of Assets), which will be examined in this thesis. 
Secondly, the indications that an asset (goodwill) may be impaired (in Section 
4.3) are important given that the accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment which may exist after the implementation of IFRS 3 are not 
directly observable, or as Nobes (2006: 239-240) calls them, ‗covert options‘. 
Using the market capitalisation indication, this thesis has specified the 
recognition choice related to goodwill impairment, which will be examined in 
Chapter 9 of this thesis (see Section 4.6.3.2). The discussion of the indications 
that an asset (goodwill) may be impaired has also highlighted the importance 
of analysing companies‘ disclosure of goodwill impairment. This leads to an 
empirical analysis of companies‘ disclosure, which will be discussed in more 
detailed in Chapter 7 (Disclosure study). 
Thirdly, the discussion of judgements and estimates involved in performing an 
impairment test of goodwill (in Section 4.4) has demonstrated that the IFRS 3 
provides covert options for managers while performing the impairment test. 
These judgements and estimates generate variables which will be further 
explored in formulating the hypotheses in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.8).  
Fourthly, the dissenting opinions of few of the IASB members regarding the 
lack of rigour in the impairment test of goodwill (in Section 4.5) have pointed 
toward the lack of any strong control mechanism, such as the two-step 
approach and the subsequent cash flow test in its IFRS 3 and IAS 36. This issue 
is crucial particularly when companies rely on an impairment-only approach as 
a way of safeguarding the goodwill amount reported on the balance sheet. 
The review has also indicated that the IASB relies on companies‘ disclosure to 
police the measurement rule related to goodwill impairment. This lead this 
researcher to conduct a disclosure study in order to examine whether 
companies provide enough information concerning their reasons for reporting 
goodwill impairment, and thereby assisting the researcher to explore the 
types of accounting choice exercised  by Malaysian listed companies (see 
Chapter 7). 
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Finally, the discussion of the accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment after the implementation of FRS 3 (in Section 4.6) has assisted in 
defining the accounting choices which will be inferred from companies‘ 
hypothesised motives in reporting goodwill impairment in the measurement 
study (see Chapter 8). The discussion has also provided the operational 
definition of the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment (see Chapter 9). 
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Chapter 5: Hypotheses Development 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 introduces the financial reporting environment of Malaysian listed 
companies before and after the implementation of FRS 3 Business 
Combinations, and discusses the ownership structures of these companies 
during the period of study. Chapter 4 continues with a discussion of the 
discretion available to companies in performing an impairment test of 
goodwill, such as CGUs and discount rates. Drawing on these two chapters and 
the two accounting choice perspectives reviewed in Chapter 2 (i.e. the 
contracting perspective, and the opportunistic behaviour perspective), the 
present chapter seeks to develop hypotheses to test both the measurement 
and the recognition studies related to goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies.  
This chapter is structured into 10 main sections, including the introduction. 
Section 5.2 presents an overview of the hypotheses and a summary of the 
dependent variables for the measurement and recognition studies of goodwill 
impairment. Section 5.3 outlines the framework for the independent 
variables. Sections 5.4 to 5.9 formulate relevant hypotheses. Section 5.10 
summarises the chapter.  
5.2 Overview of the hypotheses and summary of the 
dependent variables 
As noted in Section 5.1, the hypotheses discuss in the present chapter are 
designed for both the measurement and the recognition studies. These 
hypotheses (derived from the review of literature in Chapter 2, and the 
discussion of the context of study in Chapters 3 and 4), are grouped into six 
categories. These are: (i) economic factors, (ii) contracting perspective, (iii) 
opportunistic behaviour perspective, (iv) ownership structures, (v) discretion 
available to companies in performing an impairment test of goodwill, such as 
CGUs and discount rates, and (vi) company-specific factors. The first four 
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categories represent companies‘ motives while the fifth category (i.e. the 
discretion) reflects the amount of flexibilities, which companies have in 
measuring and recognising goodwill impairment. The last category comprises 
variables controlling for company-specific factors. Figure 5.1 maps these 
companies‘ motives and abilities with their relevant research questions and 
empirical chapters. Detailed discussion of these motives and abilities will be 
presented in Sections 5.4 to 5.8 upon developing the hypotheses. 
Figure 5.1: Factors potentially influencing accounting choices related 
to goodwill impairment examined in the measurement and the 
recognition studies and corresponding research questions 
 
 
Potential factors  
 
Research questions (RQ) 
and empirical chapters  
(see Section 1.3) 
 
Companies’ motives 
 
 
(i) Economic factors  
       (see Section 5.4) 
RQ 4 - Measurement study 
 
RQ 9 - Recognition study 
 
(ii) Contracting perspective  
(see Section 5.5) 
RQ 5 - Measurement study 
 
RQ 10 - Recognition study 
 
(iii) Opportunistic behaviour perspective 
(see Section 5.6) 
RQ 6 - Measurement study 
 
RQ 11 - Recognition study 
 
(iv) Ownership structures  
(see Section 5.7) 
RQ 7 - Measurement study 
 
RQ 12 - Recognition study 
 
 
Companies’ abilities 
 
(i) Discretion31 available in FRS 136  
(see Section 5.8) 
 
 
 
 
RQ 8 - Measurement study 
 
Table 5.1 summarises the dependent variables and the unit of analysis for 
both the measurement and recognition studies related to goodwill 
impairment.  
                                         
31 The recognition study does not test the discretion available to managers in performing 
impairment test of goodwill, including the CGUs and discount rates, because these variables 
suffer from a high frequency of missing values which significantly reduces the number of 
observation (see Section 9.3). 
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Table 5.1: Summary of dependent variables for the measurement and 
recognition studies related to goodwill impairment 
 
Dependent variable Unit of analysis 
Measurement study 
 The magnitude of 
goodwill impairment 
losses divided by prior 
year total assets 
(including goodwill), and 
zero otherwise reported 
on the income statement 
(GWIL – see Appendix 1 
of the thesis). 
 
 
 All companies which implement FRS 3 in 
the first three years of the standard taking 
effect, i.e. 2006/7 to 2008/9. These 
companies either have goodwill balance at 
the end of the financial year or reported 
goodwill impairment losses during the 
financial year.  
 
 This includes 1129 firm-years which 
reported zero goodwill impairment and 369 
firm-years which reported goodwill 
impairment losses (see Table 6.2 in Section 
6.4.2 for detailed of the data 
specification). 
 
Recognition study 
 A dichotomous variable, 
equal to one when 
companies are 
considered as exercising 
a recognition choice 
related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment, and 
zero otherwise 
[GWIL(0,1) – see 
Appendix 1 of the thesis]. 
 
 132 companies (before missing values) 
which have their market values lower than 
the book values of their net assets for 
three consecutive years. 96 of these 
companies recognised zero goodwill 
impairment throughout the three years 
(the test group) while 36 of these 
companies recognised goodwill impairment 
losses at the end of the third year (the 
control group) (see Figure 9.3 for detail). 
 
 
5.3 Framework for the independent variables: Factors 
potentially influencing the measurement and the 
recognition studies of goodwill impairment  
Factors potentially influencing both the measurement and the recognition 
studies of goodwill impairment are grouped into six categories as shown in 
Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Variables employed for the analysis of accounting choices 
related to goodwill impairment examined in the measurement and the 
recognition studies  
 
Hypotheses Variables 
 
Section 
    1. Economic factors  5.4 
H1 Change in sales (∆Sales) 5.4.1 
H2A Prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior)  5.4.2.1 
H2B Current year pre-write-off earnings 5.4.2.2 
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(EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) 
Hypotheses Variables 
 
Section 
H3 Change in pre-write-off earnings 
(∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) 
5.4.2.3 
H4 Change in operating cash flows (∆OCF) 5.4.3 
H5 Book-to-market ratio (BTM) 5.4.4 
H6 Relative size of goodwill balance (GWB) 
 
5.4.5 
    2. Contracting perspective 5.5 
H7 Leverage (DEBTRATIO) 
 
5.5 
    3. Opportunistic behaviour perspective 5.6 
H8 Change in Chief Executive Officer (∆CEO) 5.6.1 
H9 CEO tenure (CEOTENURE) 5.6.2 
H10 Big bath reporting (BATH) 5.6.3 
H11 Earnings smoothing (SMOOTH) 
 
5.6.4 
    4. Ownership structures 5.7 
H12A Managerial ownership – Linear relationship 
(MANOWNLinear) 
 
5.7.1 
H12B Managerial ownership – Non-monotonic 
relationship (MANOWNNon-monotonic) 
H13 Outside ownership concentration (OUTCON) 
 
5.7.2 
    5. Discretion available in performing an impairment test  
        of goodwill 
5.8 
H14A CGUs containing goodwill – A dummy variable 
(CGU01) 
5.8.1 
H14B CGUs containing goodwill – Actual number of CGUs 
(CGUContinous) 
5.8.1 
H15A Discount rates - % disclosed (DISCRATE) 5.8.2.1 
H15B Discount rates – Single vs. Multiple (DISCMULTIPLE) 5.8.2.2 
H15C Discount rates – Disclosed or not 
(DISCRATEDisclosed/Not) 
 
 
 
5.8.2.3 
    6. Control variables 5.9 
H16 Size of company (SIZE) 5.9.1 
H17 Industry dummy (INDUSTRYG5) 5.9.2 
H18 Year-end dummy (YEND) 5.9.3 
H19 Additions to goodwill (ADD) 5.9.4 
 
With regard to accounting choices, this thesis focuses on two perspectives: 
the contracting perspective (see Section 2.3.1) and the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective (see Section 2.3.2). Both these perspectives were 
developed from prior studies investigating listed companies in developed 
economies, mainly in the US and UK, which were reported to have dispersed 
ownership. To assess the applicability of these perspectives to Malaysian 
listed companies, found to have concentrated ownership, the formulation of 
the hypotheses involves two stages.  
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During the first stage of formulating the hypotheses, the measurement study 
of this thesis attempts to compares the findings from the analyses of 
Malaysian companies with the findings of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) in their 
study of UK listed companies implementing IFRS 3 from 2005 to 2006. 
Although there are measurement studies analysing goodwill impairment by US 
listed companies (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 2007; Zang, 2008; 
Ramanna and Watts, 2012), the analysis documented by AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011) is selected as a comparison mainly because listed companies in both 
Malaysia and UK apply IFRS 3 Business Combinations, whereas listed 
companies in the US, implement SFAS 14232 Goodwill and Other Intangible 
Assets. Thus, for the purposes of comparing the results, the first regression 
model employ in the measurement study (i.e. Model 1 - see Section 8.3.3 for 
detailed of the model specifications) closely follow the study of AbuGhazaleh 
et al. (2011). Specifically, Model 1 replicates variables testing the economic 
factors, contracting perspective, and opportunistic behaviour perspective 
which are employed by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011).  
However, unlike AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178-179), the model tests neither 
corporate governance variables (e.g. the number of independent non-
executive directors and separation of chairman and CEO - see Table 8.4 for 
detail) nor a control variable (which assesses whether a company is cross-
listed on the US stock exchange).  
Corporate governance variables are not explored in this thesis as this thesis 
focuses on analysing the motives and abilities of companies in reporting 
goodwill impairment. Due to the nature of the information required and the 
poor database coverage for Malaysian listed companies, many of the variables 
testing these motives and abilities require manual collection through company 
annual reports. Examples include information on CEOs, variables testing 
discretion, such as CGUs and discount rates, and variables testing the 
                                         
32 IFRS 3 is a result of joint effort between IASB and US FASB (see Section 4.2 for detailed 
discussion). Both IFRS 3 and SFAS 142 prohibit amortisation of goodwill and require companies 
to perform an annual impairment test of goodwill. Nevertheless, SFAS 142 differs from IFRS 3 
with respect to the transitional period given to US listed companies, allocation of goodwill to 
reporting unit instead of CGU in IFRS 3, the 2-step approach in an impairment test of 
goodwill, and the requirement to apply fair values. 
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ownership structures of companies. Moreover, for the variables testing 
ownership structures, care needs to be taken in order to differentiate 
between shares held by company directors and those held by outside 
shareholders (see Footnote 40 in Section 5.7.2). Given the extensive manual 
collection of data required, and since the main aim of the thesis is to assess 
the applicability of the contracting and opportunistic behaviour perspectives 
in companies with ownership structures that differs from those listed 
companies in developed economies (e.g. the US and UK), the researcher 
decided to trade-off testing the corporate governance variables against the 
comprehensive analysis of company ownership structures.  
A cross-listing variable is not tested in this thesis due to a lack of companies. 
Mohd Ghazali (2004: 177) found that only three of the top 100 listed 
companies she examined had foreign listings. 
After following as closely as possible the study of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) in 
the first stage of the hypotheses development, the second stage involves 
contextualising the regression model for the Malaysian environment. To 
accomplish this aim, Models 2(a)(i) to 2(h)(ii) are constructed with three 
purposes (see Section 8.3.3 for detail). Firstly, to incorporate variables which 
capture the ownership structures of Malaysian listed companies. Secondly, to 
include variables which are pertinent to understanding the measurement of 
goodwill impairment but which are not tested by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011). 
Thirdly, to improve EARNINGSPrior, as employed by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), 
by replacing the variable with EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent and ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL.  
The next section discusses in detail the development of all the hypotheses for 
the measurement and recognition studies of goodwill impairment. Appendix 1 
of the thesis presents a summary of these hypotheses.  
5.4 Economic factors 
In the studies of asset write-offs and goodwill impairment, economic factors 
refer to factors which may affect the underlying economic performance of 
companies‘ assets (inclusive of goodwill) (Riedl, 2004: 830). According to 
Wilson (1996: 172), the credibility of the findings of assets write-off and 
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goodwill impairment which point to the evidence of ‗manipulation‘ depends 
on the extent to which the studies control for the economic factors. As a 
result, variables which aim to capture the economic factors have been 
incorporated in studies of asset write-off (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 
2004; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011).  
An ideal economic factor would take account of managers‘ unbiased 
expectations of future performance of the assets (Riedl, 2004: 830). In the 
case of goodwill, an ideal economic factor of goodwill impairment would 
comprise managers‘ unbiased expectations of future performance of the CGUs 
containing goodwill (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 173). Nonetheless, because 
managers‘ expectations are generally unobservable (Riedl, 2004: 830; 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 173), proxies are employed to reflect certain parts 
of these expectations (Riedl, 2004: 830; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 173). 
To reflect the expectations of managers, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) employ 
five empirical proxies, i.e., change in sales, prior year earnings, change in 
operating cash flows, book-to-market ratio, and relative size of goodwill 
balance. As a starting point, as noted in Section 5.3, this thesis attempts to 
compare analyses of Malaysian data with the findings of AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011) in their analysis of UK listed companies implementing IFRS 3. Thus, the 
five empirical proxies which have been employed by AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011) will also be employed in this thesis. However, due to the limitation of 
a company‘s prior year earnings as employed by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) 
(see Section 5.4.2.1), two additional variables will be included as proxies for 
the economic factors, i.e., current year pre-write-off earnings (see Section 
5.4.2.2) and change in pre-write-off earnings (see Section 5.4.2.3). These 
additional variables will be tested in separate regression models (see Section 
8.3.3 for the model specification). Therefore, seven variables in total are 
employed in this thesis to test the influence of the economic factors on the 
measurement and the recognition studies of goodwill impairment by Malaysian 
listed companies. These are: ∆Sales, ∆OCF, BTM, GWB, EARNINGSprior, 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent, and ΔEARNINGSpreGWIL .  
The selection of these empirical proxies, as acknowledged by Riedl (2004) and 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), raises an important issue which requires 
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explanation. These empirical proxies measure the economic performance of a 
company rather than being specific to assets (Riedl, 2004: 831) or to CGUs 
containing goodwill (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 173). According to Riedl (2004: 
831), it is difficult to capture the specific attributes of assets such as sales, 
earnings, or cash flows, as such information is generally unavailable. Likewise, 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 173) explain that ‗no financial information is 
publicly available at the CGUs level‘. For this reason, both Riedl (2004) and 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) include neither the economic performance of 
specific assets (Riedl, 2004) nor CGUs containing goodwill (AbuGhazaleh et 
al., 2011) when considering the economic factors. Similar to Riedl (2004) and 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), this thesis does not capture the economic 
performance which is specific to CGUs containing goodwill as a test variable. 
Nevertheless, the disclosure study of this thesis (see Chapter 7) attempts to 
explore the performance of CGUs by looking at the segment result containing 
goodwill and comparing this result with companies‘ financial performance and 
their market capitalisation in selected companies (see Table 7.3 for an 
example of this analysis). The findings of the disclosure study confirm the 
difficulties in obtaining information concerning CGUs as explained by Riedl 
(2004: 831) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 173), i.e., it is challenging to 
capture the economic performance of CGUs containing goodwill, especially 
when the goodwill is allocated to a number of CGUs and the allocation of 
goodwill to each of the CGUs (or segment results) is not clearly disclosed. 
Next, Sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.5 discuss the development of the hypotheses for 
the economic factors. 
5.4.1 Change in sales (∆Sales) 
Change in sales aims to capture accrual-related performance attributes 
(Riedl, 2004: 831; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 180). An improvement in sales 
suggests that a company is performing well, which reflects the recoverability 
of asset values (inclusive of goodwill) (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). 
Prior studies analysing measurement (i.e. AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011 – UK 
study) and recognition (i.e. Guler, 2007 – US study) of goodwill impairment 
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predict a negative association between change in sales and reporting goodwill 
impairment losses. Their empirical results provided mixed findings. In term of 
the univariate analysis, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 186) found that the median 
change in sales for the write-off companies is significantly lower than the non-
write-off companies (at p-value less than 0.01). However, the mean change in 
sales between the two groups is not statistically significant33.  
Guler (2007: 89) documented that both the median and mean change in sales 
for the write-off group is significantly lower than the non-write-off groups (at 
p<10%). To her, the result of the univariate analysis suggests that the write-
off companies exhibit worse financial performance than the non-write-off 
companies (p. 31). As for the multivariate analysis, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 
190) observed the change in sales to be non-significance in explaining 
companies‘ measurement of goodwill impairment losses while Guler (2007: 
72) found the variable to be marginally significant (at p-value less than 0.10) 
in explaining the recognition of goodwill impairment. 
In this thesis, and similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178), change in sales is 
defined as change in sales from prior period to current period, divided by 
total assets at the end of prior period34 (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The 
following hypothesis is developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H1-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
change in sales. 
H1-Alternative1: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and change in sales. 
                                         
33 The fact that the mean and median change in sales as employed by AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011) differs significantly raises the issue of skewed data, which is not addressed by that 
study (see Section 8.2.2.1). 
34 In this thesis, total assets at the end of prior period are employed because for Malaysian 
listed companies, Datastream does not provide information concerning the total assets at the 
beginning of the current period. 
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H1-Alternative2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and change in sales. 
The null hypothesis is no significant association between companies‘ decisions 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses and change in sales. There are two 
alternatives hypothesis.  
H1-Alternative1 is based on the assumption that companies do not make choices 
which conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant negative 
association in H1-Alternative1 indicates that the poorer the company‘s 
performance (reflected as a decline in value of change in sales), the greater 
the likelihood of, or the greater the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses 
reported by the company. By recognising or measuring goodwill impairment 
losses when sales are falling, managers are reflecting their expectations of 
future performance of the asset (based on past performance) at a firm-level. 
Thus, in this case, there is no accounting choice exercised as managers are 
complying with FRS 3 and FRS 136. 
H1-Alternative2 is based on the assumption that companies do make choices which 
conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant positive association in H1-
Alternative2 suggests that the poorer the company‘s performance (reflected as a 
decline in value of change in sales), the lower the likelihood of, or the lower 
the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses reported by the company. By 
not recognising goodwill impairment losses or reporting lower amount of 
goodwill impairment losses when sales are falling, managers are possibly 
attempting to avoid goodwill impairment losses, or reporting lower magnitude 
of impairment losses, hoping their companies‘ performance will improve in 
the future. In such cases, the managers‘ decisions in reporting goodwill 
impairment losses do not reflect their expectations of the future performance 
of the asset at a firm-level, which may point to the possibility of accounting 
choices being exercised. 
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5.4.2 Companies’ pre-write-off earnings 
Companies‘ pre-write-off earning is another measure of a company‘s 
performance (Riedl, 2004: 831; AbuGhazaleh et al, 2011: 180). Prior studies 
(e.g. Riedl, 2004: 831; Guler, 2007: 23; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 180) 
hypothesise that the worse the company‘s performance, the higher the 
likelihood of, or the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses reported. In 
employing the pre-write-off earnings, prior studies either make use of 
companies‘ earnings at one specific point in time (e.g. prior year earnings in 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 170) or employ a change in pre-write-off earnings 
from prior year to current year (e.g. Riedl, 2004: 829; Guler, 2007: 21 and 
23). This thesis has employed both measures of earnings and tested them in 
separate random-effects tobit regression models. The next Section 5.4.2.1 
discusses the prior year earnings as employed by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011). 
5.4.2.1 Prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior)  
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178) employ prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) as 
one of the economic factors. They (p. 178) define earnings as ‗return on 
assets for company i at the end of t-1 (measured as pre-tax profit divided by 
total assets)‘. This variable faces three limitations.  
Firstly, the definition of prior year earnings provided by AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011) does not clearly explain whether the pre-tax profit is adjusted for 
(added back) goodwill impairment losses, yet for other variables(e.g. BATH35 
and SMOOTH), AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178)  specify that the earnings figure 
employed in testing big bath reporting is computed based on pre-write-off 
earnings. Thus, it is assumed that the company‘s prior year earnings 
(EARNINGSPrior) employed by AbuGhazaleh et al (2011) is not adjusted for 
(added back) goodwill impairment losses. To overcome this limitation in this 
thesis, a sensitivity analysis is carried out by replacing companies‘ prior year 
                                         
35 BATH is defined as ‗change in company i‘s pre-write-off earnings from t -1 to t deflated by 
total assets at the end of t -1, when this change is below the median of non-zero negative 
values of this variable, and zero otherwise‘ (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 178). 
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earnings (EARNINGSPrior) with prior year pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILprior) (see Sections 8.5.2.3 and 8.6.2.1). 
Secondly, it is not clear why managers would refer to prior year earnings in 
making decisions in reporting goodwill impairment in the current year. Francis 
et al. (1996: 123) argue that companies‘ current year earnings may also 
influence the timing in reporting goodwill impairment losses. This has led the 
researcher to employ an additional variable - current year pre-write-off 
earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) (see Section 5.4.2.2). 
Thirdly, the prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) measure a company‘s 
performance at one specific point in time. Riedl (2004: 831) argues that 
managers might base their decisions to write down the assets by looking at 
the change in the company‘s performance (i.e. change in pre-write-off 
earnings from the prior year to the current year). This limitation has led the 
researcher to incorporate change in pre-write-off earnings (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) 
as another variable for the economic factors (see Section 5.4.2.3). 
For the purpose of comparing the result of this thesis with the UK data, prior 
year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) as employed by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) is 
included in this thesis. AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) hypothesise a negative 
association between prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) and reporting goodwill 
impairment losses. The multivariate analysis documented by AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 190) reveals prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) to be marginally 
significant (p-value less than 0.10) in explaining the measurement of goodwill 
impairment losses.  
In this thesis, prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) is defined as prior year net 
income36 before extraordinary items37 or preferred dividends, divided by total 
                                         
36 Net income before extraordinary items or preferred dividends is selected because this is 
the level of earnings which is employed by Malaysian listed companies in computing the 
earnings per share (for e.g. see Annual report – A & M Realty Berhad, 2006: 61). This approach 
is similar to Beattie et al. (1994: 792). 
37 In Malaysia, prior to the implementation of IFRSs, ‗extraordinary items‘ was defined by FRS 
1082004 Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Fundamental Errors and Changes in Accounting 
Policies (paragraph 6) as ‗income or expenses that arise from events or transactions that are 
clearly distinct from the ordinary activities of the enterprise and, therefore, are not expected 
to recur frequently or regularly‘ (MASB, 2004b). The standard required such items to be 
disclosed on the face of the income statement, separately from the profit or loss on ordinary 
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assets at the end of prior year (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following 
hypothesis is developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H2A-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior). 
H2A-Alternative1: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior). 
H2A-Alternative2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior). 
The null hypothesis is no significant association between companies‘ decisions 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses and companies‘ prior year earnings 
(EARNINGSPrior). There are two alternatives hypothesis.  
H2A-Alternative1 is based on the assumption that companies do not make choices 
which conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant negative 
association in H2A-Alternative1 indicates that the poorer the company‘s 
performance (reflected in the lower EARNINGSprior), the greater the likelihood 
of, or the greater the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses reported by 
the company. By recognising or measuring goodwill impairment losses when 
prior year earnings are low, managers are reflecting their expectations of the 
future performance of the asset (based on past performance) at a firm-level. 
Consequently, there is no accounting choice exercised, as managers are 
complying with FRS 3 and FRS 136. 
                                                                                                                       
activities (MASB, 2004b: FRS 1082004, paragraph 5). However, after having a convergence 
policy towards the IFRSs, MASB, effective from January 1, 2006, prohibited the presentation 
of extraordinary items (MASB, 2006d: FRS 101 Presentation of Financial Statements, 
paragraph 87 - similar to IAS 1 issued by the IASB). The rationale for such prohibition is 
because extraordinary items arise from the normal business risks faced by an entity and do 
not warrant presentation in a separate component of the income statement (KPMG, 2005). 
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H2A-Alternative2 is based on the assumption that companies make choices which 
conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant positive association in 
H2A-Alternative2 suggests that the poorer the company‘s performance (reflected in 
the lower EARNINGSprior), the lower the likelihood of, or the lower the 
magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses reported by the company. By not 
recognising goodwill impairment losses, or reporting a lower amount of 
goodwill impairment losses, when a company‘s prior year earnings is low, it is 
possible that managers are attempting to avoid goodwill impairment losses, or 
reporting a lower magnitude of impairment losses in hope that the companies‘ 
performance will improve in the future. Consequently, the managers‘ 
decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses do not reflect their 
expectations of the future performance of the asset at a firm-level, which 
may point to the possibility of accounting choices being exercised. 
5.4.2.2 Current year pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) 
Thus far, no prior studies have examined current year pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) of companies. In this thesis, the variable is expected to 
be negatively associated with companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill 
impairment losses, in that, the higher the current year pre-write-off earnings, 
the lower the likelihood of, or the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses 
reported on the income statement. Current year pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) is defined as current year net income before 
extraordinary items or preferred dividends after adding back goodwill 
impairment losses, divided by total assets at the end of prior year (see 
Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following hypothesis is developed both in a null 
form and an alternate form: 
H2B-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
current year pre-write-off earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent). 
H2B-Alternative1: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
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losses and current year pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent). 
H2B-Alternative2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and current year pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent). 
The null hypothesis is no significant association between companies‘ decisions 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses and current year pre-write-off 
earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent). There are two alternatives hypothesis.  
H2B-Alternative1 is based on the assumption that companies do not make choices 
which conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant negative 
association in H2B-Alternative1 indicates that the poorer the company‘s 
performance (reflected in the lower EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent), the greater the 
likelihood of, or the greater the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses 
reported by the company. By recognising or measuring goodwill impairment 
losses when the current year pre-write-off earnings are low, managers are 
reflecting their expectations of the future performance of the asset (based on 
past performance) at a firm-level. Consequently, there is no accounting 
choice being exercised, as managers are complying with FRS 3 and FRS 136. 
H2B-Alternative2 is based on the assumption that companies make choices which 
conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant positive association in 
H2B-Alternative2 suggests that the poorer the company‘s performance (reflected in 
the lower EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent), the lower the likelihood of, or the lower the 
magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses reported by the company. By not 
recognising goodwill impairment losses, or reporting lower amount of goodwill 
impairment losses, when a current year pre-write-off earnings is low, 
managers are possibly attempting to avoid goodwill impairment losses, or 
reporting a lower magnitude of impairment losses, in the belief that the 
companies‘ performance will improve in the future. Consequently, the 
managers‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses do not reflect 
their expectations of the future performance of the asset at a firm-level, 
which may point to the possibility of accounting choices being exercised. 
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5.4.2.3  Change in pre-write-off earnings 
(∆EARNINGSpreGWIL)  
Change in pre-write-off earnings (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) is employed by Riedl 
(2004: 829), and is another measure of a company‘s performance. Similar to 
improvement in sales (∆Sales), improvement in pre-write-off earnings from 
the previous year to the current year (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) suggests that a 
company is performing well. Riedl (2004: 843) predicts a negative association 
between change in pre-write-off earnings (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) and companies‘ 
decisions in taking the write-off. This means that the poorer the company‘s 
change in pre-write-off earnings (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL), the greater the 
magnitude of the write-off reported (Riedl, 2004: 843).  
In this thesis, similar to Riedl (2004: 829), change in pre-write-off earnings 
(∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) is defined as change in a company‘s pre-write-off earnings 
from the prior period to the current period, divided by total assets at the end 
of the prior period. The pre-write-off earnings refer to net income before 
extraordinary items or preferred dividends after adding back goodwill 
impairment losses (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). This has led to the 
formulation of the following hypothesis, both in a null form and an alternate 
form: 
H3-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the change in pre-write-off earnings (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL). 
H3-Alternative1: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and the change in pre-write-off earnings 
(∆EARNINGSpreGWIL). 
H3-Alternative2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and the change in pre-write-off earnings 
(∆EARNINGSpreGWIL). 
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The null hypothesis is no significant association between companies‘ decisions 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses and the change in pre-write-off 
earnings (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL). There are two alternatives hypothesis.  
H3-Alternative1 is based on the assumption that companies do not make choices 
which conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant negative 
association in H3-Alternative1 indicates that the poorer the company‘s 
performance (reflected as a decline in the value of ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL), the 
greater the likelihood of, or the greater the magnitude of, goodwill 
impairment losses reported by the company. By recognising or measuring 
goodwill impairment losses when a company‘s pre-write-off earnings are 
falling, managers are reflecting their expectations of the future performance 
of the asset (based on past performance) at a firm-level. Thus, in this case, 
there is no accounting choice being exercised as managers are complying with 
FRS 3 and FRS 136. 
H3-Alternative2 is based on the assumption that companies make choices which 
conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant positive association in H3-
Alternative2 suggests that the poorer the company‘s performance (reflected as a 
decline in value of ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL), the lower the likelihood of, or the lower 
the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses reported by the company. By 
not recognising goodwill impairment losses, or reporting a lower magnitude of 
goodwill impairment losses, when a company‘s change in pre-write-off 
earnings fall from prior year to current year, managers are possibly 
attempting to avoid goodwill impairment losses, or reporting lower magnitude 
of impairment losses, in the belief that the companies‘ performance will 
improve in the future. Thus, in this case, the managers‘ decisions in reporting 
goodwill impairment losses do not reflect their expectations of the future 
performance of the asset at a firm-level, which may point to the possibility of 
accounting choices being exercised. 
5.4.3 Change in operating cash flows (∆OCF)  
Change in operating cash flows (∆OCF) measures the cash-related 
performance attributes (Riedl, 2004: 831; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 180). An 
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improvement in operating cash flows suggests that a company is performing 
well, which is likely to be reflected more in the return on investment in the 
asset (Riedl, 2004: 831) or goodwill (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 180). 
Prior studies analysing measurement of asset write-off (i.e. Riedl, 2004) or 
goodwill impairment (i.e. AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) predict a negative 
association between change in operating cash flows (∆OCF) and reporting the 
write-off. AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) found change in operating cash 
flows (∆OCF) to be marginally significant (at p-value less than 0.10) in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment losses. 
In this thesis, similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178), change in operating 
cash flows (∆OCF) is defined as change in operating cash flows from prior 
period to current period, divided by total assets at the end of prior period 
(see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following hypothesis is developed both in a 
null form and an alternate form: 
H4-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
change in operating cash flows (∆OCF). 
H4-Alternative1: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and change in operating cash flows (∆OCF). 
H4-Alternative2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and change in operating cash flows (∆OCF). 
The null hypothesis is that there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and change in 
operating cash flows (∆OCF). There are two alternatives hypothesis.  
H4-Alternative1 is based on the assumption that companies do not make choices 
which conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant negative 
association in H4-Alternative1 indicates that the poorer the company‘s 
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performance (reflected as a decline in the value of ∆OCF), the greater the 
likelihood of, or the greater the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses 
reported by the company. By recognising or measuring goodwill impairment 
losses when operating cash flows are falling, managers are reflecting their 
expectations of future performance of the asset (based on past performance) 
at a firm-level. Thus, in this case, there is no accounting choice exercised as 
managers are complying with FRS 3 and FRS 136. 
H4-Alternative2 is based on the assumption that companies make choices which 
conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant positive association in H4-
Alternative2 suggests that the poorer the company‘s performance (reflected as a 
decline in the value of ∆OCF), the lower the likelihood of, or the lower the 
magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses reported by the company. By not 
recognising goodwill impairment losses or reporting lower amount of goodwill 
impairment losses when operating cash flows are falling, it is possible that 
managers are attempting to avoid goodwill impairment losses, or reporting a 
lower magnitude of impairment losses, in the hope that companies‘ 
performance will improve in the future. Consequently, the managers‘ 
decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses do not reflect their 
expectations of the future performance of the asset at a firm-level, which 
may point to the possibility of accounting choices being exercised. 
5.4.4 Book-to-market ratio (BTM)  
Book-to-market ratio (BTM) attempts to capture the intensity of expected 
economic impairment of goodwill at a firm-level (Guler, 2007: 24). According 
to FRS 136 (paragraph 12), one of the indications that an asset (goodwill) may 
be impaired is when the carrying amount of the net assets of the entity is 
more than its market capitalisation (MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 12d) 
(see Section 4.3 for detailed discussion). Following the FRS 136 indication, a 
higher book-to-market ratio (BTM) may indicate a possible goodwill 
impairment loss at a firm-level. Guler (2007) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) 
posit a positive relationship between book-to-market ratio (BTM) and 
reporting goodwill impairment losses. That is, companies with higher book-to-
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market ratio (BTM) are expected to report larger amount of goodwill 
impairment losses (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 179).  
In the multivariate analysis, using tobit regression in their measurement 
study, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) documented the book-to-market ratio 
(BTM) to be positively associated with the measurement of goodwill 
impairment losses (at p-value less than 0.05). Applying logistic regression in 
her recognition study, Guler (2007: 72) also found that the higher the book-to-
market ratio (BTM), the higher the likelihood of reporting goodwill 
impairment losses, though the association is marginally significant (p-value 
less than 0.10). 
In this thesis, the book-to-market ratio (BTM) is defined as book value of 
equity divided by market value of equity at the end of the current period (see 
Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following hypothesis is developed both in a null 
form and an alternate form: 
H5-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the book-to-market ratio (BTM). 
H5-Alternative1: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and the book-to-market ratio (BTM). 
H5-Alternative2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and the book-to-market ratio (BTM). 
The null hypothesis is no significant association between companies‘ decisions 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses and the book-to-market ratio (BTM). 
There are two alternatives hypothesis.  
H5-Alternative1 is based on the assumption that companies do not make choices 
which conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant positive association 
in H5-Alternative1 indicates that the poorer the company‘s performance (reflected 
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in a higher BTM), the greater the likelihood of, or the greater the magnitude 
of, goodwill impairment losses reported by the company. By recognising or 
measuring goodwill impairment losses when BTM is large, managers are 
reflecting expectations of future performance of the asset (based on past 
performance) at a firm-level. Thus, in this case, there is no accounting choice 
exercised as managers are following the indication of FRS 136. 
H5-Alternative2 is based on the condition of choice that conflict with economic 
factors. Finding a significant negative association in H5-Alternative2 suggests that 
the poorer the company‘s performance (reflected in a higher BTM), the lower 
the likelihood of, or the lower the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses 
reported by the company. By not recognising goodwill impairment losses, or 
reporting a lower magnitude of goodwill impairment losses, when BTM are 
large, managers are possibly attempting to avoid goodwill impairment losses, 
or reporting lower magnitude of impairment losses, hoping that the 
companies‘ performance will improve in the future. Thus, in this case, the 
managers‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses are conflicting 
with the indication provided by FRS 136 (paragraph 12d), which may point to 
the possibility of accounting choices being exercised. 
5.4.5 Relative size of goodwill balance (GWB) 
Relative size of goodwill balance (GWB) represents one of the characteristics 
of goodwill (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008: 44; Zang, 2008: 48; AbuGhazaleh 
et al., 2011: 179). It is considered to be one of the economic factors related 
to impairment (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 179). Prior studies (Lapointe-
Antunes et al., 2008: 44; Zang, 2008: 49; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 179) 
argue that companies with a large amount of goodwill balance in their asset 
composition are more exposed to an impairment test, and thus more likely to 
report goodwill impairment losses than companies with a small magnitude of 
goodwill balance in their asset composition. All of the prior studies (i.e. 
Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Zang, 2008; Ramanna and Watts, 2012; 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) predict a positive association between relative size 
of goodwill balance (GWB) and the measurement of goodwill impairment 
losses.  
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The empirical results testing the association between relative size of goodwill 
balance (GWB) and companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses provide conflicting findings. For the measurement study, in their 
multivariate analysis, Zang (2008: 53) and Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008: 48) 
found the variable to be strongly significant (at p-values less than 0.01) in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment losses by US and 
Canadian listed companies respectively. On the other hand, AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 190) found the variable not to be statistically significant in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment losses by UK listed 
companies. Likewise, for the recognition study, Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011: 
403) found the relative size of goodwill balance as non-significant in 
explaining the recognition of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies. 
In this thesis, similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178), relative size of 
goodwill balance (GWB) is defined as the opening carrying value of goodwill in 
the current year divided by total assets at the end of prior period (see 
Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following hypothesis is developed both in a null 
form and an alternate form: 
H6-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
relative size of goodwill balance (GWB). 
H6-Alternative1: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and relative size of goodwill balance (GWB). 
H6-Alternative2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and relative size of goodwill balance (GWB). 
The null hypothesis is no significant association between companies‘ decisions 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses and the relative size of goodwill 
balance (GWB). There are two alternatives hypothesis.  
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H6-Alternative1 is based on the assumption that companies do not make choices 
which conflict with economic factors. Finding a significant positive association 
in H6-Alternative1 indicates that the larger the size of goodwill balance relative to 
a company‘s total assets (reflected in a high GWB), the greater the likelihood 
of, or the greater the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses being 
reported by the company. By recognising or measuring goodwill impairment 
losses when GWB is high, managers are reflecting the exposure of the goodwill 
balance to the performance of the total assets. Thus, in this case, there is no 
accounting choice exercised. 
H6-Alternative2 is based on the condition of choices that conflict with the 
economic factors. Finding a significant negative association in H6-Alternative2 
suggests that the larger the size of goodwill balance relative to a company‘s 
total assets (reflected in a higher GWB), the lower the likelihood of, or the 
lower the magnitude of, goodwill impairment losses reported by the company. 
By not recognising goodwill impairment losses, or reporting lower amount of 
goodwill impairment losses, when GWB are high, managers are possibly 
attempting to avoid goodwill impairment losses, or reporting a lower 
magnitude of impairment losses, hoping that the companies‘ performance will 
improve in the future. Thus, in this case, the managers‘ decisions in reporting 
goodwill impairment losses do not reflect the exposure of the goodwill 
balance to the performance of the total assets, which may lead to the 
possibility of accounting choices being exercised. 
5.5  Contracting perspective: Debt hypothesis 
(DEBTRATIO) 
The contracting perspective of accounting choice which will be tested in this 
thesis is the debt hypothesis. From a contracting point of view, managers‘ 
motives for exercising an accounting choice is to influence an external 
contractual arrangement between companies and their debt-holders (Fields et 
al., 2001) (See Section 2.3.1.2). This is especially true for companies that are 
close to violating their debt covenants (Fields et al., 2001). By exercising an 
accounting choice, these companies are attempting to relax the accounting-
based restrictions stipulated in the debt covenants (Smith, 1993); hence 
avoiding any violation of such covenants (Dichev and Skinner, 2002).  
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In the context of goodwill impairment, previous researchers testing the debt 
hypothesis either predicted a negative relationship between companies‘ 
closeness to the debt covenant violations and their decisions in reporting 
goodwill impairment losses (Zang, 2008; Ramanna and Watts, 2012) or 
provided no predicted sign (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 174 and 190). The 
negative prediction implies that companies which are close to violating their 
debt covenants are less likely to recognise goodwill impairment losses (Beatty 
and Weber, 2006: 265; Zang, 2008: 53). By not recognising goodwill 
impairment losses, companies are trying to maximise their current earnings 
(Godfrey and Koh, 2009: 127), and thus possibly avoiding debt covenant 
violations (Ramanna and Watts, 2012). AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 174) reason 
that due to the conflicting results documented by prior studies, they do not 
hypothesise a direction in testing the debt hypothesis. 
The empirical evidence of accounting choices related to goodwill impairment, 
testing the debt hypothesis, documented mixed results. In the US, Zang (2008: 
48 and 54) demonstrates that regardless of five different measures of 
leverage  employed in his measurement study, the results consistently support 
the debt hypothesis, showing a negative association between leverage and 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses during the 
transitional period (at p-value less than 0.05). Likewise, the empirical finding 
of Ramanna and Watts (2012) in their measurement study supported the debt 
hypothesis (at p-value less than 0.10). 
On the other hand, Beatty and Weber (2006: 280) found no significant 
association between companies‘ leverage and their decisions to report 
goodwill impairment losses in the probit regression model of their recognition 
study of goodwill impairment. Similarly, Guler (2007: 22), in her recognition 
study, found no significant relationship between debt ratio (measured as total 
liabilities at the end of t-1 divided by total assets at the end of t-1) and 
companies‘ decisions in recognising goodwill impairment losses. Nevertheless, 
Guler (2007) does not provide a possible explanation for the non-significant 
relationship between the two variables.  
Moving away from US listed companies which implemented SFAS 142, 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) found leverage (DEBTRATIO) as non-significant in 
 108 
explaining the decisions of the UK listed companies they analysed in 
measuring goodwill impairment losses. Meanwhile, Omar and Mohd-Saleh 
(2011) found leverage (DEBTRATIO) as marginally significant (at p-value less 
than 0.10) in explaining the decisions of the Malaysian listed companies they 
analysed in recognising goodwill impairment losses.  
In this thesis, due to difficulties in obtaining data relating to actual debt 
covenants38, as they are not made public, debt ratio (DEBTRATIO) has been 
employed as a proxy for companies‘ closeness to the debt covenant violations 
(see Section 2.3.1.2). Similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178), DEBTRATIO is 
defined as total debts at the end of prior year, divided by total assets at the 
end of prior year (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). In view of the inconclusive 
evidence discussed above, no prediction sign is formed regarding the 
relationship between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and leverage (DEBTRATIO). Thus, the following hypothesis is developed 
both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H7-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
leverage (DEBTRATIO). 
H7-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
leverage (DEBTRATIO). 
Finding a significant negative association between companies‘ decisions in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses and leverage (DEBTRATIO) would suggest 
that the companies are exercising accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment in an attempt to avoid debt covenant violations.  
                                         
38 According to a senior auditor of the PricewaterhouseCoopers who work in Malaysia, debt 
covenants are in use in Malaysia, particularly for companies which obtained a large amount of 
loan from financial institutions. The covenants are usually stipulated in the loan agreement 
and they include certain conditions to be met which normally relates to company‘s annual 
performance. To illustrate, in the Notes to the Financial Statement of Axiata Group Berhad 
2008, the group disclosed the following conditions of its debt covenants: ‗debt equity ratio of 
not more than 1.25; debt over EBITDA ratio of not more than 2.5; EBITDA over finance cost 
ratio of more than 5; and finance service coverage ratio of more than 1.2‖ (Axiata annual 
report 2008: Notes 15(e)(iv), page 217 – document retrieved on February 7, 2013, from 
http://axiata.listedcompany.com/misc/ar2008.pdf). It is noted that the debt equity ratio 
disclosed by Axiata Group Berhad is similar to those used in the US and the UK. 
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5.6 Opportunistic behaviour perspective 
Four variables are employed to test the evidence of managerial opportunism 
in reporting goodwill impairment. These are, change in CEO (∆CEOCurrent/prior) 
(see Section 5.6.1), CEO tenure (see Section 5.6.2), big bath reporting (see 
Section 5.6.3), and earnings smoothing (see Section 5.6.4). 
5.6.1 Change in Chief Executive Officer (∆CEOCurrent/prior) 
Change in CEO is employed by prior studies (e.g. Strong and Meyer, 1987; 
Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Francis et al., 1996) to examine the behaviour of the 
incoming CEOs in reducing reported earnings in the early year of their tenure, 
for example, by taking large asset write-off (Fields et al., 2001: 269). The 
argument raised by prior studies (e.g. Wells, 2002: 172; Riedl, 2004: 832; 
Francis, 2008: 628; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 175) is that because the 
incoming CEO is not held responsible for the company‘s past performance, he 
may have a tendency to take asset write-offs and goodwill impairment loss as 
soon as joining a company, and thus attribute current loss to some aspects of 
the preceding CEO‘s poor management. 
An opportunistic behaviour perspective suggests that incoming CEOs may have 
an incentive to take asset write-offs (including goodwill impairment losses) in 
an attempt to protect their self-interests (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Francis et 
al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). Elliott and Shaw (1988), for example, explain that the 
new CEOs are taking asset write-offs (including goodwill impairment losses) in 
the first year of their tenure in order to reduce the benchmark against which 
their future performance will be measured. At the same time, by incurring 
large asset write-offs (including goodwill impairment losses) at an early stage 
of their appointment, the incoming CEOs would be able to relieve future 
earnings from these losses (Moore, 1973). As a result, they might be able to 
report an improved earnings trend in the future (Moore, 1973) and hence 
improve the investors‘ perceptions of the company‘s future performance 
(Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). Following this line of argument, prior 
studies analysing measurement (i.e. Zang, 2008; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 
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2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) and recognition (i.e. Guler, 2007) of goodwill 
impairment predict a positive association between change in CEO and 
reporting goodwill impairment losses.  
In the measurement study of goodwill impairment, using tobit regression, 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008: 48) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) found a 
positive association between change in CEO and companies‘ decisions in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses at p-values less than 0.05 and 0.10 
respectively. In the recognition study of goodwill impairment, Guler (2007: 
72) and Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011) also observed a positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
change in CEO. These studies interpret the finding of the positive association 
between the two variables as managerial incentives playing an important role 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Lapointe-
Antunes et al., 2008). 
An alternative explanation to the positive association between reporting 
goodwill impairment losses and change in CEO is because of the economic 
factors of a company (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993) argue that companies would normally face poor earnings 
performance prior to a change in CEO. Consequently, the newly appointed 
CEO may take asset write-offs (including goodwill impairment losses) to mirror 
the company‘s poor performance rather than behaving opportunistically 
(Francis et al., 1996). If this is the case, it is viewed that the positive 
association between the two variables would indicate compliance with the 
accounting standard. Nevertheless, Riedl (2004) explains that to the extent 
that the economic factors control for the underlying performance of the 
companies, change in CEO may capture additional incentives for the incoming 
CEOs to expedite future charges in the hope of improving investors‘ 
perceptions of the companies‘ future performances. 
In this thesis, similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178), change in CEO 
(∆CEOCurrent/prior) is said to occur when a company experiences a change in CEO 
in the previous financial year or the current financial year. It is measured as a 
dichotomous variable, equal to one if a company experienced the CEO 
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change, and zero otherwise (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following 
hypothesis is developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H8-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
change in CEO which take place in the prior year or current year 
(∆CEOCurrent/prior). 
H8-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and change in CEO which take place in the prior year or 
current year (∆CEOCurrent/prior). 
Finding a statistically significant positive association between change in CEO 
(in H8) and companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses, 
after controlling for the economic factors, would indicate that incoming CEOs 
exercised accounting choices related to goodwill impairment losses. This view 
is based on the above explanation given by Riedl (2004) that to the extent the 
economic factors control for the underlying economic performance of the 
companies, a change in CEO might capture additional incentives for the 
incoming CEO to expedite future charges, with the aim of improving investors‘ 
perceptions of the companies‘ future performances. 
A point for discussion is that AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) assumes (not stated in 
the study) that a CEO holds the highest position in a company. However, prior 
studies analysing asset write-offs (i.e. Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004) apply 
no such assumption. Francis et al. (1996: 123), for example, define a change 
in top management as ‗any of the top-three executive positions (Chairman of 
the Board, CEO, or President)‘. However, Francis et al. (1996) and Riedl 
(2004) provide no rationale for including any of these three positions. 
Pourciau (1993: 324), in her investigation of earnings management associated 
with non-routine executive changes, stated that the titles of top executives 
vary among US listed companies. She exemplifies that in some companies, the 
highest position in the office is held by the president, while in other 
companies this position is subordinate to that of CEO (Pourciau, 1993: 324). 
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For this reason, Pourciau (1993: 324) considers the highest position in a 
company to be a CEO, Chairman, or President. 
In Malaysia, Gibson‘s (2003: 236) analysis of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance of eight emerging market, including Malaysia, from 1993-1997 
found variations in the title of the top management position. He (p. 236) 
identifies that in Malaysia, this position can include CEO, President, Chief 
Executive, Managing Director, or Chairman. For this reason, this thesis will 
carry out a sensitivity analysis for change in CEO in order to assess whether 
empirical results following a change in CEO would be sensitive to alternative 
definition of CEO change, which included one of the five aforementioned 
executive positions (see Section 8.5.2.1 for detail). 
Another sensitivity analysis that will be conducted for change in CEO is to 
assess whether the empirical results for a change in CEO would be sensitive to 
specification of the year of CEO change. This is done by using two additional 
definitions for the change in CEO. These are: (i) change in CEO occurring in 
the previous year (t-1), and (ii) change in CEO occurring in the current year 
(t). This sensitivity analysis will also be conducted for the top management 
positions as discussed in the above paragraph (see Section 8.5.2.1 for detail). 
5.6.2 CEO tenure (CEOTENURE) 
CEO tenure is employed by prior studies (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; 
Ramanna and Watts, 2012) for testing the behaviour of existing CEOs. The 
variable is employed as a proxy for whether the CEO was actually in place 
when the goodwill being written off was first recognised (Beatty and Weber, 
2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2012). As explained by Ramanna and Watts (2012: 
752), CEOs with a longer tenure are more likely to have initiated the mergers 
that generated the goodwill.  
Ramanna and Watts (2012: 752) argue that CEOs with a longer tenure are less 
likely to take goodwill impairment losses, in order to shield their reputations 
from the implications of the write-off. This is because reporting goodwill 
impairment losses would imply that the CEO has made costly business decision 
(Beatty and Weber, 2006; Masters-Stout et al., 2008; Ramanna and Watts, 
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2012) or that they failed to achieve the promised synergies from the business 
acquisition (Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008: 41). Thus, the prior studies (e.g. 
Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2012) hypothesise a negative 
relationship between CEO tenure and companies‘ decisions in reporting 
goodwill impairment losses. Their empirical results reveal a statistically 
significant negative association between CEO tenure and companies‘ decisions 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna 
and Watts, 2012). Ramanna and Watts (2012: 750) explain that in their study 
although all of the companies analysed have ‗market indications39 of goodwill 
impairment‘, CEOs with long tenure were less likely to take goodwill 
impairment losses when compared to CEOs with a short tenure due concerns 
about their reputation. 
In the context of a developing economy, Gibson‘s (2003: 236) analysis of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance of eight emerging market, including 
Malaysia, from 1993-1997 observed that listed companies in Malaysia faced 
the second highest CEO turnover rate. With high CEO turnover rate, it is 
possible that Malaysian listed companies are concerned about their 
reputations when making decisions on whether to report goodwill impairment 
losses or zero goodwill impairment. 
In this thesis, similar to Beatty and Weber (2006: 274), CEO tenure 
(CEOTENURE) is defined as the number of years that the CEO has held the 
position (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). Given the negative association 
revealed by Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramanna and Watts (2012), a 
negative relationship is expected between CEO tenure (CEOTENURE) and 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
                                         
39 Ramanna and Watts (2012: 750-751) define market indications of goodwill impairment as 
‗companies with market values that are greater than the book values of their net assets in t0 
(i.e. 2003), and experienced book-to-market ratio greater than one for the next two 
consecutive years (t1 -2004, and t2 – 2005)‘. 
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H9-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
CEO tenure (CEOTENURE). 
H9-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and CEO tenure (CEOTENURE). 
H9-Alternative focuses on testing the accounting choice of reporting zero goodwill 
impairment. Finding a statistically significant negative association between 
CEO tenure (CEOTENURE) and the decisions of companies to report goodwill 
impairment losses indicates that companies which have CEOs with a relatively 
longer tenure are less likely to report goodwill impairment losses. 
5.6.3 Big bath reporting (BATH) 
Big bath reporting behaviour occurs when managers take actions which lead to 
a large reduction in companies‘ earnings, especially when the earnings can 
already be considered sufficiently bad (Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002: 
762). Managers might engage in big bath reporting by taking a large amount of 
asset write-offs (Zucca and Campbell, 1992: 35). In such cases, there can be 
several incentives for taking the write-offs: to provide a signal that past 
problems have been addressed (Alciatore et al., 1998: 29), to reduce earnings 
and assets values in an attempt to avoid take over (Alciatore et al., 1998: 29), 
or it may be that new CEOs are attempting to reduce the benchmark against 
which future earnings will be judged (Alciatore et al., 1998: 29; Francis, 
2008). 
The big bath hypothesis implies managers taking higher than necessary 
economic impairment during periods when their companies have a ‗larger 
[negative pre-write-off] earnings surprise‘ (Riedl, 2004: 832; Guler, 200740; 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). Thus, prior studies analysing asset write-offs (e.g. 
                                         
40 Instead of using the term larger [negative pre-write-off] earnings surprise, as applied by 
Riedl (2004: 832), Guler (2007: 26) uses the term ‗unexpectedly low‘ pre-write-off earnings 
while AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 175) refer to it as ‗abnormally low‘ pre-write-off earnings. 
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Riedl, 2004: 832) and goodwill impairment (e.g. Guler, 2007: 17; AbuGhazaleh 
et al, 2011: 174) predict a negative association between companies‘ decisions 
in reporting asset write-offs inclusive of goodwill impairment losses and the 
larger negative pre-write-off earnings surprise, in that the stronger the 
downward trend in companies‘ pre-write-off earnings, the higher the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment losses reported.  
For the recognition study of goodwill impairment, using logistic regression, 
Guler (2007: 26 and 72) found no statistically significant difference between 
companies‘ decisions in recognising goodwill impairment losses and the larger 
negative pre-write-off earnings surprise. Nonetheless, for the measurement 
study of goodwill impairment, the tobit regression analysis carried out by 
Guler (2007: 73) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) in their measurement 
studies, provided support to the big bath hypothesis, finding a negative 
association between the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses and the 
larger negative pre-write-off earnings surprise. 
This thesis follows Riedl (2004: 829) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178), in 
that larger negative pre-write-off earnings surprise (BATH) is defined as 
change in a company‘s pre-write-off earnings from prior period to current 
period, divided by total assets at the end of prior period, when this change is 
below the median of non-zero negative values of this variable, and zero 
otherwise. The pre-write-off earnings refer to net income before 
extraordinary items or preferred dividends after adding back goodwill 
impairment losses (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). 
The following hypothesis is formulated both in a null form and an alternate 
form: 
H10-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
larger negative pre-write-off earnings surprise (BATH). 
H10-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and larger negative pre-write-off earnings surprise (BATH). 
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H10-Alternative focuses on testing the accounting choice of reporting goodwill 
impairment losses. Finding a statistically significant negative association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
BATH in H10-Alternative, suggests managers exercise an accounting choice by 
taking large goodwill impairment losses for big bath motivation. This view is 
based on the explanation offered by Riedl (2004: 833) that, to the extent 
economic factors [i.e. change in pre-write-off earnings (∆EARNINGS preGWIL) in 
H3] control for the underlying economic performance of the companies, BATH 
might capture any incremental effect relating to the big bath reporting 
incentive. 
Thus far, prior studies interpret the statistically significant result for BATH in 
a negative direction, as predicted, in two competing ways. Firstly, given that 
the change in pre-write-off earnings is negative, it implies that managers take 
a big bath to reveal private information about the company‘s true value 
(AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 194). Alternatively, seeing the negative change in 
the pre-write-off earnings, managers are behaving opportunistically and thus 
distorting the underlying economics of the company (Riedl, 2004: 833).  
Similar to Riedl (2004: 833), this thesis considers that, to the extent the 
change in pre-write-off earnings (one of the variables testing the economic 
factors - see Section 5.4.2.3) control for the performance of the underlying 
economic values of the assets, BATH (i.e. change in pre-write-off earnings 
below the median of non-zero negative values) may capture incremental 
effects relating to the big bath reporting incentives.  
5.6.4 Earnings smoothing (SMOOTH) 
Earnings smoothing involves a ‗reduction in earnings variability over a number 
of periods, or, within a single period, as the movement towards an expected 
level of reported earnings‘ (Beattie et al., 1994: 793). It is carried out by 
managers in order to maintain a steady earnings growth (Zucca and Campbell, 
1992: 35). Managers may smooth earnings where there exists concern about 
their job security (DeFond and Park, 1997), hoping that the market will 
equate smooth earnings with lower risk and thus higher stock values (Zucca 
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and Campbell, 1992: 35), or because management compensation plans are 
designed to reward smooth earnings patterns (Zucca and Campbell, 1992: 35). 
The earnings smoothing hypothesis suggests that managers take actions to 
reduce the earnings variability when their companies face ‗larger [positive 
pre-write-off] earnings surprise‘ (Riedl, 2004: 832). Thus, prior studies (e.g. 
Francis et al., 1996; Guler, 2007; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) hypothesise a 
positive association between companies‘ decisions in taking asset write-offs 
inclusive of goodwill impairment losses and companies‘ larger positive pre-
write-off earnings surprise41. The multivariate analysis undertaken by Francis 
et al. (1996: 124-125 and 127), Guler (2007: 72) and AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 190) provided support to the earnings smoothing hypothesis finding a 
positive association between companies‘ decisions in taking goodwill 
impairment losses and the larger positive pre-write-off earnings surprise. 
Similar to Riedl (2004: 829) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 178), in this thesis, 
larger positive pre-write-off earnings surprise (SMOOTH) is defined as change 
in a company‘s pre-write-off earnings from prior period to current period, 
divided by total assets at the end of prior period, when this change is above 
the median of non-zero positive values of this variable, and zero otherwise 
(see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The pre-write-off earnings refer to net income 
before extraordinary items or preferred dividends after adding back goodwill 
impairment losses (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following hypothesis is 
formulated both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H11-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the larger positive pre-write-off earnings surprise (SMOOTH). 
H11-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and the larger positive pre-write-off earnings surprise 
(SMOOTH). 
                                         
41 Instead of using the term larger [positive pre-write-off] earnings surprise, as applied by 
Riedl (2004: 832), Francis et al. (1996: 124) refer to it as ‗unexpectedly good performance‘, 
Guler (2007: 26) uses the term ‗unexpectedly high‘ pre-write-off earnings and AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 175) call it ‗abnormally high‘ pre-write-off earnings. 
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H11-Alternative focuses on testing the accounting choice of reporting goodwill 
impairment losses. Finding a statistically significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
SMOOTH in H11-Alternative, suggests managers are exercising an accounting choice 
by taking goodwill impairment losses for the purposes of earnings smoothing. 
5.7  Ownership structures 
Two variables, i.e. managerial ownership (in Section 5.7.1) and outside 
ownership concentration (in Section 5.7.2) are employed to test the influence 
of companies‘ ownership structures on the measurement and the recognition 
studies of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies.   
5.7.1 Managerial ownership (MANOWNLinear , and 
MANOWNNon-monotonic) 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, prior studies normally associate lower 
managerial ownership with an increase in companies‘ contractual constraints, 
which is often contain accounting-based restrictions (Warfield et al., 1995: 
65). With low managerial ownership, managers might be encouraged to either 
alleviate the accounting-based restriction or to capitalise on the incentives 
available in the contracts (Warfield et al., 1995: 65). Following this line of 
argument, prior studies analysing accounting method choice (e.g. Niehaus, 
1989) and accounting choice manifested in discretionary accruals adjustment 
(e.g. Warfield et al., 1995), argue that as managerial ownership increases, 
their interests become closely aligned with those of outside shareholders, 
which results in less motivation for the managers to be involved in wealth 
transferring activities. Thus, a negative association is predicted between 
managerial ownership and the accounting choice analysed (Niehaus, 1989; 
Warfield et al., 1995). The empirical results of Warfield et al. (1995: 63) 
supported their hypothesis, in finding a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and the discretionary accruals. 
Apart from predicting the negative relationship as discussed above, there are 
also studies which hypothesise a non-monotonic relationship between 
managerial ownership and accounting method choice (e.g. Niehaus, 1989: 
 119 
283), income smoothing (e.g. Carlson and Bathala, 1997) or discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management (e.g. Teshima and Shuto, 2008: 
115). These studies posit two effects of managerial ownership on their 
dependent variable.  
Firstly, as managerial ownership increases, the accounting method choice 
decreases (Niehaus, 1989: 272). This is because when managers own shares, 
their incentives become closely aligned with shareholders (Niehaus, 1989: 
272; Carlson and Bathala, 1997: 181; Teshima and Shuto, 2008: 108). 
Secondly, a high level of managerial ownership resulted in increased in 
managerial discretion, and hence increase the accounting method choice 
(Niehaus, 1989: 270). The reason is because it is difficult to discipline the 
managers who hold large portion of companies‘ shares (Niehaus, 1989: 270; 
Teshima and Shuto, 2008: 108). The combination of these two effects may 
lead to a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and 
accounting method choice (Niehaus, 1989: 283). The empirical evidence 
provided by Niehaus (1989:  283), Carlson and Bathala (1997: 193), and 
Teshima and Shuto (2008: 107) provide support to the non-monotonic 
relationship between management ownership and their dependent variable. 
In this thesis, the influence of managerial ownership on companies‘ decisions 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses is tested in two separate ways: (i) the 
linear relationship, and (ii) the non-monotonic relationship. Following Ismail 
and Weetman (2007: 521), managerial ownership (MANOWNLinear) is measured 
as the number of ordinary shares held directly by executive directors divided 
by total number of issued and paid up ordinary shares (see Appendix 1 of the 
thesis). Shares held by independent non-executive directors are not included, 
as these directors play a monitoring role, and are expected to limit any 
managerial opportunism (Mohd Ghazali, 2004: 118). The following paragraphs 
formulate the hypotheses for these two types of managerial ownership. As 
there is a lack of prior studies related to goodwill impairment analysing 
managerial ownership, no prediction sign is formed for these two hypotheses. 
For the linear relationship (MANOWNLinear), the following hypothesis is 
developed both in a null form and an alternate form:  
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H12A-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the managerial ownership (MANOWNLinear). 
H12A-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the managerial ownership (MANOWNLinear). 
For the non-monotonic relationship, the MANOWNLinear (discussed above) is 
transformed into three categories as follows: 
MANOWN1 = board ownership if board ownership < 0.05 
= 0.05 if board ownership ≥ 0.05 
 
MANOWN2 = 0 if board ownership < 0.05 
= board ownership minus 0.05 if 0.05≤board ownership< 0.25 
= 0.20 if board ownership ≥ 0.25 
 
MANOWN3 = 0 if board ownership < 0.25 
= board ownership minus 0.25 if board ownership ≥ 0.25 
The hypothesis which is developed for the non-monotonic relationship 
(MANOWNNon-monotonic) is as follows: 
H12B-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the managerial ownership (MANOWNNon-monotonic). 
H12B-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the managerial ownership (MANOWNNon-monotonic). 
The idea of the non-monotonic relationship is motivated by Morck et al. 
(1988) in their analysis of managerial ownership and companies‘ performance, 
which is then adapted by others in their study of earnings management (e.g. 
Teshima and Shuto, 2008), income smoothing (e.g. Carlson and Bathala, 
1997), audit committee (e.g. Chau and Leung, 2010), and companies‘ 
performance (e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1995). Similar to the prior studies, 
in this thesis, these three variables (i.e. MANOWN1, MANOWN2, and 
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MANOWN3) attempt to illustrate that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and reporting goodwill impairment differs at three different cut-off 
points.  
It is noted that there is an element of arbitrariness in the cut-off points of 5% 
and 25%. Although these are the cut-off points employed by Morck et al. 
(1988) in their analysis of US listed companies and later adapted by Chau and 
Gray (2010) in their investigation of Hong Kong listed companies, academic 
researchers (e.g. Morck et al., 1988: 298; Chau and Leung, 2006: 5) 
acknowledge that there is no consensus in the literature on the appropriate 
cut-off point. In Malaysia, the 5% cut-off point is in line with the Malaysian 
Securities Commission under its Securities Industry (Reporting of substantial 
shareholding) Regulations 1998 who considered substantial shareholding to be 
an ownership stake of 5% (Ngee, 2010: 11). However, there is no specific rule 
imposed by the Malaysian authorities which would dictate the choice of cut-
off point.  
To assess whether the empirical result for managerial ownership would be 
sensitive to the specification of a particular cut-off point, two other 
breakpoints will be applied in the sensitivity analysis (see Section 8.5.2.2). 
These are at 20% and at 30%. The 20% figure is adopted from Claessens et al. 
(2000: 92-93) who, in their analysis of the separation of ownership and control 
in nine East Asian countries, including Malaysia, apply the 20% rule in 
considering whether there is a control42 right of a company due to a pyramid 
structure. The 30% rule is applied by Morck et al. (1988) as part of a 
sensitivity analysis. In this thesis, a breakpoint of 50% and more could not be 
explored due to the small number of companies (i.e. 14 companies) with a 
managerial ownership of 50% and more.  
                                         
42 Claessens et al. (2000: 84) supported the cut-off point of 20% by bringing in the work of La 
Porta et al. (1999).  Claessens et al. (2000: 84) stated that ‗through the use of pyramiding and 
management appointments, as well as through cross-ownership and the (infrequent) use of 
shares that have more votes, they [La Porta et al., 1999] documented that control of East 
Asian corporations can be achieved with significantly less than an absolute majority share of 
the stock, as the probability of being a single controlling owner through holding only 20% of 
the stock is very high (above 80% across the four East Asian countries).‘ 
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5.7.2 Outside ownership concentration (OUTCON) 
With regard to outside ownership concentration, prior studies analysing 
accounting method choice hypothesise that when companies‘ ownership is 
diffused, managers exercised greater discretion in choosing one accounting 
method over another (Dhaliwal et al., 1982: 42; Niehaus, 1989: 269). This is 
because when shareholders have a small stake in the companies, they have 
less incentive for monitoring the managers‘ actions as the monitoring costs 
outweigh the benefits (Niehaus, 1989: 271-272). However, as the 
shareholders‘ ownership claims increase, the benefit of monitoring 
management tends to outweigh the costs (Niehaus, 1989: 271-272). Thus, 
these prior studies (e.g. Niehaus, 1989: 271-272; Astami and Tower, 2006: 8) 
associate increased outside ownership concentration with an increase in 
shareholder‘s monitoring of the management.  
In line with the argument that increased outside ownership concentration 
serves as a monitoring mechanism, which helps in mitigating incentive 
problems, prior studies (i.e. Niehaus, 1989: 279; Astami and Tower, 2006: 8) 
analysing accounting method choice expect increase in outside ownership 
concentration to reduce managerial discretion. Thus, these studies 
hypothesise a negative relationship between outside ownership concentration 
and managerial discretion [stated in terms of an income-increasing accounting 
method choice through the selection of FIFO in Niehaus (1989: 270); income-
increasing accounting policy choice in Astami and Tower (2006:1)]. The 
empirical results documented by Niehaus (1989) and Astami and Tower (2006) 
are consistent with their prediction. Using 344 US listed companies for the 
financial year ended 1980, Niehaus (1989: 283) found that as outside 
ownership concentration declined, managers are more likely to select FIFO 
over LIFO as the former increases company‘s reported earnings. Investigating 
442 annual reports in 2000/2001 for listed companies in the Asia Pacific region 
(i.e. Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore), Astami and 
Tower (2006: 6) observed that companies‘ levels of ownership concentration 
are negatively associated with the use of income-increasing accounting 
method.  
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Nevertheless, Fan and Wong (2002: 405) argued that when shareholders obtain 
a substantial portion of shares to the point at which they obtain an effective 
control of the company, the nature of the agency problem shifted. Instead of 
a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, the conflict is now 
between controlling owners and minority shareholders (Fan and Wong (2002: 
405). Accordingly, it is possible that an increase in outside ownership 
concentration can lead to an increase in managerial discretion by the 
controlling owners at the expense of the minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997: 760; Fan and Wong, 2002: 401-402). 
In view of the two opposite arguments discussed above and the lack of prior 
studies related to goodwill impairment examining the outside ownership 
concentration, no prediction sign is formed regarding the relationship 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
outside ownership concentration (OUTCON). Similar to Niehaus (1989: 277), 
outside ownership concentration (OUTCON) is measured as number of ordinary 
shares held by outsiders with the five largest claims, divided by the total 
number of issued and paid up ordinary shares. In this thesis, following Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006: 1042), outside shareholders43 refers to institutions, 
blockholders, and other individuals outside the company (see Appendix 1 of 
the thesis). 
The following hypothesis is developed both in a null form and an alternate 
form: 
H13-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the outside ownership concentration (OUTCON) 
                                         
43 Information concerning these shareholders is obtained from the statistics on shareholdings, 
provided by companies in their annual reports, whereby, Malaysian listed companies disclosed 
the name of the shareholders, the number of ordinary shares held, and the percentage of 
issued capital. In the case of nominee shareholders, the name of the nominee and the 
shareholders are disclosed. For example, in the annual report of Astral Supreme Berhad, the 
following information is disclosed ‗Mayban Nominees (Tempatan) Sdn. Bhd. pledged securities 
account for Cherng Chin Guan‘ (Astral Supreme Berhad, 2008: 67). From this list, the 
researcher then examines the annual reports to gauge the level of involvement which the 
investor (Cherng Chin Guan) has with the company. 
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H13-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the outside ownership concentration (OUTCON) 
Finding a significant association for H13-Alternative suggests the influential role of 
outside ownership concentration (OUTCON) on the measurement of goodwill 
impairment.  
5.8 Discretion available in performing an impairment 
test of goodwill 
In performing an impairment test of goodwill, FRS 136 Impairment of Assets 
allows managers to make judgements and estimates (Ernst and Young, 2007: 
1), which Nobes (2006: 240) and Kvaal and Nobes (2010: 185) consider as 
‗covert options‘ (see detailed discussion in Sections 4.4 to 4.4.2). The 
managerial discretion investigated in this thesis includes the number of cash-
generating-units containing goodwill (CGUs) (see Section 5.8.1), and the 
discount rates employed in estimating the recoverable amount of CGUs 
containing goodwill (see Sections 5.8.2 to 5.8.2.3). 
5.8.1 Cash-generating-units containing goodwill 
(CGUs01 and CGUsContinous) 
The discussion and empirical evidence on managerial discretion with respect 
to CGUs containing goodwill emanates largely from empirical studies analysing 
how managers of US (i.e. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 2007; Ahmed and 
Guler, 2007; Ramanna and Watts, 2012) and Canadian (i.e. Lapointe-Antunes 
et al., 2008) listed companies make use of reporting units44 containing 
goodwill.  
                                         
44 For the purpose of an impairment test of goodwill, under IAS 36 (FRS 136 in Malaysia), 
goodwill is allocated to a CGU(s) while under US and Canadian GAAP, goodwill is allocated to 
a reporting unit. A CGU is the smallest identifiable group of assets that generates cash inflows 
that are largely independent of the cash inflows from other assets or groups of assets (IASB, 
2006b: IAS 36, paragraph 6); a reporting unit is an operating segment or one level below an 
operating segment (Ernst and Young, 2010: 7). Accordingly, CGUs and reporting unit are two 
different basis of goodwill allocation (Ernst and Young, 2010: 7). 
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Prior studies (i.e. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 2007; Ramanna, 2008; 
Ramanna and Watts, 2012) analysing the relationship between reporting units 
and goodwill impairment losses argue that as the number of reporting unit 
increases, it provides managers with greater flexibility in allocating goodwill. 
This in turns increases the managerial discretion (Beatty and Weber, 2006; 
Guler, 2007; Ramanna, 2008; Ramanna and Watts, 2012). These studies 
rationalise that for companies with one reporting unit, managers are unable 
to allocate the goodwill balance among various reporting units (Beatty and 
Weber, 2006: 271; Guler, 2007: 24-25). Accordingly, the managers have fewer 
avenues to opportunistically manage the allocation of goodwill (Guler, 2007: 
24-25).  
On the other hand, for companies with multiple reporting units, managers 
have more choice in allocating the goodwill (Ramanna, 2008: 262; Ramanna 
and Watts, 2012: 760). To accelerate goodwill impairment losses, the 
managers could choose to allocate purchased goodwill to a low growth 
reporting unit (Ramanna, 2008: 261). Alternatively, to avoid reporting 
goodwill impairment losses, the managers could choose to allocate purchased 
goodwill to a high growth reporting unit that has internally generated goodwill 
(Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007: 30; Ramanna, 2008: 261; Ramanna and 
Watts, 2012: 760). In this unit, subsequent goodwill impairment losses can be 
masked by the internally generated goodwill (Ramanna and Watts, 2012: 760). 
Thus, Ramanna (2008: 255) expects that as the number of reporting units 
containing goodwill increases, managerial discretion increases. 
Instead of expecting managers to behave opportunistically where there occurs 
an increase in reporting units, Ahmed and Guler (2007: 4) argue that 
managers of companies with multiple reporting units are able to perform 
goodwill valuation more precisely. In this case, with more reporting units, 
more goodwill impairment losses will be expected as the existing losses 
cannot be netted against each other (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008: 44). 
Therefore, with more reporting units, managers are able to reflect the 
underlying economics of the companies (Guler, 2007: 51). 
Applying similar arguments to the reporting units, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) 
explore the managerial discretion with respect to CGUs containing goodwill of 
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UK listed companies implementing IFRS 3 from 2005-2006. They argue that 
compared to companies with a single CGUs, companies with multiple CGUs are 
expected to perform more impairment tests of goodwill (AbuGhazaleh et al., 
2011: 179). Consequently, these companies may report higher goodwill 
impairment losses as the existing impairment losses cannot be netted against 
one another (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 179). 
On the contrary, it is possible for managers of companies with multiple CGUs 
to exploit the number of CGUs by accelerating, avoiding or understating 
reporting goodwill impairment losses (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 180). They 
exemplify, to accelerate goodwill impairment losses, managers of companies 
with multiple CGUs could allocate a large portion of the purchased goodwill to 
CGUs that are anticipated to decline in value; to avoid or understate goodwill 
impairment losses, the managers could allocate the purchased goodwill to 
CGUs that are anticipated to rise in value (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 180).  
Because of the two different aspects of the argument, no prediction sign is 
provided by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011). Using a dichotomous variable, equal to 
one when companies have more than one CGUs and zero otherwise, 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 188) observed that the two variables are non-
significant in explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment by UK listed 
companies (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 190). 
To compare the results of this thesis with the UK data, in the first stage of the 
analysis (see Model 1 in Section 8.3.3), a dummy variable for the cash-
generating-unit (CGUs01) is employed. Similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 
178), the variable is defined as a dichotomous variable, equal to one if a 
company has more than one CGUs at the end of the current period, and zero 
otherwise (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis is developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H14A-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the multiple CGUs goodwill (CGUs01). 
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H14A-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the multiple CGUs containing goodwill (CGUs01). 
The limitation of using a dichotomous variable is that it leads to loss of 
information (Farrington and Loeber, 2000: 103). It appears that by 
dichotomising the CGUs, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) have treated all 
companies with multiple CGUs as equivalent. They (p. 199) explain that the 
CGUs is measured as a dichotomous variable because many of the UK listed 
companies analysed do not disclose the number of CGUs - these companies 
‗simply stating that goodwill is allocated to ―multiple‖ units‘. 
To overcome the issue of dichotomisation discussed above, in the second 
stage of the analysis (see Model 2 in Section 8.3.3), this thesis employs a 
continuous variable (CGUsContinous) for the CGUs. Specifically, CGUsContinous is 
defined as the actual number of CGUs containing goodwill disclosed in the 
annual reports by Malaysian listed companies at the end of the current year 
(see Appendix 1 of the thesis). However, to identify the number of CGUs 
requires careful inspection of the companies‘ Notes to the Financial 
Statement. This is where the semi-structure interviews conducted at the 
beginning of the PhD are advantageous, as the interviews provide insight into 
how companies identify their CGUs (see Section 3.2.5). 
As there are no prior studies analysing the association between CGUsContinous 
and reporting goodwill impairment losses, no prediction sign is provided in 
this thesis. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed, both in a null form 
and an alternate form: 
H14B-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses the 
number of CGUs (CGUsContinous). 
H14B-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the number of CGUs (CGUsContinous). 
 128 
5.8.2  Discount rates employed in estimating the 
recoverable amount CGUs containing goodwill  
The application of discount rates in estimating the recoverable amount of 
assets including goodwill is one of the important factors in determining 
whether there is any impairment charge (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008: 8) 
(see detailed discussion in Section 4.4.2). It requires managers to exercise 
judgement in which a change in the discount rate may have an impact on the 
recoverable amount of the assets (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008: 3). 
Prior studies of asset write-offs and goodwill impairment focusing on US and 
Canadian listed companies do not examine whether the discount rates applied 
by companies have any influence on their decisions to report goodwill 
impairment losses. This is because (for these companies), goodwill valuation 
is based on fair value instead of the recoverable amount. Because of the lack 
studies analysing the discount rates in relation to companies‘ decisions in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses, to analyse the issue of the discount 
rates, the researcher has referred to the results of the disclosure studies 
examining discount rates disclosed by companies which implement FRS 3. 
Three of the key findings of these studies that relate to the discount rates, 
and which are of interest to this thesis, are: (i) there is a wide span of 
discount rates employed by listed companies (see Section 5.8.2.1), (ii) the 
majority of companies employed a single discount rate on a blanket basis to 
all CGUs (see Section 5.8.2.2), and (iii) there are companies which do not 
disclose the discount rate employed (see Section 5.8.2.3). 
5.8.2.1 Wide span of discount rates (DISCRATE) 
Prior studies (Glaum et al., 2007: 9; Carlin and Finch, 2011) observed a wide 
span of discount rates employed by listed companies. Glaum et al. (2007:9), 
for example, found that the discount rates of 357 blue-chips companies from 
17 European countries for financial year ended 2005 ranged from 4% to 34%, 
with high proportion of companies applying a rate of between 7% and 9%. 
Likewise, Carlin and Finch (2011) documented that the discount rates of the 
200 large Australian listed companies with financial year ended 2006 which 
they examined ranged from 5.7% to 40%, with a mean discount rate of 12.3%. 
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Carlin and Finch (2009) argued that companies may manipulate reported 
earnings via the estimated discount rates. For example, to accelerate 
goodwill impairment losses, companies may estimate very high discount rates; 
to avoid reporting goodwill impairment loss, excessively low discount rates 
will be selected (Carlin and Finch, 2009).  
However, Gallery (2009: 337) opines that managers may select discount rates 
which are specific to CGUs, and these discount rates could be excessively high 
or low compared to the discount rates employed by other companies. Gallery 
(2009) argue that the specific discount rates selected by managers are 
because they attempt to signal the underlying value of the CGUs rather than 
to manipulate reported earnings. 
In view of the above discussion, this thesis attempts to explore the 
relationship between companies‘ application of discount rates (DISCRATE) and 
the decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses. The discount rate 
(DISCRATE) is defined as the percentage of discount rate employed by 
companies in estimating the recoverable amount of CGUs containing goodwill 
which is disclosed in the annual reports at the end of the current year (see 
Appendix 1 of the thesis). Because there is no empirical evidence which has 
tested this variable, no prediction sign is formed in the following hypothesis, 
which is developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H15A-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the percentage of discount rates employed (DISCRATE). 
H15A-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the percentage of discount rates employed (DISCRATE). 
5.8.2.2 Application of either a single discount rate or 
multiple discount rates (DISCMULTIPLE) 
The second issue related to the discount rates revealed by the disclosure 
study in relation to goodwill impairment is the application of either a single 
 130 
discount rate or multiple discount rates to estimate the recoverable amount 
of CGUs containing goodwill. Carlin et al. (2010a: 90-91), for example, 
reported that of the 168 Singaporean listed companies which implement FRS 
36 Impairment of Assets, more than half of the companies applied a single 
explicit discount rate. A similar result is also found for Hong Kong listed 
companies by Carlin et al (2010b: 15).  
Given the large number of companies employing a single discount rate to 
estimate the recoverable amount of CGUs containing goodwill (despite 
companies having more than one CGU), it would be interesting to analyse 
whether applying a single discount rate or multiple discount rates would 
influence a company‘s decision to report goodwill impairment losses. 
Application of either a single or multiple discount rates is defined as a 
dichotomous variable, equal to one if a company applies multiple discount 
rates, zero if the company applies a single discount rate at the end of the 
current year (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following hypothesis is 
developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H15B-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the application of multiple discount rates (DISCMULTIPLE). 
H15B-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the application of multiple discount rates (DISCMULTIPLE). 
5.8.2.3 Discount rate – Disclosed/Not disclosed 
(DISCRATEDisclosed/Not) 
Thus far, the only published study analysing the disclosure of goodwill 
impairment after the implementation of FRS 3 in Malaysia is carried out by 
Carlin et al. (2009: 91). Specifically, Carlin et al. (2009: 91) analyse the 
disclosure of goodwill impairment by 36 listed companies in Malaysia for the 
financial year ended December 2006. They found (p. 91) that of the 36 listed 
companies examined, 40% of the companies do not disclose the discount 
rates. The finding of Carlin et al. (2009: 91) leads the researcher to explore 
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whether a company‘s decision not to disclose the discount rate, has any 
influence on their decisions with regard to reporting goodwill impairment 
losses. To explore this issue, a dichotomous variable DISCRATEDisclosed/Not is 
created, which is equal to one if a company does not discloses the discount 
rate, and zero otherwise (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following 
hypothesis is developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H15C-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the decision not to disclose the discount rates 
(DISCRATEDisclosed/Not). 
H15C-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
the decision not to disclose the discount rates 
(DISCRATEDisclosed/Not). 
Finding a significant association between companies‘ decisions in reporting 
goodwill impairment losses and the decision not to disclose the discount rates 
employed (DISCRATEDisclosed/Not) points to the possibility of accounting choices 
related to goodwill impairment being exercised as these companies appear to 
hide the discount rate that they employed in the estimation of the 
recoverable amount of the CGUs containing goodwill. 
5.9  Control variables 
Four variables are included in this thesis to control for the effect of company-
specific factors (see Sections 5.9.1 to 5.9.4). 
5.9.1 Size of company (SIZE)  
SIZE variable is included to control for any differential size effects on 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses. Prior studies 
suggested that large companies might receive more public exposure, e.g. 
through a high level of scrutiny from analysts (Guler, 2007; Zang, 2008). As a 
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result, studies analysing companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill 
impairment losses argue that managers of large companies might be less likely 
to manipulate reported earnings through reporting goodwill impairment losses 
(Zang, 2008). 
On the other hand, prior studies examining accounting method choice argue 
that in an attempt to avoid political costs, managers of large companies have 
greater incentives to reduce reported earnings by selecting an income-
decreasing accounting method (Lilien and Pastena, 1982: 158; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990: 140; Jeter et al., 2008: 166). Applying this argument in the 
context of goodwill impairment losses, it is possible for large companies to 
reduce reported earnings by taking large goodwill impairment losses. Thus, in 
this case, increase in companies‘ size may lead to an increase in the 
likelihood or magnitude of goodwill impairment losses reported.  
The empirical evidence analysing companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill 
impairment losses and companies‘ size documented either a positive 
association between the two variables (e.g. Francis et al., 1996: 125-126; 
Beatty and Weber, 2006: 281; Guler, 2007: 73; Zang, 2008: 52; Omar and 
Mohd-Saleh, 2011: 403) or no significant association (e.g. Ramanna and Watts, 
2012; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 190).  
In this thesis, similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 179), SIZE is defined as the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the prior period (see Appendix 
1 of the thesis). In view of the mixed results discussed above, no prediction 
sign is formed on the association between SIZE and companies‘ decisions in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses. The following hypothesis is developed 
both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H16-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
size of companies (SIZE). 
H16-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
size of companies (SIZE). 
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5.9.2 Types of industry (INDUSTRYG5) 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990: 152) argue that accounting numbers are applied 
in different ways across industries. Accordingly, differences in the 
opportunities afforded to different types of industry might influence 
accounting method choice (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990: 152). Industry 
effects might include competition (Bens, 2006: 292) and deterioration within 
an industry (Zang, 2008: 48). To control for the industry effect, this thesis 
incorporates industry variable in the statistical model.  
To date, empirical studies examining industry effect as a control variable 
found no statistically significant association between companies‘ decisions in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses and the industry variable (e.g. Beatty 
and Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 195).  
In this thesis, the industry variable is initially measured as a dummy variable 
across 10 industry categories based on Datastream Industrial classification 
level 2. However, due to the lack of data in five industries, this industry group 
is reduced to five (see Section 8.2.2.3). The baseline for the INDUSTRYG5 is 
Industrial and basic materials (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). Because of the 
mixed evidence presented by prior studies, no prediction sign is formed on 
the association between INDUSTRYG5 and their companies‘ decisions in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses. The following hypothesis is developed 
both in a null form and an alternate form: 
H17-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
industry (INDUSTRYG5). 
H17-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
industry (INDUSTRYG5). 
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5.9.3 Financial year-end (YEND) 
Financial year-end45 dummy variable is created to control for the time period, 
especially when this thesis investigates accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment covering a three year period beginning from the first year of the 
implementation of FRS 3. DeAngelo (1988: 24), in her investigation of 
accounting performance measures in 86 proxy contests of US listed 
companies, explains that learning opportunities potentially affect the degree 
of income manipulation. With time, outsiders have a chance to learn about 
the scope of accounting discretion available to management (DeAngelo, 1988: 
24). 
Applying the argument of learning opportunities provided by DeAngelo (1988), 
this thesis argues that within a three-year period, managers might have 
opportunities to learn about the available degree of discretion in performing 
an impairment test of goodwill. Alternatively, it might also provide learning 
opportunities for auditors to learn about the available discretion exercised by 
managers. 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 179) control the two-year period in their study by 
creating a year dummy variable for each financial year-end. Their empirical 
result shows that the financial year-end of companies is non-significant in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment (p. 191).  
In this thesis, a financial year-end dummy variable (YEND) is measured as a 
dummy variable across three financial year-end categories (i.e. 2006, 2007, 
and 2008) based on Datastream classification. The baseline for the YEND is 
financial year ended 2006 (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The following 
hypothesis is developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
                                         
45 There is no statutory prescription of the date for a year end. Year ends vary from company 
to company in Malaysia as there are companies with December year-end and also companies 
with other than December year-end, such as February year-end (see Figure 6.1 in Section 6.3 
for detailed description of the year ends). 
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H18-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
their financial year-end (YEND). 
H18-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
their financial year-end (YEND). 
5.9.4 Additions to goodwill (ADD) 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 183) employ a dummy variable which captures any 
additions to goodwill arising from business acquisition within the financial 
year. They (p. 183) explain that the variable may proxy for merger and 
acquisition activities carried out by companies. With an annual impairment 
review of goodwill, companies which are involved in an acquisition that 
creates goodwill are more likely to identify and write-off any overpayment 
related to the acquisition (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 183). Accordingly, 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) predict a positive association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and additions to 
goodwill. Their multivariate analysis reveals a statistically significant positive 
association between the two variables at p-value less than 0.05 (AbuGhazaleh 
et al., 2011: 190). Apart from AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), none of the prior 
studies analysing goodwill impairment has explored companies‘ additions to 
goodwill.  
Similar to AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 179), this thesis employs a dummy 
variable which measure companies‘ additions to goodwill. The variable (ADD) 
is defined as a dichotomous variable, equal to one if a company has additions 
to its goodwill arising from business acquisitions during the financial year, and 
zero if there is no addition (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). Following the 
findings of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), this thesis predicts a positive 
association between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and the additions to its goodwill (ADD). The following hypothesis is 
developed both in a null form and an alternate form: 
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H19-Null: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant association between 
companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses and 
additions to goodwill (ADD). 
H19-Alternative: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive association 
between companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses and additions to goodwill (ADD). 
5.10  Summary  
This chapter has developed hypotheses to test both the measurement and the 
recognition studies related to goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian 
listed companies after the implementation of FRS 3. The choice of these 
hypotheses has been driven by several aims, namely to: compare Malaysian 
findings with those of  a prior study analysing UK data (i.e. AbuGhazaleh et 
al., 2011); incorporate variables that capture the characteristics of listed 
companies in Malaysia; include variables which are pertinent to understanding 
the measurement of goodwill impairment but which are not tested by 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011); and as part of the robustness test by replacing 
EarningsPrior as employed by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) with 
EarningsPreGWILcurrent and ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL (see Section 5.3). 
The dependent variable for the measurement study is the magnitude of 
goodwill impairment losses divided by prior year total assets (including 
goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on the income statement (see Table 
5.1 in Section 5.2). The dependent variable for the recognition study is a 
dichotomous variable, equal to one when companies are considered as 
exercising a recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment, 
and zero otherwise. 
To test the measurement and the recognition studies, factors potentially 
influencing the accounting choices related to goodwill impairment are 
grouped into six categories. These are: economic factors (see Section 5.4), 
contracting perspective (see Section 5.5), opportunistic behaviour perspective 
(see Section 5.6), ownership structures (see Section 5.7), and discretion 
 137 
available in performing an impairment test of goodwill (see Section 5.8). 
Company-specific factors are included as control variables (see Section 5.9).  
 
 138 
Chapter 6: Research Design and Methods 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter has three main purposes. Firstly, it discusses the methodological 
position adopted by this thesis. Secondly, it describes the total population of 
Malaysian listed companies which implemented FRS 3 in the first three years 
of the standard taking effect (from 2006/7 to 2008/9), and discusses the 
process of validating the Datastream source data. At the end of the 
discussion, the final number of Malaysian listed companies which are available 
for the analysis of accounting choices related to goodwill impairment is 
specified. Thirdly, it outlines the research design and the statistical tests for 
the three empirical chapters - disclosure, measurement, and recognition 
studies of goodwill impairment.  
This chapter is structured into ten sections including the introduction. Section 
6.2 discusses the underlying methodological position of this thesis. Section 6.3 
outlines the total population of Malaysian listed companies which 
implemented FRS 3 from 2006/7 to 2008/9. Section 6.4 describes the 
procedures involved in validating the Datastream source data. Section 6.5 
describes the research design including the data specification and research 
method for the disclosure study. Section 6.6 discusses the descriptive 
statistics and various statistical tests for both the measurement and 
recognition studies. Sections 6.7 and 6.8 discuss the multivariate analyses for 
the measurement study and recognition study respectively. Section 6.9 
describes the test statistics to be conducted in order to assess the goodness-
of-fit of the regression models for the measurement study and recognition 
study. Section 6.10 summarises the chapter. 
6.2 Methodological position 
Burrell and Morgan (1979: 22) propose four paradigms for the analysis of social 
theory. These are: radical humanist, radical structuralist, functionalist, and 
interpretive. They (p. 1) argue that these paradigms are built upon different 
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sets of assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of 
society. In the terminology of Burrell and Morgan (1979), this thesis fits within 
the functionalist paradigm. To Burrell and Morgan (1979: 22), the functionalist 
paradigm is ‗rooted in the tradition of sociological positivism‘. Therefore, this 
thesis takes a positivist research approach in analysing accounting choices 
related to goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. Before 
discussing the rationale for adopting such approach, the following paragraphs 
first discuss the four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology, 
human nature, and methodology, as underlined by Burrell and Morgan (1979), 
and then explain how these assumptions are applied in this thesis.  
Firstly, Burrell and Morgan (1979: 1) explain that assumptions of an 
ontological nature relate to the very essence of the issue investigate. A basic 
ontological question includes whether ‗reality‘, which is to be investigated is 
external to the researcher, or is it a product of individual consciousness (ibid, 
p.1). For positivists, their ontological assumption is that reality is external 
and objective (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 28). In the context of this thesis, 
the ontological approach is mainly based on objective information. The 
primary source of information applied in the analysis of accounting choices 
related to goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies are based on 
factual data obtained from companies‘ annual reports and the Datastream  
database.  
Secondly, Burrell and Morgan (1979: 1) state that assumptions of 
epistemological nature concern the ground of knowledge, i.e. how a 
researcher begins to understand the world and convey this understanding as 
knowledge to others. For positivists, their epistemological assumption is that 
knowledge is only significant if it is based on observations of external reality 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 28). With this epistemology, positivists attempt 
to ‗explain and predict what happens in the social world by looking for 
regularities and causal relationship between its constituents elements‘ 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 5). They view the development of knowledge as a 
cumulative process whereby new insights are added to the existing knowledge 
and false hypotheses are eliminated (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 5). This view 
is in sharp contrast with anti-positivists, who see social world as relativistic by 
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its nature, and can only be understood from the perspective of individuals 
who are directly involved with the issue under investigation (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979: 5). In the context of this thesis, it is the researcher‘s belief 
that adopting the positivist approach does not in itself preclude perspectives 
of individuals who are directly involved with the implementation decisions 
related to reporting goodwill impairment. For this reason, information 
gathered from semi-structured interviews with key personnel who were 
involved with the implementation of FRS 3 assisted the researcher in the 
collection of data (see Section 5.8.1) and in designing a specific research 
setting (see Section 9.2.1), prior to the analysis of data using the positivist 
approach. 
Thirdly, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979: 1), assumptions of human 
nature involve the relationship between human being and their environment, 
i.e. how human beings respond to situations faced in the external world. Two 
extreme perspectives of this model of human nature are discussed by Burrell 
and Morgan (1979: 2), namely, determinism and voluntarism. From a 
deterministic viewpoint, human beings and their experiences are seen as 
products of the environment (ibid, p.2). On the other hand, advocates of 
voluntarism see human beings as having free-will and creators of their 
environment (ibid, p.2). This thesis neither supports the assumption of 
determinism nor the idea of voluntarism. Instead, it takes a middle position 
between these two perspectives by assuming that top managers of Malaysian 
listed companies exercise some control over the corporate environment based 
on their high position. However, due to the existence of regulatory bodies in 
Malaysia, their control might be limited. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979: 2) clarify that the three sets of assumptions related 
to ontology, epistemology, and human nature have a direct implication of a 
methodological nature. They (p. 2) elaborate that, with different ontologies, 
epistemologies, and models of human nature, social scientists would have 
different methodologies. 
As noted earlier, a positivist research approach is adopted in analysing 
accounting choices related to goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies. The approach is considered appropriate as this thesis is concerned 
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with testing theory. With the positivist research approach, two perspectives 
of accounting choice (i.e. the contracting perspective and the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective) are outlined at the outset (in Chapter 2). Hypotheses 
are then formulated (in Chapter 5) from these perspectives and the 
characteristics of Malaysian listed companies (in Chapter 3) plus the discretion 
related to impairment test of goodwill (such as CGUs and discount rates, 
discussed in Chapter 4). Rigorous tests are conducted (in Chapters 8 and 9) in 
an attempt to falsify these hypotheses through a large empirical observation.  
An advantage of the positivist research approach is that by requiring a large 
empirical observation, it allows a researcher to answer the ‗what‘ questions 
which cover many situations (e.g. RQ 4: To what extent do the decisions of 
Malaysian listed companies in measuring goodwill impairment indicate that 
they reflect the underlying economic values of cash-generating-units 
containing goodwill?; RQ 5: To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian 
listed companies in measuring goodwill impairment support the contracting 
perspective? – see Section 1.3 for detail). In addition, the positivist research 
approach necessitates a clearly specified research method with well-defined 
variables. This makes it easier for other researchers to replicate the study. 
Therefore, claims made by the researcher can be publicly scrutinised. This 
might be of relevance to standard setters, in particular the MASB and the 
IASB, who might be interested to see the overall influence of the 
implementation of (I)FRS 3 related to goodwill impairment. Moreover, this is a 
practical approach due to the difficulties in getting access to top managers of 
Malaysian listed companies (see Section 3.2.5). 
6.3 Total population of Malaysian listed companies 
which implemented FRS 3 Business Combinations 
from 2006/7-2008/9 
As noted in Section 4.2 (see Figure 4.1), in Malaysia, FRS 3 was effective for 
listed companies with business combinations on or after January 1, 2006. This 
thesis focuses on Malaysian listed companies which implemented FRS 3 for the 
first three years of the standard taking effect. Figure 6.1 specifies the three-
year period of investigation with the respective dates of the business 
combinations and companies‘ financial year-ends.  
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Data analysed in this thesis has been obtained from Datastream, and from 
companies‘ annual reports, which are available at the website of Bursa 
Malaysia (See Appendix 1 of the thesis for detailed of the data sources). To 
identify companies which implemented FRS 3 in the first three years, these 
companies must either have goodwill balances or reported goodwill 
impairment losses, in any of the three years. Table 6.1 presents the total 
number of companies which implemented FRS 3 within three-years of the 
standard taking effect. The table shows that 556 companies implemented FRS 
3 in the first year, 516 companies implemented FRS 3 in the second year, and 
491 companies implemented FRS 3 in the third year. There are different 
numbers of companies in different years because some companies have fully 
impaired their goodwill or have goodwill balance for the first time in the year 
of analysis. 381 companies were present throughout the three-year period of 
investigation. 
Figure 6.1: The first three years of the implementation of FRS 3 
Financial year-
end (FYE) 
Date of business combinations  
 
Year of FRS 3 
implementation 
 
December 2006 
 
1/1/2006-31/12/2006 
 
Initial year 
 
From January to 
November  2007 
 
Within the relevant financial year 
e.g. For FYE February 2007, the date 
of business combinations is from 
1/2/2006-31/1/2007 
 
 
 
Initial year 
 
December 2007 
 
1/1/2007-31/12/2007 
 
Second year 
 
From January to 
November  2008 
 
Within the relevant financial year 
e.g. For FYE February 2008, the date 
of business combinations is from 
1/2/2007-31/1/2008 
 
 
 
Second year 
 
December 2008 
 
1/1/2008-31/12/2008 
 
Third year 
 
From January to 
November 2009 
 
Within the relevant financial year 
e.g. For FYE February 2009, the date 
of business combinations is from 
1/2/2008-31/1/2009 
 
 
Third year 
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Table 6.1: Total number of companies available for analysis of accounting choices related to goodwill impairment for the first 
three years of the implementation of FRS 3 
 
Panel A: Total no. of companies  Initial year Second year Third year Total 
no. of 
firm-
years 
FYE-
Dec-
2006 
FYE –From 
Jan. to 
Nov. 2007 
Total 
2006/7 
FYE -
Dec-
2007 
FYE –From 
Jan. to 
Nov. 2008 
Total 
2007/8 
FYE -
Dec-
2008 
FYE –From 
Jan. to 
Nov. 2009 
Total 
2008/9 
Companies which have goodwill 
balance at the end of the year or 
companies which reported 
goodwill impairment losses during 
the financial year  
 
313 
 
243 
 
556 
 
300 
 
216 
 
516 
 
298 
 
193 
 
491 
 
1563 
Elimination causes:           
 Companies with no data for 
market capitalisation 
 
8 
 
0 
 
8 
 
4 
 
2 
 
6 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
15 
 Companies with no data on the 
book values of their net assets  
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
5 
 
5 
 
6 
 
0 
 
6 
 
12 
 Companies with no data for the 
prior year total assets 
0 2 2 1 3 4 0 5 5 11 
 Companies with negative book 
value of net assets 
9 6 15 2 1 3 5 1 6 24 
 Companies with no annual 
reports between 2006/7-
2008/9 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 
Final no. of companies  294 235 529 292 205 497 285 187 472 1498 
Panel B:  
Partition into 
          
Goodwill impairment losses 77 58 135 69 54 123 67 44 111 369 
Zero goodwill impairment 217 177 394 223 151 374 218 143 361 1129 
Total 294 235 529 292 205 497 285 187 472 1498 
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From the total population of companies meeting the eligibility criterion, 
Table 6.1 indicates those that were excluded from the analysis due to a lack 
of data on: the market capitalisation, the book values of the net assets, and 
prior year total assets. Also, in the table, there were companies excluded 
because of the negative book values of their net assets, and companies which 
did not provide annual reports to Bursa Malaysia within the period of 
investigation. The exclusion of these companies resulted in the total number 
of companies available for analysis being reduced to 529, 497, and 472 in the 
first, second and third year of the FRS 3 implementation respectively. 
Unlike AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 184), the present study does not exclude 
companies in the finance industry from the total population of companies 
which implemented FRS 3. This approach of including the finance industry is 
similar to the majority of studies analysing goodwill impairment by US listed 
companies, such as Beatty and Weber (2006), Guler (2007), Lapointe-Antunes 
et al. (2008), Zang (2008), and Ramanna and Watts (2012). More importantly, 
this approach is adopted because, in Malaysia, there is no additional reporting 
requirement regarding goodwill impairment imposed by the Central Bank of 
Malaysia under its reporting guideline. 
Table 6.1 shows that out of the total number of companies which 
implemented FRS 3, less than 30% of them reported goodwill impairment 
losses. For example, in the initial implementation year, 26% of the companies 
(i.e. 135 out of 529 companies) reported goodwill impairment losses while the 
remaining 74% of the companies (i.e. 394 out of 529 companies) reported zero 
goodwill impairment. This large proportion of companies reporting zero 
goodwill impairment is quite similar to the analysis of AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 184), where 79% of the UK listed companies reported zero goodwill 
impairment. The substantial number of observations with zero values observes 
lead to a discussion of the tobit model (see Section 6.7.1) and the application 
of random-effects tobit model (see Section 6.7.2) for the measurement study 
of this thesis. 
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6.4 Validation of Datastream source data 
The validation of Datastream source data is carried out with regards to two 
main issues. These are: the accuracy of the amount of goodwill impairment 
losses, and zero goodwill impairment recorded by Datastream (see Section 
6.4.1), and the gap of information concerning the opening goodwill balance at 
the initial year of the implementation of FRS 3 (see Section 6.4.2).  
6.4.1 Accuracy of the amount of goodwill impairment 
recorded by Datastream 
The accuracy of the amount of goodwill impairment losses and zero goodwill 
impairment extracted from Datastream is validated by cross-checking these 
figures with those contained in the annual reports. The direction of checking 
is from Datastream to the annual reports.  
For companies reporting goodwill impairment losses, the validation of data is 
carried out for all of the 369 annual reports of companies which reported 
goodwill impairment losses within the first three-year period of FRS 3 
implementation (see Table 6.1). Of the 369 annual reports examined, 10 
errors made by Datastream, were found in respect of different companies. 
The errors were: goodwill impairment losses wrongly charged as other 
impairment (two companies), other impairment wrongly treated as goodwill 
impairment losses (one company), understated goodwill impairment losses 
(two companies), and offsetting goodwill impairment losses with negative 
goodwill (five companies). 
For companies reporting zero goodwill impairment, the validation of data 
recorded by Datastream was checked for 217 companies with the financial 
year ended December 2006 and for 218 companies with the financial year 
ended December 2008 (see Table 6.1). The financial year ended December 
2006 is selected as it represents the first group of companies which 
implemented FRS 3 for the first time in 2006. If there is any inaccuracy in the 
figures recorded by Datastream, it would be likely to occur in this group. If 
the inaccuracy of the figures recorded by Datastream is minimal in this group, 
it is likely that a similar situation will also apply to other groups. Additionally, 
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to ensure Datastream recording of goodwill data is consistent over time, 
companies which reported zero goodwill impairment in the financial year 
ended December 2008 are also examined. With respect to the companies 
reporting zero goodwill impairment, two errors were found in two different 
companies. The errors made by Datastream were both due to wrongly 
recorded goodwill impairment losses in a Datastream mnemonic assigned for 
an intangible asset instead of Datastream mnemonic for goodwill impairment. 
As a result these two companies are shown by Datastream to be reporting zero 
goodwill impairment when in reality they have reported impairment losses.  
All of the relevant data were adjusted and it was concluded that Datastream 
was sufficiently reliable to continue using it. 
6.4.2 Gap of information concerning the opening 
goodwill balance at the initial year of the 
implementation of FRS 3 
Under IAS 22 Business Combinations (i.e. prior to the issuance of FRS 3 
Business Combinations), any excess of the acquirer‘s interest in the fair 
values of the identifiable assets and liabilities acquired over the cost of the 
acquisition is recognised as negative goodwill (IASC, 2000: IAS 22, paragraph 
5946). IAS 22 specifies that the negative goodwill should be presented as a 
deduction from the assets in the same balance sheet classification as goodwill 
(IASC, 2000: IAS 22, paragraph 64). When FRS 3 was implemented (i.e. in 2006 
in Malaysia), the standard required the excess of acquirer‘s interest (i.e. 
previously known as negative goodwill under IAS 22) to be recognised 
immediately in profit or loss [MASB, 2006a: FRS 3, paragraph 56(b)]. To 
achieve the transition from IAS 22 to FRS 3, companies were required to de-
recognise their previously recognised negative goodwill balances at the 
beginning of the period by transferring them to equity (MASB 2006a: FRS3, 
paragraph 81).  
                                         
46 This study refers to IAS 22 instead of FRS 1222004 since FRS 1222004 does not deal with 
detailed treatment of accounting for goodwill or negative goodwill (MASB, 2004: FRS 1222004, 
paragraph 6). 
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An issue which materialises is that there was an information gap concerning 
the opening goodwill balance at the initial year of the implementation of FRS 
3 provided by Datastream. Datastream at the end of 2005 (i.e. the year 
before the implementation of FRS 3) reported closing goodwill balance as per 
IAS 22; Datastream at the end of 2006 (i.e. the first year of the FRS 3 
implementation) reported closing goodwill balance as per the new FRS 3. 
However, the database did not provide an opening goodwill balance in 2006 
on the new basis.  
It is important to assess the number of companies which were affected by this 
gap in information provided by Datastream. This is because in the 
measurement and recognition studies of goodwill impairment, one variable 
(i.e. relative size of goodwill balance – GWB in H6, see detailed discussion in 
Section 5.4.5) employs the opening goodwill balance. If the information gap 
involves a large number of companies, the unadjusted opening goodwill 
balance (based on the IAS 22) would lead to a misleading result for the 
variable computed.  
To identify the number of companies affected, all 294 companies with 
financial year ended December 2006 (i.e. companies that implemented FRS 3 
in the initial year) are selected for scrutiny (see Table 6.1). The examination 
is done by comparing these companies‘ closing goodwill balances in 2005 (pre-
FRS 3), extracted from Datastream, with the opening goodwill balances in 
2006 (post-FRS 3) as disclosed in the annual reports. The direction of checking 
is from Datastream to the annual reports.  
Of the 294 companies, seven companies had both positive and negative 
goodwill balances in 2005, with five (from the 7) companies offsetting their 
negative and positive goodwill balances. When Datastream recorded the 
closing goodwill balance in 2005, it followed the companies‘ practices by 
recording the net figure of goodwill balances for the five companies. As a 
result, for these companies, their opening goodwill balances and opening total 
assets in 2006 were incorrect. All of the incorrect figures for the five 
companies were adjusted for the purpose of this study by excluding the 
negative goodwill balances from the total balances. Due to the small number 
of companies with incorrect opening goodwill balances (i.e. 1.7% or five of the 
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294 companies examined), it was concluded that Datastream was sufficiently 
reliable to continue using, without further checking the 235 companies having 
financial years ended from January to November 2007 (see Table 6.1). 
The adjustments of goodwill data discussed in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 have 
resulted in a minor amendment to Table 6.1 to give the breakdown of the 
number of companies which reported zero goodwill impairment and goodwill 
impairment losses (see Table 6.2).  
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Table 6.2: The final number of companies available for the analysis of accounting choices related to goodwill impairment in the 
first three years of the implementation of FRS 3 
 
 Initial year Second year Third year Total no. 
of firm-
years 
FYE-
Dec-
2006 
FYE –
Between 
Jan. to 
Nov. 2007 
Total 
2006/7 
FYE -
Dec-
2007 
FYE –
Between 
Jan. to 
Nov. 2008 
Total 
2007/8 
FYE -
Dec-
2008 
FYE –
Between 
Jan. to 
Nov. 2009 
Total 
2008/9 
Goodwill impairment 
losses 
77 58 135 70 53
1 
 
123 67 44 111 369 
Zero goodwill 
impairment 
217 177 394 222 152 374 218 143 361 1129 
Total 294 235 529 292 205 497 285 187 472 1498 
 
Note:  
FYE refers to financial year-end 
1 The adjustments of goodwill data as discussed in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 have resulted in a minor change to the breakdown of the number of companies 
which reported zero goodwill impairment and goodwill impairment losses in the second year of the FRS 3 implementation. Nevertheless, as seen in Table 
6.2, the total number of companies in each of the financial years remained the same. To illustrate, in the financial years ended between January and 
November 2008, the number of companies which reported goodwill impairment losses have been reduced from 54 companies (see Table 6.1) to 53 
companies (see Table 6.2), the number of companies which reported zero goodwill impairment have been increased from 151 companies (see Table 6.1) 
to 152 companies (see Table 6.2). 
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6.5 Research design: Disclosure study of goodwill 
impairment 
The purpose of the disclosure study is to explore, via the annual reports of 
companies, types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies after the implementation of FRS 3 
(see Section 1.3). The exploration of the types of accounting choice is 
conducted in two parts. Next, Sections 6.5.1 to 6.5.2 discuss the research 
designs for these two parts. 
6.5.1 Research design: Part one of the disclosure 
study 
In exploring the types of accounting choice, as a starting point, the disclosure 
study makes use of the market capitalisation indication (see Section 4.3) as 
one of the potential drivers of goodwill impairment. The aim of the first part 
of the disclosure study is to examine the appropriateness of the market 
capitalisation indication as an indication that goodwill may be impaired (see 
Research Question 2 in Section 1.3). The next sections, 6.4.1.1 to 6.4.1.2, 
provide the data specification and research methods for this part. 
6.5.1.1 Data specification 
The first part of the disclosure study is carried out by comparing two types of 
information, which represent the observed practice vs. stated explanation 
(see Section 6.5.1.2). This comparison is carried out in two ways. Firstly, it is 
performed across companies within one year of implementing FRS 3. From 
Table 6.2, this covers 294 companies with financial year ended December 
2006 and a further 235 companies with financial years ended between January 
and November 2007. Secondly, the comparison is conducted on the same 
companies over a period of two years. This includes 258 companies with data 
available for the financial years ended December 2006 and December 2007. At 
this point, the numbers of companies included in the analysis (i.e. 258 
companies) do not tally with the number of companies shown in Table 6.2 
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(i.e. 294 companies for financial-year ended December 2006 with 292 
companies for financial year ended December 2007) due to the exclusion of 
companies with no pairs as they have either fully impaired the goodwill or 
have goodwill balance for the first time in 2007. 
6.5.1.2 Research method 
In analysing the appropriateness of the market capitalisation indication as an 
indication that goodwill may be impaired, the disclosure study compares two 
types of information, which represent the observed practice vs. stated 
explanation. The data compared are: (i) the market capitalisation indication 
of companies (i.e. where market values are lower than the book values of net 
assets at the balance sheet date), which is obtained from Datastream, and (ii) 
reasons for companies reporting goodwill impairment (both zero, and goodwill 
impairment losses) disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement (see 
Section 1.4.1). The comparison of these two types of information (conducted 
in the disclosure study – see Section 7.2) leads to observation of three groups 
as follow: 
 Group 1 – Companies with poor disclosure, which do not provide 
reasons for reporting goodwill impairment in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement. 
 Group 2 – Companies whose market capitalisation indications conflicts 
with their stated reasons for reporting goodwill impairment as disclosed 
in the Notes to the Financial Statement.  
 Group 3 – Companies whose market capitalisation indications reflect 
their stated reasons for reporting goodwill impairment as disclosed in 
the Notes to the Financial Statement. 
To determine whether the market capitalisation indication is an appropriate 
proxy for an indication that goodwill may be impaired, the number of 
companies in each of the three groups is computed. If the number of 
companies in Group 3 greatly exceeds the other groups, this suggests that the 
market capitalisation indication is an appropriate proxy as it reflects 
companies‘ reasons for reporting goodwill impairment. Alternatively, if the 
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number of companies in Group 2 far exceeds other groups, this implies that 
the market capitalisation indication is not an appropriate proxy.  
6.5.2 Research design: Part two of the disclosure study 
Following the results of the first part of the disclosure study, the second part 
of the study is conducted. In this second part, the aim is to identify types of 
accounting choice related to goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian 
listed companies after the implementation of FRS 3. Sections 6.5.2.1 to 
6.5.2.2 provide the data specification and research method for this part. 
6.5.2.1 Data specification 
The constraint of manual data collection, limits the second part of the 
disclosure study to 20 companies selected from the results of the first part of 
the study. These 20 companies are from the Group 2 category (i.e., 
companies whose their market capitalisation indication conflicts with their 
stated reasons for reporting goodwill impairment as disclosed in the Notes to 
the Financial Statement) (see Section 6.5.1.2). FRS 136 requires companies to 
disclose detailed information regarding material goodwill impairment losses 
(MASB, 2006c: FRS 136, paragraph 130). Thus, the 20 companies selected are 
those companies which reported goodwill impairment losses (companies which 
reported zero goodwill impairment are excluded from the analysis). By 
focusing on these companies, it is expected that there will be higher chances 
for these companies to provide detailed disclosure, particularly if they 
considered the impairment losses reported to be material. 
6.5.2.2 Research method 
To identify the types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies, a disclosure framework is 
constructed. As shown in Figure 6.2, the disclosure framework takes into 
account six key items of data. The first item of information to be analysed is 
the goodwill data. From this, a CGU containing goodwill that was impaired is 
identified. Focusing on the CGU, the second item of information to be 
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analysed is the segment result of the CGU (obtained from segment reporting). 
The segment result is included in the analysis in order to reflect the 
performance of the CGUs (see Section 4.4.2). By incorporating this, the 
disclosure study will be able to provide indirect empirical evidence on 
whether it is possible to employ the segment result as an additional proxy for 
an indication that goodwill may be impaired (see Section 7.3.3). The third key 
item of data which is required is financial performance, including net income 
(after adding back goodwill impairment loss) available to equity holders, and 
basic earnings per share (EPS). The fourth item of information is the market 
capitalisation indication. The fifth item of information is reasons for reporting 
goodwill impairment loss disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement. 
The last item of information is any comment in the audit report relating to 
goodwill. All of the information required is obtained from annual reports. 
Figure 6.2: A self-constructed disclosure framework for identifying types 
of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment exercised by 
Malaysian listed companies 
 
1. Goodwill data 
 
(a) Opening goodwill balance 
(b) Additions47 
(c) Miscellaneous – e.g. Dilution of equity interest in 
subsidiaries  
(d) Goodwill impairment losses  
(e) Disposed 
(f) Closing goodwill balance  
(g) Allocation of goodwill to CGUs 
(h) Basis of recoverable amount  
(i) Accounting policy – Goodwill 
 
2. Segment result 
(a) Number of segments 
(b) Segment result of an impaired goodwill  
 
3. Financial performance 
(a) Net income (after adding back goodwill impairment loss) 
available to equity holders  
(b) Basic EPS (cents) 
 
4. The market capitalisation indication 
 Companies‘ market values lower than the book values of 
their net assets at the balance sheet date 
5. Reasons for reporting goodwill impairment loss disclosed in 
                                         
47 When companies disclosed detailed information concerning their newly acquired goodwill, 
this information will also be analysed by the researcher [e.g. see Table 7.6(b)]. 
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the Notes to the Financial Statement 
 
6. Audit report – any comment concerning goodwill 
 
 
To ensure consistency in collecting and analysing the data, the six key items 
of data as shown in Figure 6.2 are compiled into a table for each of the 20 
companies (for e.g. see Table 7.3 for an application of this disclosure 
framework in one company). Using the tabulated information, an analysis will 
be carried out in Chapter 7 for each of the 20 companies selected over several 
years (depending on the traceability of goodwill impairment losses backward 
from the write-off year to the acquisition year).  
6.6 Statistical tests to be carried out for both the 
measurement and recognition studies of goodwill 
impairment 
Statistical tests discuss in this section cover three aspects, namely, 
descriptive statistics (in Section 6.6.1), missing value analysis (in Section 
6.6.2), and detecting multicollinearity (in Section 6.6.3). 
6.6.1 Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics discuss in this section include the normality test (see 
Section 6.6.1.1) and univariate analysis (see Section 6.6.1.2). These 
descriptive statistics are applied in the measurement study and recognition 
study (see Section 1.3 for the specific research question developed for these 
two studies). 
6.6.1.1 Normality test 
The normality test for the dependent variable of the measurement study is 
conducted in two ways. Firstly, the skewness and kurtosis values of the 
dependent variable are computed. According to Field (2005: 73), skewness of 
+/- 1.96 and Kurtosis of +/- 3.29 are within the normality threshold. Secondly, 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Shapiro-Wilk test are performed. For the 
data to be normally distributed, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Shapiro-
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Wilk test carried out will produce a p-value which is non-significant, that is, 
p-value greater than 0.05 (Pallant, 2001: 58). A significance of p-value less 
than 0.05 suggests that the assumption of normality is violated (Pallant, 2001: 
58). 
6.6.1.2 Univariate analysis 
To understand the distribution of data for each of the independent variables 
and control variables, descriptive statistics such as mean, median and 
standard deviation will be examined. The descriptive statistics will assist in 
identifying whether the data is skewed and in detecting any variables that 
suffer from high frequency of missing values. 
In addition, univariate analysis will be conducted in order to evaluate the 
relationship between each of the independent variables and the dependent 
variable for the measurement study (see Section 8.2.2) and the recognition 
study (see Section 9.2.2).  Both parametric and non-parametric tests are 
employed. For the parametric test, a t-test is employed, which assesses the 
difference in the mean scores. For the non-parametric test, Mann-Whitney U 
test is employed, which assesses the difference in the median score. For the 
categorical variables, the Chi-square test of independence is applied. The Chi-
square test of independence examines the relationship between two 
categorical variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007: 58).       
6.6.2 Missing values analysis 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007: 62-63) explain that there are three types of 
missing value which could occur in any research. These are: missing 
completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and missing not at 
random (MNAR). If the missing values are non-random, the generalisability of 
results will be affected (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007: 62). 
To detect the type of missing values, missing values analysis is conducted (see 
Sections 8.2.2.2, and 9.2.1). The analysis includes Little‘s MCAR test and 
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Separate Variance t tests. The Little‘s MCAR test is performed in order to see 
whether the data are missing completely at random (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007: 63). The null hypothesis for the Little‘s MCAR test is that the data are 
missing completely at random (ibid., p. 63). If the test produces statistically 
non-significant p-value (i.e. p-value greater than 0.05), the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, hence the data are missing completely at random (ibid., 
p. 63). Alternatively, if the test generates a statistically significant result (i.e. 
p-value less than 0.05), suggesting that the data are not missing completely at 
random, Separate Variance t tests are carried out (ibid., p. 63). 
The Separate Variance t tests aim to identify whether the missing value is 
related to any other variables (ibid., p. 63). The test is performed by SPSS 
only for variables with at least 5% of data missing (ibid., p. 63). Focusing on 
each of the selected variables, the Separate Variance t tests define two 
groups of cases, a group with missing value and another group with non-
missing value (ibid., p. 63). A test of mean differences between the two 
groups is conducted in order to examine whether the two groups are different 
from each other on a series of variables (both the dependent and independent 
variables) (ibid., p. 63). If the t test shows that the missing values are related 
to the dependent variable, then the missing values are inferred as non-
random (ibid., p. 63). On the other hand, if the missing value is predictable 
from variables other than the dependent variable, the data are inferred as 
missing at random (MAR) (ibid., p. 63).  
6.6.3 Detecting multicollinearity 
To examine the issue of multicollinearity between the independent variables, 
Pearson‘s product-moment correlation coefficient test and Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) are performed in the measurement study (see Section 8.3.2) and 
the recognition study (see Section 9.3). As a rule of thumb, Gujarati and 
Porter (2009: 338) suggest that a high pair-wise correlation coefficient 
between two regressors, i.e. in excess of 0.8, indicates an issue of 
multicollinearity. According to Gujarati and Porter (2009: 340) if the VIF of a 
variable exceeds 10, the variable is said to be highly collinear.  
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6.7 Multivariate analysis to be carried out for the 
measurement study of goodwill impairment 
Multivariate analysis evaluates the relationship of an independent variable to 
both the dependent variable and other independent variables in one 
regression model (Norusis 2000: 464). The multivariate analysis discusses in 
this section covers two aspects – the tobit model (see Section 6.7.1) and the 
random-effects tobit model (see Section 6.7.2). 
6.7.1 Censored regression model: Tobit model and the 
random-effects tobit model 
The dependent variable for the measurement study is the magnitude of 
goodwill impairment losses divided by prior year total assets (including 
goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on the income statement (see Table 
5.1). This dependent variable possesses four characteristics. Firstly, it is 
referred to as a limited dependent variable because its value is limited in its 
range to non-negative values. Maddala (1996: 1) explains that a limited 
dependent variable is a variable which is ‗limited in its range because of some 
underlying stochastic choice mechanism‘. Secondly, from Table 6.2, it is 
observed that the dependent variable comprises a substantial number of 
observations with zero values. Thirdly, the remaining observations take on a 
wide range of values above the limit. Finally, there are repeated 
observations. These four characteristics of the dependent variable necessitate 
the measurement study of this thesis to employ a censored regression model, 
known as random-effects tobit model, with the censoring at zero value. 
Section 6.7.2 discusses in detail the random-effects tobit model. However, 
before discussing the random-effects tobit model in Section 6.7.2, a brief 
discussion of the tobit model is presented in the following paragraphs. 
The tobit model was first studied in economics by Tobin (1958) (Amemiya, 
1984; Maddala, 1996: 151). The model is applied to a dependent variable with 
the following three criteria: (i) the dependent variable has a lower or upper 
limit, (ii) a substantial number of observations take on the limiting value, and 
(iii) the remaining observations take on a wide range of value above (or 
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below) the limit (Tobin, 1958: 24; Amemiya, 1973; 998). Tobin (1958: 25) 
explains that the concentration of observations at the limiting value resulted 
in an application of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) being inappropriate, as the 
assumption of linearity required in the OLS is not met (Tobin, 1958: 25). 
Consequently, employing OLS leads to bias and inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters (Gujarati and Sangeetha, 2007: 629).  
The tobit regression model is estimated using the method of maximum 
likelihood (Gujarati, 1995: 573). The maximum likelihood function consists of 
two terms (Greene, 2008: 875). The first term is the non-censored 
observations, which the maximum likelihood estimation treats in the same 
way as a linear regression model (Greene, 2008: 875). The second term is the 
censored observations with its value based on the probability of being 
censored and using this value in the likelihood equation (Greene, 2008: 875). 
6.7.2 Random-effects tobit model 
As noted in Section 1.4.2, the measurement study tests the total population 
of Malaysian listed companies which implemented FRS 3 in the first three 
years of the standard taking effect. From Table 6.2, this includes 1498 firm-
years with 369 firm-years reporting goodwill impairment losses and 1129 firm-
years reporting zero goodwill impairment from 2006/7 to 2008/9. Of the total 
companies which reported goodwill impairment losses within the three-year 
period, 19 companies (or 57 firm-years) reported the impairment losses 
repeatedly three times, 49 companies (or 98 firm-years) reported the 
impairment losses twice, and the remaining 214 companies reported the 
impairment losses once. The presence of the repeated impairers raises the 
question of whether it is appropriate to run a pooled regression of all the 1498 
firm-years (in the case of this study - the tobit model). Ward and Leigh (1993: 
646) argue that to run a single regression on the pooled observations with 
repeated observations lead to regression estimates that may be biased. They 
(p. 646) reason that this approach does not recognise that some observations 
are not independent. Consequently, they opine the test of significance may 
produce unreliable findings (Ward and Leigh, 1993: 646). In addition, by 
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pooling of time series and cross-sectional observations, there are implicit 
assumptions that the regression parameters (i.e. intercepts and slope 
coefficients) are constant over time and that these do not differ between 
numerous cross-sectional units (Gujarati, 1995: 524). Therefore, pooling of 
data does not allow heterogeneity across units (Baum, 2006: 220). 
Two solutions to this problem of pooling time series and cross-sectional 
observations have been proposed by prior studies, namely, a fixed-effects 
model and a random-effects model (Ward and Leigh, 1993: 647; Gujarati and 
Sangeetha, 2007: 666). In the case of a limited dependent variable, the 
estimation techniques which are required to address the issue of pooled data 
are a fixed-effects tobit and a random-effects tobit (Honore et al., 2008: 394 
and 399). The fixed-effects model relaxes the assumption that the regression 
parameters are constant over time and space (Baum, 2006: 221). It allows 
each cross-sectional unit to have its own intercept while the slope of the 
coefficients remains constant across companies (Baum, 2006: 221). Therefore, 
the fixed-effects model considers the individual-specific intercept as the 
fixed-effects of that unit (Baum, 2006: 222).  
Similar to the fixed-effects model, the random-effects model also allows for 
heterogeneity across units (Baum, 2006: 219). However, unlike the fixed-
effects model which allows individual heterogeneity (unobserved individual 
effects) to be correlated with the included variables (Greene, 2008: 200), the 
random-effects model specifies the individual heterogeneity as a random 
draw that is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2009: 
485). Therefore, the random-effects model treats the individual 
heterogeneity as purely random across cross-sectional units. When the 
unobserved individual effects are not correlated with everything else in the 
model, the individual-level effects are parameterized as additional random 
disturbances (Baum, 2006: 220). Hence, in the random-effects model, the 
individual heterogeneity is captured in the composite-error term (a 
combination of the individual-level effect and the disturbance term) (Baum, 
2006: 220 and 227). 
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As noted in Section 6.7.1, in the measurement study of this thesis, a pooled 
regression using the random-effects tobit will be employed. The random-
effects model is selected instead of the fixed-effects model because 
according to Gujarati (2003:  642), to perform the fixed-effects model would 
require an inclusion of dummy variables for each of the observations (minus 
one to avoid the dummy trap).  In the case of the measurement study of this 
thesis, the number of observation is large while the number of years to be 
analysed is small (i.e. maximum of three years). Thus, the application of the 
fixed-effects model would require a large number of dummy variables. 
Gujarati (2003: 646) explains that too many dummy variables may lead to loss 
of many degrees of freedom, and the possibility of multicollinearity. These 
problems may create difficulty in generating precise estimation of one or 
more parameters (Gujarati, 2003: 646). Hence, the fixed-effects model is not 
practical for pooled data with many cross-sectional observations (Wooldridge, 
2009: 485).  Therefore, using a random-effects tobit model, the measurement 
study of this thesis estimates the likelihood of reporting goodwill impairment 
and the extent (i.e. intensity) of goodwill impairment losses divided by prior 
year total assets reported. 
See Section 8.3.1 for an overall regression model for the measurement study 
and Table 8.3 in Section 8.3.3 for the detailed model specifications. 
6.8 Multivariate analysis to be carried out for the 
recognition study of goodwill impairment 
The dependent variable for the recognition study is a dichotomous variable, 
equal to one when companies are considered as exercising a recognition 
choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment, and zero otherwise (see 
Table 5.1). The binary nature of this dependent variable has led to the 
application of a binary logistic regression in the recognition study of this 
thesis. Logistic regression is a multiple regression with a dependent variable 
that is a categorical dichotomy and independent variables that are continuous 
or categorical (Field, 2005: 218). When the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, the assumption of linearity is normally violated (Field, 2005: 
220). Thus, the Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which assumes that 
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the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables is linear, cannot be applied (Field, 2005: 220). Menard (1995: 6-7) 
argues that applying an OLS when the dependent variable is dichotomous may 
lead to the predicted values for the dependent variable being higher or lower 
than the possible values of zero and one (p. 6). This then resulted in the issue 
of heteroskedasticity (p. 7). Also, because the residuals are not normally 
distributed, the use of OLS may lead to invalid results of the hypothesis 
testing (Menard, 1995: 7). 
According to Field (2005: 220), one solution to the non-linear relationship is to 
transform the data using logarithmic transformation. This is the principle that 
is applied in the logistic regression equation – it expresses the multiple linear 
regression equation in logarithmic terms (Field, 2005: 220). By doing so, the 
problem of violating the assumption of linearity is overcome (Field, 2005: 
220). Therefore, using the logistic regression, the recognition study of this 
thesis models the probability of recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies which have their market 
values lower than the book values of net assets for three consecutive years.  
See Figure 9.4 in Section 9.3 for the detailed regression model of the 
recognition study related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
6.9 Goodness-of-fit of the regression models to be 
conducted on the measurement and recognition 
studies 
A goodness-of-fit measure is a statistical summary which indicates the 
accuracy with which a regression model approximates the observed data 
(Maddala, 1996: 37). In the case of the measurement study of this thesis, the 
overall goodness-of-fit of the random effects tobit model is assessed using the 
log-likelihood and the overall Wald test (Baltagi, 2008: 345; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009: 390). When the value of Wald is large and statistically 
significant (p-value less than 0.05), the regression model constructed is 
considered better than the null model (i.e. when all of the independent 
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variables and control variables are omitted) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009: 390-
391). 
For the recognition study, the overall goodness-of-fit of the logistic regression 
model is assessed using -2 Log Likelihood, Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic, Cox 
and Snell‘s R Square and Nagelkerke R Square. The -2 Log Likelihood 
(commonly abbreviated as -2LL) evaluates the lack of fit of the logistic model, 
which is based on the variation unexplained by the logistic regression model 
(Menard, 2002: 21). The -2LL is analogous to the error sum of squares in linear 
regression (Menard, 2002: 21). Larger values of -2LL indicates a significant 
lack of fit for the logistic model (Menard, 2002: 21). Meanwhile, the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests the null hypothesis that the model provides a 
good fit to the data (Cary, 1995: 72). When the p-value of the Hosmer-
Lemeshow statistic is greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, suggesting that the logistic regression model fits the data well 
(Menard, 2010: 58). In addition, the Cox and Snell‘s R Square is based on the 
log likelihood for the model compared to the log likelihood for a baseline 
model, while the Nagelkerke R Square is an adjusted version of the Cox and 
Snell R-square, that is an adjusted coefficient to cover the full range from 
zero to one (Cary, 1995: 68).  
6.10 Summary  
This chapter has discussed the procedures involved in validating the 
Datastream source data. It has also outlined the research design and research 
methods required for the empirical chapters on disclosure, measurement, and 
recognition studies of goodwill impairment.  
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Chapter 7: Disclosure Study of Goodwill 
Impairment   - Results and Analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of this chapter is to explore, via the annual reports of 
companies, types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies after the implementation of FRS 3 
(see Section 1.3). This disclosure study is intended to gain more insight into 
the degree of discretion managers of Malaysian listed companies have in 
reporting goodwill impairment after the implementation of FRS 3.  
To accomplish this aim, the disclosure study is organised into two parts. The 
first part of the disclosure study aims to examine the appropriateness of the 
market capitalisation indication (i.e. companies‘ market values lower than 
the book values of their net assets at the balance sheet date) as an indication 
that goodwill may be impaired (see Section 7.2). Following from the findings 
in the first part, the second part of the disclosure study aims to identify types 
of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian 
listed companies after the implementation of FRS 3 (see Section 7.3). 
Section 7.2 reports the findings and analysis of the first part; Section 7.3 
discusses the results and analysis of the second part of the disclosure study. 
Section 7.4 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Part one of the disclosure study: The 
appropriateness of the market capitalisation 
indication  
The first part of the disclosure study addresses the following research 
question (see Section 1.3): 
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Research Question 2:  
To what extent is the market capitalisation indication (i.e. companies‘ 
market values lower than the book values of their net assets at the 
balance sheet date) an appropriate proxy for an indication that goodwill 
may be impaired? 
The appropriateness of the market capitalisation indication as a proxy for an 
indication that goodwill may be impaired (see Section 4.3 for detail) is 
examined by comparing two types of information which represent the 
observed practice vs. the stated explanation. The data compared are: (i) the 
market capitalisation indication of companies (i.e. where market values are 
lower than the book values of net assets at the balance sheet date), which is 
obtained from Datastream, and (ii) reasons for companies reporting goodwill 
impairment (both zero, and goodwill impairment losses) disclosed in the Notes 
to the Financial Statement (see Section 6.5.1.2). The comparison of these two 
types of information leads to observation of three groups as follow: 
 Group 1 – Companies with poor disclosure, as they do not provide 
reasons for reporting goodwill impairment in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement. 
 Group 2 – Companies whose market capitalisation indications conflict 
with their stated reasons for reporting goodwill impairment as disclosed 
in the Notes to the Financial Statement.  
 Group 3 – Companies whose market capitalisation indications reflect 
their stated reasons for reporting goodwill impairment as disclosed in 
the Notes to the Financial Statement. 
The first part of the disclosure study is carried out in two ways. Firstly, the 
analysis is performed across companies within one year of their implementing 
FRS 3. This covers 294 companies with financial year ended December 2006 
and a further 235 companies with financial years ended between January and 
November 2007 (see Table 7.1). Secondly, the analysis is conducted on a 
subset of companies over a period of two years. This covers 258 companies 
with data available for the financial years ended December 2006 and 
December 2007 (see Table 7.2) (see Section 6.5.1.1 for detailed discussion). 
165 
 
The first comparison provides the potential to identify a learning aspect 
within the first year of operation. It is possible that those reporting later in 
the first year learn from those reporting in the initial stage. The second 
comparison helps to assess the relative disclosure of goodwill impairment over 
time.  
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Table 7.1: The first part of the disclosure study conducted across companies within one year of implementing FRS 3 
 
 No. of companies 
December-2006 Between January and 
 November 2007 
All GWIL(IL)
 1 GWIL(0) All GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
Panel A             
No Annual reports 
 
12 4% 3 4% 9 4% 11 5% 4 7% 7 4% 
Reason for reporting goodwill impairment  not disclosed 
(Group 1) 
 
93 32% 21 27% 72 33% 68 29% 20 34% 48 27% 
Reason for reporting goodwill impairment disclosed 
(Groups 2 and 3) 
 
189 64% 53 69% 136 63% 156 66% 34 59% 122 69% 
Total 294  77  217  235  58  177  
 
Panel B: Reasons Disclosed 
 
No conflict between the market capitalisation indication 
and Notes to the Financial Statement (Group 3) 
 
84 44% 33 62% 51 37% 83 53% 21 62% 62 51% 
Conflict between the market capitalisation Indication and 
Notes to the Financial Statement (Group 2) 
 
105 56% 20 38% 85 63% 73 47% 13 38% 60 49% 
Total 189  53  136  156  34  122  
 
1 GWIL(IL) denotes reporting goodwill impairment loss; GWIL(0) denotes reporting zero goodwill impairment.
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Table 7.2: The first part of the disclosure study conducted on a subset of companies over a period of two years 
implementing FRS 3 
 
 No. of companies 
December-2006 December-2007 
All GWIL(IL)
 1 GWIL(0) All GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
Panel A             
No Annual reports 
 
10 4% 2 4% 8 4% 3 1% 0 0% 3 2% 
Reason for reporting goodwill impairment not disclosed 
(Group 1) 
 
78 30% 6 12% 72 35% 49 19% 9 15% 40 20% 
Reason for reporting goodwill impairment  disclosed 
(Groups 2 and 3) 
 
170 66% 43 84% 127 61% 206 80% 52 85% 154 78% 
Total 
 
258  51  207  258  61  197  
Panel B: Reasons Disclosed  
No conflict between the market capitalisation indication and 
Notes to the Financial Statement (Group 3) 
 
77 45% 28 65% 49 39% 93 45% 26 50% 67 44% 
Conflict between the market capitalisation indication and 
Notes to the Financial Statement (Group 2) 
 
93 55% 15 35% 78 61% 113 55% 26 50% 87 56% 
Total 170  43  127  206  52  154  
1 GWIL(IL) denotes reporting goodwill impairment loss; GWIL(0) denotes reporting zero goodwill impairment.
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From Table 7.1 (panel A), it is observed that of the 294 total number of 
companies with financial year ended December 2006, 4% of the companies (12 
companies) do not provide annual reports. A closely similar situation is found 
for companies with financial years ended between January and November 
2007, whereby 5% of the companies (11 companies) have no annual reports 
uploaded on the website of the Bursa Malaysia, or their own websites. These 
companies are excluded from the analysis. 
Table 7.1 (panel A) shows that out of the total number of companies with 
financial year ended December 2006 (i.e. 294 companies), 32% (93 companies) 
do not disclose their reasons for reporting either zero goodwill impairment or 
goodwill impairment losses (companies in Group 1). For companies having 
financial years ended between January and November 2007, the percentage 
of companies falling into Group 1 is slightly lower (i.e. 29% or 68 companies) 
than those companies having a December 2006 financial year-end. Table 7.2 
(panel A) shows that the lack of disclosure reduces over time as the 
proportion of companies which fall into Group 1 (i.e. poor disclosure) 
decreases from 30% (in 2006) to 19% (in 2007). Perhaps, this reflects increased 
understanding of the standard. 
Groups 2 and 3 comprise those companies who disclosed their reasons for 
reporting goodwill impairment in the Notes to the Financial Statement. For 
Group 2, their disclosed reasons conflicted with the companies‘ market 
capitalisation indication48. For companies with financial year ended December 
2006, of the 189 companies that disclosed their reasons for reporting goodwill 
impairment, 56% of the companies fall into Group 2 (see Panel B of Table7.1). 
For companies with financial years ended between January and November 
2007, the percentage of companies that fall into Group 2 is slightly lower 
(47%) than the companies with the December year-end. The comparison of 
companies in Group 2 over a period of two years shows similar result, in that 
in both of the financial years ended December 2006 and 2007, 55% of 
companies fall into Group 2 (see Panel B in Table 7.2).  
                                         
48 For example, see Table 7.6(a) in Section 7.3.2. 
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For Group 3, companies‘ reasons for reporting goodwill impairment disclosed 
in the Notes to the Financial Statement coincide with their market 
capitalisation indication. Table 7.1 (panel B) shows that of the 189 companies 
with financial year ended December 2006, 44% of the companies are classified 
into Group 3. This proportion is slightly increase (53%) for companies with 
financial years ended between January and November 2007. The comparison 
of the proportion of total companies in Group 3 over time shows that similar 
result (45%) is observed in both of the financial years ended December 2006 
and 2007 (see Panel B in Table 7.2).  
The findings that nearly equal proportions of companies are classified into 
Groups 2 and 3 suggest that the companies‘ market capitalisation indication is 
an appropriate proxy for goodwill impairment for approximately half of the 
companies that disclosed their reasons; it is not an appropriate proxy for the 
remaining half of the companies. Assuming that the disclosed reasons reflect 
the true and fair view of the companies‘ goodwill reported on the balance 
sheet as they have been audited, the findings for Groups 2 and 3 imply that 
companies‘ market capitalisation indication is not an ideal proxy for an 
indication that goodwill may be impaired. This is because for approximately 
half of the companies that disclosed their reasons (i.e. companies in Group 2), 
their market capitalisation indication does not fully reflect the condition of 
the cash-generating-units containing goodwill, disclosed in the Notes to the 
Financial Statement. Because market capitalisation indication is not an ideal 
measure, this finding suggests that to identify types of accounting choice 
related to goodwill impairment, further information, in addition to the 
market capitalisation indication, is needed, such as companies‘ financial 
performances and segment results containing goodwill.  
7.3 Part two of the disclosure study: Types of 
accounting choice related to goodwill impairment  
Part two of the disclosure study addresses the following research question 
(see Section 1.3): 
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Research Question 3:  
What are the types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies which can be identified through 
detailed analysis of annual reports? 
This research question is addressed by selecting 20 companies from Group 2 
(companies where their disclosed reasons conflicted with the market 
capitalisation indication) and reported goodwill impairment losses (see 
Section 6.5.2.1). Altogether, there are 59 companies which reported goodwill 
impairment losses and are classified into Group 2 (i.e. 20 companies with 
financial years ended December 2006, 13 companies with financial years 
ended between January and November 2007 - see panel B of Tables 7.1, and 
26 companies with financial years ended December 2007 – see panel B of 
Table 7.2). Thus, the 20 companies selected represent one-third of all of the 
companies which reported goodwill impairment losses and are classified into 
Group 2.  
These 20 companies comprise seven companies with financial years ended 
December 2006, seven companies with financial years ended between January 
and November 2007, and six companies with financial years ended December 
2007. The 20 companies selected not only fall into Group 2 and have reported 
goodwill impairment losses; they also have annual reports available 
throughout the period of investigation. These criteria are imposed because in 
order to identify the types of accounting choice related to goodwill 
impairment exercised, the researcher has to trace the goodwill impairment 
losses back from the write-off year to the acquisition year (i.e. the year the 
goodwill was acquired). Consequently, the number of years analysed varies 
for each of the companies. As an illustration, the analysis of goodwill 
movement for ABC349 Bhd stretches over six years from 2003 to 2008 (see 
Table 7.5 in Section 7.3.1) whereas for DEF1 Bhd, it is spread over two years 
from 2007 to 2008 (see Table 7.6(a) in Section 7.3.2).  
                                         
49 In this thesis, the name of companies are anonymised because of the critical comments 
made about them, which could be price sensitive if quoted out of context of the thesis. 
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To identify types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment, a 
disclosure framework is constructed and is applied for the 20 companies (see 
Section 6.5.2.2). The framework includes six key items of data: (i) goodwill 
data, (ii) segment result, (iii) financial performance, (iv) the market 
capitalisation indication, (v) reasons for reporting goodwill impairment loss 
disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement, and (vi) the audit report 
concerning goodwill (e.g. see Table 7.3 for an analysis of goodwill movement 
for ABC1 Bhd). The analysis of the six key items of data resulted in three 
types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment identified (see 
Figure 7.1). These are:  delayed reporting goodwill impairment losses (see 
Section 7.3.1); timing in reporting goodwill write-off from goodwill which 
arose from an apparent overpayment made at the time of business acquisition 
(see Section 7.3.2); and systematic reduction of goodwill balance (see Section 
7.3.3).  
Figure 7.1: Types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment 
identified through detailed analysis of annual reports of 20 companies  
 
Description No. of 
companies 
% 
Delayed reporting goodwill impairment losses 
 
4 
 
20 
Timing in reporting goodwill write-off from 
goodwill which arose from an apparent 
overpayment made at the time of business 
acquisition 
 
8 
 
40 
Systematic reduction of goodwill balance 
 
2 
 
10 
Cannot identify50 companies‘ reasons for 
reporting goodwill impairment losses 
 
6 
 
30 
Total 
 
20 
 
100 
 
                                         
50 Reasons for reporting goodwill impairment losses in six companies cannot be identified 
even after analysing the annual reports covering several years. This is because for these 
companies, the detailed breakdown of their business acquisition is not clearly disclosed in the 
annual reports, in the sense that the total goodwill that arose from the acquisitions does not 
tally with the amount of goodwill balance. As a result, the researcher is unable to identify 
reasons for reporting goodwill impairment losses for these six companies. 
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7.3.1 Delayed reporting goodwill impairment losses 
Of the 20 companies analysed, four companies are found to delay reporting 
goodwill impairment losses (see Figure 7.1). These companies are ABC1 Bhd, 
ABC2 Bhd, ABC3 Bhd, and ABC4 Bhd. In this thesis, delay in reporting goodwill 
impairment losses is said to occur when all three conditions are met: the 
company‘s market value is lower than the book values of the net assets, the 
segment to which goodwill is allocated has experienced a loss, and the 
company‘s financial performance [measure as net income available to equity 
holders (after adding back goodwill impairment losses)] is lower than that of 
previous year. Yet in all the three conditions, managers do not report goodwill 
impairment losses immediately in the income statement.  
Of the four companies which were identified as delaying in reporting goodwill 
impairment losses, three companies (i.e. ABC1 Bhd, ABC2 Bhd, and ABC3 Bhd) 
will be discussed in this section. This is because each of these companies 
illustrate additional issues for companies that delayed reporting goodwill 
impairment losses. ABC4 Bhd is not discussed as its case is similar to that of 
ABC1 Bhd. Tables 7.3 to 7.5 present the analyses of goodwill movement for 
these three companies.  
Table 7.3: Analysis of goodwill movement for ABC1 Bhd from 31 December 
2003-2007 
 
 Pre-FRS 3 Post-FRS 3 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1. Goodwill data      
(a) Opening 
goodwill balance  
- 587,872 587,872 589,88951 393,950 
(b) Additions 587,872 - 109,196 - - 
(c) Miscellaneous  - - - - - 
(d)Goodwill 
impairment 
losses  
- - (109,196)52 (195,939) (393,950) 
                                         
51 The company has restated its opening goodwill balance in 2006 from RM587,872 to 
RM589,889 without any information on the difference of RM2,017 disclosed in the Notes to the 
Financial Statement. 
52 Goodwill impairment loss of RM109,196 is because of a subsidiary acquired [see item 1(b)], 
which created goodwill upon acquisition (Annual report, 2005: 62). Thus, this is a case of 
goodwill written-off immediately upon acquisition; it is not an impairment of goodwill which 
was acquired in 2003 [see item 1(b)] and not a case of delay in reporting goodwill write-off. 
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(e) Disposed - - - - - 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
(f) Closing 
goodwill balance  
587,872 587,872 587,872 393,950 - 
(g) Allocation of 
goodwill to CGUs 
Not stated Electrical 
and 
mechanical 
engineering 
(h) Basis of 
recoverable 
amount  
Not stated Value in 
use 
(i) Accounting 
policy -Goodwill 
Purchased goodwill is stated at cost 
and not amortise 
Annual impairment test of 
goodwill 
2. Segment result     
(a) Number of 
segments 
3 3 3 3 3 
(b)Segment 
result of an 
impaired 
goodwill (CGU – 
Elect. and 
Mechanical 
engineering) 
 
4,505,161 
 
4,098,834 
 
(16,222,151) 
 
(14,152,837) 
 
408,468 
3. Financial performance     
(a) Net income 
(after adding 
back goodwill 
impairment loss) 
available to 
equity holders  
 
11,220,000 
 
(1,524,000) 
 
(38,574,000) 
 
(20,577,000) 
 
4,013,000 
(b) Basic EPS 
(cents) 
70.12 (2.93) (74.39) (38.89) 5.01 
4. The Market 
capitalisation  
(MV
1
 vs. BV) 
 
MV>BV 
 
2.05 
MV<BV 
 
0.80 
MV<BV 
 
0.81 
MV>BV 
 
2.28 
MV>BV 
 
2.17 
5. Reasons for 
reporting 
goodwill 
impairment 
losses disclosed 
in the Notes to 
the Financial 
Statement 
2006  
 Reason for reporting goodwill impairment loss was not 
disclosed (see ABC1 Bhd, 2006: 43). 
 
2007 
 Goodwill is allocated to the Group‘s electrical and mechanical 
engineering division. The recoverable amount of the goodwill 
was based on its value in use, which was determined by 
discounting the future cash flows generated from the 
continuing use of the unit (ABC1 Bhd, 2007: 48). 
 
6. Audit report 
concerning 
goodwill 
 
2006 and 2007 
 Unqualified opinion (ABC1 Bhd, 2006: 24; 2007: 28). 
 
Types of 
accounting 
choice 
identified 
2006 and 2007 
 This is the case of delayed reporting goodwill impairment 
losses. 
 
 
 
1 
MV denotes companies‘ market values ; BV denotes book values of the net assets of companies 
174 
 
Table 7.3 shows that ABC1 Bhd acquired goodwill in 2003 amounted to 
RM587,872 [see item 1(b)]. In 2004, the company‘s financial performance 
declines (see item 3) with its net income available to common equity holders 
(pre-goodwill impairment loss) reduces to negative RM1,524,000 and its basic 
EPS falls to negative 2.93 cents. Likewise, the company‘s market values fall 
below the book values of the net assets (see item 4). In 2005, at the end of 
the third year of acquiring the goodwill, the decline in the company‘s 
financial performance and its market value affected the segment reporting 
containing goodwill (i.e. Electrical and mechanical engineering) [see item 
2(b)].  
Seeing that segment result is performing poorly with company‘s financial 
performance deteriorates, and the company‘s market value falling below the 
book value of the net assets for two consecutive years (2004 and 2005), it 
would be expected that the company would report a goodwill impairment loss 
in 2005. Nonetheless, goodwill which was acquired in 2003 was not impaired 
in 2005. Instead, it was impaired partly (33%) in 2006 and partly (67%) in 2007 
[see item 1(d)]. In these two years, the company‘s market values were higher 
than the book values of the net assets and its financial performance was 
better than the previous year. When the company reported a goodwill 
impairment loss in 2006, its reason for reporting such a loss was not disclosed 
in the Notes to the Financial Statement (see item 5). In 2007, although the 
company disclosed its reason for the impairment loss (see item 5), the 
disclosure lacked content, in the sense that there was no specific reason for 
the impairment loss. The audit reports in 2006 and 2007 provided clean 
opinions regarding the company‘s goodwill (see item 6). 
From the analysis of goodwill movement from 2003 to 2007, presented in 
Table 7.3, it appears that managers of ABC1 Bhd waited until the company‘s 
performance was getting better than the previous year before reporting 
goodwill impairment losses. Thus, the impairment losses reported by ABC1 
Bhd in 2006 and 2007 are considered as delay in reporting goodwill 
impairment.  
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Table 7.4 shows another case of a company, ABC2 Bhd that delayed reporting 
goodwill impairment losses. This company acquired goodwill in 2003, yet in 
2005, its segment reporting [see item 2(b)] and financial performances [see 
item 3(a)] reported negative results. Similarly, the company‘s market value 
fell below the book values of the net assets (see item 4). The company‘s poor 
performances imply that it should have reported goodwill impairment loss in 
2005. Yet, the amount of impairment loss reported was relatively small [i.e. 
RM46,000 in 2005 compared to RM623,00 in 2007 - see item 1(d)]. The 
company reported a larger amount of goodwill impairment loss in 2007 [see 
item 1(d)] when its market value rose above the book value of the net assets 
(see item 4) and its financial performance was better than that of the 
previous year (see item 3). In 2007, when the company reported goodwill 
impairment loss, the reason disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement 
was that the impairment loss was based on the management assessment of 
the future trends in the semiconductor division (see item 5). If the decision to 
report goodwill impairment loss was based on the future trend of the 
semiconductor division, no impairment should have been reported in 2007 as 
the segment result for the division showed a positive amount both in 2007 and 
2008 [see item 2(b)]. Item 6 shows that in 2007, the audit report provided 
clean opinions regarding company‘s goodwill. Therefore, it is deduced that 
the reporting of goodwill impairment loss by ABC2 Bhd in 2007 may be 
regarded as delay in reporting goodwill impairment loss in 2005. 
Table 7.4: Analysis of goodwill movement for ABC2 Bhd from 31 December 
2003-2008 
 
 Pre-FRS 3 (RM’000) Post-FRS 3 (RM’000) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1. Goodwill data 
(a)Opening goodwill 
balance  
- 63,916 5,755 5,709 5,709 5,088 
(b) Additions  63,916 - - - 2 - 
(c) Miscellaneous - 
Dilution of equity 
interest in 
subsidiaries 
- (49,218) - - - - 
(d) Goodwill 
impairment losses  
- (8,943) (46) - (623) - 
(e) Disposed  - - - - - (762) 
(f) Closing goodwill 
balance  
63,916 
 
5,755 5,709 5,709 5,088 4,326 
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(g) Allocation of 
goodwill to CGUs 
Not stated Substantially to semiconductor 
division 
(h) Basis of 
recoverable amount  
Not stated VIU based on semiconductor‘s 
projected results and cash 
flows 
(i) Accounting policy 
- Goodwill 
Goodwill is taken 
up in the balance 
sheet as a 
permanent item 
Goodwill is 
tested 
annually for 
impairment 
Goodwill is reviewed for 
impairment annually or more 
frequently 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2. Segment result       
(a) Number of 
segments 
7 6 4 4 4 5 
(b) Segment result of 
an impaired goodwill 
- Semiconductor 
division 
(10,388) 82 (14,960) 3,956 11,476 7,336 
3. Financial performance      
(a) Net income (after 
adding back goodwill 
impairment loss) 
available to equity 
holders 
 
(11,207) 
 
(9,029) 
 
(41,519) 
 
(60,752) 
 
(3,608) 
 
(1,392) 
(b) Basic EPS (cents) (16.47) (17.00) (40) (58) (5) 0.9 
4. The market 
capitalisation  
    (MV vs. BV) 
 
MV>BV 
 
1.58 
MV>BV 
 
1.03 
MV<BV 
 
0.94 
MV>BV 
 
1.04 
MV>BV 
 
1.24 
MV<BV 
 
0.77 
5. Reasons for 
reporting goodwill 
impairment losses 
disclosed in the 
Notes to the 
Financial Statement 
2007: Goodwill is substantially allocated to the business of the 
semiconductor division. Goodwill impairment test was based on 
value in use and was determined by the management by assessing 
the semiconductor division‘s budget. The values assigned to the 
key assumptions used in preparing the budget represent 
management‘s assessment of future trends in the semiconductor 
division and are based on internal sources (historical data)( ABC2 
Bhd, 2007: 50). 
 
6. Audit report 
concerning goodwill 
 
2007: Unqualified opinion (ABC2 Bhd, 2007:29). 
Types of accounting 
choice identified 
2007 
Delayed reporting goodwill impairment loss 
ABC2 Bhd brings in an additional case for companies that delayed reporting 
goodwill impairment losses. Table 7.4 shows that in 2006, the company‘s 
market value is higher than the book value of the net assets (see item 4). As 
discussed in ABC1 Bhd, when the company‘s market value is above the book 
value of the net assets, this is when the company reported goodwill 
impairment loss that has become overdue. However, for ABC2 Bhd, there was 
no goodwill impairment loss reported. There are two possible reasons for the 
managers not to report goodwill impairment loss in 2006. Firstly, the 
177 
 
managers might perceived the increment in the market value above the book 
value of the net asset to be small (i.e. the market value rises from 0.94 to 
1.04 – see item 4). Secondly, the company‘s financial performance was still 
not improving compared to its previous year (see item 3). The loss was worse 
than that of the previous year. Hence, Table 7.4 illustrates that in deciding 
when to report goodwill impairment loss that has become overdue, the 
managers would wait for the increment in the market values above the book 
values to be large, and for the company‘s financial performance to be better 
than the previous year. 
ABC3 Bhd is the third case of a company that delayed reporting goodwill 
impairment loss. Table 7.5 shows that the company acquired goodwill 
amounting to RM40,876 in 2004 [see item1(b)]. At the end of the year, the 
segment to which the goodwill is allocated reported a negative result [see 
item 2(b)]. Likewise, the company‘s market value fell below the book value of 
the net asset (see item 4). The company‘s performance deteriorated in 2006 
(see item 3). Within 2005 to 2006, ABC3 Bhd might have been expected to 
report goodwill impairment losses, yet none were reported. In 2007, the 
company‘s market value was greater than the book value of the net assets 
and its financial performance improved compared to the previous year; in this 
year, the company reported goodwill impairment loss amounting to 
RM13,000,000 [see item 1(d)]. Again, in 2008, the same amount of goodwill 
impairment loss was reported.  
When the company reported goodwill impairment losses in 2007 and 2008, the 
reason disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement (see item 5) was that 
the impairment loss was based on the assessment of future trends in the bio-
healthcare industry (i.e. the CGU containing goodwill). If this is the case, the 
company should have reported goodwill impairment loss from 2005 to 2006 as 
the CGU was not performing in these years. Thus, ABC3 Bhd illustrates a 
company delaying in reporting goodwill impairment losses. What is interesting 
for ABC3 Bhd is that in 2008, the company disclosed the sensitivity analysis 
(see item 5 for year 2008) stating that if the discount rates were to increase 
by 2% or the future planned revenues were to reduce by 2%, an additional 
goodwill impairment loss of RM14,876,000 would be recognised. It appears 
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that the company plan to fully impair its goodwill in the next year (i.e. 2009) 
because by recognising goodwill impairment loss amounted to RM14,876,000, 
the goodwill balance becomes nil [see item 1(f)]. ABC3 Bhd is added as part of 
the discussion in this thesis because this company demonstrates that the 
goodwill impairment losses reported were small and too late. On 7/5/2009, 
the company was de-listed by Bursa Malaysia pursuant to Paragraph 8.15(6) of 
the Listing Requirements (compliance with the shareholding spread 
requirement due to take-over offer) (Bursa Malaysia, 200953). The case of 
delay in reporting goodwill impairment losses for ABC3 Bhd has not captured 
the external auditor‘s attention, as in the audit report for 2007 and 2008, the 
auditors provided clean opinions regarding the company‘s goodwill (see item 
6). 
Table 7.5: Analysis of goodwill movement for ABC3 Bhd from 31 December 
2003-2008 
 
 Pre-FRS 3 (RM’000) Post-FRS 3 (RM’000) 
Year  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1. Goodwill data       
(a) Opening goodwill 
balance 
400 402 40,876 40,876 40,876 27,876 
(b) Additions 2 40,876 - - - - 
(c) Miscellaneous - Dilution 
of equity interest in 
subsidiaries 
- - - - - - 
(d) Goodwill impairment 
losses  
- (402) - - (13,000) (13,000) 
(e) Disposed - - - - - - 
(f) Closing goodwill balance  402 40,876 40,876 40,876 27,876 14,876 
(g) Allocation of goodwill to   
     CGUs 
Not stated Not 
stated 
Bio-healthcare 
(h) Basis of recoverable  
     amount  
Not stated  VIU VIU 
(i) Accounting policy –  
    Goodwill 
Goodwill 
amortisa
tion 
Impairment only 
approach 
Annual impairment review 
2. Segment result        
(a) Number of segments 8 8 8 8 8 8 
(b) Segment result of an 
impaired goodwill (CGU– 
Bio-healthcare)  
 
- 
 
(1,381) 
 
(3,462) 
 
(6,214) 
 
(6,027) 
 
(5,364) 
3. Financial performance       
(a) Net income (after 
adding back goodwill 
 
5,807 
 
18,293 
 
4,962 
 
(41,642) 
 
(19,422) 
 
15,835 
                                         
53
 Bursa Malaysia (2009), retrieved on November 5, 2011 from 
http://www.thgroup.com.my/News/070509.html 
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impairment loss) available 
to equity holders  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
(b) Basic EPS (cents) 1.63 4.83 1.28 (10.93) (8.39) 0.73 
4. The market 
capitalisation  
    (MV vs. BV) 
 
MV>BV 
1.22 
MV<BV 
0.83 
MV<BV 
0.63 
MV<BV 
0.79 
MV>BV 
1.26 
MV>BV 
1.04 
5. Reasons for reporting 
goodwill impairment losses 
disclosed in the Notes to 
the Financial Statement 
2007  
 Goodwill is allocated to the bio-healthcare division. 
 The impairment test was based on its value-in-use. The 
value-in-use calculation applies a discounted cash flow 
model using the bio-healthcare division‘s pre-tax cash 
flow projections based on financial forecasts covering a 
five-year period. 
 The values assigned to the key assumptions represent 
the Group‘s assessment of future trends in the bio-
healthcare industry and are based on both external 
sources and internal sources (historical data) (ABC3 Bhd, 
2007: 73). 
 
2008 
 Company‘s reasons for reporting goodwill impairment 
loss is quite similar to the Notes to the Financial 
Statement as stated in 2007. Additional information 
concerning the sensitivity of the estimation made is 
disclosed as follows: 
‗The estimates are particularly sensitive in respect   
       of the following:- 
     1. An increase of 2 per cent point in the discount  
          rate used would have rendered an impairment  
          loss of RM14,876,000. 
      2. A 2 per cent decrease in future planned revenues   
          would have rendered an impairment loss of  
          RM14,876,000 (ABC3 Bhd, 2008: 59)‘. 
 
6. Audit report concerning 
goodwill 
Unqualified opinion both in 2007 and 2008 (ABC3 Bhd, 2007: 
43; 2008: 12-13). 
 
Types of accounting 
choice identified 
2007 and 2008 
Delayed reporting goodwill impairment loss 
 
All of the three companies discussed in this section (i.e. ABC1 Bhd, ABC2 Bhd, 
and ABC3 Bhd) provide evidence of companies which delayed reporting 
goodwill impairment losses. Such delayed reflect the exercise of managerial 
discretion in terms of timing their reporting of impairment losses. This finding 
is consistent with Hayn and Hughes (2006: 226), who find that goodwill write-
off of 1,276 acquisitions by US listed companies from 1988-1998, lag behind 
the economic impairment of goodwill. However, in their study, the lag is 
between three to four years. Hilton and O‘Brien (2009: 180) opine that one of 
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the reasons for companies to inflate the asset values (by not reporting the 
impairment losses when they are due) is because of the desire to create an 
‗illusion of financial strength‘. Perhaps, this is also what drives the three 
companies discussed in this section to delay in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses.  
Following analysis of the three companies, discussed above, a scenario which 
captures the accounting choice of delay in reporting goodwill impairment loss 
is constructed (see Figure 7.2).  
Figure 7.2: A scenario of companies that delayed reporting goodwill 
impairment losses 
 
 Selection criteria: 
(i) In years 1 and 2 of the implementation of FRS 3, companies that have their 
market values lower than the book values of their net assets, their change 
in net income available to equity holders (pre goodwill impairment losses) 
from prior year to current year is negative, and they reported zero 
goodwill impairment.  
(ii) In year 3, these companies have their market values greater than the book 
values of their net assets, positive change in net income available to 
equity holders (pre goodwill impairment losses) from the prior year to 
current year, and they reported goodwill impairment losses. 
 
 These companies will be regarded as companies that delayed reporting 
goodwill impairment losses. For the future study, these companies shall be 
tested in year 3 against a control group of companies which also have their 
market values greater than the book values of their net assets, and a positive 
change in net income available to equity holders (pre-goodwill impairment 
losses) from prior year to current year. However, this control group of 
companies reported zero goodwill impairment. 
As noted in Figure 7.2, Year 2 is included in the scenario in order to ensure 
that the decline in the financial performance of companies is not temporary, 
and to demonstrate that the managers waited for more than a year (i.e. years 
1 and 2) before reporting goodwill impairment losses in the third year. 
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However, because only a small number of companies fulfilled the selection 
criteria shown in Figure 7.2, this scenario is set aside for future study since 
the number of companies which implement FRS 3 will increase with the 
expansion of years of analysis. 
7.3.2 Timing in reporting goodwill write-off from 
goodwill which arose from an apparent 
overpayment made at the time of business 
acquisition 
Figure 7.1 (in Section 7.3) shows that of the 20 companies analysed, eight 
companies were found to report goodwill impairment losses because of the 
goodwill which arose from an apparent overpayment made at the time of 
business acquisition. Hayn and Hughes (2006: 234) explained that 
‗overpayment is more likely, the higher the proportion of the acquisition price 
assigned to goodwill‘. Therefore, in this thesis, an apparent overpayment is 
identified based on the significant amount of goodwill relative to the 
acquisition price. In their study, Hayn and Hughes (2006: 241) found that for 
the US listed companies that they examined, their goodwill balance, on 
average, represented 58% of the acquisition price. 
Of the eight companies that reported goodwill impairment losses as a result of 
the apparent overpayment, only three of them will be discussed in this 
section (see Tables 7.6 to 7.8). These three companies (i.e. DEF1 Bhd, DEF2 
Bhd, and DEF3 Bhd) are selected to demonstrate three different timings in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses arising from the apparent overpayment. 
From Tables 7.6(b), 7.7(b) and 7.8(b) (see item 1), it is observed that for each 
of the three companies, goodwill represents more than 65% of the acquisition 
price.  
Hayn and Hughes (2006: 233) consider overpayment by the acquiring company 
as one of the characteristics of business acquisition that is associated with 
goodwill impairment. Therefore, in the context of goodwill impairment, the 
apparent overpayment itself is not an accounting choice. The accounting 
choices related to goodwill impairment emerges when the managers decided 
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to fully impair the goodwill (i.e. the timing in reporting the impairment 
losses). To illustrate, all of the three companies shown in Tables 7.6 to 7.8 
have a significant amount of goodwill relative to acquisition price, and all of 
them appear to plan to get rid of the apparent overpayment by reporting 
goodwill impairment losses as soon as possible. DEF1 Bhd fully impaired the 
goodwill immediately in the year of acquisition [see Table 7.6(a), item 1(b) 
and (d)], DEF2 Bhd fully impaired the goodwill in the year subsequent to 
acquisition [see Table 7.7(a), item 1(c) and 1(d) in 2007], and DEF3 Bhd 
impaired the goodwill partially within a period of two years [see Table 7.8(a), 
item 1(b) and (d)]. 57% of the goodwill was impaired in the year of acquisition 
and the remaining 43% of the goodwill was impaired in the subsequent year 
[see Table 7.8(b)]. 
Table 7.6(a): Analysis of goodwill movement for DEF1 Bhd from 31 
December 2007-2008 
 
 Post-FRS 3  
Year  2007 2008 
1. Goodwill data   
(a) Opening goodwill balance 1,045,850 1,045,850 
(b) Additions 1,635,192 7,705,039 
(c) Miscellaneous - Dilution of equity  
     interest in subsidiaries 
 - 
(d) Goodwill impairment losses   (1,635,192)  
(see Table 7.6b) 
(603,788) 
(e) Disposed  - 
(f) Closing goodwill balance  1,045,850 8,147,101 
(g) Allocation of goodwill to CGUs (i) Manpower 
consultancy, and 
(ii) Rig services. 
(i) Manpower 
consultancy, (ii) Rig 
services, and (iii) 
Trading, maint. 
(h) Basis of recoverable amount  Value in use 
(i) Accounting policy – Goodwill 
 
Annual impairment review 
 
2. Segment result    
(a) Number of segments 6 7 
(b) Segment result of an impaired 
goodwill  
 
- - 
3. Financial performance   
(a) Net income (after adding back 
goodwill impairment loss) available to 
equity holders  
29,667,000 31,103,000 
(b) Basic EPS (cents) 48.63 4.89 
4. The market capitalisation  
    (MV vs. BV) 
 
MV>BV 
2.47 
MV<BV 
0.71 
5. Reasons for reporting goodwill 
impairment losses disclosed in the 
2007 
- The Group recognised goodwill  
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Notes to the Financial Statement impairment loss of RM1,635,192 during 
the financial year based on the 
discounted cash flows in arriving at the 
value in use (DEF1 Bhd, 2007: 97-98). 
 
6. Audit report concerning goodwill Unqualified opinion (DEF1 Bhd, 2007:44). 
Types of accounting choice 
identified 
Timing in reporting goodwill write-off 
from goodwill which arose from an 
apparent overpayment made at the time 
of the business acquisition [see Table 
7.6(b)]. 
 
 
Table 7.6(b): Detail analysis of an addition of goodwill for DEF1 Bhd - 31 
December 2007 
 
Date  RM % 
2007 Addition:   
 Group‘s share of net assets 91,464 5% 
Item 1 Goodwill arising from acquisition 1,635,192 95% 
 Cost of acquisition 1,726,656  
    
31/12/2007 Goodwill impairment 1,635,192 Fully 
impaired 
 
Table 7.7(a): Analysis of goodwill movement for DEF2 Bhd from 31 
December 2006-2007 
 
 Post-FRS 3  
Year 2006 2007 
1. Goodwill data   
(a) Opening goodwill balance  3,524,072 2,808,856 
(b) Additions  160,809 - 
(c) Miscellaneous-Foreign exch. 
difference 
- (443) See Table 7.7(b) 
(d) Goodwill impairment losses  - (160,366) 
See Table 7.7(b) 
(e) Disposed  (876,025) - 
(f) Closing goodwill balance 2,808,856 2,648,047 
(g) Allocation of goodwill to 
CGUs 
Singapore segment 
(h) Basis of recoverable amount  Value in use 
(i) Accounting policy - Goodwill Goodwill impairment 
2. Segment result of an impaired CGU  
(a) Number of segments Four CGUs – Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and 
others 
(b) Segment result – Singapore 
segment 
2,347,104 3,964,037 
3. Financial performance   
(a) Net income (after adding 
back goodwill impairment loss) 
available to equity holders  
 
21,709,000 
 
29,046,000 
(b) Basic EPS (cents) 10.73 9.44 
4. The market capitalisation  
    (MV vs. BV) 
 
MV>BV 
5.97 
MV>BV 
6.24 
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5. Reasons for reporting 
goodwill impairment losses 
disclosed in the Notes to the 
Financial Statement 
2007 
 For the purpose of impairment testing, goodwill is 
allocated to the Group‘s geographical segments. 
The recoverable amount of each CGU has been 
determined based on its value-in-use by discounting 
future cash flows generated from the CGUs. 
 The values assigned to the key assumption 
represent management‘s assessment of future 
trends in the Company‘s and the CGU‘s principal 
activities and are based on internal sources 
(historical data) (DEF2 Bhd, 2007: 51). 
6. Audit report concerning 
goodwill 
2007 - Unqualified opinion (DEF2 Bhd, 2007: 31). 
 
Types of accounting choice 
identified 
2007 - Timing in reporting goodwill write-off from 
goodwill which arose from an apparent overpayment 
made at the time of the business acquisition [see 
Table 7.7(b)] 
 
Table 7.7(b): Detail analysis of an addition of goodwill for DEF2 Bhd from 
2006-2007 
 
Date  RM % 
26/12/2006 Addition:   
 Group‘s share of net assets 69,182 30 
Item 1 Goodwill arising from acquisition 160,809 70 
 Cost of acquisition 229,991  
    
31/12/2006 Goodwill impairment -  
31/12/2007 Goodwill impairment 160,809 Fully 
impaired 
 
Table 7.8(a): Analysis of goodwill movement for DEF3 Bhd from 31 
December 2006 to 2007 
 Post-FRS 3  
Year  2006 2007 
1. Goodwill data   
(a) Opening goodwill balance  - 42,918 
(b) Additions  100,701  
(c) Miscellaneous - Dilution of 
equity interest in subsidiaries  
- 33,000 
(d) Goodwill impairment losses  (57,783) 
See Table 7.8(b) 
(42,918) 
See Table 7.8(b) 
(e) Disposed  
 
-  
(f) Closing goodwill balance  42,918 33,000 
(g) Allocation of goodwill to 
CGUs 
No information disclosed 
(h) Basis of recoverable 
amount  
Based on the estimation of VIU 
(i) Accounting policy - Goodwill Impairment 
 
2. Segment result   
(a) Number of segments The company does not disclose the basis of 
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(b) Segment result goodwill allocation. Thus, cannot determine 
whether the goodwill is allocated to business 
segment, subsidiaries acquired, or etc. 
Moreover, there is no information on segment 
results. Hence, segment result is not 
applicable. 
 2006 2007 
 
3. Financial performance  
 
(a) Net income (after adding 
back goodwill impairment loss) 
available to equity holders  
 
499,000 
 
356,000 
(b) Basic EPS (cents) 
 
1.1 0.7 
4. The market capitalisation 
(MV vs. BV) 
 
MV>BV 
2.18 
MV>BV 
1.71 
5. Reasons for reporting 
goodwill impairment losses 
disclosed in the Notes to the 
Financial Statement 
Although in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement, the company disclosed the 
amount of goodwill impairment loss 
recognised in 2006 and 2007, reasons for such 
impairment loss was not disclosed both in 
2006 and 2007 (DEF3 Bhd, 2006: 49; 2007: 
48). 
 
6. Audit report concerning 
goodwill 
Unqualified opinion in 2006 and 2007 (DEF3 
Bhd, 2006: 26; 2007: 24). 
 
Types of accounting choice 
identified 
Timing in reporting goodwill write-off from 
goodwill which arose from an apparent 
overpayment made at the time of the 
business acquisition [see Table 7.8(b)] 
 
 
 
Table 7.8(b): Detail analysis of an addition of goodwill for DEF3 Bhd 
from 2006 to 2007 
 
Date  RM % 
10/1/2006 Addition:   
 Group‘s share of net assets 52,434 34% 
Item 1 Goodwill arising from acquisition 100,701 66% 
 Cost of acquisition 153,135  
    
31/12/2006 Goodwill impairment 57,783 57% 
31/12/2007 Goodwill impairment 42,918 43% 
 Total 100,701  
When the three companies write-off their goodwill, the reasons for the write-
off is either not clearly disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement (i.e. 
DEF1 Bhd, and DEF2 Bhd – see Tables 7.6(a) and 7.7(a), item 5) or not 
disclosed at all (i.e. DEF3 Bhd - see Table 7.8(a) item 5). For DEF1 Bhd and 
DEF2 Bhd, the reasons disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement seem 
to inform the shareholders that the goodwill impairment losses occur as a 
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result of the impairment test of goodwill [see item 5 in Tables 7.6(a) and 
7.7(a)]. Nevertheless, from the analyses of goodwill movement for these three 
companies, it appears that the managers have already decided to fully impair 
the goodwill and that they chose the timing of the write-off. Therefore, the 
reporting of goodwill impairment losses for these companies provides 
evidence of the exercise of managerial discretion in terms of timing in 
reporting the write-off.  
The timing in reporting the write-off discussed above is captured into a 
scenario (see Figure 7.3). However, because of the extensive manual efforts 
require to identify companies that have goodwill arising from an apparent 
overpayment made at the time of business acquisition, this scenario will be 
set aside for future research. 
Figure 7.3: A scenario of companies exercising discretion in timing the 
goodwill write-off due to an apparent overpayment made at the time of 
business acquisition 
 
 
 Selection criteria: 
(i) Companies that acquired goodwill within the current year.  
(ii) Group the companies into two. Group 1 (control group) are those 
companies that fully impair the goodwill acquired immediately. Group 
2 (test group) are those companies that reported the impairment 
losses in the subsequent year. 
 Companies in Group 2 will be regarded as companies which exercise an 
accounting choice in terms of timing in reporting goodwill write-off from 
goodwill which arose from an apparent overpayment made at the time of 
acquisition. In the future research, they will be tested in year 1 and 
against Group 1. 
 
7.3.3 Systematic reduction of goodwill balance 
As noted in Figure 7.1 (in Section 7.3), two of the 20 companies analysed 
reduced their goodwill balance systematically annually (see Tables 7.9 and 
7.10). Table 7.9 [see item 1(i)] shows that XYZ1 Bhd had a goodwill 
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amortisation policy prior to the implementation of FRS 3 in 2007.  From 2007 
onwards, the company implemented FRS 3, which prohibited the annual 
amortisation of goodwill. Instead, the company is required to perform an 
annual impairment test of goodwill. However, Table 7.9 [see item 1(c) and 
1(d)] reveals that XYZ1 Bhd continued the process of reducing the goodwill 
balance systematically. Instead of recording the amount as an amortisation of 
goodwill [see item 1(c)], it was renamed as goodwill impairment loss [see 
item 1(d)]. From the table, it is seen that there is no reason for the company 
to report goodwill impairment losses from 2007 to 2009 when it is 
experiencing good financial performance (see item 3) and the company‘s 
market value is higher than the book value of the net assets from 2003 to 
2009 (see item 4).  
Table 7.9: Analysis of goodwill movement for XYZ1 Bhd from 31 March 
2002-2009 
 
 Pre-FRS 3 (RM’000) Post-FRS 3 (RM’000) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1. Goodwill data        
(a) Opening 
goodwill balance 
- 21,902 29,297 27,823 26,349 24,874 23,400 
(b) Additions 22,166 8,536 - - - - - 
(c) Miscellaneous - 
Goodwill 
amortisation 
(264) (1,141) (1,474) (1,474) - - - 
(d) Goodwill 
impairment losses  
- - - - (1,475) (1,474) (1,474) 
(e) Disposed - - - - - - - 
(f) Closing 
goodwill balance  
21,902 29,297 27,823 26,349 24,874 23,400 21,926 
(g) Allocation of 
goodwill to CGUs 
The group operates mainly in Malaysia and involved principally in 
the domestic marketing of petroleum products 
(h) Basis of 
recoverable 
amount  
 
Not stated 
(i) Accounting 
policy – Goodwill 
Goodwill is amortised from the date 
of initial recognition 
Goodwill is reviewed for 
impairment annually or 
more frequently 
2. Segment result  The group does not present financial information by segmental 
information as it is principally involved in the domestic marketing 
of petroleum products in Malaysia (p. 133). 
3. Financial performance 
(a) Net income 
(after adding back 
goodwill 
impairment loss) 
available to equity 
holders  
 
149,101 
 
381,198 
 
210,731 
 
505,964 
 
641,782 
 
663,139 
 
580,145 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
(b) Basic EPS 
(cents) 
30.0 76.7 21.2 50.9 64.5 66.6 58.2 
4. The market 
capitalisation  
(MV vs. BV) 
 
MV>BV 
1.24 
 
MV>BV 
1.46 
 
MV>BV 
1.51 
 
MV>BV 
1.33 
 
MV>BV 
1.75 
 
MV>BV 
2.03 
 
MV>BV 
1.89 
5. Reasons for 
reporting 
goodwill 
impairment losses 
disclosed in the 
Notes to the 
Financial 
Statement 
Similar reasons for reporting goodwill impairment losses 
disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement in 2007 to 
2009 as follows: 
 Goodwill arose from the acquisition of certain service 
stations in previous years (XYZ1 Bhd, 2007: 87; 2008: 98; 
2009: 119). 
 
6. Audit report 
concerning 
goodwill 
Unqualified opinion for 2007 to 2009 (XYZ1 Bhd, 2007: 66; 2008: 
75; 2009:91). 
 
Types of 
accounting choice 
identified 
2007-2009 
 Systematic reduction of goodwill balance. 
 
Another case of a company which reduced its goodwill balance systematically 
is XYZ2 Bhd (see Table 7.10). Unlike XYZ1 Bhd that reduced its goodwill 
balance by the same amount annually (i.e. using the straight-line method), 
XYZ2 Bhd reduced its goodwill balance with the same percentage in 2006 and 
2007 (i.e. using the reducing balance method). Table 7.10 shows that both in 
2006 and 2007, the company reduced 10% of its beginning goodwill balance 
[see item 1(d)]. In 2008, the company‘s financial performance declined 
further (see item 3) and its market value fell below the book value of the net 
assets (see item 3), which led the company to reduce its beginning goodwill 
balance by a larger percentage (10% reduction of goodwill balance for the 
newly acquired goodwill and 20% reduction of beginning goodwill balance for 
the previously acquired goodwill) [see item 1(d)]. The analyses of goodwill 
movement presented in Tables 7.9 and 7.10 seem to imply that the managers 
who were accustomed to the amortisation of goodwill prior to the 
implementation of FRS 3 were perpetuating this old system by reporting 
goodwill impairment losses systematically annually. 
The practice of reducing goodwill balance via the straight-line method as 
found with XYZ1 Bhd [see item 1(c) and (d) in Table 7.9] can be easily 
identified for other listed companies. However, the reducing balance method 
as applied by XYZ2 Bhd [see item 1(d) in Table 7.10] might be challenging to 
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detect if there is an addition of goodwill and the managers alter the 
percentage of goodwill to be reduced. Therefore, the researcher could not 
easily devise a program that would identify which of these companies had 
applied a reducing balance method prior to the implementation of FRS 3. The 
only way to distinguish these companies is through manual analysis of goodwill 
movement as has been demonstrated for XYZ1 Bhd and XYZ2 Bhd. The amount 
of manual efforts required to test companies which have reduced their 
goodwill balances systematically makes its impractical to continue further 
within the scope of this thesis. Hence, this type of accounting choice will not 
be explored further. 
Table 7.10:  Analysis of goodwill movement for XYZ2 Bhd from 31 
December 2004-2008 
 
 Pre-FRS3 Post-FRS3 
Year  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1. Goodwill data     
(a) Opening 
goodwill 
balance 
2,269,870 2,247, 171 2,156,375 1,940,738 1,746,664 
(b) Additions  - - - - 1,172,691 
(c) 
Miscellaneous - 
Goodwill     
amortisation 
policy for 25 
years 
(22,699)  
= 1% of 
GW(o/b) 
- Not 
following the 
GW-amor(1).  
(90,796) 
= 
2,269,870/25 
years 
- As per the  
GW-amor.  
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
(d) Goodwill 
impairment loss 
  (215,637) 
= 10% x 
GW(2)  
(o/b). 
- GWIL(IL)(3)  
is a 
reduction 
of 10% of 
the GW 
balance.  
(194,074) 
= 10% x GW 
(o/b). 
- GWIL(IL) 
is a 
reduction 
of 10% of 
the GW 
balance.  
 
(466,602) 
= (10% x new 
GW) + (20%x 
GW-o/b) 
= (10%x1,172, 
691) + (20% x 
1,746,664) 
=  
349,333+117,269 
=466,602. 
(e) Disposed - - - - - 
(f) Closing 
goodwill bal. 
2,247,171 2,156,375 1,940,738 1,746,664 2,452,753 
(g) Allocation 
of goodwill to 
CGUs 
Not stated Business application software 
(h) Basis of 
recoverable  
amount 
The higher of Net selling 
price and value-in-use. 
The higher of fair values less costs to sell 
and value-in-use. 
(i) Accounting policy - Goodwill 
2. Segment 
result 
None- the group principally involved in information technology related 
business. 
(1) GW-amor denotes amortisation of goodwill 
(2) GW denotes goodwill 
(3) GWIL(IL) denotes impairment losses of goodwill 
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Table 7.10 (continue):  Analysis of goodwill movement for XYZ2 Bhd from 
31 December 2004-2008 
 
 Pre-FRS3 Post-FRS3 
Year  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
3. Financial performance     
(a) Net income 
(after adding 
back goodwill 
impairment 
loss) available 
to equity 
holders  
 
408,000 
 
414,000 
 
(1,106,000) 
 
(959,000) 
 
(2,972,000) 
(b) Basic EPS 
(cents) 
 
1.62 0.44 (1.42) (1.08) (3.69) 
4. The market 
capitalisation 
(MV vs. BV) 
MV>BV 
5.25 
MV>BV 
1.03 
MV>BV 
1.06 
MV>BV 
1.18 
MV<BV 
0.71 
5. Reasons for reporting 
goodwill impairment losses 
disclosed in the Notes to the 
Financial Statement 
Similar reasons for reporting goodwill impairment 
losses disclosed in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement in 2006 to 2008 as follows: 
 The Group tests goodwill for impairment 
annually or more frequently if there are 
indications that goodwill might be impaired 
(XYZ2 Bhd, 2006: 42; 2007: 47; 2008: 54). 
6. Audit report concerning 
goodwill 
Unqualified opinion in all of the three years 2006-
2008 (XYZ2 Bhd, 2006: 29; 2007: 35; 2008: 41). 
 
Types of accounting choice 
identified 
 
Systematic reduction of goodwill balance 
As noted in Sections 4.4.2 and 6.4.2.2, in an attempt to explore whether 
segment result could be employed as a proxy for an indication that goodwill 
may be impaired, information concerning segment result is included in the 
disclosure framework (for e.g. see item 2 of Table 7.3). The result of the 
disclosure study illustrates that it is challenging to apply the segment result as 
another proxy for an indication that goodwill may be impaired, especially on a 
large scale basis. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, though companies 
have a number of business segments, not all of these segments contain 
goodwill. Moreover, not all of the segments containing goodwill reported 
goodwill impairment losses. Therefore, to identify the business segment which 
reported goodwill impairment losses, a researcher needs to inspect the annual 
reports for each of the companies. To illustrate, ABC1 Bhd (see Table 7.3) has 
three business segments. Nevertheless, there is only one business segment 
(i.e. electrical and mechanical engineering) which reported goodwill 
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impairment losses. Secondly, not all of the companies allocated their goodwill 
as per the segment reporting (either business segments or geographical 
segments). Companies also allocated their goodwill to subsidiaries acquired. 
7.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has addressed two research questions for the disclosure study 
(i.e. Research Questions 2 and 3).  
Research Question 2 asks about the appropriateness of the market 
capitalisation indication (i.e. companies‘ market values lower than the book 
values of their net assets at the balance sheet date) as a proxy for an 
indication that goodwill may be impaired. The first part of the disclosure 
study has revealed that as a stand-alone, the market capitalisation indication 
is not an ideal proxy for an indication that goodwill may be impaired (see 
Section 7.2). This is because it does not fully reflect the condition of the cash-
generating-units containing goodwill, disclosed in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement.  
Research Question 3 concerns types of accounting choice related to goodwill 
impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies. Through an in-depth 
analysis of the annual reports of 20 companies over a number of years, and 
using the self-constructed disclosure framework, the second part of the 
disclosure study has provided evidence of opportunistic timing in reporting 
goodwill impairment losses (see Section 7.3). This opportunistic timing is 
evidenced through the four companies which were found to have delayed 
reporting goodwill impairment losses (see Section 7.3.1) and eight companies 
that chose when to fully impair its goodwill which arose from an apparent 
overpayment made at the time of business acquisition (see Section 7.3.2). In 
addition, this disclosure study has revealed two companies which reduced 
their goodwill balance systematically every year, suggesting that the 
managers are perpetuating the old system of amortising their goodwill (see 
Section 7.3.3).  
192 
 
Two scenarios are constructed to capture the opportunistic timing (see 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3). However, because of the small number of companies and 
the extensive manual efforts require, these scenarios are set aside for future 
research. The deferment of these two scenarios for further research does not 
affect the quality of this thesis because the measurement study of this thesis 
(see Chapter 8) analyses the total population of companies which implement 
FRS 3 for the first three years the standard taking effect. The two scenarios 
which are constructed to capture the opportunistic timing represent an 
extension of the measurement study as they attempt to analyse companies‘ 
motives in reporting goodwill impairment losses that have become overdue. 
In conclusion, by answering Research Question 2, the disclosure study has 
revealed that as a stand-alone, the market capitalisation indication is not an 
ideal proxy for an indication that goodwill may be impaired. By answering 
Research Question 3, the disclosure study has illustrated that when the 
market capitalisation indication is coupled with the financial performance of 
companies, and their segment results, it becomes a useful starting point in 
identifying the accounting choices related to goodwill impairment exercised 
by Malaysian listed companies. Therefore, the disclosure study contributes to 
the wider thesis by providing evidence of the degree of discretion managers 
have in determining the timing and amount of goodwill impairment losses 
reported by Malaysian listed companies after the implementation of FRS 3.  
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Chapter 8: Measurement Study of Goodwill 
Impairment - Results and Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
The measurement study of goodwill impairment, presented in this chapter, 
analyses factors influencing managers‘ decisions when determining the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment losses divided by prior year total assets 
(including goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on the income statement 
(see Section 1.4.2). This study answers the research questions listed in Figure 
8.1 (see Sections 1.3 and 5.2): 
Figure 8.1: Summary of research questions (RQ) for the measurement 
study of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies 
 
 
Theoretical research question 
 
RQ 1 
 
: 
 
How can an investigation of FRS 3, focusing on goodwill impairment 
by Malaysian listed companies, contribute to the theories of 
accounting choice? 
 
 
Specific research questions  
RQ 4 : Economic factors 
 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect the 
underlying economic values of cash-generating-units containing 
goodwill? 
 
RQ 5 : Contracting perspective 
 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment support the contracting 
perspective? 
 
RQ 6 : Opportunistic behaviour perspective 
 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment support the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective? 
 
RQ 7 : Ownership structures 
 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect 
companies‘ ownership structures? 
 
RQ 8 : To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect the 
discretion available in FRS 136 Impairment of Assets? 
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 describes the dependent 
variable, and the distribution of data. Section 8.3 outlines an overall 
regression model, discusses the issues of multicollinearity, and specifies 
variables included in the regression models. Section 8.4 analyses the result of 
the regression Model 1. Section 8.5 reports the results of the overall 
regression Model 2 and the sensitivity analyses. Sections 8.6 to 8.12.2 discuss 
the findings for each of the research questions, the control variables, and the 
overall results. Section 8.13 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
8.2 Descriptive analysis 
The descriptive analysis discussed in this section describes the dependent 
variable (see Section 8.2.1) and the distribution of data (see Section 8.2.2).  
8.2.1 Dependent variable  
Two issues concerning the dependent variable of the measurement study are 
discussed – the distribution of data (see Section 8.2.1.1) and the skewed data 
(see Section 8.2.1.2). 
8.2.1.1 Dependent variable: Distribution of data 
Table 8.1 presents the distribution of data for the dependent variable, i.e. 
the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses divided by prior year total assets 
(including goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on the income statement in 
the first three years of the implementation of FRS 3. The table consists of 
three panels – Panel A reports the number of firm-years observation reporting 
goodwill impairment losses and zero goodwill impairment, Panel B focuses on 
companies which reported goodwill impairment losses only, and Panel C takes 
a closer look at the companies reported in Panel B by segregating them into 
three groups. 
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Table 8.1: Distribution of data for the dependent variable of the 
measurement study 
 
  
Initial 
 year 
Second 
year 
Third  
year 
All 
observations 
Panel A: Number of firm-years observation reporting goodwill impairment losses  
              and zero goodwill impairment 
No. of observations 
    
 - Goodwill 
impairment loss  
135 123 111 369 
 - Zero goodwill 
impairment 
394 374 361 1129 
Total 529 497 472 1498 
Panel B: Relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses
(1)
  
Minimum
(2)
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 
0.281 0.257 0.183 0.281 
Mean 
0.009 0.013 0.014 0.012 
Median 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Std. Deviation 0.031 0.036 0.029 0.032 
Skewness 7.144 4.325 3.573 5.055 
Kurtosis 56.134 21.552 15.055 30.429 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test (Sig.) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Initial year   Second year   Third year  All observations 
  N  %  N  %  N  %  N  % 
Panel C: Grouping of the relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses (from  
              Panel B) 
<1% 113 83.7% 99 80.5% 80 72.1% 292 79.1% 
1% to <10% 20 14.8% 18 14.6% 27 24.3% 65 17.6% 
10% and 
more 2 1.5% 6 4.9% 4 3.6% 12 3.3% 
Total 
 
135 
   
123   
 
111   369   
 
 
 
Panel A shows that, in each of the years, the majority of the companies 
reported zero goodwill impairment (see Section 6.3 for detailed illustration). 
Panel B shows that for observations which reported goodwill impairment 
(1) Relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses refer to magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses divided by prior year total assets (inclusive of goodwill) reported on the income 
statement. It excludes zero goodwill impairment. 
(2) Zero amount shown, because the amount of goodwill impairment losses reported by 17 
companies is very small that when they are scaled by large amount of prior year total assets 
inclusive of goodwill, they reach around zero. 
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losses only (excluding zero goodwill impairment), the relative magnitude of 
goodwill impairment losses reported on the income statement ranges from 
0.000 to 0.281 with a mean value of 1.2% and a median value of 0.2% (see 
Section 8.2.1.2 for the issue of skewness). In comparing this result with prior 
studies (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; AbuGhazaleh 
et al., 2011) who employ exactly the same measure, it is observed that the 
mean and median values presented in Panel B of Table 8.1 are lower than 
AbuGhazaleh et al., (2011: 186) who reported a mean goodwill write-off of 
1.8% (median 0.3%). Further, this result is much lower than Lapointe-Antunes 
et al. (2008) and Francis et al., (1996: 120). Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008: 
45) documented a mean goodwill write-off of 6.34% (median 3.57%), and 
Francis et al., (1996: 120) showed a mean goodwill write-off of 10.1% (median 
4.4%). 
Panel C reveals that for companies which reported goodwill impairment losses 
only, the amount of impairment losses reported for the majority of them (e.g. 
83.7% in the initial year) is less than 1% of the prior year total assets (inclusive 
of goodwill). To see whether the relative magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses would differ between companies which reported the impairment losses 
once and those that reported the losses repeatedly, a comparison of the 
extent of relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses by these 
companies is undertaken. The comparison shows that the majority of 
companies (e.g. 82 of the 135 companies in the initial year - see Appendix 
8.1) reported goodwill impairment losses once during the three-year period of 
investigation, while nineteen companies reported losses thrice. Nonetheless, 
detailed inspection of the nineteen companies reveals no obvious pattern in 
reporting the impairment losses. 
The high skewness54 and kurtosis values portrayed in Panels A and B suggest 
that the dependent variable is not normally distributed - not only for the total 
observations (Panel A) but also for companies which reported goodwill 
impairment losses only (Panel B). From Panel B, it is observed that the non-
normality of the relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses reported on 
                                         
54
 According to Field (2005: 73), skewness of +/- 1.96 and Kurtosis of +/- 3.29 are within the 
normality threshold (see Section 6.6.1.1). 
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the income statement is further supported by the result of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov55 test with significant p-value of less than 0.01.  
8.2.1.2 Dependent variable: Skewed data for the 
relative
56
 magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses  
As noted in Section 6.7.1, the dependent variable for the measurement study 
comprises zero values and a range of the relative magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses. The latter reported high skewness and kurtosis values (see 
Section 8.2.1.1). According to Cameron and Trivedi (2009: 525), with high 
skewness and kurtosis, there is a possibility for tobit maximum likelihood 
estimation to be a flawed estimator for the model. To overcome this issue, 
two approaches have been considered57 by the researcher. 
The first approach is based on the suggestion made by Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009: 525 and 532-534), which is to transform the relative magnitude of 
goodwill impairment losses through natural logarithm, and to use the zero 
values as they are. Therefore, in this case, the dependent variable would 
consist of zero values and natural logarithm of the relative magnitude of 
goodwill impairment losses. The researcher has attempted to follow this 
suggestion. A random-effects tobit regression is run using the revised 
dependent variable.  
However, because the relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses 
comprises many values that are close to zero (e.g. 0.01) (see Panel C of Table 
8.1), the natural logarithm of these values produces negative values, which 
                                         
55 Kolmogorov-Smirnov with p-value less than 0.05 suggests violation of the assumption of 
normality (Pallant, 2001: 58) (see Section 6.6.1.1). 
56 The relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses refer to magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses divided by prior year total assets (inclusive of goodwill) reported on the 
income statement. It excludes zero goodwill impairment. 
57 In considering these two approaches, the researcher has carried out a discussion with Mr 
Darryl Holden, the author of ‗Testing the normality assumption in the tobit model‘, Journal of 
Applied Statistics, at his office at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland. The 
researcher would like to take this opportunity to thanks Mr Darryl Holden for his advices and 
suggestions. 
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together with the lower limit censoring (at zero values), resulted in STATA not 
being able to generate the regression output. To solve this technical problem, 
the researcher could alter the censoring limit from the lower limit (at zero 
value) to the upper limit (at zero value), and then run the regression again 
with the revised dependent variable. However, theoretically, this would be 
incorrect because goodwill impairment losses cannot be negative. Therefore, 
the approach of applying natural logarithm to the relative magnitude of 
goodwill impairment losses, is unsuited to the present measurement study. 
The second approach in solving the high skewness and kurtosis values is to 
replace the denominator of the dependent variable from prior year total 
assets inclusive of goodwill to goodwill balance at the beginning of the year. 
This approach has been applied by Beatty and Weber (2006: 273) where their 
dependent variable is the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses divided by 
goodwill balance at the beginning of the year, and zero otherwise reported on 
the income statement. However, when adopting this approach in the present 
study, the issue of high skewness and kurtosis is not resolved. With the 
beginning goodwill balance as the new denominator, the skewness and 
kurtosis values are even higher than when the denominator is the prior year 
total assets inclusive of goodwill. Therefore, this approach is also unsuitable 
for the present measurement study.  
As the two approaches discussed above cannot be applied in the present 
measurement study, the researcher has referred back to prior studies 
analysing goodwill impairment (e.g. Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). However, none of these studies discusses the 
normality test and the issue of whether the tobit maximum likelihood 
estimation may be flawed. Therefore, the way forward is for the researcher 
to employ the initial dependent variable, that is, the dependent variable 
which comprises zero values and a range of the relative magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses. Also, to acknowledge that with the high skewness and 
kurtosis values, there is a possibility that the tobit maximum likelihood 
estimation may be a flawed estimator for the model in this measurement 
study. 
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8.2.2 Distribution of data for the independent variables 
and control variables 
The descriptive statistics for the continuous and categorical variables 
employed in the present measurement study are displayed in Appendices 8.2 
and 8.3. The appendices highlight three issues concerning the distribution of 
data. Firstly, ∆SALES is positively skewed with its mean value differing 
significantly from the median (see Appendix 8.2). Secondly, a number of 
variables suffer from high frequencies of missing values (see Appendices 8.2 
and 8.3 – e.g. DISCRATE).  Thirdly, there is a lack of data for the industry 
dummy (see Appendix 8.3). These three issues will be discussed in Sections 
8.2.2.1 to 8.2.2.3 respectively.  
8.2.2.1 Skewed data for the independent variables 
The mean p-value for change in sales (∆SALES) is greater than its median and 
the difference is statistically significant, suggesting that the variable is 
positively skewed (see Appendix 8.2). Detailed inspection revealed that 
∆SALES reports skewness value of 4.418 and kurtosis value of 57.204. 
According to Field (2005: 73), skewness of +/- 1.96 and Kurtosis of +/- 3.29 
are within the normality threshold (see Section 6.6.1.1). For a variable which 
has a substantially positive skewness with zero values, Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) suggest transforming the variable into logarithmic plus constant value, 
such as logarithmic plus 1. Following this suggestion, ∆SALES is transformed 
into Log(∆SALES+1). Accordingly, the skewness value for Log(∆SALES+1) is 
reduced to -0.673. 
8.2.2.2 Missing values 
The descriptive analysis presented in Appendices 8.2 and 8.3 shows that the 
variables for testing the discretion available in performing impairment test of 
goodwill (i.e. CGU01, CGUContinuous, DISCRATE, and DISCMULTIPLE) suffer from 
high frequency of missing values. These variables were not disclosed by more 
than half of the total firm-years analysed. The missing value analysis is 
carried out using Little‘s MCAR test and Separate Variance t tests (see Section 
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6.6.2). The Little‘s MCAR test produces a Chi-Square value of 1527.70 and is 
statistically significant at p-value of less than 0.01 (see Appendix 8.4), 
suggesting that the null hypothesis that the data are missing completely at 
random is rejected. Hence, it is inferred that the data are not missing 
completely at random.  
Separate Variance t tests are carried out by SPSS only for variables where at 
least 5% of data missing (see Section 6.6.2). Accordingly, the Separate 
Variance t tests are conducted on eight variables - GWB, DEBTRATIO, 
∆CEOCurrent/prior, CEOTENURE, CGU01, CGUcontinuous, DISCRATE, and DISCMULTIPLE 
(see Appendix 8.4). In all of the eight variables tested, the Separate Variance 
t tests show that the dependent variable is not statistically significant (see 
Appendix 8.4). This means that there is no systematic relationship between 
the missing values faced by each of these eight variables and the dependent 
variable. This result suggests that the missing values encountered by these 
eight variables are not related to the dependent variable. 
Instead, the missing value is predictable from other independent variables. 
For example, in Model 1 (see Section 8.4), the total population of firm-years 
analysed is reduced from 1498 to 538 because of the missing values for CGU01. 
From Appendix 8.4, it is seen that the missing data on CGU01 is more likely to 
differ, for example, in their EARNINGSPrior. Because the missing data is not 
related to the dependent variable, the result of Separate Variance t tests 
indicates that the data is missing at random (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007: 
63). Consequently, it is inferred that the missing values, which occur at 
random will not affect the generalisability of results.  
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007: 63-71) offer a few solutions to the problem of 
missing values, such as imputing the missing values, treating missing values as 
data, deletion of cases, and deletion of variables. In the present study, the 
high frequency of missing values for the four out of the eight variables (i.e. 
CGU01, CGUcontinuous, DISCRATE, and DISCMULTIPLE - see Appendix 8.4) makes it 
impractical to adopt the first two solutions. For example, imputing the data, 
by replacing the missing score with average score for the related variables 
may suppress the true value of the standard deviation and the standard error. 
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Field (2005: 184) explains that the standard deviation will be suppressed 
because for any replaced case, there will be no difference between the mean 
value and the score value. If there are many missing values, imputing the data 
is potentially dangerous as smaller standard errors are more likely to lead to 
significant results that are a product of replacement rather than a genuine 
effect (Field, 2005:184). 
Because the Separate Variance t tests indicate that the missing values occur 
at random, the issue of missing values is solved by constructing Model 2(h)(i) 
and (ii), which is a subcategory of Model 2 (see Section 8.3.3 and Table 8.3). 
The model retains those variables testing economic factors, contracting 
perspective, opportunistic behaviour perspective, ownership structures, and 
control variables. However, it excludes all of the variables testing the 
discretion (see Table 8.3). Thus, Models 2(h) (i) and (ii) solve the problem of 
missing values by deleting variables testing the discretion such as CGUs and 
discount rates that suffer from a high frequency of missing values. 
8.2.2.3 Lack of data for industry variable 
Due to the small number of companies involved, the industry group 
classification is reduced from 10, by combining these into five groups as 
follows: (i) industrials and basic materials, (ii) consumer goods and services, 
(iii) financials, (iv) utilities, healthcare and oil and gas, and (v) technology 
and telecommunication (see Appendix 8.3). The reduction of 10 industries to 
five industries follows as closely as possible the industry classification as 
provided by Bursa Malaysia, which is also applied by Haniffa (1999: 295).  
8.3 Multivariate analyses 
The multivariate analyses discuss in this section include an overall regression 
model (see Section 8.3.1), the issue of multicollinearity (see Section 8.3.2), 
and model specifications (see Section 8.3.3). 
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8.3.1 An overall regression model 
An overall regression model (see Appendix 1 of the thesis for detailed 
definitions of these variables) is applied in this section as follows: 
GWIL = f(Economic factors, Contracting perspective, Opportunistic behaviour 
perspective, Ownership structures, Discretion available in performing 
impairment test of goodwill, Control variables) + ε  
Where; 
Variable Description 
GWIL   = The magnitude of goodwill impairment losses, divided by prior 
year total assets (including goodwill), and zero otherwise 
reported on the income statement. 
 
Economic factors 
∆SALES (H1) Change in sales divided by total assets at the end of prior year 
 
= (Salest - Salest-1) 
    Total assetst-1 
 
The variable is transformed into Log(∆SALES+1) (see Section 
8.2.2.1). 
 
EARNINGSPrior
58
 (H2A) Prior year earnings divided by total assets at the end of prior 
year. 
 
EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent 
(H2B) 
Current year pre-write-off earnings divided by total assets at 
the end of prior year. 
 
 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL(H3) 
Change in pre-write-off earnings divided by total assets at the 
end of prior year 
 
= [EARNINGSt + GWIL(IL)t]- [EARNIINGSt-1 + GWIL(IL) t-1] 
                           Total assetst-1 
 
 
∆OCF (H4) 
Change in operating cash flows divided by total assets at the 
end of prior year 
 
= (OCFt - OCFt-1)/Total assetst-1 
 
 
BTM (H5) 
Book-to-market ratio 
 
= Company i‘s book value of equity divided by market value of  
   equity at the end of current year. 
 
 
GWB (H6) 
Relative size of goodwill balance 
 
= Opening goodwill balancet 
        Total assets t-1 
Contracting perspective 
 
DEBTRATIO (H7) 
Debt contracting 
 
= Total Debtst-1 
Total assetst-1 
 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective 
                                         
58 EARNINGSPrior and EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent are not tested in the same regression model (see 
Section 8.3.3 for the detailed of the model specifications).  
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∆CEOCurrent/prior(H8) Change in CEO
59 
= One if there is a change in CEO in the previous financial year 
or current financial year, and zero otherwise. 
 
CEOTENURE (H9) CEO tenure 
= Number of years that the CEO has held the position 
 
BATH (H10) Big bath reporting 
= Change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current  
   year, divided by total assets at the end of prior year, when  
   this change is below the median of non-zero negative values  
   of this variable, and zero otherwise. 
 
SMOOTH (H11) Earnings smoothing 
= Change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current  
   year, divided by total assets at the end of prior year, when  
   this change is above the median of non-zero positive values of  
   this variable, and zero otherwise. 
Ownership structures 
MANOWNLinear (H12A) 
- Linear relationship 
Managerial ownership 
= No. of ordinary shares held directly by executive directors 
       Total number of issued and paid up ordinary shares 
 
MANOWNNon-monotonic  
(H12B) 
 - Non-monotonic  
   relationship 
MANOWN1 
 board ownership if board ownership < 0.05 
 0.05 if board ownership ≥ 0.05 
 
MANOWN2 
 0 if board ownership < 0.05 
 board ownership minus 0.05 if 0.05≤board ownership< 0.25 
 0.20 if board ownership ≥ 0.25 
 
MANOWN3 
 0 if board ownership < 0.25 
 board ownership minus 0.25 if board ownership ≥ 0.25 
 
OUTCON (H13) Outside ownership concentration 
= Number of ordinary shares held by outsiders with the five  
   largest claims, divided by the total number of issued and paid  
   up ordinary shares. 
 
Discretion available in performing impairment test of goodwill 
CGU01 (H14A) Cash-generating-units containing goodwill 
= One if there is more than one CGUs in current year, and zero  
   otherwise. 
 
CGUContinuous (H14B) Cash-generating-units containing goodwill 
= The actual number of CGUs containing goodwill disclosed in  
   the annual reports at the end of the current year. 
DISCRATE (H15A) % of discount rates employed for the purpose of computing the 
recoverable amount of CGUs containing goodwill disclosed in 
annual reports at the end of current year. 
 
DISCMULTIPLE (H15B) Application of a single or multiple discount rates 
= One if companies applied multiple discount rates, and zero for  
   single discount rates. 
 
DISCRATEDisclosed/Not 
(H15C) 
Discount rates - disclosed or not 
= One if companies do not disclose the discount rates, and zero  
   otherwise. 
                                         
59 Sensitivity analysis is carried out for additional definitions of ∆CEO (see Section 8.5.2.1). 
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Control variables 
SIZE (H16) Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of prior year. 
 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17) Types of industry  
= A dummy variable across five industry categories. 
YEND (H18)  Financial year-end 
= A dummy variable across three financial year-end categories 
(i.e. 2006, 2007, and 2008). 
 
ADD (H19) Additions to goodwill 
= One if there is a newly acquired goodwill, and zero otherwise. 
 
Ε = Error term 
 
8.3.2 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is assessed using Pearson‘s product-moment correlation 
coefficient test and variance inflation factor (VIF) computed by regression 
analysis (see Section 6.6.3). This section discusses the result of the Pearson‘s 
product-moment correlation coefficient test. The result of VIF is shown in 
Section 8.4 after running the regression analysis. 
Table 8.2 shows the result of the Pearson‘s product-moment correlation 
coefficient test performed on the continuous variables60. Gujarati and Porter 
(2009: 338) suggested that if the pair-wise correlation coefficient between 
two regressors is in excess of 0.8, it indicates an issue of multicollinearity (see 
Section 6.6.3). Following this suggestion, Table 8.2 shows that for the most 
part, the independent variables are not significantly correlated with one 
another or with the control variables. Exceptions include the correlations 
between: (1) MANOWNLinear and MANOWN1, and (2) MANOWNLinear and 
MANOWN2, which are correlated by construction, and (3) ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL 
and SMOOTH. Multicollinearity is not an issue in practice for the first two 
correlations because these variables are included in different regression 
models (see Section 8.3.3 for the model specification). 
                                         
60 Pearson‘s correlation is not performed on the categorical variables because according to 
Field (2005: 125), the correlation requires data which are measured at an interval or ratio 
level for the result to be meaningful. 
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Table 8.2: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients 
 
   Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 GWIL 1.00          
2 Log(∆SALES+1)(H1) -0.02 1.00         
3 EARNINGSPrior (H2A) -0.14** 0.10** 1.00        
4 EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent(H2B) -0.17
**
 0.22** 0.59** 1.00       
5 ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL(H3) -0.02 0.15** -0.26** 0.54** 1.00      
6 ∆OCF (H4) -0.00 0.18** -0.04 0.18** 0.22** 1.00     
7 BTM (H5) -0.02 -0.15** -0.19** -0.22** -0.08** -0.03 1.00    
8 GWB (H6) -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.07* -0.02 1.00   
9 DEBTRATIO (H7) 0.10 -0.04 -0.24** -0.16** 0.09** 0.02 0.07* -0.02 1.00  
10 CEOTENURE (H9)  0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.05* 0.04 -0.02 0.08** -0.17** 0.07** 1.00 
11 BATH (H10) -0.10** 0.13** -0.02 0.48** 0.66** 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.13** 0.07** 
12 SMOOTH (H11) 0.04 0.10** -0.34** 0.35** 0.82** 0.27** -0.11** 0.04 -0.04 0.07** 
13 MANOWNLinear (H12A) -0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 
14 MANOWN1 (H12B1) -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.07* -0.00 0.06* -0.01 
15 MANOWN2 (H12B2) -0.01 0.05* 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
16 MANOWN3 (H12B3) -0.00 0.07* 0.10** 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.09** -0.07* 
17 OUTCON (H13) -0.05 0.01 0.12** 0.12** 0.01 0.00 -0.09** -0.04 -0.01 -0.12** 
18 CGUcontinuous (H14B) 0.12** 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.11** -0.00 0.05 -0.08* 
19 DISCRATE (H15A) 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.00 -0.10* 0.03 -0.11** -0.13** 
20 SIZE (H16) 0.06* -0.03 0.06* 0.08** 0.03 -0.01 -0.08** -0.06* 0.11** 0.19** 
   Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
12 SMOOTH (H11) 0.12** 1.00         
13 MANOWNLinear (H12) -0.06* 0.04 1.00        
14 MANOWN1 (H12B1) -0.06* 0.04 0.94** 1.00       
15 MANOWN2 (H12B2) -0.06** 0.04 0.89** 0.69** 1.00      
16 MANOWN3 (H12B3) -0.04 -0.04 0.59** 0.37** 0.67** 1.00     
17 OUTCON (H13) 0.08** -0.06* -0.62** -0.62** -0.60** -0.47** 1.00    
18 CGUcontinuous (H14B) 0.07 -0.05 -0.09* -0.09* -0.08 -0.07 0.02 1.00   
19 DISCRATE (H15A) -0.16** 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 1.00  
20 SIZE (H16) 0.16** -0.08** -0.38** -0.38** -0.33** -0.25** 0.28** 0.42** 0.11** 1.00 
*, ** denote significance at the 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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The high correlation (0.82) between ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL and SMOOTH at p-value 
less than 0.01 is similar to Riedl (2004: 841). In his study, Riedl (2004: 841) 
found ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL and SMOOTH to be correlated at 0.786 with p-value 
less than 0.01. He (p. 832) reasoned that since the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for the two variables are less than 561, multicollinearity does not appear 
to be significant. On the other hand, for the present measurement study, VIF 
for ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL and SMOOTH are high. The VIF for ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL is 
52.68 and for SMOOTH is 25.19. To overcome the issue of multicollinearity, 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL and SMOOTH are analysed separately (see Section 8.3.3 for 
the model specification).  
8.3.3 Model specifications 
Two main random-effects tobit regression models have been constructed – 
Model 1, and Model 2. Model 1 has been constructed with the aim of 
comparing the result of the present measurement study with AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011) (see Section 5.3 for detailed explanation). With the exceptions of 
corporate governance variables, and a cross-listing variable which are not 
included in the model (see Section 5.3), variables presented in Model 1 are 
similar to those of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011). 
Model 2 has been developed with three purposes (see Table 8.3 for the model 
specifications). Firstly, to incorporate variables which capture the ownership 
structures of Malaysian listed companies, i.e. managerial ownership, and 
outside ownership concentration [see Model 2(a)(i) and (ii) in Table 8.3]. 
Model 2(a)(i) tests the linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
reporting goodwill impairment losses while Model 2(a)(ii) tests the non-
monotonic relationship between the two variables. 
                                         
61 VIF of a variable which exceed 10 is regarded as highly collinear by Gujarati and Porter 
(2009: 340) (see Section 6.6.3). 
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Table 8.3: Models specification for the analysis of the measurement of goodwill impairment 
 
Model Specifications of the variables 
 
Model 1  = α + Log(∆SALES+1) + EARNINGSPrior + ∆OCF + BTM + GWB + DEBTRATIO   
      + ∆CEOCurrent/prior + BATH +  SMOOTH + CGU01 + SIZE + YEND + ADD + ε 
 
Model 2(a)(i)  = Model 1 + Ownership variables (i.e. MANOWNLinear, and OUTCON) 
 
Model 2(a)(ii)  = Model 1 + MANOWN1 + MANOWN2 + MANOWN3 + OUTCON  
Model 2(b)  = Model 1- CGU01 + Discretion (i.e. CGUContinuous, DISCRATE, DISCMULTIPLE, and DISCRATEDisclosed/Not) 
 
Model 2(c)  = Model 1 + CEO tenure (i.e. CEOTENURE)  
 
Model 2(d)  = Model 1 + Industry variable (i.e. INDUSTRYG5) 
 
Model 2(e)  = Model 1 – EARNINGSPrior + EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent    
 
Model 2(f)  = Model 1 – EARNINGSPrior + ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL – SMOOTH 
 
Model 2(g)(i)  = Model 1 + MANOWN1 + MANOWN2 + MANOWN3 + OUTCON - CGU01 + CGUContinuous + DISCRATE 
  + DISCMULTIPLE + DISCRATEDisclosed/Not  + CEOTENURE + INDUSTRYG5 - EARNINGSPrior  
  + EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent 
 
Model 2(g)(ii)  = Model 1 + MANOWN1 + MANOWN2 + MANOWN3 + OUTCON - CGU01 + CGUContinuous + DISCRATE  
   + DISCMULTIPLE  + DISCRATEDisclosed/Not  + CEOTENURE + INDUSTRYG5 - EARNINGSPrior  
   +  ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL  - SMOOTH 
 
Model 2(h)(i)  = Model 2(g)(i) - Discretion (i.e. CGUContinuous, DISCRATE, DISCMULTIPLE, and DISCRATEDisclosed/Not) 
 
Model 2(h)(ii)  = Model 2(g)(ii) - Discretion (i.e. CGUContinuous, DISCRATE, DISCMULTIPLE, and DISCRATEDisclosed/Not) 
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Secondly, to include variables which are pertinent to understanding the 
measurement of goodwill impairment but are not tested by AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011). These variables are categorised into three groups: (i) variables 
testing the discretion such as CGUs available to managers in performing an 
impairment test of goodwill (i.e. CGUContinuous, DISCRATE, DISCMULTIPLE, and 
DISCRATEDisclosed/Not) [see Model 2(b)], (ii) CEO tenure [see Model 2(c)], and 
(iii) industry variable which has been tested by prior studies (e.g. Beatty and 
Weber, 2006: 283; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008: 44; AbuGhazaleh62 et al., 
2011: 195) [see Model 2(d)].  
Thirdly, to improve prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) as employed by 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) by replacing the variable with current year pre-
write-off earnings in Model 2(e) and change in pre-write-off earnings from 
prior year to current year in Model 2(f). In Model 2(f), because of the high 
correlation between ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL and SMOOTH (see Section 8.3.2), 
SMOOTH is dropped from the model (see Table 8.3). 
To see the effect of incorporating and changing variables moving away from 
the model of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), Model 2 is developed in a number of 
stages starting from Model 2(a)(i) to Model 2(h)(ii) (see Table 8.3). 
Specifically, Models 2(a)(i) to Model 2(f) replicate Model 1 and incorporate 
additional variable(s) as discussed above. Further, Model 2(g)(i) is a 
combination of all of the variables included in Model 2(a)(ii) to 2(e) (see Table 
8.3). Meanwhile, Model 2(g)(ii) is a combination of all of the variables 
included in Models 2(a)(ii) to 2(d) and 2(f). The model is developed separately 
from Model 2(g)(i) because of the issue of multicollinearity between 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL and SMOOTH (see Section 8.3.2). Additionally, because of 
the high frequency of missing values for variables testing the discretion (see 
Section 8.2.2.2), Models 2(h)(i) and (ii) are added in. Model 2(h) retains the 
variables testing economic factors, contracting perspective, opportunistic 
                                         
62
 AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 195) tested industry variable as part of an additional analysis 
(not reported in the main regression model), and the study found the variable as non-
significant.  
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behaviour perspective, ownership structures, and control variables. However, 
it excludes all of the variables testing the discretion. Therefore, with the 
exception of variables testing the discretion, Model 2(h)(i) replicates Model 
2(g)(i) while Model 2(h)(ii) replicates Model 2(g)(ii).  
8.4 Regression result for Model 1 
This section reports the random-effects tobit regression Model 1 (see Sections 
6.7.1 and 6.7.2 for the rationale of using random-effects tobit). Table 8.4 
summarises the result of Model 1 and how it compares to AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 190). It is noted that the analysis of Model 1 is based on 538 
observations, which are fewer than the total population of 1498 due to 
missing values (see Section 8.2.2.2 for detailed discussion of the missing 
values analysis). Also, the model reveals that the largest variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is 1.62 and that the VIFs for all of the variables are below 2. 
Multicollinearity becomes an issue when VIF exceeds 10 (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009: 340) (see Section 6.6.3). Thus, the VIF results further reinforce the lack 
of multicollinearity issue in the random-effect tobit regression Model 1 (see 
Section 8.3.2).  
The goodness-of-fit for the random-effects tobit model is evaluated using the 
log-likelihood and the overall Wald test (see Section 6.9). Table 8.4 shows 
that Model 1, which incorporates 10 independent variables and three control 
variables, is significant (at p-value less than 0.05) with Wald Chi-square of 
27.69 and log likelihood of 186.398. This means that the model as a whole fit 
significantly better than an empty model (i.e. a model with no predictor). The 
goodness-of-fit for the model cannot be compared with AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011) as this prior study pooled all of the observations from two years and 
then ran a tobit model. 
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Table 8.4: Factors influencing managerial decisions on the measurement of 
goodwill impairment - Comparison of the regression results between Model 
1 and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) 
 
  
Sign 
Model 1 
- Random-effects tobit   
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 
190) 
- Tobit model 
 Coefficie
nt 
z-statistics VIF Coefficien
t 
t-statistics 
No. of observations 538  528 
Intercept  -0.057 -3.74***  -0.169 6.28*** 
Economic factors      
Log(∆SALES+
1) (H1)  
- -0.019 -1.03 1.16 0.006 0.94 
EARNINGSPrior 
(H2A) 
- -0.042 -1.71* 1.52 -0.053 -1.82* 
∆OCF (H4) - 0.002 0.29 1.09 -0.059 -1.76* 
BTM (H5) + 0.001 0.79 1.36 0.020 1.96** 
GWB (H6) + 0.030 1.17 1.10 0.022 1.36 
Contracting perspective     
DEBTRATIO 
(H7) 
? 0.005 0.52 1.16 -0.012 -0.71 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective    
∆CEOCurrent/prior 
(H8) 
+ 0.010 2.17** 1.06 0.011 1.73* 
BATH (H10) - -0.085 -2.35** 1.09 -0.094 -3.38*** 
SMOOTH 
(H11) 
+ 0.068 1.68* 1.32 0.102 2.14** 
Discretion in an impairment test    
CGU01 (H14A) ? 0.003 0.71 1.15 0.013 1.46 
Corporate 
governance 
     
BINDEP  - -  0.046 2.13** 
SEPCHAIR  - -  0.006 0.48 
BACTIVITY  - -  0.003 3.85*** 
BLOCK  - -  0.001 2.68*** 
EXEOWN  - -  0.060 2.05** 
NONEXEOWN  - -  0.110 2.39** 
Control variables      
SIZE (H16) ? 0.002 2.03** 1.23 0.003 1.18 
YEND (H18) - 
Year 1 
?      
  - Year 2  0.001 0.26 1.49 0.010 1.65 
  - Year 3  0.000 0.05 1.62   
ADD (H19) + -0.001 -0.39 1.17 0.017 2.28** 
USCLIST  - -  0.020 1.96** 
Log likelihood  186.398  - 
Wald Chi-square 27.69**  - 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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As for the variables tested in Model 1, similarities between the result of Model 
1 and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) occur in four areas. Firstly, with regards to 
an opportunistic behaviour perspective, consistent with AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011), in Model 1 of the present study, three variables are found to be 
statistically significant, as predicted, in the measurement of goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies. These are ∆CEOCurrent/prior, BATH, 
and SMOOTH (see Table 8.4). Nevertheless, the level of significance found in 
the present study differs from AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) (see Section 8.8 for 
detailed discussion of these variables).  
Secondly, in terms of the contracting perspective, similar to AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011), Model 1 shows that debt ratio is non-significant in the 
measurement of goodwill impairment (see Section 8.7 for detail).  
Thirdly, in terms of the discretion available to managers in performing an 
impairment test of goodwill, consistent with AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), Model 
1 of the present study reports non-significance of CGU01 (see Section 8.10.1 
for detailed discussion of the CGU). 
Fourthly, three variables that are grouped under the economic factors also 
provide results consistent with AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011). Similar to 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) is found 
marginally significant (at p-value less than 0.10). In addition, relative size of 
goodwill balance (GWB) and change in sales [Log(∆SALES+1)] are found non-
significant in the present measurement study and also in AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011). 
Key differences between the result of Model 1 and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) 
relate to control variables and the remaining variables testing the economic 
factors. For the control variable, Model 1 shows SIZE to be statistically 
significant; which is not the case for AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011). Alternatively, 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) document additions to goodwill (ADD) as a 
significant factor in explaining the measurement of goodwill; Model 1 does not 
report similar result.  
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For the economic factors, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) reported ∆OCF and BTM 
as significant in explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment. 
However, in Model 1, none of these variables is statistically significant. 
Because of the similarities with respect to three variables proxying for an 
opportunistic behaviour perspective (∆CEOCurrent/prior, BATH, and SMOOTH), the 
comparison of results between Model 1 and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), 
presented in Table 8.4, seems to suggest that the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective is applicable among Malaysian listed companies as it is applied 
when explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment among UK listed 
companies. Moreover, studies analysing goodwill impairment by US listed 
companies (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 2007; Zang, 2008) and 
Canadian listed companies (e.g. Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008) also found 
that an opportunistic behaviour perspective helps explained the measurement 
of goodwill impairment (see Section 5.6). Yet, all of these studies have 
focused on listed companies in developed economies with ownership 
structures that differ from Malaysian listed companies (see Section 2.3.3). 
Prior studies document that compared to listed companies in developed 
economies, such as the UK and US, listed companies in Malaysia are managed 
by their owners and that they have concentrated ownership (see Section 3.4). 
In addition, La Porta et al. (1998: 471) and Claessens et al. (2000: 82) 
believed that the theoretical study of Jensen and Meckling (1976) was 
developed around the image of companies with disperse ownership (see 
Section 2.3.3). Therefore, before making any inferences on the applicability 
of an opportunistic behaviour perspective, it is important to explore the 
influence of ownership structures on the measurement of goodwill impairment 
by Malaysian listed companies. This is undertaken in Model 2 (see Section 
8.5).  
8.5 Overall regression results for Model 2: Malaysian 
context  
This section discusses the result of the overall model (see Section 8.5.1) and 
the sensitivity analyses carried out for three variables (see Section 8.5.2). 
213 
 
8.5.1 Results of the overall models  
Model 2 comprises eleven subcategories starting from Model 2(a)(i) to Model 
2(h)(ii) (see Table 8.5). In term of the goodness-of-fit for Model 2, Table 8.5 
shows that of the eleven models constructed, eight models [i.e. Model 2 (a)(i) 
and (ii),(c), (d), (e), (f), (h)(i), and (h)(ii)] reported high Wald Chi-square 
values and are statistically significant while three models [i.e. Model 2 (b), 
(g)(i), and (g)(ii)] reported low Wald Chi-square values and are non-
significant.  
The goodness-of-fit of the models constructed in the present study, which is 
based on log-likelihood and the Wald test generated by a random-effects tobit 
model, cannot be compared with prior studies examining either goodwill 
impairment (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et 
al., 2008; Zang, 2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) or asset write-offs (e.g. 
Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). This is because none of these studies 
applied a random-effects tobit model. For example, Beatty and Weber (2006), 
Guler (2007), Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008), and Zang (2008) analysed 
goodwill impairment within a one year period (without analysing a 
combination of cross-sectional and time-series data). Hence they were using 
tobit regression model.  
8.5.2 Sensitivity analyses  
Sensitivity analyses are performed on three variables, namely, change in CEO 
(see Section 8.5.2.1), managerial ownership (see Section 8.5.2.2), and prior 
year earnings (see Section 8.5.2.3). The sensitivity analyses for the first two 
variables are tested in Model 2(h)(i) and Model 2(h)(ii). These two models are 
selected because they produce the highest Wald Chi-squares with statistically 
significant p-values, suggesting that these models can better explain the 
overall factors influencing managerial decisions on the measurement of 
goodwill impairment than the other models shown in Table 8.5. The 
sensitivity analysis for prior year earnings is tested in Model 1, and Models 
2(a)(i) to (d) because the variable is not included in Models 2(h)(i) and (ii). 
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Table 8.5: Random-effects tobit regression Model 2: Factors influencing managerial decisions on the measurement of goodwill 
impairment 
 
 
 
 
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) for Model 2 
(a)(i) (a)(ii) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)(i) (g)(ii) (h)(i) (h)(ii) 
Observations (N) 518 518 374 531 537 537 537 358 358 1124 1124 
Intercept  -0.047 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.054 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.050 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.060 
(-3.87)*** 
-0.057 
(-3.56)*** 
-0.054 
(-3.58)*** 
-0.061 
(-3.95)*** 
-0.044 
(-1.77)* 
-0.052 
(-2.16)** 
-0.038 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.67)*** 
Economic factors            
Log(∆SALES
+1) (H1) 
- -0.016 
(-0.86) 
-0.021 
(-1.11) 
-0.007 
(-0.30) 
-0.018 
(-0.97) 
-0.017 
(-0.95) 
-0.016 
(-0.88) 
-0.026 
(-1.43) 
-0.004 
(-0.15) 
-0.007 
(-0.31) 
-0.003 
(0.21) 
-0.007 
(-0.55) 
EARNINGSPr
ior (H2A) 
- -0.049 
(-2.15)** 
-0.044 
(-1.78)* 
-0.049 
(-1.45) 
-0.041 
(-1.63) 
-0.040 
(-1.62) 
- - - - - - 
EARNINGSPr
eGWILcurrent  
(H2B) 
- - - - - - -0.080 
(-2.72)*** 
- -0.064 
(-1.48) 
- -0.090 
(-4.87)*** 
- 
∆EARNINGS
preGWIL (H3)  
- - - - - - - 0.104 
(2.97)*** 
- 0.140 
(2.52)** 
- 0.062 
(2.89)*** 
∆OCF (H4) - 0.002 
(0.31) 
0.003 
(0.37) 
-0.007 
(-0.41) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.004 
(0.54) 
-0.004 
(-0.24) 
-0.006 
(-0.37) 
0.002 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
BTM (H5) + 0.000 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(1.02) 
0.001 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.88) 
0.001 
(0.70) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
0.001 
(1.15) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
0.002 
(0.98) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.000 
(0.26) 
GWB (H6) + 0.016 
(0.70) 
0.024 
(0.93) 
0.010 
(0.32) 
0.035 
(1.32) 
0.031 
(1.17) 
0.034 
(1.31) 
0.029 
(1.11) 
0.014 
(0.44) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
0.021 
(1.31) 
0.021 
(1.32) 
Contracting perspective           
DEBTRATIO 
(H7) 
? 0.002 
(0.20) 
0.004 
(0.36) 
-0.005 
(-0.40) 
0.004 
(0.38) 
0.006 
(0.63) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.010 
(1.06) 
-0.006 
(-0.51) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.014 
(-1.86)* 
-0.005 
(-0.65) 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 8.5 (continue): Random-effects tobit regression Model 2: Factors influencing managerial decisions on the measurement of 
goodwill impairment 
 
 
 
 
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) for Model 2 
(a)(i) (a)(ii) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)(i) (g)(ii) (h)(i) (h)(ii) 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective          
∆CEOCurrent/prio
r (H8) 
+ 0.011 
(2.43)** 
0.011 
(2.42)** 
0.015 
(2.60)*** 
0.012 
(2.37)** 
0.010 
(2.23)** 
0.009 
(2.07)** 
0.010 
(2.22)** 
0.019 
(2.82)*** 
0.019 
(2.79)*** 
0.011 
(2.49)** 
0.012 
(2.63)*** 
CEOTENUR
E (H9) 
- - - - 0.000 
(1.13) 
- - - 0.000 
(0.85) 
0.000 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(1.67)* 
0.000 
(1.24) 
BATH (H10) - -0.091 
(-2.53)** 
-0.079 
(-2.13)** 
-0.096 
(-1.93)* 
-0.088 
(-2.41)** 
-0.082 
(-2.25)** 
-0.009 
(-0.22) 
-0.181 
(-3.20)*** 
-0.032 
(-0.50) 
-0.233 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.052 
(-1.96)* 
-0.194 
(-5.87)*** 
SMOOTH 
(H11) 
+ 0.052 
(1.36) 
0.058 
(1.41) 
0.09 
(1.59) 
0.072 
(1.78)* 
0.066 
(1.64) 
0.128 
(3.51)*** 
- 0.147 
(2.52)** 
- 0.080 
(3.66)*** 
- 
Ownership structure            
MANOWNLine
ar (H12A) 
? -0.002 
(-0.53) 
- - - - - -     
MANOWN1 
(H12B1) 
? - -0.002 
(-1.48) 
     -0.002 
(-1.14) 
-0.002 
(-1.12) 
-0.002 
(-2.31)** 
-0.002 
(-2.44)** 
MANOWN2 
(H12B2) 
? - 0.000 
(0.97) 
     0.000 
(0.18) 
-0.002 
(0.30) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
0.000 
(0.71) 
MANOWN3 
(H12B3) 
? - 0.000 
(0.77) 
     0.000 
(1.15) 
0.000 
(1.09) 
0.000 
(0.93) 
0.000 
(0.33) 
OUTCON 
(H13) 
? -0.000 
(-1.75)* 
-0.000 
(-0.89) 
- - - - - -0.000 
(-1.21) 
-0.000 
(-1.10) 
-0.000 
(-1.87)* 
-0.000 
(-2.22)** 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 8.5 (continue): Random-effects tobit regression Model 2: Factors influencing managerial decisions on the measurement of 
goodwill impairment 
 
 
 
 
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) for Model 2 
(a)(i) (a)(ii) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)(i) (g)(ii) (h)(i) (h)(ii) 
Discretion - impairment test           
CGU01 
(H14A) 
? 0.005 
(1.49) 
0.003 
(0.81) 
- 0.003 
(0.75) 
0.003 
(0.76) 
0.002 
(0.64) 
0.002 
(0.51) 
- - - - 
CGUContinuous 
(H14B) 
? - - 0.001 
(1.26) 
- - - - 0.001 
(1.22) 
0.001 
(1.35) 
- - 
DISCRATE 
(H15A) 
? - - -0.001 
(-1.20) 
- - - - -0.001 
(-1.01) 
-0.001 
(-1.12) 
- - 
DISCMULTI
PLE (H15B) 
? - - 0.004 
(0.80) 
- - - - 0.002 
(0.58) 
0.003 
(0.68) 
- - 
Control variables            
SIZE (H16) ? 0.002 
(2.25)** 
0.002 
(2.05)** 
0.002 
(1.63) 
0.002 
(2.03)** 
0.002 
(1.86)* 
0.002 
(2.08)** 
0.002 
(2.06)** 
0.002 
(1.46) 
0.002 
(1.58) 
0.002 
(2.05)** 
0.001 
(1.45) 
INDUSTRYG
5 (H17) 1 – 
Indust. and 
B.m 
 
? 
- - - -  - -     
2 - Consumer 
goods and 
serv. 
 
 
    -0.001 
(-0.28) 
  -0.000 
(-0.09) 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
3 – Financials      0.000 
(0.01) 
  -0.001 
(-0.11) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.000 
(-0.22) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
4 - Utilities, 
health, Oil 
and Gas 
     -0.004 
(-0.65) 
  -0.004 
(-0.72) 
-0.005 
(-0.76) 
-0.004 
(-0.75) 
-0.005 
(-0.96) 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 8.5 (continue): Random-effects tobit regression Model 2: Factors influencing managerial decisions on the measurement of 
goodwill impairment 
 
 
 
 
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) for Model 2 
(a)(i) (a)(ii) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)(i) (g)(ii) (h)(i) (h)(ii) 
5 – Tech. and 
Telecom. 
 
 
    0.001 
(0.12) 
  0.000 
(0.07) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
0.003 
(0.69) 
YEND - Year 
1 (H18) 
?            
- Year 2  0.000 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.33) 
0.003 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
0.003 
(0.66) 
0.003 
(0.68) 
0.003 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
- Year 3  0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(-0.08) 
0.003 
(0.52) 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
-0.000 
(-0.13) 
ADD (H19) + -0.004 
(-1.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.003 
(-0.64) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
-0.003 
(-0.56) 
-0.004 
(-0.85) 
-0.007 
(-2.23)** 
-0.008 
(-2.67)*** 
Log 
likelihood 
 225.45 186.86 146.15 185.54 186.66 188.79 185.19 156.73 164.72 378.85 354.86 
Wald chi-
square 
 36.43*** 33.63** 23.09 27.96** 28.20* 31.52*** 24.93** 24.71 24.01 101.49*** 78.91*** 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
 
218 
 
8.5.2.1 Sensitivity analyses – Change in CEO 
∆CEOCurrent/prior is defined as a change in CEO which occurs in the previous 
financial year or the current financial year (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). 
Sensitivity analyses for the ∆CEOCurrent/prior are conducted in order to assess 
whether empirical result of the change in CEO would be sensitive to: (i) the 
specification of the CEO change year, and (ii) to an additional definition of 
CEO change as a change in one of the top five executive positions (hereafter 
referred to as top management) - i.e. CEO, President, Chief Executive, 
Managing Director, or Chairman, occurring in the previous financial year or 
the current financial year (see Section 5.6.1). Accordingly, five additional 
definitions of change in CEO are tested. These are:  
(i) Change in CEO occurring in the previous financial year (∆CEOPrior), 
(ii) Change in CEO occurring in the current financial year(∆CEOCurrent),  
(iii) Change in top management occurring in the previous financial year or 
the current financial year (∆TopMgtCurent/prior),  
(iv) Change in top management occurring in the previous financial 
year(∆TopMgtPrior), and  
(v) Change in top management occurring in the current financial year 
(∆TopMgtCurent).  
The results of the sensitivity analyses for ∆CEOCurrent, ∆TopMgtCurent/prior, and 
∆TopMgtCurent tested in Models 2(h)(i) and (ii) (see Appendix 8.5) are similar to 
∆CEOCurrent/prior as reported in Table 8.5. That is, these variables are found 
statistically significant, in a positive direction, in the measurement of 
goodwill impairment. The results for all other variables in the models are 
almost63 similar to those reported prior to the sensitivity analyses (see 
Appendix 8.5). Variables which are found statistically significant (non-
significant) in Models 1 and 2 are found statistically significant (non-
significant) in the sensitivity analyses.  
                                         
63
 There are few variables where the level of significant change. For example, the level of 
significant for debt ratio change from p-value less than 0.10 to p-value less than 0.05 (in 
Model 2(h)(i)-TopMgtprior). 
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When the change in CEO or top management is defined as a change occurring 
in the previous financial year (i.e. ∆CEOPrior , and ∆TopMgtPrior), these 
variables are found non-significant in the measurement of goodwill 
impairment (see Appendix 8.5).  
The results of the sensitivity analyses discussed above suggest that the 
incoming CEO‘s or top managers took the goodwill write-off soon after joining 
their companies; they have not waited a year before deciding to report the 
write-off. 
8.5.2.2 Sensitivity analyses – Managerial ownership  
The sensitivity analysis for managerial ownership is performed into two ways.  
Firstly, the sensitivity analysis for the linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and the dependent variable is conducted using large data, i.e. in 
Model 2(h)(i) and Model 2(h)(ii). The results (see Appendix 8.6 in the last two 
columns) reveal that MANOWNLinear is found non-significant in Model 2(h)(i) and 
marginally significant (at p-value less than 0.10) in Model 2(h)(ii). Thus, the 
result of the sensitivity analysis confirmed the result of Model 2(a)(i) (see 
Table 8.5), that is, in a linear relationship, managerial ownership plays less or 
no influential role in explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment by 
Malaysian listed companies.  
Secondly, for the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
the dependent variable, the sensitivity analyses are performed by re-defining 
the cut-off points from 25% to 20% and from 25% to 30% (see Section 5.7.1). In 
both cut-off points, the inferences on managerial ownership, as well as other 
variables, are consistent with those in the primary analysis as shown in Table 
8.5. Thus, the sensitivity analysis (see Appendix 8.6 in the first four columns) 
indicates that the result of the managerial ownership is not sensitive to the 
specification of the cut-off point from 25% to 20% and from 25% to 30%. 
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8.5.2.3 Sensitivity analysis – Prior year earnings 
The sensitivity analysis for prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) is performed by 
constructing a new variable, that is, prior year pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILprior), which is EARNINGSprior after adjusting for (adding back) 
goodwill write-off. The results of the sensitivity analysis for 
EARNINGSPreGWILprior tested in Models 1, 2(a)(i) to 2(d) reveal that the new 
variable is statistically significant (at p-value less than 0.01) in five of the six 
models tested (see Appendix 8.7). Thus, the result of the sensitivity indicates 
that compared to EARNINGSprior which is found marginally significant (at p-
value less than 0.10) (see Table 8.4), EARNINGSPreGWILprior is more appropriately 
employed in the regression model, explaining the measurement of goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
Next, Sections 8.6 to 8.10 discuss the regression results for each of the 
research questions. 
8.6 Research Question 4: Economic factors  
In the studies of asset write-off (including goodwill impairment losses), 
economic factors refer to factors which may affect the underlying 
performance of companies‘ assets (inclusive of goodwill) (Riedl, 2004: 830) 
(see Section 5.4). Seven variables are employed in the present measurement 
study to test the influence of the economic factors on the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. These are: Log(∆Sales+1), 
∆OCF, BTM, GWB, EARNINGSprior, EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent, and ΔEARNINGSpreGWIL 
(see Table 8.5).  
Of the seven variables tested, two variables, i.e., EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent and 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL are found statistically significant in nearly all of the models. 
In addition, EARNINGSprior is found statistically significant in Model 1 and Model 
2(a)(i) and (ii). Other variables are found non-significant in the measurement 
of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. The results suggest 
that the main economic factors driving the measurement of goodwill 
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impairment are pre-write-off earnings, specifically, current year pre-write-off 
earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) and change in pre-write-off earnings from 
prior year to current year (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL). Next, Sections 8.6.1 to 8.6.5 
provide detailed discussion of these results.  
8.6.1 Change in sales [Log(∆Sales+1)] 
Log(∆Sales+1) is found non-significant in Model 1 (see Table 8.4) and Model 2 
(see Table 8.5). Thus, the null hypothesis for H1-Null (see Section 5.4.1) cannot 
be rejected. The results in Models 1 and 2 are consistent with Riedl (2004: 843 
for post-SFAS121), Guler (2007: 73), and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190). This 
result implies that managers do not take into account the decline in the sales 
performance (from prior year to current year) in the measurement of goodwill 
impairment losses by Malaysian listed companies. 
8.6.2 Companies’ pre-write-off earnings  
Three variables are employed to measure company earnings, namely, prior 
year earnings (see Section 8.6.2.1), current year pre-write-off earnings (see 
Section 8.6.2.2), and change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to 
current year (see Section 8.6.2.3). 
8.6.2.1 Prior year earnings (EARNINGSPrior) 
Prior year earnings (i.e. EARNINGSPrior) is found marginally significant (at p-
value less than 0.10) in Model 1 and Model 2(a)(ii), in a negative direction as 
predicted, in explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment (see Tables 
8.4 and 8.5). This result is consistent with AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) who 
documented a marginally significant result (at p-value less than 0.10) for the 
EARNINGSPrior. In Model 2(a)(i), the variable is found statistically significant (at 
p-value less than 0.05) as predicted. The marginally significant and non-
significant results of the variable in the majority of the models tested are 
because the prior year earnings (i.e. EARNINGSPrior) is applied without 
adjusting for (adding back) goodwill impairment losses. This is evidenced in 
the sensitivity analysis for EARNINGSprior where the variable is redefined as 
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EARNINGSPreGWILprior (prior year pre-write-off earnings) and is found strongly 
significant (at p-value less than 0.01) as predicted in five of the six models 
tested (see Section 8.5.2.3 and Appendix 8.7). 
The statistically significant result for prior year pre-write-off earnings, in a 
negative direction, suggests that the poorer the prior year pre-write-off 
earnings, the greater the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses reported 
by Malaysian listed companies. By reporting goodwill impairment losses when 
the prior year pre-write-off earnings are low, managers are reflecting 
company economic factors at a firm-level. In this case, it indicates no 
accounting choice that is contrary to the economic factors, exercised by 
Malaysian listed companies. 
8.6.2.2 Current year pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) 
Current year pre-write-off earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) is found statistically 
significant in two of the three models tested, in a negative direction as 
predicted (see Table 8.5). This result provides support for the alternative 
hypothesis set in H2B-Alternative1 (see Section 5.4.2.2). The results suggest that 
the poorer the current year pre-write-off earnings, the greater the magnitude 
of goodwill impairment losses reported by Malaysian listed companies. By 
reporting goodwill impairment losses when the current year pre-write-off 
earnings are low, managers are reflecting their expectations of future 
performance of the asset (based on past performance) at a firm-level. In this 
case, it indicates no accounting choice that is contrary to the expected 
impact of economic factors, exercised by Malaysian listed companies. 
Thus far, no prior studies have examined the current year pre-write-off 
earnings. Hence, comparison of the finding of the present study with prior 
studies cannot be made. 
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8.6.2.3 Change in pre-write-off earnings 
(∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) 
In separate random-effects tobit regression models, change in pre-write-off 
earnings from prior year to current year (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) is also statistically 
significant in explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment in all of the 
models tested (see Table 8.5). However, the variable is found statistically 
significant in a positive direction, which is contrary to the prediction for the 
economic factors set in the alternative hypothesis H3-Alternative1. The result 
suggests that the poorer the company‘s performance, which is reflected as a 
negative value for ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL, the lower the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses reported. In this case, it is possible that the managers are 
attempting to avoid reporting goodwill impairment losses, or reporting a small 
magnitude of goodwill impairment losses, hoping that the company‘s 
performance will improve in the future. Accordingly, managers‘ decisions in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses do not reflect their expectations of the 
future performance of the asset at a firm-level (based on past performance), 
which may point to the possibility of accounting choices being exercised. This 
result is inconsistent with Riedl (2004: 843) and Guler (2007: 73). Riedl (2004: 
843) documented a non-significance of ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL and the asset write-
offs post-SFAS121. Meanwhile, Guler (2007: 73) reported ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL as 
statistically significant in a negative direction in the measurement of goodwill 
impairment. 
The two conflicting results for pre-write-off earnings as discussed above, i.e. - 
(i) pre-write-off earnings, measured at one specific point in time (i.e. 
EARNINGSPreGWILprior, and EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) and (ii) the change in pre-write-
off earnings from prior year to current year (i.e. ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) will be 
discussed further in Section 8.12.1 by positioning them in context of the 
overall results of the measurement study.  
8.6.3 Change in operating cash flows (∆OCF) 
Consistent with Riedl (2004: 843), who examined asset write-offs, in the 
present study, ∆OCF is non-significant in explaining the measurement of 
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goodwill impairment (see Tables 8.4 and 8.5). Thus, the null hypothesis for H4-
Null (see Section 5.4.3) cannot be rejected. This result implies that changes in 
operating cash flows do not play an influential role in the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
8.6.4 Book-to-market ratio (BTM)  
Consistent with Francis et al. (1996: 126), BTM is found non-significant in all 
of the models tested (see Tables 8.4 and 8.5). Thus, the null hypothesis for 
H5-Null (see Section 5.4.4) cannot be rejected. However, this result is in 
contrast with the results of Beatty and Weber (2006: 281), Guler (2007: 73) 
and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) who documented statistically significant 
results for BTM in their analyses of the measurement of goodwill impairment. 
The non-significance of BTM implies that the intensity of expected economic 
impairment of goodwill has no impact on the measurement of goodwill 
impairment. Possibly, this occurs when companies‘ market values fall below 
the book values of their net assets due to a short-term volatility in the stock 
market.  
8.6.5 Relative size of goodwill balance (GWB)  
Consistent with AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190), relative size of goodwill 
balance (GWB) is found non-significant in all of the models tested in the 
present study (see Tables 8.4 and 8.5). Thus, the null hypothesis for H6-Null 
(see Section 5.4.5) cannot be rejected. The non-significance of GWB implies 
that the exposure of goodwill balance, measured in terms of the amount of 
goodwill balance in their asset composition, has no influence on the 
measurement of goodwill impairment.  
8.7 Research Question 5: Contracting perspective 
(DEBTRATIO) 
The contracting perspective, in particular, the debt hypothesis is tested using 
debt ratio (see Section 5.5). The variable is found marginally significant in 
Model 2(h)(i) and non-significant in the remaining models tested (see Tables 
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8.4 and 8.5). Thus, the null hypothesis for H7-Null (see Section 5.5) cannot be 
rejected. Accordingly, the present study could not provide support to the 
contracting perspective in explaining the measurement of goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies. This result is consistent with Guler 
(2007: 73) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190). The non-significance of 
DEBTRATIO found in the majority of the models is possibly because as noted 
by Lys (1984), Fields et al., (2001) and Dichev and Skinner (2002), leverage 
(i.e. DEBTRATIO) does not fully capture the default risk of debt (see Section 
2.3.1.2).  
8.8 Research Question 6: Opportunistic behaviour 
perspective 
Four variables are employed to test an opportunistic behaviour perspective, 
namely, change in CEO (see Section 8.8.1), CEO tenure (see Section 8.8.2), 
big bath reporting (see Section 8.8.3), and earnings smoothing (see Section 
8.8.4). 
8.8.1 Change in CEO (∆CEOCurrent/prior) 
Consistent with Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008: 48), Zang (2008: 53), and 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190), change in CEO (∆CEOCurrent/prior) is found 
statistically significant in a positive direction in all of the models tested in the 
present study (see Tables 8.4 and 8.5). This result provides support for the 
alternative hypothesis set in H8-Alternative (see Section 5.6.1), suggesting that 
incoming CEOs reported larger magnitude of goodwill impairment losses than 
continuing CEOs. The sensitivity analyses performed on ∆CEOCurrent/prior provide 
additional evidence that the incoming CEOs took the goodwill write-off as 
soon as joining the companies (i.e. in the current year) instead of waiting for 
a year (see Section 8.5.2.1 for the discussion of the sensitivity analyses).  
The conclusion reached is that, to the extent that the economic factors 
control for the underlying performance of the companies, change in CEO may 
capture additional incentives for the incoming CEOs to expedite future 
charges in the hope of improving investors‘ perceptions of the companies‘ 
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future performances. Accordingly, similar to prior studies (i.e. Elliott and 
Shaw, 1988; Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004), this result provides support to 
an opportunistic behaviour perspective.   
8.8.2 CEO tenure (CEOTENURE) 
CEO tenure, a variable proxying for whether a CEO is responsible in business 
acquisitions leading to an existence of goodwill (Beatty and Weber, 2006: 
266), is non-significant in all of the subcategories of Models 2 tested [except 
in Model 2(h)(i) where the variable is found marginally significant] (see Table 
8.5). Thus, the null hypothesis for H9-Null (see Section 5.6.2) cannot be 
rejected. This result could not provide support to the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective.  
The non-significance of CEOTENURE, which is inconsistent with Beatty and 
Weber (2006: 280) and Ramanna and Watts (2012), suggests that for a large 
number of Malaysian listed companies, the number of years a CEO held a 
position is an indirect proxy for whether the CEO was responsible with an 
existence of goodwill.  This result could partly be explained by looking at the 
relationship between CEOTENURE and the ratio of the number of companies 
which have newly acquired goodwill (i.e.  ADD64 in H19) (see Figure 8.2). 
Figure 8.2: The relationship between CEO tenure  and companies’ addition 
to their goodwill 
 
 
                                         
64
 A dichotomous variable, equal to one if company i has additions to its goodwill due to 
acquisitions during the financial year, and zero when there is no addition (see Section 5.9.4). 
CEO Tenure 
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Figure 8.2 shows that companies that have CEOs with short tenure (e.g. below 
five years) have more addition to its goodwill than companies that have CEOs 
with longer tenure (e.g. five years and more). This means that CEOs with 
short tenure acquired more goodwill in the current year compared to CEOs 
with long tenure. Ramanna and Watts (2012) argues that CEOs with longer 
tenure are less likely to take goodwill impairment losses in order to shield 
their reputations from the implications of the write-offs. The figure 
demonstrates that this argument could also apply to CEOs with short tenure. 
Hence, in the present study, the argument that a CEO who acquired goodwill 
is reluctant to impair it, can apply to both CEOs with short tenure and CEOs 
with long tenure.  
8.8.3 Big bath reporting (BATH)  
BATH is found statistically significant, in a negative direction, in Model 1 (see 
Table 8.4) and in nearly all of the subcategories of Models 2 tested (see Table 
8.5). This result provides support for the alternative hypothesis set in H10-
Alternative (see Section 5.6.3), suggesting that the stronger the downward trend 
in companies‘ change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current 
year, the higher the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses reported. This 
finding is consistent with AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) and Riedl (2004: 
843). 
To the extent that change in pre-write-off earnings (∆EARNINGSpreGWIL- one of 
the variables testing the economic factors, see Section 8.6.2.3) controls for 
the performance of the underlying economic values of the assets, the 
statistically significant negative association between BATH and reporting 
goodwill impairment losses found in the present study may capture an 
incremental effect relating to the big bath reporting incentives. Thereby, 
similar to Riedl (2004: 833), this finding provides supports to the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective. 
It is noted that there is an alternative interpretation of this result provided by 
prior study (i.e. AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 194) (see Section 5.6.3,). That is, 
the larger negative pre-write-off earnings surprise could also imply that 
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managers are taking a big bath to reveal private information about the 
company‘s true value (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 194). However, the tests 
conducted in this thesis do not distinguish between these two interpretations. 
8.8.4 Earnings smoothing (SMOOTH)  
SMOOTH is marginally significant (at p-value less than 0.10) in Model 1 (see 
Table 8.4) and statistically significant in Models 2 (e), (g)(i), and (h)(i) (see 
Table 8.5). This result provides support for the alternative hypothesis set in 
H11-Alternative (see Section 5.6.4). The significantly positive association between 
SMOOTH and the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses suggests that the 
stronger the upward trend in companies‘ earnings (measured in term of above 
the median of non-zero positive values in the change in pre write-off 
earnings, and zero otherwise), the higher the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses reported. Accordingly, this finding provides support to the 
smoothing hypothesis, which is consistent with the findings reported by 
Francis et al. (1996: 125)65, Guler (2007: 73), and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 
190). Hence, the result provides support to an opportunistic behaviour 
perspective, suggesting that Malaysian listed companies make use of goodwill 
impairment losses as a tool to smooth earnings. 
8.9 Research Question 7: Ownership structures 
Two variables, i.e. managerial ownership, and outside ownership 
concentration are employed to test the influence of companies‘ ownership 
structures on the measurement of goodwill impairment. The descriptive 
analysis reported in Appendix 8.2 shows that the ownership structures of 
                                         
65 The definition of SMOOTH provided by Francis et al. (1996: 126) and Guler (2007: 22) differ 
from Riedl (2004: 843), AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) and this thesis. Francis et al. (1996: 
126) defines SMOOTH as ‗operating earnings in the current year less operating earnings in the 
previous year]/total assets at the end of year-1‘. In this thesis, SMOOTH is defined in a similar 
way to Riedl (2004: 843) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) as ‗change in company i‘s pre-
write-off earnings from t-1 to t divided by total assets at the end of t-1, when this change is 
above the median of non-zero positive values of this variable, and zero otherwise‘. Hence, 
SMOOTH in the present study focused on companies which are more likely to have an 
incentive to engage in earnings smoothing. 
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Malaysian listed companies which implement FRS 3 is concentrated, in that 
the five largest outside shareholders (OUTCON) hold on average 46.8% of the 
companies‘ shares. Sections 8.9.1 and 8.9.2 discuss the result of these 
variables. 
8.9.1 Managerial ownership (MANOWNLinear and 
MANOWNNon-monotonic)  
The influence of managerial ownership on the measurement of goodwill 
impairment is tested in two ways – linear relationship and non-monotonic 
relationship (see Section 5.7.1). For the linear relationship, the result shows 
that managerial ownership is non-significant in Model 2(a)(i) (see Table 8.5) 
and Model 2(h)(i) (see Appendix 8.6). It is marginally significant (at p-value 
less than 0.10) in model 2(h)(ii) (see Appendix 8.6). This finding suggests that 
in a linear relationship, managerial ownership plays less or no influential role 
in the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
The non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and the 
measurement of goodwill impairment is tested using three variables which 
reflect three cut-off points. These are: (i) MANOWN1 when the managerial 
ownership is between 0% and less than 5%, (ii) MANOWN2 when the managerial 
ownership is between 5% to less than 25%, and (iii) MANOWN3 when the 
managerial ownership is from 25% onwards (see Section 5.7.1). The results 
show that at the outset, in Model 2(a)(ii), managerial ownership (i.e. 
MANOWN1, MANOWN2, and MANOWN3) is found non-significant in the 
measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
However, in Model 2(h)(i) and Model 2(h)(ii), with the exclusion of variables 
testing the discretion, such as CGUs and discount rates that suffer from high 
frequency of missing values, MANOWN1 is found statistically significant (at p-
value less than 0.05) in a negative direction, in explaining the measurement 
of goodwill impairment. MANOWN2 and MANOWN3 independently are 
positively associated with the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses. 
However, they are non-significant in the measurement of goodwill 
impairment. These results suggest that as the managerial ownership increases 
from 0% to less than 5% (in MANOWN1), the magnitude of goodwill impairment 
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losses reduces. Nevertheless, when the managerial ownership is at 5% and 
beyond (i.e. as in MANOWN2 or MANOWN3), managerial ownership has no 
influential role in the measurement of goodwill impairment. The sensitivity 
analysis carried out by altering the cut-off points from 25% to 20% and from 
25% to 30% (see Section 8.5.2.2 and Appendix 8.6) shows that the result of the 
managerial ownership remained similar, in that, MANOWN1 is found 
statistically significant in a negative direction while MANOWN2 and 
MANOWN3, individually, is non-significant in the measurement of goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies.  
Carlson and Bathala (1997: 191), in their study of managerial ownership and 
income smoothing, explained that in companies where managers hold less or 
no shares (i.e. management-controlled companies), the managers are more 
likely to present the companies‘ operating results in the most favourable 
manner as a job preserving strategy. Applying this explanation to the result 
discussed above, it makes sense to observe a negative association between 
managerial ownership (MANOWN1) and the magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses by Malaysian listed companies when the managerial ownership from is 
0% to less than 5%. This is because reporting goodwill impairment losses 
reduce companies‘ earnings. Therefore, in reporting goodwill impairment 
losses, the managers might not be able to present the operating result of the 
companies in the best possible manner to the shareholders. Hence, as the 
managerial ownership increases, lower magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses are reported by companies in which the managers hold between 0% and 
less than 5% of the shares. Thus, the result for MANOWN1 provides support to 
the incentives effect (see Section 5.7.1), in that, as managerial ownership 
increases from 0% to less than 5%, managers‘ incentives become closely 
aligned with shareholders. 
8.9.2 Outside ownership concentration (OUTCON)  
OUTCON is found statistically significant, in a negative direction, in Model 
2(h)(ii) and marginally significant in (at p-value less than 0.10) in Models 
2(a)(i) and (h)(i) (see Table 8.5). This finding suggests that as the level of 
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outside ownership concentration increases, less magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses is reported. Prior studies (e.g. Niehaus, 1989: 271-272; 
Astami and Tower, 2006: 8) associate an increase in outside ownership 
concentration (OUTCON) with an increase in shareholders monitoring of the 
management (see Section 5.7.2). Following this explanation, the result of the 
present study suggests that as the level of outside ownership concentration 
increases, indicating an increase in outside monitoring, lower goodwill 
impairment losses are reported.  
8.10 Research Question 8: Discretion available in 
performing an impairment test of goodwill 
None of the variables testing the discretion, including CGUs (see Section 
8.10.1) and discount rates (see Section 8.10.2) employed in performing 
impairment test of goodwill is significant in explaining the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies.  
8.10.1 Cash-generating-units containing goodwill 
(CGU01 and CGUContinuous) 
Two variables, namely, CGU01 and CGUContinuous are employed in a separate 
model to test the influence of managerial discretion with regard to CGUs on 
the measurement of goodwill impairment – (see Section 5.8.1). None of these 
variables is found statistically significant in explaining the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. Accordingly, the null 
hypotheses set in H14A-Null for CGU01 and H14B-Null for CGUContinuous cannot be 
rejected. For CGU01, the result is consistent with AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 
190) who also found the variable to be non-significant in the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by UK listed companies. Thus, the result suggests that 
the number of CGUs plays no influential role in the measurement of goodwill 
impairment.  
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8.10.2  Discount rates (DISCRATE, DISCMULTIPLE, and 
DISCRATEDisclosed/Not ) 
Three variables are employed to test the influence of managerial discretion 
with regard to discount rates on the measurement of goodwill impairment by 
Malaysian listed companies. These are DISCRATE, DISCMULTIPLE, and 
DISCRATEDisclosed/Not (see Section 5.8.2). DISCRATEDisclosed/Not is excluded from 
the regression analysis because of the multicollinearity between the variable 
and DISCRATE. Similar to managerial discretion relating to CGUs, all of the 
variables testing discount rates are found non-significant in explaining the 
measurement of goodwill impairment. Therefore, the null hypothesis for H15A-
Null (for DISCRATE), and H15B-Null (for DISCMULTIPLE) cannot be rejected. Thus 
far no prior studies have explored the application of discount rates in the 
measurement of goodwill impairment (see Section 5.8.2). Accordingly, the 
result of the present study cannot be compared with prior studies.  
The non-significance of the discount rates suggests that there is little 
variation in the discount rate applied by companies. In estimating the 
recoverable amount of CGUs containing goodwill, managers could reflect their 
expectation concerning possible variation in the recoverable amount, in 
particular, the value-in-use, either through adjustment to the forecasted cash 
flow or adjusted to the discount rate (FRS 136, paragraph 30-32) (see Section 
4.4.2). Possibly, in the case of Malaysian listed companies examined in the 
present chapter, the expectation about possible variation in the value-in-use 
is reflected in the forecasted cash flow rather than the discount rates. Hence, 
the application of discount rates has no influence on the measurement of 
goodwill impairment.  
8.11 Company-specific factors (control variables)  
Four variables are included in the regression model in controlling for 
company-specific factors. These are SIZE (see Section 8.11.1), INDUSTRYG5 
(see Section 8.11.2), YEND (see Section 8.11.3), and ADD (see Section 8.11.4).  
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8.11.1 Size of company (SIZE)  
SIZE is found statistically significant in a positive direction, in the majority of 
the models tested (see Tables 8.4 and 8.5). This result provides support for 
the alternative hypothesis set in H16-Alternative (see Section 5.9.1), suggesting 
that as company size increases, larger magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses is reported. This finding is consistent with Francis et al. (1996: 125-
126), Beatty and Weber (2006: 281), Guler (2007: 73), and Zang (2008: 52). 
However, it differs with AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) possibly because their 
study focused on the top 500 UK listed companies, where, there is not much 
variation of SIZE resulting in the variable being found to be non-significant. 
8.11.2 Types of industry (INDUSTRYG5)  
Consistent with Beatty and Weber (2006: 283), and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 
195), types of industry (INDUSTRYG5), which is an industry classification based 
on five groups (see Appendix 8.3) is found non-significant in all of the models 
tested (see Table 8.5). Thus, the null hypothesis for H17-Null (see Section 5.9.2) 
cannot be rejected, suggesting that types of industry play no influential role 
in the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
8.11.3 Financial year-end (YEND) 
YEND, a dummy variable created to control for the three-year period of study, 
is found non-significant in all of the models tested (see Tables 8.4 and 8.5). 
This result is consistent with AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) who reported 
non-significant results for their year dummy. Thus, the null hypothesis for H18-
Null (see Section 5.9.3) cannot be rejected. This finding suggests that different 
financial year-ends have no influence on the measurement of goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
234 
 
8.11.4 Addition to goodwill (ADD) 
ADD, a dummy variable capturing an addition to company goodwill, is found 
non-significant in Model 1 (see Table 8.4), and Model 2 (see Table 8.5). In 
Model 2(h)(i) and (ii), the variable is found statistically significant, in a 
negative direction, which is contrary to the prediction set in H19-Alternative (see 
Section 5.9.4). This is possibly because Malaysian listed companies do not 
impair their newly acquired goodwill. This result is inconsistent with the 
finding of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011: 190) who documented ADD to be 
statistically significant, but in a positive direction.  
8.12 Overall results of the measurement study 
Overall, the results of the random-effects tobit regression Models 1 and 2 
show that after controlling for company-specific factors, three main factors 
play influential roles in the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian 
listed companies during the first three years of the FRS 3 implementation. 
These factors are: economic factors (in particular, companies‘ pre-write-off 
earnings), an opportunistic behaviour perspective (i.e. BATH, SMOOTH, and 
∆CEOCurrent/prior), and ownership structures (i.e. outside ownership 
concentration, and managerial ownership). The remaining two factors, 
namely, contracting perspective, and discretion, such as CGUs and discount 
rates available to managers in performing impairment test of goodwill are 
found non-significant in the measurement of goodwill impairment by 
Malaysian listed companies. 
Two points are worth further discussion. These are conflicting results for 
types of pre-write-off earnings employed (see Section 8.12.1), and the 
interpretation of the findings of the measurement study using the self-
constructed disclosure framework (see Section 8.12.2). 
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8.12.1 Conflicting results for two different measures of 
pre-write-off earnings  
For the economic factors, conflicting results are obtained depending on the 
measures of pre-write-off earnings that are selected in a particular model 
(see Section 8.6.2.3). When regression models employ company earnings at 
one specific point in time (i.e. prior year earnings in Section 8.6.2.1, prior 
year pre-write-off earnings in Appendix 8.7, and current year pre-write-off 
earnings in Section 8.6.2.2), the findings show for example, that as the 
current year pre-write-off earnings increase, the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses reported decreases. The results for these variables imply 
that managers are reporting goodwill impairment losses to reflect the 
underlying economic values of the company. On the other hand, when 
regression models employ a change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year 
to current year (i.e. ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL in Section 8.6.2.3), the positive 
association between the variable and the magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses seems to point to the possibility of companies exercising accounting 
choices related to goodwill impairment. The result for change in pre-write-off 
earnings seems to be in line with that of the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective. This is because for the opportunistic behaviour perspective, 
regardless of the models employed, a change in CEO (∆CEOCurrent/prior) (see 
Section 8.8.1), big bath reporting (BATH) (see Section 8.8.3), and earnings 
smoothing (SMOOTH) (see Section 8.8.4) provide consistent results supporting 
the perspective, suggesting that there is a possibility for companies exercising 
the accounting choice. 
The results discussed in the above paragraph seem rather perplexing, as they 
suggest that in one random-effects tobit regression model, the economic 
factors (in particular earnings which is measured at one specific point in time) 
and the opportunistic behaviour perspective (i.e. change in CEO, BATH, and 
SMOOTH) work in an opposite direction in explaining the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. To further understand the 
two conflicting results, detailed investigation of 30 companies has been 
carried out. These 30 companies comprise three groups: (i) 10 companies with 
the highest change in pre-write-off earnings (i.e. ΔEARNINGSpreGWIL), (ii) 10 
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companies with the lowest change in pre-write-off earnings (i.e. 
ΔEARNINGSpreGWIL), and (iii) 10 companies with a change in pre-write-off 
earnings (i.e. ΔEARNINGSpreGWIL) which falls in the middle.  
Detailed investigation of these three groups of company, together with their 
current year pre-write-off earnings, earnings smoothing, and big bath 
reporting, reveals that the number of companies which reported goodwill 
impairment losses is greater for the two groups of company which have the 
highest and the lowest change in pre-write-off earnings rather than for the 
middle group. This result suggests that companies are behaving differently 
with regard to the relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses reported 
depending on their level of pre-write-off earnings. As the companies‘ current 
year pre-write-off earnings increase, lower relative magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses reported. However, as the gap between the current year 
pre-write-off earnings and the prior year pre-write-off earnings is large 
(leading to companies‘ engaging in big bath reporting or earnings smoothing), 
higher relative magnitude of goodwill impairment losses is reported. This 
finding corroborates the finding of McNichols and Wilson (1988: 4) who found 
that companies with extreme earnings (either unusually high or low66) chose 
an income-decreasing accounting choice (in their case the discretionary 
component of the provision for bad-debts). Therefore, in the context of the 
present measurement study, in one random-effects tobit regression model, it 
is possible that an opportunistic behaviour perspective and economic factors 
work in opposite directions, as companies are behaving in a different way 
depending on their level of pre-write-off earnings. 
8.12.2 Interpretation of the findings of the 
measurement study using the self-constructed 
disclosure framework  
The second point for discussion is that in an attempt to further understand 
the result of the measurement study discussed in this chapter, the researcher 
has re-applied the disclosure framework which has been constructed in the 
                                         
66 The definition of extreme earnings provided by McNichols and Wilson (1988: 13) is the 
comparison of the current year with prior year earnings which is deflated by total assets.  
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disclosure study (in Chapter 7) to the result of the measurement study (in 
Chapter 8). Specifically, from the result of the measurement study, the 
researcher has selected 10 companies found to be engaging in earnings 
smoothing, with no change in their CEOs, and where the management hold 
the top 10 highest proportion of shares (i.e. ranging from 31.78% to 51.70%). 
The aim here is to understand why continuing CEOs, or top managers holding a 
large proportion of company shares, would reduce the goodwill balance (by 
reporting goodwill impairment losses) merely for the purposes of earnings 
smoothing. 
Using the self-constructed disclosure framework (discussed in Chapter 7 – see 
e.g. Table 7.3 in Section 7.3.1), the goodwill data, segment result, financial 
performance, the market capitalisation indication, reasons for reporting 
goodwill impairment loss disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement, 
and audit report concerning goodwill of these companies are scrutinised. 
Detailed investigation reveals that of the 10 companies selected, four67 
companies are found to report goodwill impairment losses because of the 
characteristic of the goodwill. Two companies impaired goodwill which arose 
from an apparent overpayment made at the time of acquisition (see Section 
7.3.2 for discussion of the apparent overpayment) and another two companies 
impaired goodwill immediately upon acquisition. In the case of these four 
companies, these results suggest that the managers have already decided on 
the amount of goodwill impairment losses to be reported. When changes in 
pre-write-off earnings are large68, the managers take the opportunity to 
eliminate the goodwill. Although the investigation discussed above involved a 
small number of companies (10 companies), the result helps contextualise one 
of the motives of Malaysian listed companies for engaging in earnings 
smoothing by reporting goodwill impairment losses. 
                                         
67 For the remaining six companies, their reasons could not be identified by the researcher. 
68 Earnings smoothing is defined as a change in pre-write-off earnings from prior period to 
current period, divided by total assets at the end of prior period, when this change is above 
the median of non-zero positive value for the variable, and zero otherwise. 
238 
 
8.13 Summary and conclusions  
This chapter has analysed factors influencing managerial decisions on the 
measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies in the 
first three years of the implementation of FRS 3 Business Combinations. The 
factors are grouped into economic factors (see Section 8.6), contracting 
perspective (see Section 8.7), opportunistic behaviour perspective (see 
Section 8.8), ownership structures (see Section 8.9), discretion available to 
managers in performing an impairment test of goodwill (see Section 8.10), 
and company-specific factors (see Section 8.11). In analysing these factors, 
two main random-effects tobit regression models have been constructed, i.e. 
Model 1, and Models 2(a)(i) to 2(h)(ii) (see Section 8.3.3).  
The analysis of the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies began with Model 1, by testing as closely as possible the variables 
tested by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) (exceptions include corporate governance 
variables and a cross listing variable) (see Section 8.3.3). The comparison of 
results reported in Model 1 of the present chapter with the study of UK listed 
companies as undertaken by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) (see Table 8.4 in 
Section 8.4), shows that Malaysian listed companies behave similarly to UK 
listed companies with respect to a variable testing the economic factors (i.e. 
prior year earnings), a variable testing the contracting perspective (i.e. debt 
ratio), and three variables testing the opportunistic behaviour perspective 
(i.e. change in CEO, big bath reporting, and earnings smoothing). They also 
behave similarly to UK listed companies with respect to a variable testing the 
discretion available to managers in performing impairment test of goodwill 
(i.e. CGU01 - the only discretion that is tested by AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). In 
contrast, Malaysian listed companies differ from UK listed companies with 
regard to two variables testing companies‘ economic factors (BTM, and ΔOCF) 
and two variables testing company-specific factors (i.e. ADD and SIZE). 
In regression Model 2, the present measurement study goes beyond 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) in the following three ways. Firstly, it introduces 
variables that are specific to Malaysian listed companies, i.e. ownership 
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structures - managerial ownership, and outside ownership concentration (see 
Section 8.9). Secondly, it brings in variables that are pertinent to 
understanding the measurement of goodwill impairment but are not tested by 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011), namely CEO tenure and industry variable (see 
Section 8.3.3). Thirdly, it explores companies‘ earnings with three different 
definitions, namely, prior year earnings (see Section 8.6.2.1), current year 
pre-write-off earnings (see Section 8.6.2.2), and change in pre-write-off 
earnings from prior year to current year (see Section 8.6.2.3).  
The main conclusions of the chapter are as follows: 
Firstly, with regard to the theoretical contributions, the present measurement 
study has provided support for the opportunistic behaviour perspective in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies (see Section 8.8). The applicability of the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective is based on the statistically significant results for ∆CEOCurrent/prior, 
BATH and SMOOTH. However, the present study could not provide support for 
the contracting perspective in explaining the measurement of goodwill 
impairment (see Section 8.7).  
Secondly, although the opportunistic behaviour perspective is applicable in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill by Malaysian listed companies, the 
results generated from Model 2 have shown that not all of the companies‘ 
decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses are driven solely by the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective. The conflicting results for the economic 
factors, in particular, the companies‘ pre-write-off earnings suggest that 
companies behave differently depending on their level of earnings (see 
Section 8.12.1). As the current year pre-write-off earnings increase, lower 
magnitude of goodwill impairment losses are reported. However, as there is a 
larger earnings surprise69 between the current year pre-write-off earnings and 
                                         
69 Larger refers to BATH, and SMOOTH. As shown in Appendix 1 of the thesis, BATH is defined 
as a change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year, divided by total assets 
at the end of prior year, when this change is below the median of non-zero negative values of 
this variable, and zero otherwise. Meanwhile, SMOOTH is defined as a change in pre-write-off 
earnings from prior year to current year, divided by total assets at the end of prior year, 
when this change is above the median of non-zero positive values of this variable, and zero 
otherwise. 
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the prior year pre-write-off earnings, higher magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses is reported.  
Thirdly, with regard to the ownership structures, the present study has shown 
that Malaysian listed companies have concentrated ownership, in that, the 
five largest outside shareholders (OUTCON) hold on average 46.8% of the 
companies‘ shares (see Section 8.9). This finding suggests that concentrated 
ownership of companies does not prevent managerial opportunism. Unlike 
listed companies located in developed economies where the opportunistic 
behaviour occurs due to an agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers (see Section 2.3.2), for the Malaysian listed companies which 
implement FRS 3, managerial opportunism most probably occurs because of an 
agency conflict between the controlling shareholders (shareholders outside of 
the companies) and the minority shareholders. Within this conflict, managers 
would possibly act on behalf of the controlling shareholders at the expense of 
the minority shareholders. 
Finally, the present measurement study has tested the non-monotonic 
relationship between managerial ownership and the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses (see Section 8.9.1). In doing so, the study has provided 
evidence on the influence of managerial ownership on the measurement of 
goodwill impairment when the executive directors collectively hold less than 
5% of a company‘s shares. However, where executive directors collectively 
hold 5% or more of the shares, managerial ownership has no influential role on 
the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
Thus, this finding highlights the need to incorporate managerial ownership 
(using a non-monotonic approach - see Section 5.7.1) in order to provide a 
more comprehensive model of accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies. 
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Appendix 8.1: Break down of companies which have reported goodwill impairment losses into 
one time impairers and repeated impairers and their mean and median values of the ratio of 
goodwill write-off to prior year total assets (including goodwill) 
 
  Initial year Second year Third year 
Impairers N Mean  Median N Mean  Median N Mean  Median 
One time impairment 82 
         
0.0048  
       
0.0010  67 
       
0.0173  
       
0.0015  65 
    
0.0179  
  
0.0044  
Repeated impairers                  
- Twice 12 0.0115 0.0030 - - - 12 0.0174 0.0031 
- Consecutively (years 1 and 2) 22 0.0041 0.0027 22 0.0098 0.0018 - - - 
- Consecutively (years 2 and 3)    15 0.0032 0.0003 15 0.0022 0.0003 
- Thrice 19 0.0321 0.0061 19 0.0107 0.0046 19 0.0126 0.0063 
Total 135     123     111     
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Appendix 8.2: Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables for total firm-years within the three years period of study 
 All observations Write-off group 
GWIL(IL) 
Non-Write-off group 
GWIL(0) 
 
Test of differences (write-
off vs. Non-write-off) 
N Missing 
values 
Mean Median 
 
SD Mean Median 
 
SD Mean Median 
 
SD Mean  
p-value 
Median  
p-value 
Dependent variable    GWIL  1498 - 0.003 0.000 0.017 0.012 0.002 0.032 - - - - - 
Economic factors              
  ∆SALES (H1) 1498 - 0.092 0.047 0.297 0.080 0.030 0.292 0.096 0.056 0.299 0.387 0.027 
  EARNINGSPrior (H2A) 1486 12 0.042 0.043 0.107 0.015 0.028 0.120 0.050 0.048 0.101 0.000 0.000 
  EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent (H2B) 1486 12 0.039 0.036 0.102 0.011 0.025 0.110 0.048 0.038 0.098 0.000 0.000 
  ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL (H3) 1486 12 0.008 0.005 0.092 0.004 0.005 0.109 0.009 0.006 0.085 0.406 0.769 
  ∆OCF (H4) 1489 9 0.014 0.010 0.157 0.015 0.007 0.197 0.014 0.011 0.142 0.897 0.565 
  BTM (H5) 1498 - 1.585 1.280 1.301 1.622 1.410 1.256 1.573 1.240 1.315 0.526 0.143 
  GWB (H6) 1309 189 0.051 0.019 0.081 0.046 0.017 0.072 0.053 0.019 0.084 0.176 0.144 
Contracting perspective              
  DEBTRATIO (H7) 1422 76 0.252 0.237 0.173 0.255 0.238 0.177 0.251 0.237 0.171 0.720 0.915 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective             
  CEOTENURE (H9) 1389 109 7.307 5.000 7.244 7.733 5.000 8.034 7.167 5.000 6.962 0.208 0.682 
  BATH (H10) 1486 12 (0.018) 0.000 0.052 (0.026) 0.000 0.070 (0.015) 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.015 
  SMOOTH (H11) 1486 12 0.024 0.000 0.069 0.029 0.000 0.073 0.023 0.000 0.068 0.108 0.295 
Ownership structure              
  MANOWNLinear (H12A)  1434 64 10.189 2.745 14.756 10.348 2.335 15.156 10.137 2.895 14.628 0.794 0.459 
  MANOWN1 (H12B1) 1434 64 2.624 2.760 2.286 2.509 5.371 2.497 2.662 2.895 2.283 0.274 0.208 
  MANOWN2 (H12B2) 1434 64 5.201 0.000 7.815 2.350 0.000 0.000 5.145 0.000 7.720 0.636 0.696 
  MANOWN3 (H12B3) 1434 64 2.372 0.000 6.725 2.296 8.104 6.820 2.331 0.000 6.697 0.686 0.365 
  OUTCON (H13) 1434 64 46.816 46.620 20.208 45.123 44.465 19.613 47.379 47.105 20.379 0.067 0.066 
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Appendix 8.2 (continue): Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables for total firm-years within the three years period of 
study 
 
 
 All observations Write-off group 
GWIL(IL) 
Non-Write-off group 
GWIL(0) 
 
Test of differences (write-
off vs. Non-write-off) 
N Missing 
values 
Mean Median 
 
SD Mean Median 
 
SD Mean Median 
 
SD Mean  
p-value 
Median  
p-value 
Discretion in performing an impairment test of goodwill        
  CGUcontinuous (H14B)
 
 659 839 2.387 2.000 1.769 2.759 2.000 2.237 2.265 2.000 1.570 0.002 0.006 
  DISCRATE (H15A) 726 772 8.736 8.000 3.172 8.766 8.000 2.896 8.726 8.000 3.257 0.885 0.745 
Control variables              
  SIZE (H16) 1498 - 12.877 12.671 1.635 13.039 12.828 1.753 12.824 12.634 1.592 0.0284 0.043 
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Appendix 8.3: Descriptive statistics for the categorical variables for the 
total firm-years within the three years period of study 
 
 
Variables 
Number of observations (count) Chi-square test of 
independence 
(write-off vs. Non-
write-off) 
All Missing 
values 
Write-
off  
group 
Non-write-
off group 
Value Sig.  
(2-
tailed 
test) 
Contracting perspective      
 
 
 1.793 
  
 
 
 0.181 
∆CEOCurrent/prior (H8) 1402 96   
-  Change    40 95 
-  No Change   309 958 
 
Discretion in an impairment test of goodwill 
   
CGU01 (H14A)  659 839    
4.851 
 
0.028 -  More than one CGU   118 315 
-  One CGU   44 182 
DISCMULTIPLE (H15B) 727
70 771    
7.188 
 
0.007 -  Multiple   45 91 
-  Single   131 460 
DISCRATEDisclosed/Not (H15C) 1498 -    
 
 
0.137 
 
 
 
0.712 
-  Disclosed   176 551 
-  Not disclosed   193 578 
ADD (H19) 1480 18    
22.626 
 
0.000 - Yes   77 387 
- No   285 731 
YEND (H18) 1498 -    
0.544 
 
0.762 - Year 1   135 394 
- Year 2   123 374 
- Year 3   111 361 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17)71 1495 3     
(1) Industrials and  
     Basic materials 
  153 451   
(2) Consumer goods and 
services 
  94 332  
6.251 
 
0.181 
(3) Financials   60 138 
(4) Utilities, healthcare, 
Oil and gas 
  24 92 
(5) Technology and   
  Telecommunication 
  35 116 
   366 1129   
                                         
70
 A difference of one between DISCMULTIPLE (H15B) and DISCRATE (H15A) (see Appendix 8.2) 
as one company stated that it has applied multiple discount rates without providing the 
actual rate applied. 
71The industry group is reduced from 10 to five by combining these industries because of the 
small number of companies in five industries (see Section 8.2.2.3). 
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Appendix 8.4: Missing value analysis: The result of Little’s MCAR test and Separate Variance t tests  
 
 
 Variables tested for 
missing values 
GWB  
(H6) 
DEBTRATIO 
(H7) 
∆CEOCurrent/prior 
(H8) 
CEOTENURE 
(H9) 
CGU01 
(H14A) 
CGUcontinuous 
(H14B) 
DISCRATE 
(H15A) 
DISCMULTIP
LE (H15B) 
Series of variables         
1. Dependent variable 
GWIL 
- t 
- df 
- P (2-tail) 
- Mean (Present) 
- Mean (Missing) 
 
 
(1.10) 
206 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
(1.05) 
76 
0.29 
0.00 
0.01 
 
 
(0.65) 
101 
0.52 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
(0.89) 
116 
0.38 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
(1.30) 
1494 
0.19 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
(1.30) 
1494 
0.19 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
(0.73) 
1471 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
(0.72) 
1469 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
2. Log(∆SALES+1) (H1) 
- t 
- df 
- P (2-tail) 
- Mean (Present) 
- Mean (Missing) 
 
(3.74) 
202 
0.00 
0.07 
0.21 
 
0.61 
80.95 
0.55 
0.09 
0.07 
 
(0.33) 
98 
0.75 
0.09 
0.11 
 
(0.23) 
113 
0.82 
0.09 
0.10 
 
0.25 
1496 
0.80 
0.09 
0.09 
 
0.25 
1496 
0.80 
0.09 
0.09 
 
0.08 
1489 
0.94 
0.09 
0.09 
 
0.07 
1488 
0.94 
0.09 
0.09 
3. EARNINGSPrior (H2A) 
- t 
- df 
- P (2-tail) 
- Mean (Present) 
- Mean (Missing) 
 
(1.59) 
223 
0.11 
0.04 
0.05 
 
(3.28) 
71 
0.00 
0.04 
0.10 
 
3.73 
105 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
 
3.70 
120 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
 
1.78 
1484 
0.08 
0.05 
0.04 
 
1.78 
1484 
0.08 
0.05 
0.04 
 
2.97 
1416 
0.00 
0.05 
0.03 
 
2.90 
1415 
0.00 
0.05 
0.03 
4. EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent 
(H2B) 
- t 
- df 
- P (2-tail) 
- Mean (Present) 
- Mean (Missing) 
 
(3.60) 
200 
0.00 
0.03 
0.07 
 
(2.51) 
68 
0.01 
0.04 
0.10 
 
3.98 
108 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
 
4.14 
125 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
 
3.41 
1442 
0.00 
0.05 
0.03 
 
3.41 
1442 
0.00 
0.05 
0.03 
 
2.99 
1484 
0.00 
0.05 
0.03 
 
3.09 
1484 
0.00 
0.05 
0.03 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 8.4 (continue): Missing value analysis: The result of Little’s MCAR test and Separate Variance t tests  
 
 Variables tested for 
missing values 
GWB  
(H6) 
DEBTRATIO 
(H7) 
∆CEOCurrent/prior 
(H8) 
CEOTENURE 
(H9) 
CGU01 
(H14A) 
CGUcontinuous 
(H14B) 
DISCRATE 
(H15A) 
DISCMULTIP
LE (H15B) 
Series of variables         
5. ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL 
(H3) 
- t 
- df 
- P (2-tail) 
- Mean (Present) 
- Mean (Missing) 
 
 
(2.87) 
200 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
 
 
(0.54) 
68 
0.59 
0.01 
0.02 
 
 
1.01 
111 
0.31 
0.01 
0.00 
 
 
0.95 
131 
0.34 
0.01 
0.00 
 
 
1.55 
1466 
0.12 
0.01 
0.00 
 
 
1.55 
1466 
0.12 
0.01 
0.00 
 
 
0.28 
1478 
0.78 
0.01 
0.01 
 
 
0.43 
1478 
0.67 
0.01 
0.01 
6. ∆OCF (H4) 
- t 
- df 
- P (2-tail) 
- Mean (Present) 
- Mean (Missing) 
 
(1.29) 
195 
0.20 
0.01 
0.04 
 
(1.14) 
69 
0.26 
0.01 
0.05 
 
0.72 
101 
0.47 
0.02 
0.00 
 
0.56 
116 
0.58 
0.01 
0.00 
 
0.96 
1250 
0.34 
0.02 
0.01 
 
0.96 
1250 
0.34 
0.02 
0.01 
 
(0.15) 
1435 
0.88 
0.01 
0.01 
 
(0.17) 
1433 
0.87 
0.01 
0.01 
7. BTM (H5) 
- t 
- df 
- P (2-tail) 
- Mean (Present) 
- Mean (Missing) 
 
5.80 
335 
0.00 
1.64 
1.21 
 
7.69 
103 
0.00 
1.62 
0.92 
 
(1.04) 
107 
0.30 
1.58 
1.73 
 
(1.54) 
122 
0.13 
1.57 
1.79 
 
(1.72) 
1428 
0.09 
1.52 
1.64 
 
(1.72) 
1428 
0.09 
1.52 
1.64 
 
1.04 
1475 
0.30 
1.62 
1.55 
 
1.05 
1477 
0.29 
1.62 
1.55 
8. GWB (H6) 
- t 
- df 
- P (2-tail) 
- Mean (Present) 
- Mean (Missing) 
 
. 
. 
. 
 
0.35 
54 
0.72 
0.05 
0.05 
 
(1.46) 
82 
0.15 
0.05 
0.07 
 
(1.22) 
97 
0.22 
0.05 
0.06 
 
(1.29) 
1298 
0.20 
0.05 
0.05 
 
(1.29) 
1298 
0.20 
0.05 
0.05 
 
4.26 
1250 
0.00 
0.06 
0.04 
 
4.27 
1252 
0.00 
0.06 
0.04 
 
Little‘s MCAR test:   
Chi-Square = 1527.70     DF = 769  Sig. = 0.000 
 
247 
 
Appendix 8.5: The result of sensitivity analyses for ∆CEOCurrent/prior  
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) 
 ∆CEOPrior ∆CEOCurrent ∆TopMgtCurrent/prior ∆TopMgtPrior ∆TopMgtCurrent 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Observations (N) 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
Intercept  -0.038 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.036 
(-2.59)** 
-0.037 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.034 
(-2.50)** 
-0.039 
 (-2.82)*** 
-0.036 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.039 
 (-2.82)*** 
-0.036 
(-2.59)*** 
-0.038 
 (-2.59)*** 
-0.036 
(-2.59)*** 
Economic factors           
Log(∆SALES+
1) (H1) 
- 0.004 
(0.33) 
-0.005 
(-0.40) 
0.004 
(0.32) 
-0.005 
(-0.43) 
0.004 
 (0.30) 
-0.006 
(-0.44) 
0.005 
 (0.38) 
-0.005 
(-0.39) 
0.005 
 (0.35) 
-0.005 
(-0.36) 
EARNINGSPreG
WILCurrent (H2B) 
- -0.091 
(-4.66)*** 
 -0.090 
(-4.86)*** 
- -0.089 
 (-4.79)*** 
- -0.093 
 (-4.94)*** 
- -0.087 
 (-4.50)*** 
- 
∆EARNINGSpre
GWIL (H3) 
- - 0.061 
(2.82)*** 
- 0.062 
(2.92)*** 
- 0.061 
(2.83)*** 
- 0.06 
(2.82)*** 
- 0.060 
(2.82)*** 
∆OCF (H4) 
 
- 0.003 
(0.35) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.000 
 (0.05) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.002 
 (0.21) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.002 
 (0.31) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.001 
 (0.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
BTM (H5) 
 
+ -0.000 
(-0.20) 
0.000 
(0.51) 
-0.000 
 (-0.47) 
0.000 
(0.35) 
-0.000 
 (-0.46) 
0.000 
(0.33) 
-0.000 
 (-0.30) 
0.000 
(0.53) 
-0.000 
 (-0.25) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
GWB (H6) 
 
+ 0.021 
(1.22) 
0.022 
(1.35) 
0.020 
 (1.22) 
0.020 
(1.26) 
0.022 
 (1.37) 
0.022 
(1.40) 
0.020 
 (1.26) 
0.022 
(1.34) 
0.021 
 (1.23) 
0.022 
(1.37) 
Contracting perspective          
DEBTRATIO 
(H7) 
? -0.014 
(-1.76)* 
-0.006 
(-0.75) 
-0.014 
 (-1.86)* 
-0.005 
(-0.63) 
-0.015 
 (-1.91)* 
-0.005 
(-0.71) 
-0.015 
 (-1.98)** 
-0.005 
(-0.75) 
-0.013 
 (-1.65)* 
-0.005 
(-0.69) 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective         
∆CEOCurrent/prio
r (H8) 
+ 0.000 
(0.03) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.017 
 (3.19)*** 
0.018 
(3.33)*** 
0.008 
 (1.94)* 
0.009 
(2.29)** 
-0.003 
 (-0.49) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
0.016 
 (3.13)*** 
0.016 
(3.26)*** 
CEOTENURE 
(H9)  
- 0.000 
(0.85) 
0.000 
(0.47) 
0.000 
 (1.68)* 
0.000 
(1.23) 
0.000 
 (1.47) 
0.000 
(1.10) 
0.000 
 (0.90) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
0.000 
 (1.58) 
0.000 
(1.26) 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 8.5 (continue): The result of sensitivity analyses for ∆CEOCurrent/prior  
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) 
 ∆CEOPrior ∆CEOCurrent ∆TopMgtCurrent/prior ∆TopMgtPrior ∆TopMgtCurrent 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective         
BATH (H10) 
 
- -0.052 
(-1.89)* 
-0.195 
(5.83)*** 
-0.054 
 (-2.05)** 
-0.196 
(-5.97)*** 
-0.053 
 (-1.98)** 
-0.193 
(-5.82)*** 
-0.051 
 (-1.92)* 
-0.195 
(-5.84)*** 
-0.055 
 (-2.03)** 
-0.194 
(-5.87)*** 
SMOOTH (H11) 
 
+ 0.066 
(2.84)*** 
- 0.080 
 (3.67)*** 
- 0.079 
 (3.59)*** 
- 0.079 
 (3.61)*** 
- 0.064 
 (2.79)*** 
- 
 
Ownership structure           
MANOWN1 
(H12B1) 
? -0.002 
(-2.54)** 
-0.002 
(-2.67)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.33)** 
-0.002 
(-2.48)** 
-0.002 
(-2.28)** 
-0.002 
(-2.38)** 
-0.002 
(-2.55)** 
-0.002 
(2.69)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.31)** 
-0.002 
(-2.43)** 
MANOWN2 
(H12B2) 
? 0.000 
(0.56) 
0.000 
(0.73) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
0.000 
(0.37) 
0.000 
(0.67) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
0.000 
(0.74) 
0.000 
(0.51) 
0.000 
(0.67) 
MANOWN3 
(H12B3) 
? 0.000 
(0.72) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
0.000 
(0.91) 
0.000 
(0.30) 
0.000 
(0.94) 
0.000 
(0.36) 
0.000 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
OUTCON 
(H13) 
? -0.000 
(-1.66)* 
-0.000 
(-2.18)** 
-0.000 
 (-1.93)* 
-0.000 
(-2.28)** 
-0.000 
 (-1.80)* 
-0.000 
(-2.15)** 
-0.000 
 (-1.83)* 
-0.000 
(-2.18)** 
-0.000 
 (-1.75)* 
-0.000 
(-2.24)** 
Control variables           
SIZE (H16) 
 
? 0.002 
(2.02)** 
0.002 
(1.68)* 
0.002 
 (2.01)** 
0.001 
(1.40) 
0.002 
 (2.10)** 
0.001 
(1.49) 
0.002 
 (2.31)** 
0.002 
(1.70)* 
0.002 
 (1.81)* 
0.001 
(1.47) 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17) 1 -Ind. ?          
2 - Consumer 
goods and 
serv. 
 
 
0.001 
(0.46) 
0.000 
(0.20) 
0.001 
 (0.41) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
0.002 
 (0.51) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.002 
 (0.51) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.001 
 (0.35) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
3 – Financials  -0.000 
(-0.15) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.000 
 (-0.13) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.000 
 (-0.11) 
0.000 
(0.12) 
-0.000 
 (-0.10) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.001 
 (-0.15) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
4 - Util.health., 
Oil and Gas 
 -0.003 
(-0.62) 
-0.004 
(-0.82) 
-0.004 
 (-0.74) 
-0.005 
(-0.96) 
-0.003 
 (-0.63) 
-0.004 
(-0.84) 
-0.003 
 (-0.61) 
-0.004 
(-0.82) 
-0.004 
 (-0.71) 
-0.005 
(-0.91) 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 8.5 (continue): The result of sensitivity analyses for ∆CEOCurrent/prior  
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) 
 ∆CEOPrior ∆CEOCurrent ∆TopMgtCurrent/prior ∆TopMgtPrior ∆TopMgtCurrent 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
Model 2 
(h)(i) 
Model 2 
(h)(ii) 
5 - Technology 
and Telecom. 
 
 
0.004 
(0.73) 
0.004 
(0.77) 
0.003 
 (0.66) 
0.003 
(0.72) 
0.003 
 (0.63) 
0.003 
(0.69) 
0.003 
 (0.72) 
0.004 
(0.78) 
0.003 
 (0.58) 
0.003 
(0.61) 
YEND–1 (H18) ?           
- Year 2  0.003 
(1.12) 
0.002 
(0.78) 
0.003 
 (1.10) 
0.003 
(0.92) 
0.003 
 (0.97) 
0.002 
(0.78) 
0.003 
 (1.00) 
0.002 
(0.80) 
0.004 
 (1.31) 
0.003 
(0.98) 
- Year 3  0.002 
(0.51) 
-0.000 
(-0.13) 
0.002 
 (0.59) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.001 
 (0.41) 
0.000 
(-0.10) 
0.001 
 (0.43) 
-0.000 
(-0.11) 
0.002 
 (0.69) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
ADD (H19) + -0.007 
(-2.17)** 
-0.008 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.007 
 (-2.24)** 
-0.008 
(-2.67)*** 
-0.006 
 (-2.19)** 
-0.008 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.007 
 (-2.26)** 
-0.008 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.006 
 (-2.12)** 
-0.008 
(-2.62)*** 
Log likelihood 289.36 316.27 349.78 332.74 355.88 295.43 330.43 338.64 294.09 320.97 
Wald Chi-square 87.03*** 72.09*** 105.62*** 83.33*** 99.10*** 77.26*** 95.48*** 72.19*** 96.42*** 82.81*** 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 8.6: The result of sensitivity analyses for Managerial ownership  
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) 
MANOWNNon-monotonic  
MANOWNLinear Changing the cut-off point 
from 25% to 20% 
Changing the cut-off point 
from 25% to 30% 
Model 2(h)(i) Model 2(h)(ii) Model 2(h)(i) Model 2(h)(ii) Model 2 (h)(i) Model 2 (h)(ii) 
Observations (N)  1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
Intercept  -0.038 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.035 
(-2.56)** 
-0.038 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.035 
(-2.56)** 
-0.037 
(-2.50)** 
-0.035 
(-2.54)** 
Economic factors       
Log(∆SALES+1) (H1) - -0.002 
(0.21) 
-0.007 
(-0.55) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
-0.007 
(-0.55) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
-0.006 
(-0.47) 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent (H2B) - -0.091 
(-4.90)*** 
- -0.090 
(-4.86)*** 
 -0.086 
(-4.49)*** 
 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL (H3)  - - 0.063 
(2.93)*** 
- 0.063 
(2.93)*** 
- 0.061 
(2.85)*** 
∆OCF (H4) 
 
- 0.002 
(0.21) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.002 
(0.24) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
BTM (H5) 
 
+ -0.001 
(-0.59) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
GWB (H6) 
 
+ 0.021 
(1.31) 
0.021 
(1.32) 
0.021 
(1.31) 
0.021 
(1.32) 
0.022 
(1.31) 
0.022 
(1.37) 
Contracting perspective      
DEBTRATIO (H7) ? -0.014 
(-1.84)* 
-0.005 
(-0.61) 
-0.014 
(-1.86)* 
-0.005 
(-0.61) 
-0.014 
(-1.69)* 
-0.005 
(-0.69) 
 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed 
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Appendix 8.6 (continue): The result of sensitivity analyses for Managerial ownership  
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) 
MANOWNNon-monotonic  
MANOWNLinear Changing the cut-off point 
from 25% to 20% 
Changing the cut-off point 
from 25% to 30% 
Model 2(h)(i) Model 2(h)(ii) Model 2(h)(i) Model 2(h)(ii) Model 2 (h)(i) Model 2 (h)(ii) 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective       
∆CEOCurrent/prior (H8) 
 
+ 0.011 
(2.51)** 
0.012 
(2.64)*** 
0.011 
(2.49)** 
0.012 
(2.64)*** 
0.012 
(2.66)*** 
0.011 
(2.65)*** 
CEOTENURE (H9)  - 0.000 
(1.69)* 
0.000 
(1.25) 
0.000 
(1.67)* 
0.000 
(1.25) 
0.000 
(1.37) 
0.000 
(1.05) 
BATH (H10) 
 
- -0.051 
(-1.94)* 
-0.195 
(-5.91)*** 
-0.052 
(-1.97)** 
-0.192 
(-5.91)*** 
-0.055 
(-2.00)** 
-0.193 
(-5.87)*** 
SMOOTH (H11) 
 
+ 0.080 
(3.69)*** 
- 0.080 
(3.65)*** 
- 0.063 
(2.75)*** 
- 
Ownership structure       
MANOWNLinear (H12A) 
 
?     -0.004 
(-1.53) 
-0.005 
(-1.73)* 
MANOWN1 (H12B1) ? -0.002 
(-2.02)** 
-0.002 
(-2.19)** 
-0.002 
(-2.42)** 
-0.002 
(-2.19)** 
- - 
MANOWN2 (H12B2) ? -0.000 
(-0.14) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.64) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
- - 
MANOWN3 (H12B3) ? -0.000 
(-1.36) 
0.000 
(0.77) 
0.000 
(0.76) 
0.000 
(0.77) 
- - 
OUTCON (H13) ? -0.000 
(-1.86)* 
-0.000 
(-2.22)** 
-0.000 
(-1.87)* 
-0.000 
(-2.22)** 
-0.000 
(-2.18)** 
-0.000 
(-2.63)*** 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed 
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Appendix 8.6 (continue): The result of sensitivity analyses for Managerial ownership  
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics) 
MANOWNNon-monotonic  
MANOWNLinear Changing the cut-off point 
from 25% to 20% 
Changing the cut-off point 
from 25% to 30% 
Model 2(h)(i) Model 2(h)(ii) Model 2(h)(i) Model 2(h)(ii) Model 2 (h)(i) Model 2 (h)(ii) 
SIZE (H16) 
 
? 0.002 
(2.07)** 
0.001 
(1.47) 
0.002 
(2.05)** 
0.001 
(1.47) 
0.002 
(1.83)* 
0.001 
(1.55) 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17) 1 – Indust. ?       
2 - Consumer goods and  
      services 
 
 
0.001 
(0.45) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.002 
(0.55) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
3 – Financials  -0.001 
(-0.22) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(-0.21) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
4 - Utilities, healthcare,   
      Oil and Gas 
 -0.004 
(-0.79) 
-0.005 
(-1.01) 
-0.004 
(-0.74) 
-0.005 
(-1.01) 
-0.004 
(-0.67) 
-0.005 
(-0.94) 
5 - Technology and Telecom.  
 
0.003 
(0.64) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
0.003 
(0.62) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
0.004 
(0.76) 
0.004 
(0.81) 
YEND – Year 1 (H18) ?       
- Year 2  0.003 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
0.003 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
0.003 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.62) 
- Year 3  0.001 
(0.41) 
-0.000 
(-0.12) 
0.001 
(0.39) 
-0.000 
(-0.12) 
0.002 
(0.52) 
-0.003 
(-0.09) 
ADD (H19) + -0.007 
(-2.20)** 
-0.007 
(-2.64)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.24)** 
-0.008 
(-2.64)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.21)** 
-0.008 
(-2.69)*** 
Log likelihood  354.81 314.57 300.24 314.57 290.34 309.43 
Wald chi-square  101.86*** 78.96*** 101.43*** 78.96*** 89.41*** 75.67*** 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed 
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Appendix 8.7: The result of sensitivity analyses for EARNINGSprior by replacing it with EARNINGSPreGWILprior 
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics)  
Model 1 Model 2(a)(i) Model 2(a)(ii) Model 2(b) Model 2(c) Model 2(d) 
Observations (N)  538 518 518 374 531 537 
Intercept  -0.055 
(-3.58)*** 
-0.044 
(-2.59)*** 
-0.051 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.047 
(-2.59)*** 
-0.057 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.055 
(-3.41)*** 
Economic factors        
Log(∆SALES+1) (H1) 
 
- -0.017 
(-0.93) 
-0.015 
(-0.78) 
-0.020 
(-1.03) 
-0.007 
(-0.29) 
-0.016 
(-0.88) 
-0.016 
(-0.87) 
EARNINGSPreGWILprior - -0.082 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.074 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.085 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.069 
(-1.70)* 
-0.083 
(-2.72)*** 
-0.080 
(-2.70)*** 
∆OCF (H4) 
 
- 0.002 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.002 
(0.28) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
BTM (H5) 
 
+ 0.001 
(0.61) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
0.001 
(0.81) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.66) 
0.001 
(0.52) 
GWB (H6) 
 
+ 0.035 
(1.32) 
0.019 
(0.83) 
0.028 
(1.07) 
0.012 
(0.41) 
0.039 
(1.46) 
0.035 
(1.31) 
Contracting perspective       
DEBTRATIO (H7) ? 0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.007 
(-0.59) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective      
∆CEOCurrent/prior (H8) 
 
+ 0.010 
(2.07)** 
0.011 
(2.35)** 
0.011 
(2.31)** 
0.015 
(2.61)*** 
0.012 
(2.31)** 
0.010 
(2.12)** 
 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 8.7 (continue): The result of sensitivity analyses for EARNINGSprior by replacing it with EARNINGSPreGWILprior 
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics)  
Model 1 Model 2(a)(i) Model 2(a)(ii) Model 2(b) Model 2(c) Model 2(d) 
CEOTENURE (H9)  - - - - - 0.000 
(1.23) 
- 
BATH (H10) 
 
- -0.091 
(-2.51)** 
-0.096 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.086 
(-2.33)** 
-0.099 
(-1.99)** 
-0.094 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.089 
(-2.43)** 
SMOOTH (H11) 
 
+ 0.048 
(1.20) 
0.043 
(1.12) 
0.039 
(0.96) 
0.082 
(1.42) 
0.052 
(1.28) 
0.047 
(1.18) 
Ownership structure        
MANOWNLinear (H12A) ?  -0.002 
(-0.66) 
- - - - 
MANOWN1 (H12B1)  ? - - -0.001 
(-1.50) 
- - - 
MANOWN2 (H12B2) ? - - 0.000 
(0.75) 
- - - 
MANOWN3 (H12B3) ? - - 0.000 
(0.97) 
- - - 
OUTCON (H13) 
 
? - -0.000 
(-1.75)* 
-0.000 
(-0.83) 
- - - 
Discretion - impairment test       
CGU01 (H14A) 
 
? 0.002 
(0.62) 
0.005 
(1.45) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
- 0.002 
(0.65) 
0.003 
(0.65) 
CGUcontinuous (H14B) 
 
? - - - 0.001 
(1.20) 
- - 
  
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 8.7 (continue): The result of sensitivity analyses for EARNINGSprior by replacing it with EARNINGSPreGWILprior 
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics)  
Model 1 Model 2(a)(i) Model 2(a)(ii) Model 2(b) Model 2(c) Model 2(d) 
DISCRATE (H15A) ? - - - -0.001 
(-1.13) 
- - 
DISCMULTIPLE (H15B) 
 
? - - - 0.004 
(0.82) 
- - 
Control variables        
SIZE (H16) 
 
? 0.002 
(2.08)** 
0.022 
(2.22)** 
0.002 
(2.04)** 
0.002 
(1.58) 
0.002 
(2.04)** 
0.002 
(1.90)* 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17) 
1 - Indus. And 
B.materials 
 
? 
      
2 - Consumer goods and 
services 
 
 
- - - - - -0.001 
(-0.24) 
3 – Financials  - - - - - -0.000 
(-0.04) 
4 - Utilities, healthcare, 
and Oil and Gas 
 - - - - - -0.003 
(-0.54) 
5 - Technology and  
     Telecom. 
 
 
 
- - - - - -0.000 
(-0.00) 
YEND – Year 1 (H18) ?       
- Year 2  0.001 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
0.003 
(0.67) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
- Year 3  0.001 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.52) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 8.7 (continue): The result of sensitivity analyses for EARNINGSprior by replacing it with EARNINGSPreGWILprior 
 
  
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Z statistics)  
Model 1 Model 2(a)(i) Model 2(a)(ii) Model 2(b) Model 2(c) Model 2(d) 
ADD (H19) + -0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.98) 
-0.000 
(-0.08) 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
Log likelihood  188.99 222.43 189.58 154.13 188.07 189.15 
Wald chi-square  31.82*** 39.43*** 37.63*** 23.92* 32.02*** 32.16** 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Chapter 9: Recognition Study of Goodwill 
Impairment - Results and Analysis 
9.1 Introduction 
The measurement study in Chapter 8 has provided empirical evidence on factors 
influencing the managers‘ decisions when determining the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses divided by prior year total assets (including goodwill), and 
zero otherwise reported on the income statement (see Section 1.4.2). In their 
review of studies on asset write-offs, Alciatore et al. (1998: 33) highlighted the 
lack of research on the motives of companies that ‗have impaired assets but have 
not written them down‘ (see Section 2.2.2). In the context of goodwill 
impairment, the gap identified is timely, as one of the concerns raised by the 
IASB board members via the dissenting opinion of IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 
was the lack of a rigorous impairment test of goodwill, given that the focus of 
the IASB is in preventing excessive assets write-offs (see Section 4.5).  
In response to the gap highlighted by Alciatore et al. (1998: 33), the present 
chapter takes a step beyond the measurement study by examining factors 
influencing the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies in a situation where their market values 
are below the book values of their net assets for three consecutive years. By 
analysing the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment, 
this chapter aims to address the research questions summarised in Figure 9.1 (see 
Sections 1.3 and 5.2 for detailed discussion):  
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Figure 9.1: Summary of research questions (RQ) for the recognition study of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies 
 
 
Theoretical research question 
 
RQ 1 
 
: 
 
How can an investigation of FRS 3, focusing on goodwill impairment 
by Malaysian listed companies, contribute to the theories of 
accounting choice? 
 
 
Specific research questions  
RQ 9 : Economic factors 
 
To what extent does the recognition choice72 related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies 
reflect the underlying economic values of cash-generating-units 
containing goodwill? 
 
RQ 10 : Contracting perspective 
 
To what extent does the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies 
support the contracting perspective? 
 
RQ 11 : Opportunistic behaviour perspective 
 
To what extent does the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies 
support the opportunistic behaviour perspective? 
 
RQ 12 : Ownership structures 
 
To what extent does the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies 
indicate that they reflect companies‘ ownership structures? 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 describes the setting which is 
constructed to capture evidence of a recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment, and the distribution of data. Section 9.3 outlines two main 
binary logistic models employed, and discusses the issue of multicollinearity. 
Section 9.4 discusses the regression diagnostics tests carried out, the overall 
goodness-of-fit of the models, and the sensitivity analysis performed. Section 9.5 
discusses the results for each of the research questions and the control variables. 
Section 9.6 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
                                         
72
 The recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment focuses on companies 
which their market values lower than the book values of the net assets for three consecutive 
years and which reported zero goodwill impairment. 
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9.2 Descriptive analysis  
The descriptive analysis discussed in this section serves two purposes: firstly, to 
describe the setting which is designed to capture evidence of a recognition 
choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment (see Section 9.2.1); 
secondly, to describe the distribution of data (see Section 9.2.2). 
9.2.1 Setting designed to capture evidence of a 
recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment 
This chapter seeks to explore the motives of companies in recognising zero 
goodwill impairment. To explore these motives, companies which have market 
values below the book values of their net assets for three consecutive years are 
selected since (as discussed in Section 4.3) this condition is one of the indications 
that goodwill may be impaired. Interviews with the senior manager of a big-4 
audit firm, a financial analyst, a former standard setter, and a finance manager 
with Malaysian listed companies were carried out by the researcher in Malaysia at 
an early stage of this PhD study (see Section 3.2.5). Results from these interviews 
suggest that for Malaysian listed companies, market capitalisation indication 
occurring within a single year, could be considered to be a temporary situation. 
Accordingly, such companies may not consider undertaking goodwill write-off.  
Therefore, focusing on companies which have market values below the book 
values of their net assets for three consecutive years, provides a stronger market 
capitalisation indication that goodwill may be impaired. Moreover, this provides 
a setting to test why companies in a condition that appears to indicate goodwill 
may be impaired, would recognise zero goodwill impairment, while other 
companies in a similar condition would recognise goodwill impairment losses. 
In this setting, companies which recognise zero goodwill impairment throughout 
the three years are considered as exercising a recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment. These companies are referred to as a test 
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group; and are tested against a control group of companies (see Figure 9.2). The 
control group is a group of companies which experience similar condition (i.e. 
their market values are below the book values of their net assets for three 
consecutive years); however, these companies report goodwill impairment losses 
at the end of the third year. To perform the analysis, the test group is coded as 
one and the control group is coded as zero (see Figure 9.2). Accordingly, the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, equal to one for the test group, 
and zero for the control group. The setting comprises 132 companies (before 
missing values) of which 96 companies are regarded as the test group and 36 
companies are considered as the control group (see Figure 9.3). 
Figure 9.2: Summary of a setting designed to capture evidence of a 
recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment 
 
Description Recognition 
choice examined 
Selection criteria Dependent 
variable 
Year of 
analysis 
A situation 
where 
companies‘ 
market 
values are 
lower than 
the book 
values of 
their net 
assets for 
three 
consecutive 
years 
The recognition 
choice for 
companies which 
recognise zero 
goodwill 
impairment when 
their market 
values are below 
the book values 
of their net 
assets for three 
consecutive years 
Test group: 
Companies which 
reported zero 
goodwill 
impairment when 
their market values 
are lower than the 
book values of their 
net assets for three 
consecutive years. 
 
Control group: 
Companies which 
reported goodwill 
impairment losses 
at the end of the 
third year when 
their market values 
are below the book 
values of their net 
assets for three 
consecutive years. 
Is a 
dichotomous 
variable, 
equal to one 
for the test 
group; zero 
for the 
control 
group 
The 
analysis of 
the 
recognition 
choice is 
carried out 
in year 3. 
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Figure 9.3: Number of companies tested for the test group and the control 
group 
 
 Before missing 
values 
After missing 
values 
Test group: 
Market values less than the book values of the 
net assets for three consecutive years and 
reported zero goodwill impairment 
 
 
96 
 
7773 
Control group: 
Market values less than the book values of the 
net assets for three consecutive years and 
reported goodwill impairment losses at the end 
of year 3 
 
36 
 
31 
 
Total 132 10874 
9.2.2 Distribution of data 
The descriptive statistics for both the continuous and categorical variables tested 
in the present chapter are displayed in Appendices 9.1 to 9.2. The appendices 
highlight two issues concerning the distribution of data. Firstly, current year pre-
write-off earnings (i.e. EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent) are highly skewed (see Appendix 
9.1). The transformation of this variable into logarithm [i.e. Log10(0.475- 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent] solves the issue of skewness as the skewness value of the 
variable reduces from -2.827 to 1.242. Therefore, in the present chapter, 
                                         
73 An alternative approach would to be to test the two groups of companies using the match-pair 
based on size of a company. However, in doing so more than half of the companies in the test 
group would be lost.  Therefore, to get a comprehensive analysis of companies which recognised 
zero goodwill impairment when their market values are lower than the book values of their net 
assets for three consecutive years, the match-pair analysis is not undertaken. 
74 The missing value analysis is carried out using Little‘s MCAR test (see Section 6.6.2). The test 
produces a Chi-Square value of 74.875 and is non-significant (i.e. p-value greater than 0.05), 
suggesting that the null hypothesis that the data are missing completely at random cannot be 
rejected. Hence, it is inferred that the data are missing completely at random. According to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007: 63), when this is the case, then there is no serious problem with the 
data as the missing values are not related to the dependent variable or the independent 
variables. 
75 Although Log10(EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent) solves the issue of skewness of the variable, Log10(0.4- 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent) is employed. This is because the former would lead to loss of 25 companies 
which reported negative current year pre-write-off earnings (see Footnote 1 of Table 9.2 for the 
interpretation of the coefficient).  
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Log10(0.4-EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent) will be applied in testing the recognition choice 
related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
The second issue regarding the distribution of data is the lack of companies for 
three variables, i.e. ∆CEOCurrent/prior, ADD, and INDUSTRYG5 (see Appendix 9.2). 
For example, for ∆CEOCurrent/prior, there are five companies in the control group 
which experienced change in CEO (the expected cell frequency is 3). Peers 
(1996: 167) argues that the Chi-square test should not be used when any 
expected cell frequencies are small because the probability distribution of the 
Chi-square gives a poor approximation to the sampling distribution of the Chi-
square statistic. For this reason, these variables are excluded in the regression 
diagnostics tests I and II (see Section 9.4.1 and Table 9.2). 
9.3 Binary logistic regression models 
In the present chapter, the binary nature of the dependent variable (see Figure 
9.2) leads to the application of a binary logistic regression (see Section 6.8). 
Accordingly, the recognition study is modelling the probability of a recognition 
choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian 
listed companies. Two models constructed in the measurement study (see 
Section 8.3.3) are adapted in the present chapter to test the recognition choice 
related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. These models are Model 2(h)(i) 
and Model 2(h)(ii) (see Figure 9.4). The two models are selected as they produce 
the highest Wald Chi-square with statistically significant p-values, suggesting that 
these models can better explain the overall factors influencing managers‘ 
decisions related to goodwill impairment. Hence, compared to the other models 
specified in Section 8.3.3, they are expected to best model the recognition 
choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
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Figure 9.4: Models specification for the analysis of the recognition choice 
related to reporting zero goodwill impairment 
 
Model Specifications of the variables 
 
Model A 
 
- Adapted from Model 
2(h)(i) in the 
measurement study  
= α   + β1∆SALES+β2EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent +β4∆OCF+β5BTM 
        + β6GWB + β7DEBTRATIO +β8∆CEOCurrent/prior    
            + β9CEOTENURE+ +β10BATH +β11SMOOTH  
        + β12B1MANOWN1 + β12B2MANOWN2   
        + β12B3MANOWN3 + β13OUTCON+β16SIZE  
        + β17INDUSTRYG5 +β19ADD +ε 
 
Model B 
- Adapted from Model 
2(h)(ii) in the 
measurement study  
= α + β1∆SALES+β3∆EARNINGSpreGWIL+β4∆OCF+β5BTM 
+β6GWB + β7DEBTRATIO + β8∆CEOCurrent/prior 
+β9CEOTENURE+ β11SMOOTH  +β12B1MANOWN1 + 
β12B2MANOWN2 + β12B3MANOWN3 
+β13OUTCON+β16SIZE +β17INDUSTRYG5 +β19ADD +ε 
 
Where; 
Variable Description (see Appendix 1 of the thesis for detail) 
GWIL(0,1) = A dichotomous variable, equal to one when companies are 
considered as exercising a recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment, and zero otherwise. 
Economic factors 
∆SALES (H1) Change in sales 
= (SALESt - SALESt-1) 
    Total assetst-1 
 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent  
(H2B) 
Current year pre-write-off earnings 
=  (EARNINGSt + GWIL(IL)t) 
          Total assetst-1 
The variable is transformed into logarithm [i.e. Log10(0.4- 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent] (see Section 9.2.2). 
 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL 
(H3) 
Change in pre-write-off earnings 
= [EARNINGSt + GWIL(IL)t]- [EARNINGSt-1 + GWIL(IL)
76
t-1] 
                         Total assetst-1 
∆OCF (H4) Change in operating cash flows 
= (OCFt - OCFt-1)/Total assetst-1 
BTM (H5) Book-to-market ratio 
= Company i‘s book value of equity divided by market value of 
equity at the end of t. 
 
GWB (H6) Relative size of goodwill balance 
 
= Opening goodwill balancet 
        Total assetst-1 
 
Contracting perspective 
DEBTRATIO (H7) Debt contracting 
=  Total Debtst-1 
                                         
76 GWIL(IL) refers to reporting goodwill impairment losses. 
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Total assetst-1 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective 
∆CEOCurrent/prior 
(H8) 
Change in CEO 
= One if there is a change in CEO in t-1 or t, and zero otherwise. 
 
CEOTENURE (H9) CEO tenure 
= The number of years that the CEO has held the position 
BATH (H10) Big bath reporting 
= Change in pre-write-off earnings from t-1 to t divided by  
total assets at the end of t-1, when this change is below the  
median of non-zero negative values of this variable, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
SMOOTH (H11) Earnings smoothing 
= Change in pre-write-off earnings from t-1 to t divided by  
total assets at the end of t-1, when this change is above the  
median of non-zero positive values of this variable, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Ownership structure 
MANOWNNon-
monotonic (H12B) 
 
MANOWN1 = board ownership if board ownership < 0.05 
= 0.05 if board ownership ≥ 0.05 
MANOW2 = 0 if board ownership < 0.05 
= board ownership minus 0.05 if 0.05≤board 
ownership< 0.25 
= 0.20 if board ownership ≥ 0.25 
MANOWN3 = 0 if board ownership < 0.25 
= board ownership minus 0.25 if board 
ownership ≥ 0.25 
 
 
OUTCON (H13) Outside ownership concentration 
= (No. of ordinary shares held by outsiders with the five largest 
claims)/ (Total no. of issued and paid up ordinary shares) 
Control variables 
SIZE (H16) Size of company 
= Ln(Total assetst-1) 
 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17) Type of industry 
= A dummy variable across five industry categories. 
ADD (H19) Addition to goodwill 
= One if there is a newly acquired goodwill, and zero otherwise. 
 
ε = Error term 
 
The two models presented in Figure 9.4 differ from Models 2(h)(i) and 2(h)(ii) of 
the measurement study. The changes from the measurement study are now 
explained. In the measurement study, models 2(h)(i) and 2(h)(ii) test the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment losses divided by prior year total assets 
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(including goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on the income statement. In 
the present chapter, i.e. the recognition study, the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable (see Table 5.1 in Section 5.2). For this reason, Model 2(h)(i) 
is referred to as Model A, and Model 2(h)(ii) is referred to as Model B (see Figure 
9.4). In both models, financial year-end (YEND) is excluded as the analysis of 
data is undertaken in the third year. 
Secondly, multicollinearity is assessed using Pearson‘s product-moment 
correlation coefficient test. Table 9.1 shows that for the most part, the 
independent variables are not significantly correlated with one another or with 
the control variables, except the correlations between BATH and 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL at 0.86 with p-value less than 0.01. To overcome the issue of 
multicollinearity, ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL is analysed separately from BATH. 
Accordingly, BATH which is included in Model 2(h)(ii) is excluded from Model B. 
Additionally, because there is no issue of multicollinearity between SMOOTH and 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL, Model B incorporates SMOOTH. Therefore, Model B differs 
slightly from Model 2(h)(ii) as it excludes BATH and includes SMOOTH (see Figure 
9.4 in Section 9.3, and Table 8.3 in Section 8.3.3). 
Thirdly, in the present chapter, the effects of variables such as CGUs and 
discount rates, testing the discretion available to managers in performing an 
impairment test of goodwill, are not examined. This is because these variables 
suffer from a high frequency of missing values, and including these variables 
would reduce the number of observations significantly.  
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Table 9.1: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients 
 
    Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 GWIL(0,1)   1.00         
2 ∆SALES (H1) 0.11 1.00        
3 EARNINGSPriorPreGWIL (H2A) 0.12 0.20* 1.00       
4 Log10(0.4- 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent) (H2B) 
0.26** -0.20* -0.42** 1.00      
5 ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL (H3) 0.18* -0.01 -0.41** -0.64** 1.00     
6 ∆OCF (H4) -0.06 0.17 0.03 -0.12 0.09 1.00    
7 BTM (H5) 0.01 -0.12 -0.31** 0.27** 0.02 0.04 1.00   
8 GWB (H6)  -0.07 -0.13 -0.25** 0.25** -0.05 -0.08* 0.06 1.00  
9 DEBTRATIO (H7) -0.02 -0.05 -0.26** 0.22* 0.05 0.13 0.27** -0.01 1.00 
10 CEOTENURE (H9) 0.10 0.06 0.10 -0.16 0.09 0.00 0.13 -0.18* -0.06 
11 BATH (H10)  0.20 0.04 0.15 0.66** -0.86** 0.11 0.09 -0.12 0.05 
12 SMOOTH (H11)  0.04 -0.10 -0.55** -0.20* 0.60** -0.01 -0.10 0.08 0.05 
13 MANOWN1 (H12B1) -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.01 -0.13 0.09 
14 MANOWN2 (H12B2) -0.13 -0.20* -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 
15 MANOWN3 (H12B3) -0.16 -0.23* 0.08 -0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 
16 OUTCON (H13) 0.12 0.21* 0.18* -0.04 -0.13 0.09 -0.12 0.10 -0.29** 
17 SIZE (H16) 
 
-0.08 0.04 0.21* 0.06 -0.20* -0.12 -0.10 -0.00 0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
*, ** denote significance at the 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 9.1 (continue): Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients 
 
    Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17  
10 CEOTENURE (H9) 1.00 0.13** -0.04 0.06* -0.03 -0.09** -0.00 0.11**  
11 BATH (H10)   1.00 0.12** -0.06* -0.06* -0.04 0.08** 0.16**  
12 SMOOTH (H11)    1.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.06* -0.08**  
13 MANOWN1 (H12B1)    1.00 0.69** 0.37** -0.54** -0.42**  
14 MANOWN2 (H12B2)     1.00 0.67** -0.60** -0.33**  
15 MANOWN3 (H12B3)      1.00 -0.47** -0.25**  
16 OUTCON (H13)       1.00 0.28**  
17 SIZE (H16)        1.00  
*, ** denote significance at the 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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9.4 Regression results: Recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment 
Table 9.2 reports the results of binary logistic regression for Model A and Model 
B. Initially, the analysis of the two models, i.e. the full model is based on 108 
companies (see Table 9.2). However, as shown in Table 9.2, the full models, both 
for Model A and Model B, are non-significant with p-values greater than 0.10. The 
Chi-square values for Model A and Model B are 21.866 and 17.977 respectively. 
According to Menard (1995: 56), a non-significant regression model indicates that 
the explanatory variables of the model contribute no more than chance to the 
explanation of the dependent variable. This occurs for two reasons, namely, a 
small number of observations, and a large number of variables in the model 
(Menard, 1995: 56-57). 
From Table 9.2, it is observed that the small number of observations and the 
large number of variables tested in the present chapter have resulted in the full 
model not representing the best fit model to explain companies‘ motives in 
recognising zero goodwill impairment when their market values are below the 
book values of their net assets for three consecutive years. Section 9.4.1 
discusses these two issues and the regression diagnostic test executed to solve 
the issue. Section 9.4.2 continues with the second regression diagnostic test. 
Section 9.4.3 discusses the overall goodness-of-fit of the models and, finally, 
Section 9.4.4 discusses the sensitivity analysis carried out. 
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Table 9.2: Binary logistic regression models: Factors influencing the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment 
 
  
Predict
ed Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Wald statistics)  
Model A  Model B  
Full model 
(as in Section 
9.3) 
Diagnostics tests Full model 
(as in 
Section 9.3) 
Diagnostics tests 
Test I Test II Test I Test II 
Observations (N)  108 116 113 108 116 114 
Intercept  1.154 
(0.063) 
-1.570 
(0.176) 
0.048 
(0.000) 
5.823 
(2.292) 
3.456 
(1.572) 
5.322 
(3.275)* 
Economic factors        
∆SALES (H1) + -0.177 
(0.013) 
0.910 
(0.436) 
1.823 
(1.329) 
0.513 
(0.118) 
1.269 
(0.894) 
2.361 
(2.404) 
Log10(0.4-
EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent)
1
 (H2B) 
+ -11.800 
(3.156)* 
-10.726 
(3.863)** 
-12.190 
(4.137)** 
- - - 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL(H3)  + - 
 
- - 6.104 
(1.848) 
5.999 
(3.080)* 
7.626 
(4.339)** 
∆OCF (H4) + -3.657 
(2.715)* 
-2.639 
(1.970) 
-6.176 
(5.894)** 
-3.809 
(3.035)* 
-2.660 
(2.084) 
-5.654 
(6.021)** 
BTM (H5) - 0.007 
(0.003) 
0.064 
(0.273) 
0.112 
(0.664) 
-0.084 
(0.410) 
- - 
GWB (H6) - -0.798 
(0.054) 
- - -2.412 
(0.561) 
-2.245 
(0.812) 
-3.054 
(1.367) 
Contracting perspective       
DEBTRATIO (H7) ? 2.039 
(1.209) 
1.608 
(1.048) 
1.535 
(0.793) 
0.812 
(0.230) 
0.631 
(0.205) 
0.772 
(0.265) 
      
 
1 
When EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent is transformed into Log10(0.4- EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent], the direction of the current year pre-write-off earnings  
changes. The negative current year pre-write-off earnings are transformed to positive current year pre-write-off earnings, while the positive 
current year pre-write-off earnings are transformed to negative current year pre-write-off earnings. For this reason, the beta coefficients for 
Log10(0.4- EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent] is negative. In interpreting the result, this direction is changed back to its initial direction, which is positive.  
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Table 9.2 (continue): Binary logistic regression models: Factors influencing the recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment 
 
  
Predict
ed Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Wald statistics)  
Model A  Model B  
Full model 
(as in Section 
9.3) 
Diagnostics tests Full model 
(as in 
Section 9.3) 
Diagnostics tests 
Test I Test II Test I Test II 
∆CEOCurrent/prior (H8) 
 
- 0.196 
(0.033) 
- - -0.057 
(0.003) 
- - 
CEOTENURE (H9) + -0.016 
(0.142) 
- - -0.008 
(0.039) 
- - 
BATH (H10) + -1.763 
(0.071) 
-1.445 
(0.070) 
-0.369 
(0.004) 
- - - 
SMOOTH (H11) - -3.081 
(0.165) 
- - -7.848 
(0.696) 
-6.000 
(0.628) 
-9.124 
(1.368) 
Ownership structure        
MANOWN1 (H12B1) ? 0.043 
(0.079) 
- - 0.040 
(0.069) 
- - 
MANOWN2 (H12B2) ? 0.029 
(0.252) 
- - 0.022 
(0.148) 
- - 
MANOWN3 (H12B3) ? -0.102 
(2.642) 
- - -0.079 
(1.946) 
- - 
OUTCON (H13) ? 0.021 
(1.168) 
0.025 
(4.049)** 
0.038 
(6.716)*** 
0.017 
(0.877) 
0.023 
(3.318)* 
0.029 
(4.726)** 
 
 
*, ** denote significance at the 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 9.2 (continue): Binary logistic regression models: Factors influencing the recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment 
 
  
Predi
cted 
Sign 
The  results of coefficients (Wald statistics)  
Model A  Model B  
Full model 
(as in Section 
9.3) 
Diagnostics tests Full model 
(as in Section 
9.3) 
Diagnostics tests 
Test I Test II Test I Test II 
SIZE (H16) ? -0.509 
(2.700) 
-0.293 
(1.865) 
-0.497 
(4.314)** 
-0.405 
(1.846) 
-0.272 
(1.553) 
-0.422 
(3.263)* 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17) – 
Industrial and basic 
materials 
 
? 
 - -  - - 
2 - Consumer goods and  
     services 
 
 
-0.323 
(0.277) 
- - -0.468 
(0.620) 
- - 
3 – Financials  0.899 
(0.821) 
- - 0.365 
(0.169) 
- - 
4 - Utilities, health, Oil and 
     Gas 
 -1.381 
(0.961) 
- - -1.307 
(0.939) 
- - 
5 - Technology and 
     Telecom. 
 
 
-2.104 
(3.039)* 
- - -2.115 
(3.229)* 
- - 
ADD (H19) - 0.822 
(0.732) 
- - 0.703 
(0.593) 
- - 
-2 Log likelihood  109.396 125.664 108.309 113.284 129.723 116.740 
Chi-square  21.866 NS 14.674* 24.472*** 17.977NS 10.615 NS 18.604** 
Hosmer-Lemeshow  0.707 0.658 0.315 0.854 0.447 0.342 
Cox and Snell R Square  0.183 0.119 0.195 0.153 0.087 0.151 
Nagelkerke R Square  0.261 0.169 0.282 0.218 0.125 0.217 
*, ** denote significance at the 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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9.4.1 Regression diagnostic test I: Small number of 
observations 
The first regression diagnostic test is carried out because of the small number of 
observations. Long (1997: 53-54) explains that it is risky to apply the maximum 
likelihood (the estimation procedure in logistic regression model) if the number 
of observations is smaller than 100. This is because the maximum likelihood 
estimators may not necessarily be good estimators in a small observation (Long, 
1997: 53-54). He (p. 54) added that if there are many parameters in the model, 
then more observations are needed. As a rule of thumb, Green (1991: 508) and 
Field (2009: 222) suggested that the minimum number of observation should be 
50 + 8k, where k is the number of variables tested.  
In the present chapter, the number of observations cannot be increased. This is 
because the 108 companies analysed in the full model represent the total 
population of companies which fulfil the selection criteria (see Figure 9.2). Thus, 
to reduce the risk of flawed estimators, the number of variables tested needs to 
be reduced. Following the suggestion made by Greene (1991), in the Diagnostic 
test I, the number of variables to be included in the regression model is reduced 
to eight (i.e. applying Greene (1991)‘s formula of 50 + 8k = 108). Using the 
general to specific modelling strategy as explained by Field (2009: 213), variables 
are dropped from the full model (as shown in Table 9.2) one at a time until the 
number of variables is reduced to 8. At the same time, because of the lack of 
companies for ∆CEO, ADD, and INDUSTRYG5, these variables are also dropped 
from the model (see Section 9.2.2). In dropping these variables, two criteria 
apply. Firstly, these are the least significant variables, and secondly, the 
dropping of these variables does not lead to a failure in addressing any of the 
five research questions specified in Section 9.1. As an example, although debt 
ratio is non-significant, it is retained in the model as it is the only variable 
employed to test the debt hypothesis. Thus, as shown in Table 9.2, in Model A 
and Model B, the Diagnostic test I consists of 116 observations with eight test 
variables. Reducing the number of variables tested has improved Model A as its 
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Chi-square value is 14.674 and is marginally significant at p-value less than 0.10. 
However, the Chi-square value for Model B is non-significant.  
9.4.2 Regression diagnostic test II: Influential 
observations  
The second diagnostic test carried out is based on the argument put forward by 
Menard (2002) that influential observations may mislead the result of the binary 
logistic regression. Therefore, in Diagnostic test II, using the model derived from 
the Diagnostic test I, influential observations are excluded from the analysis. This 
is done using the Casewise listing of residuals in SPSS where standardised 
residuals which are greater than two are identified (Tarling, 2009: 75). In Model 
A under the Diagnostic test I, three cases which reported standardised residuals 
greater than two are deleted; in Model B under the Diagnostic test I, two cases 
which reported standardised residuals greater than two are deleted. Accordingly, 
as shown in Table 9.2, in Model A under the Diagnostic test II, the number of 
observation is based on 113 companies, and in Model B under the Diagnostic test 
II, the number of observation is based on 114 companies. 
9.4.3 Assessing the overall model 
Comparing the overall fit of the full model, Diagnostic test I, and Diagnostic test 
II (see Table 9.2), it is observed that in Model A under Diagnostic test I, by 
reducing the number of test variables, the overall fit of the model is improved. 
Additionally, by solving the issue of influential observations under Diagnostic test 
II, the overall fit for both Model A and Model B has greatly improved. Thus, 
because of the small number of observations analysed and the issue of influential 
observations, Model A and Model B (derived from Diagnostics test II) are the two 
best models which could help explain companies‘ motives in recognising zero 
goodwill impairment in a situation where their market values are below the book 
values of their net assets for three consecutive years. 
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9.4.4 Sensitivity analysis – Current year pre-write-off 
earnings 
Sensitivity analysis for current year pre-write-off earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) 
is conducted in order to assess whether empirical result of the variable would be 
sensitive to the specific year of analysis. This is done by substituting the variable 
with prior year pre-write-off earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILprior) (see Appendix 9.3). 
The results of the sensitivity analysis reveal that the new variable is statistically 
significant in Model A and the Diagnostic test II; the variable is marginally 
significant (at p-value less than 0.10) in the Diagnostic test I. This point will be 
discussed further in Section 9.5.1.1. 
9.5 Discussion of the result for a recognition choice 
related to reporting zero goodwill impairment  
This section discusses results of the five factors which have been employed to 
test the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. These 
factors are: economic factors (see Section 9.5.1), the contracting perspective 
(see Section 9.5.2), the opportunistic behaviour perspective (see Section 9.5.3), 
ownership structures (see Section 9.5.4), and company-specific factors (see 
Section 9.5.5). 
As noted in Section 2.2.2, Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011) conducted a recognition 
study related to goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. However, 
the result of the present chapter could not be compared with them because the 
focus of their study differs from the present study. Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011: 
400 and 402) examined the recognition of goodwill impairment by the total 
population of Malaysian listed companies during the initial year of implementing 
FRS 3 (see Section 2.2.2 for detail), whereas the present recognition study 
focuses on companies which recognise zero goodwill impairment in a specific 
setting (i.e. companies‘ market values lower than the book values of their net 
assets for three consecutive years). 
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9.5.1 Research Question 9: Economic factors 
Variables employed to test for the influence of the economic factors on the 
recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment are: ∆SALES, 
∆OCF, BTM, GWB, EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent, ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL, and EARNINGSPreGWILPrior 
(see Sections 5.4 to 5.4.5). The results reveal that four variables – 
EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent, EARNINGSPreGWILprior, ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL, and ∆OCF - are found 
statistically significant in explaining the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment in companies which have market values below the book 
values of their net assets for three consecutive years. The remaining three 
variables - ∆SALES, BTM and GWB - are found non-significant in all of the models 
tested (see Table 9.2). Therefore, the null hypotheses set in H1-Null for ∆SALES 
(see Section 5.4.1), in H5-Null for BTM (see Section 5.4.4), and in H6-Null for GWB 
(see Section 5.4.5) cannot be rejected.  
Next, Sections 9.5.1.1 to 9.5.1.3 discuss the statistically significant result for the 
pre-write-off earnings (i.e. EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent and EARNINGSPreGWILprior), change 
in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year (∆EARNINGSPreGWIL), and 
change in operating cash flows from prior year to current year (∆OCF), 
respectively. 
9.5.1.1 Companies’ pre-write-off earnings 
(EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent and EARNINGSPreGWILprior) 
Current year pre-write-off earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILcurrent) is found statistically 
significant in Model A (i.e. the full model, Diagnostics test I, and Diagnostics test 
II) in a positive direction as predicted (see Table 9.2). The result of the 
sensitivity analysis also shows a statistically significant positive relationship 
between prior year pre-write-off earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILprior) and the 
recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment (see Appendix 
9.3).  
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The positive direction observed for the current year pre-write-off earnings 
provides support to the economic factors (see H2B in Appendix 1 of the thesis), 
suggesting that the higher the current year pre-write-off earnings, the more 
likely it is that the companies will recognise zero goodwill impairment. This 
result indicates that when comparing two groups of companies, i.e. the test 
group vs. the control group, which experienced similar market capitalisation 
indication (i.e. their companies market values are lower than the book values of 
their net assets at the balance sheet date) for three consecutive years, the test 
group of companies recognised zero goodwill impairment because their current 
year pre-write-off earnings are higher than the control group of companies. This 
result suggests that the test group chose to go against the market capitalisation 
indication which exists for three consecutive years (by recognising zero goodwill 
impairment) because their current year pre-write-off earnings are better than 
the control group. Therefore, in the case of the current year pre-write-off 
earnings, this finding indicates that the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment exercised by the test group reflects the economic 
factors. 
9.5.1.2 Change in pre-write-off earnings 
(∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) 
Change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year 
(∆EARNINGSpreGWIL) is found marginally significant (at p-value less than 0.10) in 
Model B - Diagnostics test I, and statistically significant in Model B - Diagnostics 
test II (see Table 9.2). The positive direction observed for ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL 
provides support to the economic factors (see H3 in Appendix 1 of the thesis). 
This result suggests that the better the performance of a company, which is 
reflected as positive value for ∆EARNINGSpreGWIL, the higher the likelihood they 
will exercise recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. In 
this context, when comparing two groups with similar experiences of market 
capitalisation indication for three consecutive years, the test group of companies 
are found to have recognised zero goodwill impairment in order to reflect the 
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companies‘ better performance. This result suggests that the test group chose to 
go against the market capitalisation indication which exists for three consecutive 
years (by recognising zero goodwill impairment) because their change in pre-
write-off earnings are better than the control group. Therefore, for the change in 
pre-write-off earnings, this finding indicates that the recognition choice related 
to reporting zero goodwill impairment exercised by the test group reflects the 
economic factors. 
9.5.1.3 Change in operating cash flows (∆OCF) 
Change in operating cash flows from prior year to current year (∆OCF) is found 
statistically significant in explaining the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment in Model A - Diagnostic test II, and in Model B - 
Diagnostic test II (see Table 9.2). However, the variable is found significant in a 
negative direction, which is contrary to the prediction set for the economic 
factors (see H4 in Appendix 1 of the thesis). This result indicates that in 
comparing two groups of companies - the test group vs. the control group, the 
test group of companies recognised zero goodwill impairment because changes in 
their operating cash flows from prior year to current year are lower than those of 
the control group. Thus, this result suggests that the test group chose to go 
against the market capitalisation indication which exists for three consecutive 
years (by recognising zero goodwill impairment) because their change in 
operating cash flows from prior year to current year are worse than the control 
group.  
The result for the change in operating cash flows from prior year to current year 
discussed in the above paragraph conflicts with the results for the current year 
pre-write-off earnings (discussed in Section 9.5.1.1) and change in pre-write-off 
earnings from prior year to current year (discussed in Section 9.5.1.2). To 
understand these conflicting results, a detailed inspection of the change in 
operating cash flows for all of the 108 companies is carried out. The inspection 
reveals no unusual pattern of the operating cash flows. Companies which 
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recognised zero goodwill impairment have lower change in operating cash flows 
from prior year to current year than companies which recognised goodwill 
impairment losses. Accordingly, the result of the change in operating cash flows 
indicates that the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment exercised by the test group do not reflects the economic factors. 
Because change in operating cash flows measures the cash-related performance 
attributes (see Section 5.4.3), it is possible that the managers are recognising 
zero goodwill impairment in the belief that the company‘s performance (i.e. in 
terms of its operating cash flows) will improve in the future. 
9.5.2 Research Question 10: Contracting perspective 
Debt ratio, the only variable testing the contracting perspective is non-significant 
in explaining the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill 
impairment (see Table 9.2). Therefore, the null hypothesis for H7-Null (see Section 
5.5) cannot be rejected. As discussed in Section 8.7, the non-significance of 
DEBTRATIO in the measurement study could be due to the indirect proxy 
employed. Thus, similar to the measurement study, the recognition study also 
could not provide evidence on the applicability of the contracting perspective in 
explaining the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment 
for companies which have their market values lower than the book values of their 
net assets for three consecutive years. 
9.5.3 Research Question 11: Opportunistic behaviour 
perspective  
Four variables are employed to test the applicability of an opportunistic 
behaviour perspective in explaining the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment. These variables are: change in CEO, CEO tenure, big 
bath reporting behaviour, and earnings smoothing activities (see Sections 5.6.1 to 
5.6.4). Table 9.2 shows that none of these variables is statistically significant in 
the binary logistic regression models employed - Model A and Model B. Therefore, 
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the null hypothesis set in H8-Null for change in CEO (see Section 5.6.1), H9-Null for 
CEO tenure (see Section 5.6.2),  H10-Null for big bath reporting (see Section 5.6.3), 
and H11-Null for earnings smoothing (see Section 5.6.4) cannot be rejected. Hence, 
the results of the present chapter could not provide evidence that managers 
exercised recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment for 
opportunistic reporting. 
There are two possible reasons for the non-significance of these variables. 
Firstly, for the CEO tenure, as discussed in detail in Section 8.8.2, the variable 
which measured the number of years a CEO held a position is an indirect proxy 
for whether a CEO is responsible in business acquisitions which lead to an 
existence of goodwill. 
Secondly, for ∆CEO, the non-significance of this variable means that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. This could occur because the small number of 
observations and less variation in the test group and the control group. As shown 
in Appendix 9.2, only 10 CEO changes took place of which five are from the test 
group and five from the control group.  
A point for discussion is that big bath reporting (BATH) is found non-significant in 
Models A and B (see Table 9.2). However, in the sensitivity analysis using prior 
year pre-write-off earnings (see Appendix 9.3), the variable is found statistically 
significant, in a positive direction, in the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment. The positive direction observed suggests that 
companies which recognised zero goodwill impairment (the test group) reported 
lower BATH than companies which recognised goodwill impairment losses (the 
control group). This result indicates that the variable, BATH, test companies‘ 
motives in reporting goodwill impairment losses and not companies‘ motives in 
reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
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9.5.4 Research Question 12: Ownership structures 
Two variables are employed to test the influence of company ownership 
structures, i.e., managerial ownership (MANOWNNon-monotonic) and outside 
ownership concentration (OUTCON). Table 9.2 reports that MANOWNNon-monotonic 
(i.e. MANOWN1, MANOWN2, and MANOWN3) is non-significant in the recognition 
choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. Accordingly, the null 
hypothesis for H12B-Null (see Section 5.7.1) cannot be rejected. 
Meanwhile, outside ownership concentration (OUTCON) is statistically significant 
in Models A and B, for both Diagnostics test I and Diagnostics test II. The 
statistically significant result, in a positive direction, suggests that the higher the 
outside ownership concentration, the more likely it is for the companies to 
recognise zero goodwill impairment. This result indicates that outside ownership 
concentration play an influential role in recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment in companies which have market values below the book 
values of their net assets for three consecutive years. Hence, the result suggests 
that the test group chose to go against the market capitalisation indication which 
exists for three consecutive years (by recognising zero goodwill impairment) 
because their outside ownership concentration is higher than the control group.  
The descriptive analysis in Appendix 9.1 shows the outside ownership 
concentration for the test group has a mean value of 0.47 (median value of 0.49) 
while the control group has a mean value of 0.42 (median value of 0.45). Looking 
at the descriptive analysis and the regression result from another perspective, 
the finding suggests that despite an indication that goodwill may be impaired 
which prevail for three consecutive years in these companies, the managers 
choose to go against the market capitalisation indication by recognising zero 
goodwill impairment because of the high concentration of outside ownership. 
This implies that in companies with high outside ownership concentration, when 
recognising zero goodwill impairment, the managers are less influenced by the 
market capitalisation indication which exists for three consecutive years.  
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9.5.5 Company-specific factors (control variables)  
Three variables are employed to control for company-specific factors, i.e. SIZE, 
Industry (INDUSTRYG5), and addition of goodwill (ADD). Apart from SIZE, the 
other two variables are found non-significant in the recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment. Accordingly, the null hypotheses set in H17-
Null for INDUSTRYG5 (see Section 5.9.2) and   H19-Null for ADD (see Section 5.9.4) 
cannot be rejected.  
Because of the mixed results documented by prior studies, there is no prediction 
sign formed on the association between SIZE and the recognition choice related 
to reporting zero goodwill impairment (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). The 
regression result reported in Table 9.2 shows that size is statistically significant 
in a negative direction, suggesting that the greater the company size, the lower 
the likelihood of recognising zero goodwill impairment.  
9.6 Summary and conclusions  
This chapter has analysed factors influencing the recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment in a specific setting whereby companies have 
their market values lower than the book values of their net assets for three 
consecutive years. In this setting, companies which recognise zero goodwill 
impairment are considered as exercising a recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment. They are referred to as a test group and are being 
tested against a control group of companies. The control group is a group of 
companies which experience similar condition (i.e. their market values are below 
the book values of the net assets for three consecutive years); however, they 
report goodwill impairment losses at the end of the third year. 
Factors influencing the recognition choice are grouped into economic factors (see 
Section 9.5.1), contracting perspective (see Section 9.5.2), opportunistic 
behaviour perspective (see Section 9.5.3), ownership structures (see Section 
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9.5.4), and company-specific factors (see Section 9.5.5). In analysing these 
factors, two binary logistic models have been constructed (i.e. Model A, and 
Model B) with two regression diagnostics tests undertaken (see Sections 9.4.1 to 
9.4.2).  
Overall, by recognising zero goodwill impairment when companies‘ market values 
are below the book values of their net assets for three consecutive years, the 
managers of such companies chose to go against the market capitalisation 
indication which is stated in FRS 136 Impairment of Assets. This choice can be 
explained partly by three main factors. These are: (i) economic factors (i.e. 
current year pre-write-off earnings, prior year pre-write-off earnings, change in 
pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year, and change in operating 
cash flows from prior year to current year), (ii) ownership structures (i.e. outside 
ownership concentration), and (iii) size of company.  
The results for the current year pre-write-off earnings, prior year pre-write-off 
earnings, and change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year 
suggest that the recognition choice exercised reflect the economic factors. On 
the other hand, the result for the change in operating cash flows from prior year 
to current year suggests that the recognition choice exercised does not reflect 
the economic factors. Similarly, for the outside ownership concentration, the 
result suggests that companies in the test group chose to go against the market 
capitalisation indication which exists for three consecutive years (by recognising 
zero goodwill impairment) because of their higher outside ownership 
concentration compared to companies in the control group. 
At the same time, the binary logistic regression results could not provide 
evidence on the applicability of the contracting perspective, or the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective, in explaining the recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment.  
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The results of the present chapter, therefore, contribute to the literature of 
accounting choices related to goodwill impairment in three ways.  
Firstly, as discussed in the above paragraphs, the recognition study provides 
empirical evidence on the influence of the economic factors (i.e. companies‘ 
pre-write-off earnings, and change in operating cash flows) and size of company 
on the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
Secondly, it provides new empirical evidence on the influence of outside 
ownership concentration on the recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment. The result reveals that the higher the outside ownership 
concentrated, the more likely it is for the companies to exercise the recognition 
choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
Thirdly, it provides Malaysian literature, for the first time, with a research 
setting designed to capture evidence of a recognition choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies after the 
implementation of FRS 3. This setting could also be tested in listed companies in 
other countries which have concentrated ownership, such as the Asian developing 
countries. 
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Appendix 9.1: Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables  
 
  
All observations 
(N = 132 companies) 
Test group 
Choice 
(N = 96) 
Control group 
No choice 
(N = 36) 
Test of 
differences  
N Missi
ng 
values 
Mean Median 
 
SD Mean Median 
 
SD Mean Median 
 
SD Mean  
p-
value 
Median  
p-value 
Economic factors              
∆SALES (H1) 130 2 0.025 0.005 0.182 0.037 0.014 0.160 (0.007) (0.005) 0.230 0.302 0.234 
EARNINGSPriorPreGWIL  130 2 0.023 0.028 0.058 0.028 0.031 0.057 0.010 0.019 0.059 0.122 0.144 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent 
(H2B)  
130 2 0.017 0.022 0.073 0.029 0.024 0.046 (0.017) 0.019 0.112 0.022 0.120 
∆EARNINGSpreGWIL(H3)  130 2 (0.006) 0.001 0.074 0.002 0.001 0.055 (0.027) 0.003 0.107 0.135 0.517 
∆OCF (H4) 131 1 0.009 0.015 0.134 0.003 0.018 0.127 0.024 0.012 0.152 0.436 0.892 
BTM (H5) 132 0 3.149 2.550 1.979 3.154 2.545 1.989 3.136 2.600 1.982 0.963 0.818 
GWB (H6) 131 1 0.044 0.016 0.082 0.040 0.014 0.084 0.054 0.019 0.074 0.385 0.162 
Contracting perspective             
DEBTRATIO (H7) 128 4 0.257 0.260 0.166 0.254 0.251 0.162 0.266 0.265 0.177 0.716 0.783 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective           
CEOTENURE (H9) 123 9 8.894 7.000 6.792 9.281 7.000 6.695 7.882 6.000 7.040 0.309 0.141 
BATH (H10) 130 2 (0.019) 0.000 0.059 (0.012) 0.000 0.034 (0.039) 0.000 0.097 0.110 0.204 
SMOOTH (H11) 130 2 0.013 0.000 0.037 0.014 0.000 0.038 0.011 0.000 0.034 0.680 0.576 
Ownership structure             
MANOWN1 (H12B1) 120 12 3.027 4.650 2.238 2.965 4.235 2.241 3.182 5.000 2.258 0.635 0.541 
MANOWN2 (H12B2) 120 12 5.158 0.000 7.557 4.538 0.000 7.001 6.726 1.055 8.727 0.154 0.349 
MANOWN3 (H12B3) 120 12 1.927 0.000 5.809 1.361 0.000 4.246 3.360 0.000 8.502 0.198 0.195 
OUTCON (H13) 121 11 45.751 47.050 19.780 47.105 49.130 19.669 42.286 45.485 19.932 0.230 0.235 
Control variables              
SIZE (H16) 132 0 12.647 12.545 1.039 12.601 12.525 1.105 12.770 12.555 0.839 0.408 0.300 
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Appendix 9.2: Descriptive statistics for the categorical variables  
 
 
Variables 
Number of observations (count) Chi-square test of 
independence (Choice 
vs. No choice) 
All Missing 
values 
Test group 
 
 - Choice 
Control 
group  
- No choice Value Sig.  
(2-tailed 
test) 
Contracting perspective     
 
 
 
2.482 
 
 
 
 
0.115 
∆CEOCurrent/prior (H8)  123 9   
-  Change    5 5 
-  No Change   83 30 
 
Control variables    
ADD (H19) 132 -    
0.016 
 
 
0.901 - Yes   11 4 
- No   84 33 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17) - 
(1) Industrials and 
Basic materials 
   
42 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
3.621 
 
 
 
 
 
0.460 
(2) Consumer goods  
     and services 
  32 12 
 
(3) Financials   15 4 
(4) Utilities, 
healthcare,Oil and 
gas 
  3 1 
(5) Technology and     
Telecommunication 
  4 4 
Total 131 1 96 35 
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Appendix 9.3: Sensitivity analysis for current year pre-write-off earnings by 
replacing it with prior year pre-write-off earnings  
 
  
 
Sign 
 
The  results of coefficients (Wald statistics)  
Model A 
Full model 
(as in Section 9.3) 
Diagnostics tests 
Test I Test II 
Observations (N)  108 116 113 
Intercept  6.334 
(2.591) 
4.174 
(2.292) 
6.718 
(4.802)** 
Economic factors     
∆SALES (H1)  + -0.119 
(0.006) 
0.994 
(0.529) 
1.838 
(1.367) 
EARNINGSPreGWILprior  + 16.611 
(4.847)** 
7.710 
(3.625)* 
9.151 
(4.469)** 
∆OCF (H4) + -0.119 
(2.557) 
-2.814 
(2.192) 
-6.492 
(6.465)** 
BTM (H5) - 16.611 
(0.139) 
0.024 
(0.043) 
0.065 
(0.248) 
GWB (H6) - -0.295 
(0.007) 
- - 
Contracting perspective    
DEBTRATIO (H7) ? 2.224 
(1.472) 
1.276 
(0.706) 
1.213 
(0.552) 
Opportunistic behaviour perspective   
∆CEOCurrent/prior (H8) - 0.217 
(0.038) 
- - 
CEOTENURE (H9) + -0.021 
(0.257) 
- - 
BATH (H10) + 9.514 
(3.125)* 
8.157 
(4.662)** 
10.589 
(6.812)*** 
SMOOTH (H11) - 13.840 
(1.745) 
- - 
Ownership structure     
MANOWN1 (H12B1) ? 0.037 
(0.056) 
- - 
MANOWN2 (H12B2) ? 0.027 
(0.207) 
  
MANOWN3 (H12B3) ? -0.108 
(2.781)* 
  
OUTCON (H13) ? 0.022 
(1.243) 
0.022 
(3.145)* 
0.034 
(5.756)** 
Control variables     
SIZE (H16) ? -0.572 
(3.324)* 
-0.362 
(2.702) 
-0.590 
(5.622)** 
INDUSTRYG5 (H17)  
1 - Indust and basic mat. 
 
 
? 
- - - 
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Sign 
 
The  results of coefficients (Wald statistics)  
Model A 
Full model 
(as in Section 9.3) 
Diagnostics tests 
Test I Test II 
2 - Consumer goods and  
     services 
 
 
-0.226 
(0.132) 
- - 
3 – Financials  1.099 
(1.196) 
- - 
4 - Utilities, health, Oil and 
Gas 
 -1.495 
(1.112) 
- - 
5 - Technology and 
     Telecom. 
 
 
-2.013 
(2.747)* 
- - 
ADD (H19) - 0.910 
(0.839) 
- - 
-2 Log likelihood  106.917 125.873 107.793 
Chi-square  24.34 NS 14.465* 24.987*** 
Hosmer-Lemeshow  0.736 0.488 0.485 
Cox and Snell R Square  0.202 0.117 0.198 
Nagelkerke R Square  0.287 0.167 0.287 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed) 
    
       NS denotes Not significant 
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Chapter 10: Discussion and Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter has two main purposes. Firstly, it reviews briefly the 
achievement of the four research objectives, which have been formulated at the 
outset of this thesis (see Section 1.3). Secondly, it discusses the contributions of 
the study in relation to the research objectives and extant literatures, explains 
its limitations, and offers suggestions for future research. 
This chapter is structured into six sections including the introduction. Section 
10.2 reiterates the overall aim of this thesis and the four research objectives. 
Section 10.3 describes briefly the achievement of the four research objectives. 
At the end of the section, a synthesis of accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment is presented. Section 10.4 discusses the contributions of the thesis. 
Section 10.5 explains the limitations of the study. Section 10.6 concludes the 
chapter by offering suggestions for future research. 
10.2  Research aim and objectives 
This thesis has sought to analyse accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment exercised by listed companies in Malaysia in the first three years of 
the implementation of FRS 3 Business Combinations (i.e. 2006/7 to 2008/9) (see 
Section 1.3). Table 10.1 reiterates the four research objectives of the thesis as 
set out in Section 1.3. Next, Section 10.3 describes briefly the achievement of 
the four research objectives.  
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Table 10.1: Summary of research objectives 
 
Theoretical research objective 
 
1. 
 
To assess the applicability of theories of accounting choice in explaining 
the implementation decisions related to goodwill impairment by 
Malaysian listed companies. 
 
 
Specific research objectives 
             Empirical  
             chapters 
 
2. 
 
To explore, via the annual reports of companies, types of 
accounting choice related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies after the 
implementation of FRS 3. 
 
 
Disclosure 
study - 
Chapter7 
3. To analyse factors influencing managers‘ decisions when 
determining the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses 
divided by prior year total assets (including goodwill), 
and zero otherwise reported on the income statement. 
 
Measurement 
study - 
Chapter 8 
4. To analyse factors influencing the recognition choice 
related to reporting zero goodwill impairment exercised 
by Malaysian listed companies in a situation where 
companies‘ market values are lower than the book values 
of their net assets for three consecutive years. 
 
Recognition 
study - 
Chapter 9 
10.3 Achievement of the four research objectives 
This section describes briefly77 how the four research objectives of this thesis 
(see Table 10.1) have been achieved by answering 12 research questions (see 
Section 1.3). At the end of the section, a synthesis of accounting choices related 
to goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies is presented (see 
Section 10.3.5).  
10.3.1 Objective 1: Theoretical research question 
The first research objective has sought to assess the applicability of theories of 
accounting choice in explaining the implementation decisions related to goodwill 
                                         
77 Detailed discussions of these findings in relation to the extant literature have been carried in 
each of the empirical chapters (see Chapters 7-9). 
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impairment by Malaysian listed companies (see Table 10.1), focusing on Research 
Question 1: 
How can an investigation of FRS 3, focusing on goodwill impairment by 
Malaysian listed companies, contribute to the theories of accounting 
choice? 
Two perspectives of accounting choices have been tested in this thesis, i.e. the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective (see Sections 8.8 and 9.5.3), and the 
contracting perspective (see Sections 8.7 and 9.5.2). For the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective, the measurement study has provided empirical evidence 
on the applicability of this perspective in explaining the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. The evidence is presented 
through the statistically significant results for three variables, i.e. change in 
CEO, big bath reporting, and earnings smoothing (see Section 10.3.3 for detail 
discussion). However, in the recognition study, the non-significance results of 
these three variables could not provide evidence on the applicability of the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective in explaining the recognition choice related 
to reporting zero goodwill (see Section 10.3.4 for detailed discussion).   
For the contracting perspective, the non-significance of the debt ratio, a variable 
testing the debt hypothesis, both in the measurement and recognition studies 
suggest that the two studies could not provide evidence on the applicability of 
the debt hypothesis in explaining the implementation decisions related to 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies (see Section 10.4.1.1 for 
detail).  
See Sections 10.4.1 to 10.4.1.2 for detailed discussion of the applicability of 
these two perspectives of accounting choice. 
10.3.2  Objective 2: Disclosure study of goodwill 
impairment 
The second research objective has aimed to explore, via the annual reports of 
companies, types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment exercised 
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by Malaysian listed companies after the implementation of FRS 3 (see Table 
10.1). This aim has been achieved in the disclosure study of goodwill impairment 
by answering two research questions - Research Question 2 and Research 
Question 3 (detailed below). 
Research Question 2:  
To what extent is the market capitalisation indication (i.e. companies’ 
market values lower than the book values of their net assets at the 
balance sheet date) an appropriate proxy for an indication that 
goodwill may be impaired? 
Research Question 2 has been addressed in part one of the disclosure study (see 
Section 7.2) by comparing two types of information, which represent the 
observed practice with stated explanation. The data compared are: (i) the 
market capitalisation indication of companies (i.e. where market values are 
lower than the book values of net assets at the balance sheet date), and (ii) 
reasons for companies reporting goodwill impairment (both zero, and goodwill 
impairment losses) disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement (see Section 
1.4.1).  
The results of part one of the disclosure study show that the market 
capitalisation indication can be employed as a starting point in identifying types 
of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian 
listed companies (see Sections 7.2 and 7.4). However, it cannot be applied as a 
stand-alone indicator that goodwill might be impaired. This is because the 
market capitalisation indication does not fully reflect the condition of the cash-
generating-units containing goodwill, disclosed in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement. This finding suggests that to identify the types of accounting choice, 
further information, in addition to the market capitalisation indication, is 
needed, such as companies‘ financial performances and segment results 
containing goodwill. 
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Following on from this suggestion, a disclosure framework has been constructed. 
The disclosure framework takes into account six key items of data: (i) goodwill 
data, (ii) segment result, (iii) financial performance, (iv) the market 
capitalisation indication, (v) reasons for reporting goodwill impairment loss 
disclosed in the Notes to the Financial Statement, and (vi) audit report 
concerning goodwill (see Figure 6.2 in Section 6.5.2.2).  
Using the self-constructed disclosure framework, Research Question 3 has been 
answered in part two of the disclosure study (see Section 7.3).  
Research Question 3: 
 What are the types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies which can be identified 
through detailed analysis of annual reports? 
From the result of part one of the disclosure study, 20 companies which are 
categorised into Group 2 and reported goodwill impairment losses have been 
selected. Using the self-constructed disclosure framework, an in-depth analysis 
of goodwill movement of these 20 companies for the past several years 
(depending on the traceability of goodwill impairment losses backward from the 
write-off year to the acquisition year) has been undertaken (see Section 7.3).  
The result reveals three types of accounting choice related to goodwill 
impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies (see Section 7.3). These are, 
delayed reporting goodwill impairment losses for four companies (see Section 
7.3.1), timing in reporting goodwill write-off from goodwill which arose from an 
apparent overpayment made at the time of business acquisition for eight 
companies (see Section 7.3.2), and systematic reduction of goodwill balance for 
two companies (see Section 7.3.3). The first two types of accounting choice 
reflect the exercise of managerial discretion in terms of timing in reporting the 
impairment losses. The last type of accounting choice reflects companies‘ 
attempt in perpetuating the old system of amortising its goodwill balance 
systematically every year (see Section 7.4). 
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10.3.3 Objective 3: Measurement study of goodwill 
impairment 
The third research objective has sought to analyse factors influencing managers‘ 
decisions when determining the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses divided 
by prior year total assets (including goodwill), and zero otherwise reported on 
the income statement (see Table 10.1). Using the total population of Malaysian 
listed companies implementing FRS 3 in the first three years of the standard 
taking effect (i.e. 2006/7 to 2008/9), this aim has been achieved in the 
measurement study of goodwill impairment by answering five research questions 
(i.e. Research Question 4 to Research Question 8). The following paragraphs 
specify each of these research questions and briefly review their key findings.  
Research Question 4 tests the influence of the economic factors on the 
measurement of goodwill impairment as follows: 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect the 
underlying economic values of cash-generating-units containing 
goodwill? 
The key finding for the economic factors is that there is consistent evidence of 
pre-write-off earnings (EARNINGSPreGWILprior, EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent, and 
ΔEARNINGSpreGWIL) influencing the measurement of goodwill impairment by 
Malaysian listed companies (see Section 8.6).  
When pre-write-off earnings are measured at one specific point in time (as in 
EARNINGSPreGWILprior in Section 8.6.2.1, and EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent in Section 
8.6.2.2), the statistically significant negative association between the pre-write-
off earnings and the reporting of goodwill impairment losses shows that as the 
pre-write-off earnings increase, lower goodwill impairment losses are reported. 
This suggests that the managers‘ decisions when determining the impairment 
losses reflect companies‘ economic factors.  
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However, when the earnings of companies are measured as a change in pre-
write-off earnings from prior year to current year (as in ΔEARNINGSpreGWIL – see 
Section 8.6.2.3), the statistically significant positive association between the 
change in pre-write-off earnings and the reporting of goodwill impairment losses 
shows that as change in pre-write-off earnings increase, higher goodwill 
impairment losses are reported. This result points to the possibility of companies 
exercising an accounting choice. This is because the decisions when determining 
the impairment losses do not reflect companies‘ economic factors.  
Detailed discussion of the two conflicting results for companies‘ pre-write-off 
earnings is presented in Section 10.4.2.2.  
Research Question 5 deals with the contracting perspective as follows: 
 To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment support the contracting perspective? 
In the present study, due to the unavailability of data relating to actual debt 
covenants, debt ratio (leverage) has been employed as a proxy for companies‘ 
closeness to the debt covenant violations (see Section 5.5). The result shows that 
debt ratio is non-significant in nearly all of the regression models in explaining 
the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies (see 
Section 8.7). Thus, the present study could not provide evidence to support the 
contracting perspective, in particular, the debt hypothesis. 
Detailed discussion of the contracting perspective is presented in Section 
10.4.1.1. 
Research Question 6 deals with the opportunistic behaviour perspective: 
 To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment support the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective? 
Four variables have been employed to test the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective, i.e. CEO tenure, change in CEO, big bath reporting, and earnings 
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smoothing (see Section 5.6). CEO tenure is found non-significant while the last 
three variables are found statistically significant in explaining the measurement 
of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies (see Sections 8.8.1 to 
8.8.4). The statistically significant results for these three variables provide 
evidence to support the opportunistic behaviour perspective. 
See Section 10.4.1.2 for the detailed discussion of the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective. 
Research Question 7 tests the influence of ownership structures of companies on 
the measurement of goodwill impairment: 
To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect companies’ 
ownership structures? 
Two variables are employed to test the ownership structures of companies, i.e. 
managerial ownership, and outside ownership concentration (see Section 8.9). 
Both of these variables are found to play influential roles in the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies.  
For managerial ownership, when the board of executive directors collectively 
increase their shareholding from 0% to less than 5%, lower goodwill impairment 
losses are reported. However, once the board of directors collectively owns 5% or 
more of the shares, managerial ownership is statistically non-significant in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies (see Section 10.4.2.1 for detailed). 
For outside ownership concentration, as the top five outside shareholders (i.e. 
institutions, blockholders, and other individuals outside the company) increase 
the proportion of shares held, lower goodwill impairment losses are reported 
(see Section 8.9.2). Prior studies (e.g. Niehaus, 1989: 271-272; Astami and 
Tower, 2006: 8) associate an increase in outside ownership concentration with an 
increase in the monitoring of management by shareholders (see Section 5.7.2). 
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Following this explanation, the negative association between outside ownership 
concentration and reporting goodwill impairment losses suggests that as the level 
of outside ownership concentration increases, indicating increases in outside 
monitoring, lower goodwill impairment losses are reported. 
The final research question for the measurement study, Research Question 8 is as 
follows: 
 To what extent do the decisions of Malaysian listed companies in 
measuring goodwill impairment indicate that they reflect the discretion 
available in FRS 136 Impairment of Assets? 
All of the variables testing the discretion related to CGUs and discount rates (i.e. 
CGU01, CGUContinuous, DISCRATE, DISCMULTIPLE, and DISCRATEDisclosed/Not) are found 
non-significant in the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies (see Section 8.10). Thus, the present study could not find evidence to 
support the arguments made by prior studies (e.g. Guler, 2007: 11; AbuGhazaleh 
et al., 2011: 169 and 180), that if managers have an incentive to overstate or 
understate goodwill impairment losses, they can be selective in applying 
estimates and judgements while performing an impairment test of goodwill (see 
Section 4.4).  
The non-significance of these variables could be due to managers not exploiting 
the discretion they have in reporting goodwill impairment losses. Alternatively, 
because the discretion (e.g. CGUs and discounts rates) is part of the disclosure 
requirements of FRS 136, and thus readily observable, managers might not make 
use of this discretion. Instead, they might exercise their discretion through cash 
flows projections, which companies are not required to disclose in the Notes to 
the Financial Statement. 
10.3.4 Objective 4: Recognition study of goodwill 
impairment  
The fourth research objective has aimed to analyse factors influencing the 
recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment exercised by 
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Malaysian listed companies in a situation where companies‘ market values are 
lower than the book values of their net assets for three consecutive years (see 
Table 10.1). This objective has been addressed in the recognition study of 
goodwill impairment by focusing on 77 companies (after missing values) which 
recognised zero goodwill impairment when market values are lower than the 
book values of their net assets for three consecutive years (see Figure 9.3 in 
Section 9.2.1). These companies are tested against a control group of companies 
(31 companies) which experienced a similar condition (i.e. companies which have 
market values below the book values of their net assets for three consecutive 
years) but who reported goodwill impairment losses at the end of the third year. 
The aim of the recognition study has been accomplished by answering four 
research questions (Research Questions 9 to 12 – see Section 1.3).  
Specifically, Research Questions 9 to 12 cover four factors which potentially 
influence the recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
These are: economic factors (in Research Question 9), the contracting 
perspective (in Research Question 10), the opportunistic behaviour perspective 
(in Research Question 11), and the ownership structures of companies (in 
Research Question 12) (see Figure 5.1 in Section 5.2). Overall, the results show 
that two main factors play influential roles in the recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment in companies which have market values 
below the book values of their net assets for three consecutive years. These are: 
(i) economic factors (i.e. increase in the current year pre-write-off earnings, or 
increase in change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year, and 
a decrease in change in operating cash flows from prior year to current year), 
and (ii) ownership structures (i.e. increase in outside ownership concentration). 
Also, the recognition study found that the greater the company size (measured in 
terms of total assets), the lower the likelihood of recognising zero goodwill 
impairment. However, the recognition study could not provide evidence on the 
applicability of the contracting perspective and the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective in explaining the recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment. 
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10.3.5 Synthesis of accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment exercised by Malaysian listed 
companies 
This thesis has analysed accounting choices related to goodwill impairment 
exercised by Malaysian listed companies in the first three years of the 
implementation of FRS 3. The accounting choices are identified by the 
implementation decisions made by managers (see Section 1.1). Three aspects of 
the implementation decisions are examined, namely, disclosure, measurement, 
and recognition of goodwill impairment. In the disclosure study, using a self-
constructed disclosure framework, types of accounting choice related to goodwill 
impairment are identified (see Section 7.3). In the measurement study, 
accounting choices related to goodwill impairment losses are inferred based on 
companies‘ hypothesised motives in reporting goodwill impairment losses (see 
Section 8.13). In the recognition study, evidence of a recognition choice related 
to reporting zero goodwill impairment is captured in a specific setting, and 
factors influencing this choice are analysed (see Section 9.6). 
An attempt has been made to synthesise accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment exercised by Malaysian listed companies (see Section 8.12.2 for 
detail). This is done by selecting 10 companies found to be engaging in earnings 
smoothing, with no change in their CEO, and where the management hold the 
top 10 highest proportion of shares (i.e. ranging from 31.78% to 51.70%). These 
10 companies are then analysed in detail using the self-constructed disclosure 
framework. The purpose is to understand the reasons why continuing CEOs, or 
top managers holding a large proportion of company shares, would reduce the 
goodwill balance by reporting goodwill impairment losses, merely for earnings 
smoothing purposes. The result reveals that four78 companies reported goodwill 
impairment losses because of the characteristic of the goodwill - two companies 
impaired goodwill which arose from an apparent overpayment made at the time 
of acquisition, and a further two companies impaired goodwill immediately upon 
acquisition. These results suggest that managers of these four companies had 
                                         
78 The remaining six companies‘ reasons could not be identified by the researcher. 
 299 
already decided on the amount of goodwill impairment losses to be reported. 
When their companies encountered a larger positive pre-write-off earnings 
surprise (i.e. existence of earnings smoothing – see Section 10.4.1.2 for detail), 
the managers take the opportunity to eliminate the goodwill by reporting the 
impairment loss. 
The results discussed above, despite involving a small number of companies (10 
companies), help contextualise one of the motives of Malaysian listed companies 
for engaging in earnings smoothing by reporting goodwill impairment losses. By 
undertaking different approaches in analysing accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment, this thesis demonstrates that a wider picture in 
understanding accounting choices related to goodwill impairment exercised by 
Malaysian listed companies can be provided. Specifically, the disclosure study 
discovers characteristics of goodwill that are most likely to be impaired, such as 
goodwill that arose from an apparent overpayment made at the time of 
acquisition (see Section 7.3.2), or goodwill that has been overdue (in the case of 
companies that delayed reporting goodwill impairment losses - see Section 
7.3.1). In addition, the measurement study reveals when companies would impair 
these types of goodwill (e.g. when there is larger pre-write-off earnings 
surprise). 
In summary, three conclusions are reached from the empirical studies related to 
goodwill impairment conducted in this thesis. Firstly, the three empirical 
chapters have provided evidence of managers making accounting choices related 
to goodwill impairment that conflict with companies‘ economic factors. These 
choices are seen in terms of timing in reporting goodwill impairment losses on 
the income statement, companies‘ motives in measuring goodwill impairment 
losses, and companies‘ motives in recognising zero goodwill impairment when 
their market values are lower than the book values of their net assets for three 
consecutive years.  
Secondly, based on the motives of companies for reporting goodwill impairment 
losses derived from the measurement study, it is found that the number of 
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companies which are inferred to exercise accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment losses in Malaysia is not large. Table 10.2 groups the motives in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses for the total population of companies (i.e. 
1498 firm-years) which implemented FRS 3 in the first three years of the 
standard taking effect. The table shows that, of the 1498 firm-years, 14% of 
these firm-years (192 companies or 210 firm-years) motives for reporting 
goodwill impairment losses provide evidence of managerial opportunism. 
Table 10.2: Companies' motives in reporting goodwill impairment losses 
derived from the measurement study which examined the total 
population of companies from 2006/7 to 2008/7 
 
 
Motives No. of 
companies 
No. of firm-
years 
1. Earnings smoothing only 85 97 
2. Big bath reporting only 70 73 
3. Change in CEO   
 a. Change in CEO only 16 19 
 b. Change in CEO and Earnings smoothing 10 10 
 c. Change in CEO and Big bath reporting 
behaviour 
11 11 
 
     Total 192 210 
 
Total population of firm-years analysed 
  
1498 
Percentage of accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment losses 
 
14% 
Thirdly, the accounting choices related to goodwill impairment are mostly 
exercised by different companies with different motives. For example, in the 
measurement study (see Table 10.2), the decisions of a group of companies in 
reporting goodwill impairment losses are driven by earnings smoothing, while 
another group of companies are influenced by an incidence of a change in CEO. 
This explanation is supported by the non-significant result of Pearson product-
moment correlation between change in CEO and earnings smoothing variable, 
and the change in CEO and big bath reporting variable (result not reported). In 
only a few cases were the same companies found to have more than one motive 
for reporting goodwill impairment losses (e.g. 10 companies which have two 
motives - change in CEO and earnings smoothing shown in Table 10.2). 
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10.4  Research contributions 
This section discusses the contributions of this thesis in relation to the research 
objectives and extant literature. The discussion is structured into four main 
areas, i.e. theoretical contributions (see Section 10.4.1), empirical contributions 
(see Section 10.4.2), contribution to research design (see Section 10.4.3), and its 
policy implications (see Section 10.4.4). 
10.4.1 Contribution to theories of accounting choice 
(Objective 1) 
The review of literature in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.2) has highlighted a 
number of studies analysing goodwill impairment after the impairment-only 
approach in accounting for goodwill. The impairment-only approach was required 
by the IASB and the US FASB as part of their joint initiative on accounting for 
business combinations (see Section 4.2). Two perspectives of accounting choice 
that have been applied by these studies are the contracting perspective, and the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective. The review has illustrated that the majority 
of these studies focused on listed companies in developed economies, mainly in 
the US (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Guler, 2007; Zang, 2008; Ramanna and 
Watts, 2012) and also in Canada (i.e. Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008) and the UK 
(i.e. AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). However, there is a lack of studies focusing on 
goodwill impairment by listed companies in developing economies. 
The review of literature in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.3) has also revealed that 
listed companies in developed economies, such as the US and UK are found to 
have dispersed ownership whereas listed companies in developing economies, 
such as Malaysia are reported to have concentrated ownership (Leuz et al., 2003: 
516-517). In listed companies with concentrated ownership, the literature review 
has highlighted that the nature of agency problem might differ from those with 
dispersed ownership, in the sense that there are two potential agency problems. 
Firstly, there could be fewer agency problems, which arise from the separation 
of ownership and management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 754; Fan and Wong, 
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2002: 405). Secondly, when shareholders obtain a substantial portion of company 
shares, to the point at which they obtain an effective control of the company, 
the nature of the agency problem shifts (Fan and Wong, 2002: 405). Instead of a 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, the conflict is between 
controlling owners and minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002: 405) (see 
Section 2.3.3). The potentially different nature of the agency problem might 
affect the applicability of both the contracting perspective and the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective (which rely on the agency theory model of Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) in explaining the accounting choices related to goodwill 
impairment by companies with concentrated ownership.  
The present thesis tests the contracting perspective and the opportunistic 
behaviour perspective in Malaysian listed companies with concentrated 
ownership, neither of which have been explored comprehensively in prior studies 
analysing goodwill impairment. In doing so, this thesis makes a theoretical 
contribution by providing support for the opportunistic behaviour perspective in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies. Next, Sections 10.4.1.1 to 10.4.1.2 discuss the results of the 
contracting perspective and the opportunistic behaviour perspective 
respectively. 
10.4.1.1 Contracting perspective  
Because of the unavailability of data on management compensation plans, the 
only contracting perspective tested in this thesis is the debt hypothesis. In the 
context of goodwill impairment, the debt hypothesis suggests that companies 
which are close to violating their debt covenants are less likely to report goodwill 
impairment losses (see Section 5.5). In this thesis, due to an inability to 
investigate actual debt covenants (due to lack of data), debt ratio (leverage) has 
been employed as a proxy for companies‘ closeness to the debt covenant 
violations (see Section 5.5). The result shows that debt ratio is non-significant in 
nearly all of the regression models in explaining both the measurement and the 
recognition of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies (see Sections 
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8.7 and 9.5.2). The non-significance of the variable is possibly because of the 
indirect proxy employed (see Section 10.5 for the limitations of the study). Thus, 
the present study could not provide evidence on the applicability of the 
contracting perspective, in particular, the debt hypothesis in explaining both the 
measurement and the recognition of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies. 
10.4.1.2 Opportunistic behaviour perspective 
The development of hypotheses in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.6) noted that four 
variables have been employed in this thesis to test the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective, i.e. CEO tenure, change in CEO, big bath reporting, and earnings 
smoothing. In the measurement study, the last three variables are found 
statistically significant in the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian 
listed companies (see Sections 8.8.1, 8.8.3, and 8.8.4). In the recognition study, 
all the four variables are found non-significant (see Section 9.5.3). The next 
paragraphs discuss the applicability of the opportunistic behaviour perspective, 
based on the statistically significant results of these three variables - change in 
CEO, big bath reporting, and earnings smoothing respectively. 
Change in CEO attempts to capture the opportunistic behaviour of incoming CEOs 
in reporting goodwill impairment losses as soon as they join their new companies 
(see Section 5.6.1). To capture this behaviour, a dummy variable is created 
which is equal to one when there is a change in a CEO in the previous financial 
year or current financial year, and zero otherwise (see Appendix 1 of the thesis). 
The argument raised by prior studies (e.g. Riedl, 2004: 832; Francis, 2008: 628; 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 175) is that the newly appointed CEOs have the ability 
to attribute current losses to some aspect of the preceding CEO‘s poor 
management (see Section 5.6.1). This gives them the opportunity to take large 
asset write-offs and goodwill impairment losses as soon as joining new 
companies. Among the reporting incentives faced by the newly appointed CEOs 
are to reduce the benchmark against which their future performance will be 
evaluated, and to release future earnings from the losses, in the hope that this 
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might improve investors‘ perceptions of the companies‘ future performance (see 
Section 5.6.1). 
In the present measurement study, the statistically significant positive 
association between change in CEO and the reporting of goodwill impairment 
losses shows that incoming CEOs reported higher goodwill impairment losses than 
the continuing CEOs (see Section 8.8.1). The conclusion reached is that, to the 
extent the economic factors control for the performance of the underlying 
economic values of the assets, change in CEO may capture additional incentives 
for the new top managers to expedite future charges. Therefore, similar to prior 
studies (i.e. Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004), the result 
for the change in CEO provides support to an opportunistic behaviour 
perspective. 
From an opportunistic behaviour perspective, both big bath reporting hypothesis 
and earnings smoothing hypothesis related to asset write-offs shared a similar 
concept, in that managers have the ability to reduce the pre-write-off earnings 
because of the larger pre-write-off earnings surprise experienced by the 
companies. This gives them the opportunity to report asset write-offs or goodwill 
impairment losses (Riedl, 2004: 832-833; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 174-175). For 
the big bath hypothesis, larger pre-write-off earnings surprise refers to 
negative79 pre-write-off earnings surprise (see Section 5.6.3) whereas for 
earnings smoothing hypothesis, it refers to positive80 pre-write-off earnings 
surprise (see Section 5.6.4). Unlike change in CEO which emphasises the 
behaviour of incoming CEOs, prior studies of asset write-offs and goodwill 
impairment losses testing big bath hypothesis and earnings smoothing hypothesis 
do not differentiate between the behaviour of incoming CEOs and the existing 
CEOs. 
                                         
79 BATH is defined as a change in company‘s pre-write-off earnings from prior period to current 
period, divided by total assets at the end of prior period, when this change is below the median 
of non-zero negative values of this variable, and zero otherwise. 
80 SMOOTH is defined as a change in company pre-write-off earnings from prior period to current 
period, divided by total assets at the end of prior period, when this change is above the median 
of non-zero positive values of this variable, and zero otherwise. 
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With regard to big bath hypothesis, the statistically significant negative 
association between BATH and the reporting of goodwill impairment losses found 
in the present measurement study shows that the stronger the downward trend 
in companies‘ pre-write-off earnings, the higher the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses reported (see Section 8.8.3). The conclusion reached for the 
big bath reporting behaviour is that to the extent that change in pre-write-off 
earnings (one of the variables testing the economic factors - see Section 5.4.2.3) 
controls for the performance of the underlying economic values of the assets, 
BATH (i.e. change in pre-write-off earnings below the median of non-zero 
negative values) may capture an incremental effect relating to the big bath 
reporting incentives (see Section 8.8.3). Thus, similar to Riedl (2004: 833), the 
statistically significant result for BATH provides evidence of managerial 
opportunism in the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies. It is noted that there is an alternative interpretation of this result 
provided by prior study (e.g. AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 194). As discussed in 
Section 5.6.3, the larger negative pre-write-off earnings surprise could also imply 
that managers are taking a big bath to reveal private information about the 
company‘s true value (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 194). However, the tests 
conducted in the present measurement study do not distinguish between these 
two interpretations. 
As for the earnings smoothing hypothesis, the statistically significant positive 
association between SMOOTH and the reporting of goodwill impairment losses 
found in the present measurement study shows that the stronger the upward 
trend in the pre-write-off earnings, the higher the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses reported (see Section 8.8.4). The conclusion reached for the 
earnings smoothing is that to the extent the change in pre-write-off earnings (a 
variable testing the economic factors - see Section 5.4.2.3) control for the 
performance of the underlying economic values of the assets, SMOOTH (i.e. 
change in pre-write-off earnings above the median of non-zero positive values) 
may capture an incremental effect relating to the earnings smoothing incentives. 
Hence, the statistically significant result for SMOOTH in the present study 
provides support for an opportunistic behaviour perspective, indicating that 
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managers of Malaysian listed companies make use of goodwill impairment losses 
as a tool to smooth earnings (see Section 8.8.4).   
The result of the three variables testing the opportunistic behaviour perspective 
discussed above is consistent with those of prior studies investigating US (e.g. 
Francis et al., 1996: 125; Riedl, 2004: 843) and UK (i.e. AbuGhazaleh et al., 
2011: 190) listed companies. Specifically, this result revealed that even though 
Malaysian listed companies have concentrated ownership, in that the five largest 
outside shareholders (OUTCON) hold on average 46.816% of company shares (see 
Section 8.9), an opportunistic behaviour perspective is still applicable in 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment. With regard to these three 
variables, the result suggests that Malaysian listed companies which are found to 
have concentrated ownership behave similarly to listed companies in developed 
economies, such as the US and UK which are documented to have dispersed 
ownership. This result implies that concentrated ownership of companies does 
not prevent managerial opportunism.  
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, the nature of agency problem faced by listed 
companies with concentrated ownership might differ from those with dispersed 
ownership. That is, whether there is less agency problem arising from the 
separation of ownership and management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 754), or 
whether there is different nature of agency conflict that have existed (i.e. a 
conflict between controlling owners and minority shareholders) (Fan and Wong, 
2002: 405). Focusing on goodwill impairment reported by listed companies in 
Malaysia, the results of change in CEO, big bath reporting behaviour, and 
earnings smoothing activities suggest that with high outside ownership 
concentration, the opportunistic behaviour most probably occurs due to an 
agency conflict between the controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders.  
Fan and Wong (2002: 405), in explaining the conflict between the controlling 
shareholders and the minority shareholders, seem to associate the controlling 
shareholders with the managers of the companies (see Section 2.3.3). However, 
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this is not the case for Malaysian listed companies. This is because on average, 
managers of Malaysian listed companies hold 10.189%81 of shares (median 2.745%) 
(see Appendix 8.2 in Chapter 8). Moreover, the Pearson product moment-
correlation shows a negative correlation between outside ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership (see Table 8.2 in Section 8.3.2), 
suggesting that as outside ownership concentration increases, managerial 
ownership decreases. For the Malaysian listed companies analysed in this thesis, 
the concentration of ownership is with shareholders outside of the companies82.  
Therefore, in the context of the measurement study examines in this thesis, the 
statistically significant results for change in CEO, big bath reporting variable, and 
earnings smoothing variable contribute to theories of accounting choice by 
suggesting that opportunistic behaviour occurs due to an agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders (shareholders outside of the companies) and the 
minority shareholders. Within this conflict, managers would possibly act on 
behalf of the controlling shareholders at the expense of the minority 
shareholders. 
10.4.2  Empirical contributions 
The empirical contributions of this research relate to providing new evidence on 
factors influencing managerial decisions on the measurement of goodwill 
impairment by Malaysian listed companies (see Sections 10.4.2.1 to 10.4.2.2).  
                                         
81 This result is quite similar to Suphakasem (2008: 214) who reported the executive directors of 
Malaysian listed companies she analysed (for financial year ended 2004) hold on average 12.43% 
of the companies‘ shares. However, the result is lower than Ismail (2007: 131) and Mohd Ghazali 
(2004: 206) who documented mean executive director ownership of Malaysian listed companies 
they examined of 19.4% (for financial year ended 2001) and 21.42% (from 1996-2002) 
respectively. The lower percentage of shares owned by the executive directors reported in this 
thesis compared to these prior studies may be explained by the differences in the year of analysis 
and the categories of companies examined. 
82 Thus far, prior studies analysing ownership concentration of Malaysian listed companies (e.g. 
Mohd Ghazali, 2004; Astami and Tower, 2006; Suphakasem, 2008) do not differentiate between 
inside concentration and outside concentration. For examples, Mohd Ghazali (2004: 117) and 
Suphakasem (2008: 230) define ownership concentration as shares owned by the 10 largest 
shareholders; Astami and Tower (2006: 7) measure the ownership concentration as the 
‗percentage of the sum of all the ownership representing 10% or more of the total issued share 
capital‘. Thus, the result of the present study could not be compared with these prior studies. 
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10.4.2.1 Managerial ownership (Objective 3) 
The present thesis extends the idea of a non-monotonic relationship between 
managerial ownership and companies‘ performance, which has been popularised 
by Morck et al. (1988) into the field of goodwill impairment. The idea 
popularised by Morck et al. (1988) has also been extended by recent studies into 
other areas such as income smoothing, earnings management, and audit 
committee (see Section 5.7.1). Specifically, this thesis has analysed the non-
monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and the reporting of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies (see Section 5.7.1). Similar to 
Morck et al. (1988: 298), the non-monotonic relationship is analysed by 
segregating the managerial ownership into three categories: (i) MANOWN1 (0% to 
less than 5%), (ii) MANOWN2 (5% to less than 25%), and (iii) MANOWN3 (25% and 
more) (see Section 5.7.1). 
The result of the measurement study of this thesis reveals that as the managerial 
ownership increases from 0% to less than 5% (in MANOWN1), lower goodwill 
impairment losses are reported (see Section 8.9.1). However, when the 
managerial ownership stands at 5% or more (i.e. in MANOWN2 as well as 
MANOWN3), managerial ownership has no influential role in the measurement of 
goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed companies. The statistically significant 
result for managerial ownership (from 0% to less than 5%) provides support to the 
incentives effect, in that, as managerial ownership increases from 0% to less than 
5%, the incentives of managers becomes closely aligned with those of the 
shareholders. Because reporting goodwill impairment losses have an impact on 
companies‘ earnings, the managers might report lower goodwill impairment 
losses in order to portray companies‘ operating results in the most favourable 
manner to the shareholders (see Section 8.9.1 for detailed discussion of this 
finding). 
The result discussed above makes an empirical contribution by providing new 
evidence that in Malaysian listed companies where executive directors 
collectively hold a small portion of shares (below 5%), the decisions to report 
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goodwill impairment is influenced, in a negative direction, by the level of shares 
owned. This result also highlights the need to incorporates managerial ownership 
(using a non-monotonic approach - see Section 5.7.1) in order to provide a more 
comprehensive model of accounting choices related to goodwill impairment. 
10.4.2.2 Companies’ pre-write-off earnings (Objective 3) 
This thesis has also added to the literature of accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment with regard to the definitions of companies‘ pre-write-off 
earnings. Previous studies of asset write-off and goodwill impairment have either 
employed the earnings of companies at one specific point in time (e.g. prior year 
earnings in AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011: 170, see Section 8.6.2.1), or employed a 
change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year (e.g. Riedl, 
2004: 829; Guler, 2007: 21 and 23, see Section 8.6.2.3). Instead of selecting one 
of these earnings, this thesis has employed both measures of earnings and tested 
them in separate random-effects tobit regression models.  
By testing two different measures of earnings (i.e. earnings at one specific point 
in time, and change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year), 
the measurement study of this thesis has improved on the previous studies (e.g. 
Riedl, 2004, and AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). Hence, the measurement study has 
made an empirical contribution in terms of presenting new evidence on the 
relationship between companies‘ pre-write-off earnings and the reporting of 
goodwill impairment losses. The study has shown that companies are behaving 
differently with regard to goodwill impairment losses reported depending on 
their level of pre-write-off earnings (see Section 8.12.1). As current year pre-
write-off earnings increase, lower goodwill impairment losses are reported. 
However, as the gap between the current year pre-write-off earnings and the 
prior year pre-write-off earnings is large83, higher goodwill impairment losses are 
                                         
83 Large refers to BATH and SMOOTH. BATH is defined as change in pre-write-off earnings from 
prior year to current year, divided by total assets at the end of prior year, when this change is 
below the median of non-zero negative values of this variable, and zero otherwise. SMOOTH is 
defined as a change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year, divided by total 
assets at the end of prior year, when this change is above the median of non-zero positive values 
of this variable, and zero otherwise. 
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reported. This finding corroborates the finding of McNichols and Wilson (1988: 4) 
who found that companies with extreme earnings (either unusually high or low84) 
chose income-decreasing accounting choice (in their case the discretionary 
component of the provision for bad-debts) (see Section 8.12.1). 
10.4.3  Contributions to research design   
Contributions to research design are discussed according to two aspects: a self-
constructed disclosure framework (see Section 10.4.3.1), and the design of a 
research setting which aims to capture evidence of a recognition choice related 
to reporting zero goodwill impairment (see Section 10.4.3.2).  
10.4.3.1 A self-constructed disclosure framework 
(Objective 2)  
The disclosure study of this thesis (Chapter 7) has contributed to the research 
design by developing a disclosure framework (see Figure 6.2 in Section 6.5.2.2). 
Using the disclosure framework, the disclosure study makes an empirical 
contribution by identifying types of accounting choice related to goodwill 
impairment and providing evidence on the degree of discretion managers of 
Malaysian listed companies have in reporting goodwill impairment (see Section 
7.4). By exploring (via annual reports) the types of accounting choice, this 
research has indirectly85 responded to the suggestion offered by Fields et al. 
(2001: 290) for researchers of accounting choice studies ‗to return to basics and 
use our expertise as accountants to measure multi-dimensional accounting choice 
directly via the financial statements‘. 
Future researchers could make use of the self-constructed disclosure framework 
to interpret their statistical findings related to goodwill impairment, which this 
thesis has attempted to do (see Section 8.12.2). In addition, future researchers 
                                         
84 One of the definitions of extreme earnings provided by McNichols and Wilson (1988: 13) is the 
comparison of the current year with prior year earnings which is deflated by total assets.  
85 It is indirect because Fields et al. (2001: 290) were discussing about the issue of multiple 
method choice. 
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could identify types of accounting choice related to goodwill impairment through 
the disclosure framework. 
10.4.3.2  Research setting designed to capture evidence 
of a recognition choice related to reporting zero 
goodwill impairment (Objective 4) 
The recognition study of this thesis (in Chapter 9) has contributed to the research 
design by constructing a research setting which aims to capture evidence of a 
recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment exercised by 
Malaysian listed companies in a situation where companies‘ market values are 
lower than the book values of the net assets for three consecutive years (see 
Section 9.2.1).  
Testing of this setting has allowed the study to makes a contribution by 
identifying the motives of companies in recognising zero goodwill impairment, 
which has received limited attention by prior studies (see Section 2.2.2). 
Specifically, the recognition study has provided empirical evidence on the 
influence of economic factors (i.e. higher current year pre-write-off earnings, or 
higher change in pre-write-off earnings from prior year to current year, and 
lower change in operating cash flows from prior year to current year) on the 
recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment (see Section 
9.6).  
The recognition study has also provided new empirical evidence on the influence 
of outside ownership concentration on the recognition choice related to 
reporting zero goodwill impairment. The result shows that the higher the outside 
ownership concentrated, the more likely it is for the companies to exercise the 
recognition choice related to reporting zero goodwill impairment. 
Information concerning the motives of companies for recognising zero goodwill 
impairment is useful to the relevant regulatory bodies overseeing financial 
reporting standards on goodwill in Malaysia, such as MASB, Malaysian Securities 
Commission, and auditors. This information will assist these bodies to take note 
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of companies‘ impairment tests of goodwill in order to identify whether these 
companies have left their goodwill on the balance sheet for a long time without 
any impairment losses reported.  
10.4.4 Policy implications 
One of the key findings of this research is that companies‘ disclosure related to 
discount rates and cash-generating-units (CGUs) is not encouraging. As noted in 
Section 8.2.2.2, more than half of the firm-years examined do not disclose 
information concerning CGUs and discount rates. IASB, in its Basis for Conclusion 
(IASB, 2006: IAS 36, Basis for Conclusions, BC198) (see Section 4.5), relied on 
companies‘ disclosure as a way of improving the reliability of the impairment 
test of goodwill. In the case of Malaysian listed companies, this thesis has 
provided empirical evidence that the actions of the IASB, and thus the MASB, in 
relying on disclosure have not yet been successful. Issues regarding companies‘ 
disclosure on CGUs and discount rates are also documented by the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK. The FRC in the UK (2008: 4) reports that even 
though all of the 32 UK listed companies which they have analysed disclosed 
information regarding an impairment testing of goodwill, many of these 
disclosures are generic in nature and ‗inappropriately aggregated‘. They consider 
such disclosures as providing little information to users of financial statement in 
understanding factors influencing valuation of goodwill, and in evaluating the 
estimation made by the management concerning the impairment test (FRC, 2008: 
4). 
Subsequent to the first phase of the implementation of IFRS 3 and IAS 36, which 
is the focus of this thesis, IASB has (through an annual improvement project) 
revised IAS 36 twice, in relation to an impairment test of goodwill. Firstly, in 
phase two of the IAS 36, issued on 22 May 2008 (see Figure 4.1 in Section 4.2), 
IASB revised the disclosure requirement for the recoverable amount of the CGUs, 
computed based on fair values less costs to sell (IASB, 2008: IAS 36, 
Improvements to IFRSs). Secondly, in the annual improvements for IAS 36, issued 
on 16 April 2009, the IASB amended the requirement for a CGU in accordance 
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with the definition of operating segment stated in paragraph 5 of IFRS 8 (IASB, 
2009: IAS 36, Improvements to IFRSs). The conclusion for this thesis is that unless 
these improvements help improve disclosure related to goodwill impairment by 
companies in the near future, IASB and MASB will be unable to police the 
measurement rule via disclosure. This thesis suggests that, rather than relying on 
companies‘ disclosure as a way of improving the reliability of an impairment test 
of goodwill, it would be better for the IASB to implement a strong control 
mechanism (such as the subsequent cash flow test or the two-step impairment 
test as discussed in Section 4.5 ) within the standard itself.  
10.5 Limitations of the study 
This research project is subjected to at least two limitations.  
Firstly, some variables had to be manually collected directly from annual 
reports, as these were not available in any database. These include variables 
testing discretion such as CGUs and discount rates, CEO tenure, change in CEO, 
managerial ownership, and outside ownership concentration. By relying on 
annual reports of companies, the data was constrained, not only by the 
availability of the annual reports, but also by the information disclosed in the 
annual reports themselves. This constraint is quite severe for variables testing 
the discretion related to CGUs and discount rates where more than 50% of the 
companies examined did not disclose the number of CGUs and discount rates 
employed in the estimation of the recoverable amount of value-in-use containing 
goodwill (see Appendix 8.2 – e.g. DISCRATE). The missing value analysis 
performed was an attempt to lessen this limitation and to provide evidence that 
the missing values of these variables occurred at random (see Section 8.2.2.2). 
Secondly, data unavailability has hindered the researcher in conducting a 
thorough test of the contracting perspective. The bonus plan hypothesis is not 
tested in this research due to the lack of publicly available data on management 
compensation plans. In addition, testing of the debt hypothesis is limited to the 
use of leverage (DEBTRATIO) as a proxy for companies‘ closeness to their debt 
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covenant violations. Prior studies argued that leverage does not fully capture the 
default risk of debt (Lys, 1984; Fields et al., 2001; Dichev and Skinner, 2002) (see 
Section 2.3.1.2). Therefore, the test of the contracting perspective is 
inconclusive. That is, whether the debt hypothesis is not applicable for 
explaining the measurement of goodwill impairment by Malaysian listed 
companies, or whether the use of the noisy proxy variable (i.e. debt ratio) 
resulted in a low power test of the contracting perspective of accounting choice. 
10.6 Suggestions for future research 
A number of suggestions for future research emerge from this thesis.  
Firstly, this study can be extended to other countries in developing economies, in 
particular, East Asian developing countries which are found to have concentrated 
ownership. This will improve an understanding of accounting choices related to 
goodwill impairment across these countries. 
Secondly, this thesis has examined abilities and motives of companies for 
reporting goodwill impairment. The abilities are examined through the available 
discretion, i.e. CGUs and discount rates. The motives are captured through 
variables testing the contracting perspective and the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective. However, this thesis has not examined factors which may act as a 
monitoring mechanism to reduce the managerial opportunism. These include 
strong governance mechanisms, such as an independent board and the number of 
meetings held by the board of directors during the financial year. These factors 
represent another potentially interesting area for future research.  
Thirdly, three aspects of the implementation decisions related to goodwill 
impairment have been examined in this thesis, i.e., disclosure, measurement, 
and recognition of goodwill impairment. To get a more comprehensive view of 
the implementation decisions, future research is suggested to explore the 
presentation choice related to goodwill impairment loss. Specifically, future 
work could analyse managers‘ presentation of goodwill impairment loss within 
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the financial statement, i.e., whether the manager disaggregate goodwill 
impairment loss as a separate line item on the face of the income statement, or 
aggregate the loss into another line item identified only via Notes to the 
Financial Statement. Under both presentation choices, goodwill impairment loss 
is deducted from the earnings of companies. 
Finally, this study could not thoroughly test the contracting perspective of 
accounting choice because of the lack of data for the management compensation 
plan. To gather this data and hence test the contracting perspective extensively, 
it is recommended that future studies conduct a survey questionnaire, to ask 
whether such management compensation plans are being applied by Malaysian 
listed companies and the parameters employed for these plans. 
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Appendix 1 of the thesis: Summary of Hypotheses 
Formulated and Detailed Definitions of the Variables 
Employed  
Note for Appendix 1: 
This appendix presents a summary of all the hypotheses developed in Chapter 5. 
In this thesis, two types of motive for companies to report goodwill impairment 
are explored - companies‘ motives for reporting goodwill impairment losses, and 
companies‘ motives for reporting zero goodwill impairment. For this reason, the 
predicted sign, shown in Appendix 1 has two columns. A column labelled GWIL(IL) 
predicts companies‘ motives for reporting goodwill impairment losses; a column 
labelled GWIL(0) predicts companies‘ motives for reporting zero goodwill 
impairment.  
Further, in Appendix 1, it is observed that there are hypotheses with a predicted 
sign which is labelled as ‗?‘. The sign ‗?‘ denotes unspecified predicted sign, 
which occur either because of the inconclusive empirical evidences provided by 
prior studies, or no prior studies testing the variable. As an example, leverage 
(DEBTRATIO in H7) has a predicted sign labelled as ‗?‘. This is because of the 
mixed results documented by prior studies concerning the association between 
leverage and companies‘ decisions in reporting goodwill impairment losses. In 
addition, DISCRATE, which refers to the percentage of discount rates disclosed by 
companies in their annual reported (see H15A) has a predicted sign labelled as ‗?‘. 
Nonetheless in this case, it is because there is no published works testing the 
relationship between discount rates and companies‘ decisions in reporting 
goodwill impairment losses. Detailed discussion of the predicted sign for each of 
the hypotheses is carried out in Sections 5.4 to 5.9. 
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Appendix 1 of the thesis: Summary of hypotheses formulated and the detailed definitions of the variables employed 
 
       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data sources Main studies 
refer (Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
 GWIL 
- Dependent 
variable for the 
Measurement 
study (see Table 
5.1 in Section 
5.2) 
   The magnitude of goodwill 
impairment losses, divided 
by prior year total assets 
(including goodwill), and 
zero otherwise reported on 
the income statement. 
Datastream 
 Goodwill 
impairmen
t losses – 
WC18225 
 Total 
assets - 
WC02999 
AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 178);  
 
Lapointe-
Antunes et al. 
(2008: 43). 
 GWIL(0,1) 
- Dependent 
variable for the 
Recognition 
study (see Table 
5.1 in Section 
5.2) 
 
   A dichotomous variable, 
equal to one when 
companies are considered 
as exercising a recognition 
choice related to reporting 
zero goodwill impairment, 
and zero otherwise (see 
Table 5.1). 
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Appendix 1 of the thesis (continue): Summary of hypotheses formulated and the detailed definitions of the variables employed 
 
       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative 
hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data sources Main studies refer 
(Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H1 ∆SALES 
- Change in 
sales (see 
Section 
5.4.1) 
 
 
Economic 
factors 
- + Change in sales for company i 
from prior period (t-1) to current 
period (t), divided by total assets 
at the end of prior period (t-1). 
 
= (SALESt - SALESt-1) 
     TOTAL ASSETSt-1 
 
For the measurement study, the 
variable is transformed into 
Log(∆SALES+1) (see Sections 5.4.1 
and  8.2.2.1). 
Datastream 
 Net sales - WC01001 
 Total assets - WC02999 
AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 178) 
H2A EARNINGSPrior  
- Prior  year 
earnings (see 
Section 
5.4.2.1) 
 
Economic 
factors 
- + Prior year earnings divided by 
total assets at the end of prior 
period (t-1 ). 
 
=  EARNINGSt-1 
  TOTAL ASSETSt-1 
Datastream 
 Earnings = Net income 
before extraordinary 
items or preferred 
dividends - WC01551 
 Total assets - WC02999 
 
AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 178). 
 
- Sensitivity 
analysis is carried 
out by replacing 
EARNINGSPrior with 
EARNINGSPreGWILpri
or (see Section 
8.5.2.3). 
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Appendix 1 of the thesis (continue): Summary of hypotheses formulated and the detailed definitions of the variables employed 
 
       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data sources Main studies 
refer 
(Notes) GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H2B EARNINGSPreGWILCur
rent 
- Current  year 
pre-write-off 
earnings (see 
Section 5.4.2.2) 
 
Economic 
factors 
- + Current year pre-write-off earnings 
divided by total assets at the end of prior 
period (t-1). 
 
=EARNINGSt + GWIL(IL)  
       TOTAL ASSETSt-1 
For the recognition study, the variable is 
transformed into Log10(0.4- 
EARNINGSPreGWILCurrent) (see Section 9.2.2). 
Datastream 
 Earnings = Net income 
before extraordinary 
items or preferred 
dividends - WC01551 
 Goodwill impairment 
losses – WC18225 
 Total assets - WC02999 
- 
H3 ∆EARNINGSpreGWI
L 
- Change in pre-
write-off 
earnings (see 
Section 5.4.2.3) 
 
Economic 
factors 
 
- + Change in company i‘s pre-write-off 
earnings from prior period (t-1) to 
current period (t), divided by total assets 
at the end of prior period (t-1).  
 
= [(EARNINGSt + GWIL(IL)t)- (EARNINGSt-1 + 
GWIL(IL) t-1)]/TOTAL ASSETSt-1 
Datastream 
 Earnings = Net income 
before extraordinary 
items or preferred 
dividends - WC01551 
 Goodwill impairment 
losses – WC18225 
 Total assets - WC02999 
Riedl (2004: 
829)  
 
H4 ∆OCF 
- Change in 
operating cash 
flows (see 
Section 5.4.3) 
 
Economic 
factors 
 
- + Change in operating cash flows for 
company i from prior period (t-1) to 
current period (t), divided by total assets 
at the end of prior period (t-1) 
 
=  (OCFt - OCFt-1) 
     TOTAL ASSETSt-1 
Datastream 
 Operating cash flows - 
WC04860 
 Total assets - WC02999 
 
AbuGhazale
h et al. 
(2011: 178); 
Riedl (2004: 
829) 
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Appendix 1 of the thesis (continue): Summary of hypotheses formulated and the detailed definitions of the variables employed 
 
       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data sources Main studies 
refer (Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H5 BTM 
- Book-to-market 
ratio (see Section 
5.4.4) 
 
Economic 
factors 
 
+ - Company i‘s book value of equity 
divided by market value of equity 
at the end of current period (t). 
Datastream 
 Book value of 
equity = Total 
shareholders‘ 
equity (WC03995) 
less Preferred 
stock (WC03451) 
 Market value of 
equity – WC08001. 
AbuGhazaleh 
et al. (2011: 
178) 
H6 GWB 
- Relative size of 
goodwill balance 
(see Section 
5.4.5) 
 
Economic 
factors  
 
+ - Company i‘s opening carrying 
value of goodwill in the current 
year divided by total assets at the 
end of prior period (t-1). 
 
= Opening goodwill  
  balancet/TOTAL ASSETS t-1 
 
Datastream 
 Goodwill balance – 
WC18280 
 Total assets - 
WC02999 
AbuGhazaleh 
et al. (2011: 
178) 
H7 DEBTRATIO 
- Leverage (see 
Section 5.5) 
 
Contracting 
perspective 
 
?  ? Company i‘s total debts at the end 
of prior year (t-1), divided by 
total assets at the end of prior 
year (t-1). 
 
=   TOTAL DEBTSt-1 
 TOTAL ASSETSt-1 
Datastream 
 Total debts -  
WC03255 
 Total assets - 
WC02999 
AbuGhazaleh 
et al. (2011: 
178);  
 
Zang (2008: 
48). 
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Appendix 1 of the thesis (continue): Summary of hypotheses formulated and the detailed definitions of the variables employed 
 
       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data sources Main studies refer 
(Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H8 ∆CEOCurrent/pri
or 
- Change in 
CEO in the 
previous year 
or the current 
year (see 
Section 5.6.1) 
Opportunistic 
behaviour 
perspective 
 
+ - Change in CEO is said to occur 
when a company experiences a 
change in CEO in the previous 
financial year (t-1) or the current 
financial year (t). It is measured as 
a dichotomous variable, equal to 
one if company i experienced the 
CEO change, and zero otherwise. 
 
Annual reports AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 178) 
- Sensitivity 
analysis is 
conducted for an 
alternative 
definition of ∆CEO 
(see Section 
8.5.2.1). 
H9 CEOTENURE 
 
- CEO tenure 
(see Section 
5.6.2) 
Opportunistic 
behaviour 
perspective 
 
- + Number of years that the CEO has 
held the position. 
 
 
Annual reports Beatty and Weber 
(2006: 274);  
 
Ramanna and 
Watts (2012). 
H10 BATH 
- Big bath 
reporting (see 
Section 5.6.3) 
 
Opportunistic 
behaviour 
perspective 
 
- ? Change in company i‘s pre-write-
off earnings from prior period (t -
1) to current period (t), divided by 
total assets at the end of prior 
period (t -1), when this change is 
below the median of non-zero 
negative values of this variable, 
and zero otherwise. 
Datastream 
 Earnings = Net income 
before extraordinary 
items or preferred 
dividends - WC01551 
 Goodwill impairment 
loss - WC18225 
 Total assets - 
WC02999 
AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 178);  
 
Riedl (2004: 829) 
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       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data sources Main studies refer 
(Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H11 SMOOTH 
- Earnings 
smoothing (see 
Section 5.6.4) 
 
Opportunistic 
behaviour 
perspective 
 
+ ? Change in company i‘s pre-
write-off earnings from 
prior period (t -1) to 
current period (t), divided 
by total assets at the end 
of prior period (t -1), when 
this change is above the 
median of non-zero 
positive values of this 
variable, and zero 
otherwise. 
Datastream 
 Earnings = 
Net 
income 
before 
extraordin
ary items 
or 
preferred 
dividends - 
WC01551 
 GWIL(IL) - 
WC18225 
 Total 
assets - 
WC02999 
 
Riedl (2004: 829); 
AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 178);  
 
 
 
 
 
 
H12A MANOWNLinear 
- Managerial 
ownership (see 
Section 5.7.1) 
Ownership 
structures  
- Linear 
relationship 
? ? Number of ordinary shares 
held directly by executive 
directors, divided by total 
number of issued and paid 
up ordinary shares. 
 
 
Annual report - Ismail and 
Weetman (2007: 
521). 
 
- Sensitivity analysis 
is conducted for 
MANOWNLinear (see 
Section 8.5.2.2). 
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       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data 
sources 
Main studies refer 
(Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H12B MANOWNNon-
monotonic 
- Managerial 
ownership (see 
Section 5.7.1) 
Ownership 
structures 
- Non-
monotonic 
relationship 
 
? ? Following MANOWNLinear from 
H12A , the non-monotonic 
relationship is measured as 
follows: 
 
MANOWN1 
 board ownership if board 
ownership < 0.05 
 0.05 if board ownership ≥ 
0.05 
 
MANOWN2 
 0 if board ownership < 0.05 
 board ownership minus 0.05 
if 0.05≤board ownership< 
0.25 
 0.20 if board ownership ≥ 
0.25 
 
MANOWN3 
 0 if board ownership < 0.25 
 board ownership minus 0.25 
if board ownership ≥ 0.25 
 - Morck et al. (1988: 
298); McConnell and 
Servaes (1990: 607); 
adapted by Chau 
and Leung (2006: 7); 
Chau and Gray 
(2010: 98). 
- Sensitivity analysis 
is conducted for 
MANOWNNon-monotonic 
(see Section 
8.5.2.2). 
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       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative 
hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data 
sources 
Main studies refer 
(Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H13 OUTCON 
- Outside ownership 
concentration (see 
Section 5.7.2) 
 
Ownership 
structures 
? ? Number of ordinary shares held by 
outsiders86 with the five largest claims, 
divided by the total number of issued and 
paid up ordinary shares. 
 
Annual 
report 
Niehaus (1989: 
277) 
 
H14A CGU01 
- Cash-generating 
units containing 
goodwill (see 
Section 5.8.1) 
Discretion 
available in 
performing an 
impairment test 
of goodwill 
?  ? A dichotomous variable, equal to one if 
company i has more than one CGUs at the 
end of the current year (t), and zero 
otherwise. 
Annual 
reports 
AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011: 178) 
H14B CGUcontinuous 
- Cash-generating 
units containing 
goodwill (see 
Section 5.8.1) 
Discretion 
available in 
performing an 
impairment test 
of goodwill 
? ? The actual number of CGUs containing 
goodwill disclosed in the annual reports by 
Malaysian listed companies at the end of the 
current year (t). 
 
Annual 
reports 
In a regression 
model that is 
separate from 
CGU01 
(as in H14A) 
H15A DISCRATE 
- Discount rates (% 
disclosed) (see 
Section 5.8.2.1) 
 
Discretion 
available in 
performing an 
impairment test 
of goodwill 
? ? The percentage of discount rate employed 
by companies in estimating the recoverable 
amount of CGUs containing goodwill which is 
disclosed in the annual reports at the end of 
the current year (t).  
Annual 
reports 
 
                                         
86 Following Haniffa and Hudaib (2006: 1042), outside shareholders refer to institutions, blockholders, and other individuals outside the company (see Section 5.7.2 
for detail). 
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       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data sources Main studies 
refer (Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H15B DISCMULTIPLE 
- Application of a 
single or multiple 
discount rates 
(see Section 
5.8.2.2) 
Discretion 
available in 
performing an 
impairment 
test of 
goodwill 
? ? A dichotomous variable, 
equal to one if a company 
applies multiple discount 
rates, zero if the company 
applies a single discount 
rate at the end of the 
current year (t). 
 
Annual 
reports 
 
H15C DISCRATEDisclosed/
Not  
- Discount rates -
Disclosed/Not 
disclosed (see 
Section 5.8.2.3) 
 
Discretion 
available in 
performing an 
impairment 
test of 
goodwill 
 
 
? ? A dichotomous variable, 
equal to one if a company 
do not disclose the 
discount rate, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Annual 
reports 
 
H16 SIZE 
– Size of 
company (see 
Section 5.9.1) 
Control 
variables  
 
? ? Natural logarithm of total 
assets at the end of prior 
period (t-1). 
 
= Ln(TOTAL ASSETSt-1) 
Datastream 
 Total assets 
- WC02999 
 
AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 179); 
Lapointe-
Antunes et al. 
(2008: 44). 
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       Variables Potential 
factors 
Predicted sign 
(Alternative hypothesis) 
 
Definition of the variables Data sources Main studies 
refer (Notes) 
GWIL(IL) GWIL(0) 
H17 INDUSTRYG5 
- Industry 
dummy (see 
Section 5.9.2) 
Control 
variables 
? ? A dummy variable across 10 
industry categories based on 
Datastream Industrial classification 
level two. 
 
- Because of the lack of data in five 
industries, the industry group is 
reduced to five (see Section 
8.2.2.3). 
- The baseline for the INDUSTRYG5 
is Industrial and basic materials. 
 
Datastream 
 Industry 
classification - 
INDM2 
AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 195); 
Zang (2008: 48). 
H18 YEND 
- Financial-year-
end dummy [see 
Section 5.9.3] 
Control 
variables  
? ? A dummy variable across three 
financial year-end categories (i.e. 
2006, 2007, and 2008) based on 
Datastream classification. 
- The baseline for the YEND is 
financial year-ended 2006. 
Datastream 
 Fiscal year - 
WC05350 
 
 
AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 179) 
 
H19 ADD 
- Additions to 
goodwill (see 
Section 5.9.4) 
Control 
variables  
 
+ - A dichotomous variable, equal to 
one if a company has additions to 
its goodwill during the financial 
year, and zero if there is no 
addition. 
Datastream 
 Goodwill 
balance - 
WC18280 
 
AbuGhazaleh et 
al. (2011: 179) 
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